Iraq's Ballistic Missile Binary Warhead Capabilities 

Filename:0502br.90

TASKER 2142                      [   (b)(2)   ]

[   (b)(2)   ]                   SUSPENSE: 8 NOV 90 0200

SUBJECT:	Iraq's Ballistic Missile Binary Warhead Capabilities 

DISCUSSION:

                DIA believes that Iraq has limited numbers of 
binary warheads for its ballistic missiles. These warheads are 
probably filled with precursor chemicals which when mixed in 
flight will produce the G-series nerve agent (GB or GF) or binary 
components to form the nerve agent VX.

[   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]





       Iraqi missiles are derived from Soviet SCUD-B short range 
ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that can deliver an 800 kg warhead to a 
range of up to 300 km. SCUD accuracy is 850 meters circular error 
(CEP) at a nominal range of 200 km. In addition to the basic SCUD, 
Baghdad has two longer range systems which it achieved by reducing 
payload and sacrificing accuracy. According to computer modeling, 
the Al Husayn carries less than a 100 kg warhead to a range of 600 
km, but with a CEP in excess of 2,000 meters. In April 1988, Iraq 
claimed the Al Abbas was test flown to a range of 900 km. Computer 
modeling suggests that the maximum range for the Al Abbas is about 
725 km with little or no warhead mass. This missile will have a 
larger CEP than the Al Husayn, at least 3,000 meters, at a 600 km 
range. Iraq displayed both the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas at an 
October 1988 military exposition.

    DIA believes that Iraq could have a few binary CW-equipped 
SRBMs aimed at coalition facilities in Saudi Arabia. However, due 
to poor accuracy, the most lucrative targets would be urban areas, 
as was the case with conventional warhead missile targeting in the 
Iran-Iraq War. Iraq probably has neither the number of warheads, 
firing crews, nor launchers to salvo-launch a series of CW-
equipped missiles at coalition military installations (i.e. 
airfields) to compensate for poor accuracy. [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ]                                                  
Saddam may believe that even inaccurate missiles could serve 
psychological purposes. Large concentrations of troops (without 
early warning and protective equipment) could be targeted but such 
a strike would require responsive targeting and good tactical 
reconnaissance, which the Iraqis are unlikely to have in Saudi 
Arabia.

[   (b)(6)   ][   (b)(2)   ]