CZECH CW REPORT Filename:604rpt.93o DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT 220CT93 SUBJECT: CZECH CW REPORT 1. Responding to a Czech report of chemical agent detection during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, DIA [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] for a [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] on the Czech findings of chemical agents. 2. Incident I: a. On 19 January 1991 two Czech NBC detachments detected nerve agents at their positions north and northwest of Hafr Al Batin. Each unit was operating [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] detectors, which use the active biochemical butyryl cholinesterase (BChE). Following the initial alarm, each unit then used [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] units, which also use BChE, and determined through sampling protocol, the presence and limits of the concentration nf the agent. One detachment also collected an air sample which was analyzed in a mobile field lab and determined to contain the nerve agent Sarin (GB). b. The concentration of Sarin in the air sampled was determined through basic sampling protocols to be between 5 x l0-5 and 5 x 10-7 milligrams per liter. The elapsed time from the initial alarm to the all clear was about 40 minutes. GB is considered a "non-persistent agent," which dissipates in the air in various periods of time. c. This detection was made during a period in which there were no SCUD missiles launches, artillery exchanges, or other military action(s) observed by the Czechs in the area. Further. there were no CW detections reported by other units in this area. The Czechs observed that there were no identifiable physiological manifestations (such as eye, nose, or breathing problems) which might be associated with such an exposure to this chemical agent dosage. d. The nearest location of any known lraqi storage or production was some 150 km away from the area where the agent was detected. In order for the detection that was made to have resulted from a collateral release of GB from this area, large amounts of agents would have had to have been released, which would than have drifted over troop concentrations causing casualties. Other units would have detected the presence of agents in these amounts. No such events were reported. e. The Czechs did not see any physical evidence that the chemical agents detected were the result of offensive or hostile actions by the Iraqi forces. The Czechs flled a sitrep on their detection. 3. Incident II: a. Approximately five days after the detection of the GB agent, a Saudi liaison officer approached the 3rd Czech NBC detachment subordinated to the Saudi Royal Forces in King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and requested that they investigate a "suspicious" area in the desert. The liaison officer directed the NBC detachment from KKMC to a location a few kilometers north-northwest of KKMC. DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DR~FT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT As they approached the area he queried them if they shouldn't don their protective gear, which they did. Upon arriving at the site, they found a wet area on the desert floor, measuring ahout 60 cm by 200 cm in dimension. They tested this with two separate methods, and determined that the soil was contaminated sulphur mustard agent. b. The Czech officers who had been on the scene said that there were no munitions fragments, craters, or other indications of military involvement with this site. The Czechs also said there were no SCUD alerts for this area immediately prior to this finding. Followinq the determination of the presence of mustard, the detachment left the area. A sitrep was filed with the Saudi Command of the Joint Forces North Area HQ in KKMC. 4. The only units to have detected and confirmed the presence of chemical agents during Desert Shield/Desert Storm were the three Czech detachments, all of which were subordinated to the Joint Forces North Area under the command of the Royal Saudi Liberation Forces. The detections involved each of the three units, and occurred within a single five day period. No prior or subsequent detections were made, or confirmed by the Czech detachments. 5. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 6. DIA has assembled a team of experts and military officers to completely review and analyze all the information within the Department for relevance to these Czech findings. They are currently reviewing CENTCOM's logs and records, troop dispositions and order of battle, and battle damage assessments. At this juncture, the facts do not tie any known Iraqi offensive military actions to these CW detections. DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT