Study on IZ Abilities to Conduct Chemical Warfare Filename:0150pgv.91d [ (b)(2) ] [ (b)(6) ] 1530 8 FEB 91 [ b.2. ] Study on IZ Abilities to Conduct Chemical Warfare [ (b)(2) ] 1. Probability of Binary - Agree with [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] comment that binary is tougher to do than unitary. DIA continues to believe Iraq could use binary, but the extent of binary introduction into the Iraqi force structure remains unknown. 2. Storage of DF- The DF storage may be easier than the CWA. First, DF is easier to make than agent due to lower toxicity; this should allow them to make higher purity chemical which would have better stability. Also, DF can be, stored in plastic containers which can be used to separate binary component chemicals; the plastic would be resistant to fluoride attack, extending storage life. The stabilizers mentioned are good to help extend the storage life of agents which are made in fairly high purity. If the amount of stabilizer becomes too great, it Just dilutes the agent and can't really retard degradation. 3. Quality of Other Agents - Agree that the greatest problem Iraq has is with the sarin and GF. Information on the quality of mustard is sketchy, but it is the easiest to make. Production of good quality mustard is something Iraq has probably done. [ b.2. ] As for tabun quality, some older reporting mentions quality problems for this agent. Stabilization of tabun with chlorobenzene is a known Iraqi capability. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) 4. Cyanides - DIA has noted a growing body of information on cyanide. It is possible that the cyanides possibly used at Halabja came from Iraq rather than Iran. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 5. SSM Fuses- DIA has no confirmation that Iraq has best fusing for their missile warheads with chemical fills. This may not be a real consideration since Iraq is using these weapons as a terror weapon, not as a military weapon. 6. Rocket-Propelled Grenades - DIA has received some reports on employment of CWA using rocket-propelled grenades. These reports remain unconfirmed. Our assessment is that, if the report is true, Iraq was trying to experiment with this type of weapon for chemical delivery. This device has probably not been adopted for wide fielding within the Iraqi forces. 7. Chemical Mines - As for the grenades mentioned in paragraph, the reporting on the chemical mines is anecdotal. DIA can't confirm this capability for Iraq. 8. Dusty Agent Threat - According to current estimates, dusty agent can penetrate the protective ensemble and cause injury. For a soldier wearing the mask, the type of injury would be an irritation which would not develop for some time following exposure. If not wearing a mask, the dust would have the effect of speeding mustard injury on the lungs and could cause rapid-developing mustard casualties rather than delayed casualties. 9. Aerosol Generators - DIA has no information on Iraq's use of aerosol generators to disseminate CWA. This is a potential delivery means for biological agents. 10. Lowest Echelon with Chemical Munitions - DIA has no information on which units have CWA available. The Republican Guards are considered most likely to have chemical weapons available, but all units in the KTO could have them. 11. Use of CWA by Special Forces - No information is available on this method of employing CWA. It is ppossible that Iraqi special forces could deliver either biological or chemical agents. This is based on potential, not on any evidence that these forces would do this, or that they are training to do it. 12. [ (b)(6) ]