[b.2.]
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
SUBJECT: AFMIC SPECIAL WEEKLY WIRE 32-90(C) (U)
1. (U) GENERAL
(U) THIS MESSAGE CONSISTS OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, 4ND GENERAL
MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE. IT IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A TIMELY SUMMARY OF
CURRENT DISEASE INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSES. THE REMARKS
ARE
PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO REVISION AND DO NOT NECESSARILY
REPRESENT
AN AGREED DOD POSITION. CLINICAL REVIEW HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE
AFMIC-SG, [b.6.]
2. (U) THIS SPECIAL WIRE IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION AND
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE ON A SUBJECT OF
CURRENT
INTEREST.
3. TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) CAPABILITIES
B. IRAQ: LASER ASSESSMENT
C. IRAQ: MEDICAL IMPACT OF AGENT GF
D. IRAQ: MILITARY MEDICAL ASSESSMENT
4. INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A. IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CBW) CAPABILITIES
AFMIC ANALYSTS ASSESS THAT IRAQ HAS A MATURE OFFENSIVE BW
PROGRAM. SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF BOTULINUM TOXIN LIKELY HAVE BEEN
PRODUCED AND PROBABLY ARE WEAPONIZED. IN ADDITION, BACILLUS
ANTHRACIS
(ANTHRAX), VIBRIO CHOLERAE (CHOLERA), STAPHYLOCOCCUS ENTEROTOXIN
B
(SEB), AND CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS BACTERIA OR ITS TOXIN MAY BE IN
THE ADVANCED STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OR AVAILABLE FOR
WEAPONIZATION.
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] IRAQI FORCES
USED BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS DURING THE
IRAN/IRAQ WAR. IT IS ASSESSED THAT IRAQI FORCES WILL USE BW ONLY AS
A
LAST RESORT.
THE BW RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION FACILITY AT
SALMAN PAK (33-04-30N 44-35-01E) IS BELIEVED TO BE THE MAJOR
PRODUCTION AND STORAGE FACILITY FOR BW IN IRAQ.
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]
THE IRAQI ARMY
FACILITY AT TAJI (33-31-40N 44-16-20E), A FACILITY AT ABU GHURAYB
(EAST OF BAGHDAD), AND THE IRAQI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION FACILITY
AT
TUWAITHA (NEAR BAGHDAD) ALSO ARE SUSPECTED OF ENGAGING IN
RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT AND POSSIBLY PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
AGENTS. AGENT TESTING HAS BEEN REPORTED AT A FACILITY LOCATED IN
THE
MARSHES SOUTHEAST OF AN NASIRIYAH (31-02-41N 46-16-21E).
VARIOUS MECHANISMS ARE AVAILABLE TO IRAQ FOR DISSEMINATION
OF BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS: AEROSOL GENERATORS WHICH CAN BE
TRANSPORTED BY TRUCK, BOAT, HELICOPTER, AND OTHER CONVEYANCES;
CLUSTER BOMBS; SPRAY TANKS FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT;
ARTILLERY
SHELLS; AND VARIOUS MISSILES. THE USE OF SUBMUNITIONS FOR INCREASED
AREA COVERAGE IS LIKELY.
IRAQ IS NOT EXPECTED TO USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN AREAS OF
CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THEIR OWN TROOPS. THESE WEAPONS LIKELY WILL BE
DEPLOYED AT NIGHT OR IN THE EARLY MORNING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
FAVORABLE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS.
BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS PROBABLY WILL BE DELIVERED IN
AEROSOL FORM. MASKS ALONE PROBABLY WILL OFFER SUFFICIENT
PROTECTION
AGAINST KNOWN AEROSOLIZED WET OR DRY BW AGENTS; HOWEVER, THE
POSSIBILITY FOR RE-AEROSOLIZATION OF THE AGENT EXISTS. COMPLETE
DECONTAMINATION BEFORE MASK REMOVAL IS CRITICAL. DELIVERY OF
BIOLOGICAL TOXINS OR INFECTIOUS AGENTS BOUND TO A SILICA MATRIX
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(a)] MAY BE WITHIN IRAQI
CAPABILITY. SUCH AN AGENT POSSIBLY COULD WORK ITS WAY THROUGH THE
FABRIC OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND BECOME IMBEDDED IN THE SKIN.
[b.6.]
B. IRAQ: LASER ASSESSMENT
) IT IS HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT LASER EYE INJURIES OCCURRED IN THE
IRAN/IRAQ WAR, BASED ON NUMEROUS REPORTS OF SUCH INJURIES AND THE
KNOWN PURCHASE OF LASERS FOR THE IMPLIED PURPOSE OF WEAPONIZATION.
THE TYPES OF LASERS PURCHASED ARE AMENABLE TO ANTIPERSONNEL OR
ANTISENSOR APPLICATIONS.
THE INJURIES, DESCRIBED AS RETINAL BURNS AND HEMORRHAGES,
REPORTEDLY WERE CAUSED BY A LASER DEVICE ASSOCIATED WITH IRAQI
TANKS.
THE REPORTED INJURIES COULD HAVE BEEN INFLICTED BY A VISIBLE OR
NEAR-
INFRARED LASER, MOST LIKELY A TANK-MOUNTED RUBY OR
NEODYMIUM/GLASS
LASER RANGEFINDER.
OUR OVERALL ASSESSMENT IS THAT LASER EYE INJURIES PROBABLY
OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE USE OF TANK-MOUNTED LASER
RANGEFINDERS OR
OTHER LASER SYSTEMS. THESE SYSTEMS POSSIBLY WERE USED IN AN
OFFENSIVE, ANTIPERSONNEL MODE, WITH THE EXPLICIT PURPOSE OF BLINDING
TROOPS. HAND-HELD LASER RANGEFINDERS AND DESIGNATORS ASSOCIATED
WITH
ARMOR OR ARTILLERY COULD BE USED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DAZZLE,
DISORIENT,
OR BLIND PERSONNEL IN LOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT (FIXED AND ROTOR WING).
LASERS ALSO HAVE BEEN PURCHASED BY IRAQ PRESUMABLY FOR MILITARY
APPLICATION. [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] REPORTED THAT IRAQ FIELDED THESE LASERS
AS ANTISENSOR OR ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONS; HOWEVER, NO [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]
CONFIRMATION EXISTS TO SUPPORT THIS REPORT.
[b.6.]
C. IRAQ: MEDICAL IMPACT OF AGENT GF
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] CLAIMED THAT AGENT GF
(CYCLOHEXYLMETHYLPHOSPHONOFLUORIDATE) WAS USED BY THE IRAQIS
DURING
THE AL-FAW OFFENSIVE. THIS REPRESENTED THE FIRST REPORTED USE OF GF
IN COMBAT. IRAQ LAUNCHED MORE THAN 1,500 ROCKETS CONTAINING SARIN
(GB) AND GF ON THE IRANIAN TROOPS DURING THE 2-DAY ATTACK, CAUSING
AN
ESTIMATED 5,000 CASUALTIES AND MASS FLIGHT OF IRANIAN TROOPS FROM
THE
BATTLEFIELD (A PHENOMENON THAT DID NOT OCCUR IN EARLIER BATTLES).
GF IS A "G" SERIES NERVE AGENT PREVIOUSLY STUDIED BY THE U.S.
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS, THERAPY, AND METHODS OF PROTECTION AND
DETECTION ARE THE SAME AS FOR SARIN. SOAP AND WATER IS
RECOMMENDED
/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
FOR DECONTAMINATION. THE EFFECTS OF GF DIFFER FROM SARIN IN TWO
MAJOR
RESPECTS: GF IS MORE PERSISTENT AND MORE READILY ABSORBED THROUGH
THE
SKIN.
GF IS A LIQUID AGENT THAT WILL REMAIN IN THE TARGET AREA FOR
SEVERAL HOURS (AT 20 DEGREES CENTIGRADE, VAPOR PRESSURE IS 0.06
MILLIMETERS AND VOLATILITY IS 600 MILLIGRAMS/CUBIC METER), WHILE
SARIN WILL DISSIPATE IN A FEW MINUTES (VAPOR PRESSURE 2,200
MILLIMETERS AT 25 DEGREES CENTIGRADE AND VOLATILITY 40.000
MILLIGRAMS/CUBIC METER AT 35 DEGREES CENTIGRADE) AT THE
TEMPERATURES
FOUND IN THE MIDDLE EAST. GF IS NOT AS TOXIC AS SARIN BY INHALATION,
BUT IS MORE TOXIC BY PERCUTANEOUS ABSORPTION (ESTIMATED
PERCUTANEOUS
LETHAL DOSE 50 FOR GF IS 45 TO 50 MILLIGRAMS/90 KILOGRAM MAN, AND FOR
SARIN IS 1,700 TO 3,500 MILLIGRAMS/MAN).
BASED ON THE SEVERAL-HOUR PERSISTENCE OF GF, WE BELIEVE THIS
AGENT WOULD BE USED IN AREAS THAT ARE NOT TARGETED FOR IMMEDIATE
OCCUPATION. HOWEVER, SINCE GF WILL ONLY PERSIST IN THE AREA FOR
HOURS, WE ASSESS THAT THE AGENT WOULD LIKELY BE USED ON TARGETS
IRAQ
INTENDS TO OCCUPY WITHIN ONE DAY. SINCE THE PERSISTENCE OF GF WILL
NECESSITATE THAT FORCES REMAIN IN PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR FOR
LONGER
PERIODS THAN FOR SARIN, PERSONNEL WILL EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT HEAT
STRESS AND DEGRADATION OF PERFORMANCE.
[b.6.]
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]