Interim Report on Iraq Biological Warfare (BW) Filename:001me.90d 17 December 1990 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Subject: Interim Report on Iraq Biological Warfare (BW) [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 1. BACKGROUND: An Interagency Intelligence Community working group has been formed to examine various issues related to Iraqi BW capabilities, and intentions. This memorandum represents an interim report of that group. This report reflects the key judgments on capabilities, intentions, and some general considerations which impact on the BW problem. These judgments, will continue to be refined as the group continues its work. The judgments rendered here in are for the moss part consistent with work previously accomplished within the Intelligence Community. 2. IRAQI BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PRODUCTION `FACILITIES: There are several facilities associated with the Iraqi BW program. There are at least three known and three suspect biological warfare (BW) production facilities in Iraq. Anthrax and botulinum toxin are confirmed BW agents which are believed to have been weaponized. Based upon the technical capability of the Iraqis, it is well within their capacity to have produced 1,000 kilograms of dried anthrax spores. The Iraqis have shown interest in the development of a number of other infectious agents and toxins for BW purposes but the status of development is not known. It also is not known what types of munitions have been filled with BW agent but could include missile warheads, aerial bombs with and without cluster submunitions, artillery, and spray and aerosol generating devices. 3. Salman Pak, Abu Ghraib Vaccine Plant, and Taji Pilot Plant, are considered to be the three primary BW-related production facilities. We believe that Salman Pak is currently involved in only BW activities. Intelligence indicates that the Clostridium vaccine plant was completed in 1984, and that the plant is operational. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], this plant is located in the Abu Ghraib area and is disguised as a legitimate vaccine plant. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] a plant in the Taji area is producing anthrax. This plant may have been producing for several years. 4. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] since the early 1980s the Abu Gharaib infant formula plant may be involved in the production of BW agents. The plant has unusually high security, and state of the art fermenters and driers. Indications are that the facility is not in operational use, but may be maintained for back up purposes. We believe this facility is capable of producing large amounts of anthrax or botulinum toxin. Another plant, at Samarra built by the Soviets in the 1970s is known to produce numerous biological products. Although the plant does produce legitimate antibiotics, the equipment there would allow the Iraqis to produce a variety of BW agents. Finally, there are some indications that the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center may have some role in the BW program. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] continues to suggest that BW-related virus research takes place at Tuwaitha. 5. IRAQI BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STORAGE FACILITIES: There are 35 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers at 17 facilities which may be associated with the Iraqi BW program. Of the 35, at least 17 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers are refrigerated/air conditioned and are believed capable of storing BW agents/munitions. With the exception of four[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers at Salman Pak (only two are refrigerated and air conditioned), the remainder are located at or near large general purpose ammunition storage depots. We cannot rule out the possibility that these bunkers are used for purposes other than BW, such as storing components of fuel air explosives, and electronic equipment. Iraq's [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunker storage capability far exceeds any conceivable BW requirement. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] indicates another possible, unlocated, BW storage site in the Taji area utilizing large scale liquid nitrogen cooling. 6. IRAQI POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS: Baghdad probably believes that the greatest benefits it derives from biological warfare are its deterrent value and the escalatory option it provides. Iraq would consider using BW as a weapon to save the regime from falling. 7. Saddam is most likely to use biological weapons in a strategic role as a terror weapon against military and civilian targets. It is less likely to use BW in tactical situations, although the threshold for use of toxic agents would be lower than for infectious agents. 8. The initiation of biological warfare would be based on Saddam Husayn's determination that it would achieve significant national security objectives, inflict major damage against his enemies, or fulfill his own sense of mission. Saddam probably would retain control over all of his strategic weapon systems, including BW, through at least the initial stages of hostilities. 9. IMPLICATIONS: Previous use of chemical weapons by Iraq and statements by Iraqi officials, justifying the use of any weapon to defend their country, suggests that Baghdad would consider using biological weapons under certain circumstances. Iraq has the technical capability to produce sufficient amounts of anthrax spores to pose a highly credible threat of death to unprotected individuals. In addition, Iraq is capable of producing sufficient quantities of botulinum toxin to pose an equally high threat of death to exposed individuals (smaller amounts and more rapid onset). 10. Detailed vulnerability studies are ongoing to determine options available to either destroy or contain the BW agents, or to deny access to them. We believe, any planning for military action against Iraqi BW production and storage sites should consider a multiple set of probable outcomes ranging from no release of agent to the liberation of many hundreds of kilograms of live agent resulting in significant collateral loss of life. Unless the total and complete destruction of all agent is assured, then one must presume the release of, at least some, BW agent into the atmosphere. If the storage bunkers are attacked and a plume results, the spores will be carried into the plume to a height depending upon the size of the explosion and any resulting fire. Once in the air, the spores will be carried to a distance depending upon a number of meteorological conditions. However, there is a mitigating factor. Exposure to the sun's ultra-violet rays accelerates the breakdown of both anthrax and botulinum toxin BW agents. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]