Factors Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical weapons: So Far, So Good Filename:0405pgf [ (b)(2) ] Factors Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical weapons: So Far, So Good Key Judgments The probability of chemical use will increase as Coalition forces come into contact with the Iraqi army in the KTO and as Baghdad's situation becomes more desperate. Factors deterring Iraqi use of chemical weapons have included fear of retaliation, limited supplies of ammunition, and military operational considerations. Background Iraq×has not yet used its chemical weapons in the Gulf war. All of the modified SCUDs launched into Israel and Saudi Arabia have had high explosive warheads. Iraq made extensive use of chemicals in the war with Iran. Although early results were uneven, Iraq learned to use chemicals effectively in both the offense and defense. Iraq is believed to have evaluated chemical use as an important contributor to the defeat of the Iranian military. Following the war, Iraq continued to give priority to chemical agent and weapon production. Employment of chemical weapons is an integral part of Iraq's military doctrine. The allied bombing campaign has severely damaged Iraq's known chemical production and munitions filling sites. Iraq's ability to produce additional chemical munitions in the near term has been drastically reduced. The location of Iraq's chemical inventory is not known. DIA believes Iraq retains a significant arsenal of chemical weapons. Nerve and blister agent can be delivered by weapon systems ranging from mortars to ballistic missiles. Some nerve agent stocks may be in a binary configuration to improve storage life. Although it cannot be confirmed, Iraq probably deployed chemical munitions with its forces in the KTO so they would be available for use when required. Continued interdiction of Iraqi supplies has slowed the flow of materiel to the KTO, but it cannot be determined if chemical munitions have been affected. The storage life of Iraq's nerve agent weapons is probably limited by the poor quality of Iraqi agent. Iraq's nerve agent contains hydrofluoric acid (HF), which accelerates decomposition of the nerve agent and attacks the metal shell casing. This problem would be most severe in weapons filled with unitary agents. Such weapons will lose much of their lethality after six weeks from the dote of manufacture, but could still be used against Coalition forces. [ (b)(2) ] Chemical Deterrence The fear of retaliation is one of the reasons that nations have not used chemicals, even when they had such weapons. Other factors such as sustainability and political consequences have been contributing factors. The decision by Iraq not to use chemical weapons thus far in the war is probably driven by all these considerations. [ (b)(2) ] Iraq has promoted its chemical capability and received a great deal of international attention and notoriety. In April 1990 Saddam Husayn boasted about his 'dual chemical' weapon which he would use to `burn half of Israel.' Iranian protests about Iraqi chemical attacks highlighted this capability during the Iran-Iraq war. Two factors may be significant in Iraqi non-use of chemicals: retaliation and sustainability. Israel's policy to retaliate strongly for any provocation is well established and must be considered. Baghdad is convinced Israel has nuclear and chemical weapons which would be used against Iraq. [ (b)(2) ] Iraq also appreciates that Coalition member states have chemical and nuclear weapons that it can deliver anywhere in Iraq or the KTO. This impression has been reinforced by public statements by Coalition leaders, and has probably led Iraq to conclude the consequences of any chemical attack would be severe. Further, DIA assesses that Iraq has only a limited number of chemical warheads for its SSMs. This would mean that any use of chemicals with SSMs could not be sustained. Prospects for Use Against the Coalition The Coalition bombing campaign has disrupted Iraqi communications, destroyed chemical weapons plants, negated Iraqi tactical intelligence capabilities, and diminished delivery means for chemicals. Destruction of Iraqi ammunition supplies has probably decreased the chemical ammunition supplies available. During the Iran-Iraq War, chemical use was initially tightly controlled by the political leadership in Baghdad. Over time this was changed as the authority for the use of chemicals was delegated to Corps commanders. If this practice to maintain tight political control over the initial use of chemical weapons has continued, the disruption of normal lines of communications have made it more difficult for Baghdad to transmit such orders to units in the KTO.× The Republican Guards still maintain effective landline communications. However, their location as a strategic reserve makes their direct use of chemicals early in a ground assault less likely. Diminished communication capability would result in less effective coordination of a chemical strike. The destruction/dispersal of Iraqi air capabilities and the continuing assault on SCUD launchers has reduced Iraq's ability to deliver chemicals against deep targets. Without an air reconnaissance capability, Iraq has very limited means of determining tactical target locations. Until a Coalition ground assault begins, there is little military utility for Iraq to initiate chemical use. Iraq has a finite number of chemical weapons and practically no ability to replace expended stocks. This may prompt Iraq to conserve its chemical ammunition until it can be used to greatest advantage. The amount of chemical ammunition forward in the KTO is unknown, but probably is substantial. These stocks possibly were deployed before the start of the war, and limited replenishment may have occurred. Most stocks will remain serviceable for some time, particularly the mustard and binary nerve weapons. Unitary nerve agent amnunition is believed to be unstable and DIA estimates the lethality of unitary stocks will be substantially degraded after 31 March 1991. Intentions and Factors of Employment Iraq's leaders almost certainly intend to employ CW if the borders of Iraq are breached by Coalition ground forces, and if the viability of the Baath regime is seriously threatened. Inside the borders of Kuwait, Iraqi considerations will mainly include how the conduct of the war is proceeding. If Iraq's forces were about to suffer serious defeat, and/or commanders received authorization from the leadership, it is quite likely that CW would be employed in Kuwait. At the tactical level, Iraqi commanders will base their decisions on when and where to use chemical weapons on the amount of intelligence available on the disposition of Coalition forces, and the degree of success in luring coalition forces into predetermined kill zones. [ (b)(6) ][ (b)(2) ]