[ (b)(2) ], Iraqi Chemical Threat Reassessment Filename:0407pgf.91 [ (b)(2) ] 17 FEB 1991 0830 SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ] PREPARED BY: [ (b)(6) ] FM: DIA/OICC TO: ARCENT INFO: CENTCOM Subject: [ (b)(2) ], Iraqi Chemical Threat Reassessment 1. Iraq still retains a credible capability to employ chemical weapons against ARCENT. While Iraq's capabilIty to deliver chemical munitions by aircraft has been severely degraded, SCUD-B and artillery delivery have not been significantly impacted. 2. DIA continues to assess Iraq to possess a limited number of CW warheads for their SCUDs to include extended range SCUDs. There is no indication that the capability of Iraq to use these SRBMs to deliver chemical munitions has been significantly degraded. Coalition air superiority, however, has likely limited Iraq's overall SRBM employment by restricting firing times. The previous assessment remains that Iraq's intention is to withhold SCUD-B's employment until the ground war starts. 3. We have begun to consider with increased concern the possibility of SCUD-B (300 km variety) launches from south central Iraq into massed troop concentrations along the border. These missiles would be more accurate and carry more agent (approx 550 kg) and therefore may have limited success against military point targets. We reiterate the point that we assess Iraq to have limited CW warheads and thus could not sustain Cw attacks with SCUD missiles. 4. We assess that by 31 March most Iraqi unitary nerve agent will have degraded beyond usefulness. Blister agents will degrade but at a rate which will not affect there usefulness in the near term. The known production capability has been degraded by 75%. 5. We assess the Iraqis to have weaponized binary Cw nerve agents but that the majority of their agent remains unitary. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] assesses that the majority of agent is binary. Both [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] and DIA agree that neither assessment can be defended conclusively. 6. Coalition air strikes against the LOCs have not degraded the transportation system enough to affect the movement of Iraqi chemical munitions assets. 7. The majority of bunkers at airfields associated with chemical munitions have been either destroyed or severely damaged. The listing below is the bomb damage assessment regarding these airfield facilities as of 16 Feb 91: TARGET NAME / BE NO. TARGET DESCRIPTION STATUS Tallil Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed-I5 Feb 91 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Al Jarrah Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Both Bunkers Destroyed [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] H-2 Afld 3 Storage Bunkers 1 Destroyed, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 1 severely damaged, 1 undamaged 14 Feb 91 H-3 Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed- 9 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Feb 91 K-2 Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Severe [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Damage-10 Feb 91 Al Taqqadum Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Moderate [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Damage- 4 Feb 91 Mosul Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed- 28 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Jan 91 Kirkuk Afld [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Destroyed- 15 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Feb 91 8. Most of the airfields in southern and southeastern Iraq, including airfields in Kuwait, have suffered significant damage to runways and operational support facilities. Although the Iraqis have demonstrated energetic rapid runway repair efforts, the overall effect of the MCF airstrikes has largely constrained Iraq's capability to stage and sustain sortie generation against Coalition Forces. 9. Coalition destruction of aircraft, Iraqi aircraft in Iran, and the wide dispersal of remaining aircraft will significantly degrade Iraq's capability to conduct chemical warfare. The concentration of bombing on aircraft shelters near the FEBA has probably destroyed a great number of the ground attack aircraft capable of employing CW munitions noted deployed to southern Iraq and Kuwait before the outbreak of hostilities. Therefore, if CW munitions are to be used, the remaining aircraft will have to come from more distant bases This will increase the probability of their detection and destruction by coalition aircraft well before they reach the battlefront. 10. It is currently believed that Iraqi aircraft now in Iran will probably not be launched from Iranian airbases (though the possibility cannot be discounted). This further degrades Iraqi air force CW capabilities. The dispersal of Iraqi aircraft, given the current degradation of Iraqi C3 capabilities, will difficult for the IZAF to employ CW munitions in a coherent or coordinated manner. However, the current state of the IZAF does not preclude the possibility of a successful "leak through' of aircraft should the Iraqis attempt to conduct an attack using air defense saturation techniques. 11. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 12. Initial release authority for all chemical weapons (illegible)ably remains with Saddam Husayn, at least in the sense that Saddam has determined and approved the situations in which chemical munitions may be used. Sadam probably does retain greater control over aircraft and SSM weapons with chemical delivery capability, not so much because these have a particular importance in chemical warfare, but because these delivery systems are by their nature be better controlled from the center than can fast changing ground operations. 13. We assess that chemical release authority for aircraft remains with Saddam Husayn, and that he is still capable of communicating his orders to use chemicals to his commanders. Unlike ground forces at the front, to which chemical use authority devolves to below-corps levels, a chemical-laden air force must be tightly controlled to ensure they never have the opportunity to bomb Saddam. 14. Even though chemical munitions in the past have been kept at the corps level and delivered under close supervision to the firing units for a particular firing mission, there are several defector reports that chemical munitions have already been delivered to divisional artillery units. This would make sense given the differences in the present situation from that which existed during the Iran-Iraq War. In all likelihood, chemical munitions have already been delivered to those firing units assigned chemical firing missions. These units will probably be given two different contingencies under which they can fire chemical munitions. In a prepared fire, units will fire only those types of rounds which the corps fire plan requires. However, if the division is under threat of being overrun, the division commander has probably been given authority to use any means, including chemical munitions to defend his unit. Despite coalition emphasis on degrading Iraqi artillery, there are still more than enough artillery tubes and MRLs available to all divisions and Corps to fire a high priority chemical delivery mission. 15. [ (b)(2) ]