Iraqi's SRBM Capabilities and Options for Use Filename:0182pgv.00d Subject: Iraqi's SRBM Capabilities and Options for Use Key Judgments [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] - Chemical or biological SRBM warheads (if available) will be withheld as a potential response to battlefield reverses or as retaliation for attacks on Baghdad. They will be aimed at military targets or at civilian locations (possibly including Israeli as well as opposing Arab) as weapons of terror or retribution. - Possible deployment areas in southern Iraq and Kuwait put US forces in range of Iraqi missiles. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] could force Saddam Hussein into a 'use or lose' situation for the missiles, and create pressure for their employment with chemical or biological warheads. I. Background [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] II. Operational Capability [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] In addition to high explosive (HE) warheads, Iraq is assessed to have chemical warfare (CW) warheads for their SCUD, Al Abbas, and Al Husayn missiles. While unitary agents (mustard, Tabun, and possibly VX) are most likely, Iraq may also have a binary SRBM chemical warhead (Sarin or GF). Chemical-tipped SRBMs would most likely be fired during the early morning hours probably from 0300 to 0600 local to ensure that the meteorological conditions will keep the CW agent from rising into the atmosphere. Such weapons are not assessed as posing a significant threat to Iraq's military forces opposing Iraq due to the probable limited quantity of binary warheads available, reduced payloads of deliverable CW agents, and missile inaccuracy. However, they could pose a 'terror weapon' threat to large population centers in the region. Iraq also is assessed as having the technological capability to produce biological warfare (BW) agents -- anthrax and botulinum toxin -- as well as develop air and ground munitions delivery capabilities. A SRBM BW warhead cannot be discounted, although very few would be available. While Iraq is assessed to have fuel air explosive (FAE) aerial bombs and possibly multiple rocket rounds, no such warheads are believed available for any SRBM. Likewise, nuclear SRBM warheads are not believed likely until sometime after the year 2000, despite an active, long-established nuclear program. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] IV. Iraqi SRBM Employment: An Assessment [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] We assess the Iraqis probably will refrain from using chemical weapons against opposing military forces unless the military situation seriously deteriorates, or Baghdad is directly attacked on a significant scale. In such a case, Saddam Hussein could order SRBM CW/BW attacks on distant airfields or assembly areas with salvos of four to six missiles. However, even this use of SRBMs will not significantly affect military operations because of the low levels of agents in Iraqi weapons and missile inaccuracy. In the face of further reverses, Saddam Hussein could seek to repeat his apparently successful use of SRBMs as weapons of terror during the Iran war by, as a last resort, ordering HE-, CW-, or possibly BW-armed SRBM attacks against densely populated areas such as Dhahran or Riyadh. Such an attack would probably involve all of Iraq's SRBM assets within range of these civilian areas, and could include Israeli targets. While such SRBM attacks could be costly in the loss of civilian life and economic impact, they, too, would have little effect on the final outcome of the war. V. Conclusions The Iraqis can employ their SRBM force in a variety of ways: -- With conventional warheads against military targets -- With CW/BW warheads against military targets -- With CW/BW warheads as 'Terror Weapons' against civilian or economic targets. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] While use of CW/BW warheads would greatly increase the destructiveness of a small number of missiles, the resulting resentment and outrage may establish a consensus among Gulf states and in the Arab world to destroy the Iraqi regime and its military potential. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]