Use of Radioactive Material in SCUD Warhead (S) Filename:005bk.91p [ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ] 19 Feb 91 Background Paper for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy SUBJECT: Use of Radioactive Material in SCUD Warhead (S) 1. PURPOSE: To provide an assessment of the likelihood and effect of Iraqi use of radioactive material in SCUD warhead. 2. POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST: a. Likelihood of Use: Iraq has the potential to develop and use a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) based on placing radioactive material in a SCUD warhead. There is no [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] that this is being done, but Iraq has made many claims about having surprise weapons. Iraq's leadership almost certainly intends to use all available weaponry at its disposal if the viability of the Saddam-led Baath regime is threatened. This situation would pertain if Saddam were to be removed and succeeded by other members of the Revolutionary Command Council, as well. DIA also considers it likely that if Iraq's borders are breached by coalition ground forces that this event too, would cross Iraq's threshold for employing nonconventional weapons. Iraq's leaders are reasonably well-informed on U.S. nuclear and chemical capabilities. A U.S. threat of retaliation is unlikely to deter Iraq. Inside the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO), Iraq would probably employ nonconventional weapons, like the RDD, if its forces were about to suffer a significant and serious defeat. b. Availability of Radioactive Material: Iraq has four sources of radioactive materials: spent reactor fuel, commercially produced and purchased radioisotopes (i.e., Cobalt 60 for medical uses), Iraqi made radioisotopes, and low level radioactive waste from laboratory and medical procedures. Little is known about the total inventory of Iraqi radioactive material, but the last two sources would probably be very low activity or short lived medical/experimental isotopes, and the overall inventory is assessed to be quite small. c. Area Contaminated: Area of contamination is a complex question that varies with: (l) Weight of warhead (and therefore range of SCUD): Determines amount of material spread. (2) Ratio of explosive weight to radioactive material weight: More explosive means wider dispersion pattern, but less active material carried. (3) Height of burst: The higher the burst, the wider the pattern. (4) Particle size of contaminant: Larger particles travel farther (in the absence of wind effects), but are easier to find and remove. If the goal is to produce a heavy concentration to greatly restrict access, then the area of contamination will necessarily be smaller than if the goal is to spread material out as much as possible as a weapon of psychological terror (if not actual danger) against civilian populations. d. Delivery Scenarios: Iraq could deliver its radioactive material in three forms: liquid solution, mechanically chopped (pre-loading) small pellets, and large, crude chunks. Iraq has not demonstrated nor is assessed to have either a liquid filled warhead or an airburst fuse, however, there are three potential delivery scenarios: maximum pellet/chunk dispersion using largest possible high explosive warhead (short range, less than 300 km); pellet/chunk dispersion using less energetic warhead (longer range, 300-600 km);'and low airburst liquid or powder wind driven dispersion in the manner of chemical agents Pellet (or chunk) dispersion would be very uneven, with discrete pieces scattered or imbedded throughout the area. Ground burst could scatter pieces to approximately the same maximum distances as airburst, but far more fragments would be contained much closer (several hundred meters) to the point of impact. Liquid or powder dispersion provides more uniform, difficult to remove coverage. Processing of material into liquid, powder, or pellet form could be difficult and dangerous to operators. High activity warheads could be very dangerous to handling and launch crews. Airburst could be caused by SCUD intercept. (l) Maximum dispersal is only available at short ranges due to weight of high explosive required and could contaminate ; 3 mile diameter circle [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], but at a fairly low level of contamination. (2) Liquid dispersal in the same manner as for chemical agents could result in a contaminated area of several square miles, with hazard dropping off rapidly with distance from explosion. (3) Less energetic pellet/chunk dispersion for longer range warhead, would most likely result in a contaminated area about 900 feet in diameter. Some larger pieces could be thrown several thousand feet. (4) Ground burst would produce contamination over several hundred meter radius, although some larger pieces may be thrown several thousand feet. 3. EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS: a. In no case is an RDD expected to be militarily significant. U.S. forces in the theater have equipment and training for operations in a nuclear environment, an environment that an RDD does not even approach. U.S. NBC protective clothing cannot prevent soldiers from receiving radiation doses in a contaminated environment, but does shield against some radiation types and prevents direct skin and lung contact. This, coupled with proper radiation monitoring and exposure time limitations, provides excellent practical protection. b. Without a detailed knowledge of the Iraqi radioisotope inventory, the degree of possible contamination is impossible to predict. Any dispersal pattern will produce small areas of relatively high contamination, and large areas much less so. In no circumstance is an RDD expected to produce an area of immediate lethality hazard. Washdown and scrapedown of contaminated surfaces is very effective in dose reduction. Proper monitoring and detection is important to preclude long term exposure in high activity areas. Residual low activity may result in exposure in excess of the guidelines for long term (months or years) civilian residence in contaminated areas. PREPARED BY: [ (b)(2) ][ (b)(6) ] APPROVED BY: