No Subject Line Found Filename:0902pgv.91 [ (b)(2) ] 15 MAR 91/1202 HOURS/SENT BY: [ (b)(6) ] [ (b)(2) ] Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability: Surviving Assets and Non-Use During the War KEY JUDGMENTS Iraq's biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) production capability has been severely degraded, but not eliminated. To completely reconstitute the BW system to pre-war levels would require a minis of 5-8 years, although a very minimal capability could be established much quicker. Reconstitution of the CW system to prewar levels would require a minimum of 3-5 years, although some agent production may be possible once the electrical power system is operational. Chemical weapons were not made available to Iraqi units to use against coalition forces. While a full accounting of the plans of Iraq's military and political leadership is not known, they made fundamental miscalculations about how the coalition would prosecute the war, and how effectively their own forces would be able to respond. These miscalculations, together with the fear of coalition unconventional retaliation likely influenced the non-use of chemical weapons. Background Coalition air forces struck biological weapons research, development and storage facilities, as well as chemical weapons research and development, production, filling and storage facilities. The bombing campaign against these targets progressed generally in three stages, although with a great overlap between the stages. The first stage targeted both BW and CW R&D/production and CW filling capability. The second stage targeted BW storage, followed by CW storage. During the second stage, much of the R&D/production capability that survived the first stage was restruck and destroyed. The third stage targeted delivery systems in the field and targets not destroyed in the first two stages were also restruck. Biological Warfare Research and Development, Production and Storage Initially, four BW R&D/Production facilities--the Abu Ghurayb Suspect BW Production facility, the Abu Ghurayb Clostridium Vaccine Plant, the Taji Suspect BW Production facility, and the Salman Pak R&D/Suspect Production and Support facility--were identified and targeted by coalition forces. A fifth facility, the Latifiyah BW Production facility, was added in February 1991. As a result of coalition bombing, 11 of the 13 buildings associated with BW R&D/production at these facilities were destroyed and two were severely damaged. All five facilities are assessed to be unable to support BW R&D and/or production. BW storage initially included 19 12-frame refrigerated bunkers at 11 locations. During February 1991 two additional 12-frame refrigerated bunkers were identified, bringing the total to 21 such bunkers. Of these targets, the original 19 refrigerated bunkers were all destroyed. The final two refrigerated bunkers were discovered too late in the campaign to be attacked. Chemical Warfare Research and Development, Production, Filling and Storage CW production included the Samarra Chemical Weapons Research, Production and Storage Facility, and three separate precursor production facilities at Habbaniyah. Production at Samarra occurred in 10 buildings, five of which were destroyed. Of the five surviving production buildings the most significant is P-6, which is capable of producing 50-70 MT of sarin per month. About 70% of Samarra's total production capacity was destroyed. The three Habbaniyah facilities were destroyed. Three buildings at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions filling and all three buildings were destroyed. At least one of these buildings may have been empty at the time of its destruction raising the possibility that Iraq has retained at least part of its chemical munitions filling capability and possibly other chemical related equipment. CW storage capability was in the form of 8 cruciform bunkers at Samarra and 22 "S"-shaped bunkers at 14 locations. Of the 8 cruciform bunkers one was destroyed and the remaining 7 sustained only superficial damage. Of the 22 "S"-shaped bunkers 16 were destroyed and 6 suffered serious damage. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(2) ] architecture is not relevant to its ability to store agent or weapons, and Iraq [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Factors Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons Iraq's failure to use its chemical weapons cannot be completely understood without a full accounting of the plans made by the Iraqi military and political leadership in preparation for the war, and the execution of those plans. Intelligence information on this subject remains limited and analysis of the reasons for deterrence is still preliminary. However, the following is an estimate of the influence of several factors which may have contributed to a decision not to use chemical weapons. Major Factors The reason chemical weapons were not used during the war was that they were not made available to the Iraqi troops. To date, we have no evidence that chemical weapons were deployed to the KTO. Iraqi leadership made fundamental miscalculations about how the coalition would prosecute the war, and how effectively they would respond. Possibly expecting the coalition forces to fight like the Iranians, i.e. attacking first with infantry followed by mobile armor, it appears the Iraqis felt they would have days or even weeks to move chemical weapons into the KTO once the war began. Given the above, it is likely the Iraqis misjudged coalition speed of advance, the degree to which their air force and artillery assets would be attrited, and the degree to which their ability to resupply would be degraded. It is equally likely Iraq believed that both Israel and the coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons, and would use them if provoked. They quickly realized that these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq. This impression was reinforced by public statements of allied and Israeli leaders, and probably led Iraq to conclude the consequences of any chemical attack would be too severe to justify their use and may have led to an early decision not to use them. The speed and violence of the coalition advance which reached its objectives deep inside Iraq in only four days was probably the most significant tactical factor in precluding chemical use. Iraqi forces were constantly off balance, and coalition air supremacy made effective concentration of artillery for use against coalition ground forces virtually impossible. With minor exception, Iraq did not take the military initiative during the DESERT STORM operation, and was constantly on the defensive. Coalition forces deterred Iraq from repeating the success it had enjoyed with CW during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq's C3 system was heavily damaged by coalition bombing. In addition, Iraqi commanders could not control their forces in part because of a complete failure of their intelligence system to evaluate the developing situation. The immediate establishment of allied air superiority denied Iraq information on the disposition of coalition forces, making fire planning extremely difficult. The limited information available may have resulted in a decision not to disperse chemicals within theater until the ground battle began and coalition force dispositions became better defined. Destruction of Iraqi CW production likely had a significant effect on a decision not to use chemicals. The chemicals made earlier by Iraq may have deteriorated in storage, or Iraq may have miscalculated that their defenses would allow them time to produce and deploy chemicals later in the conflict. The loss of their production facilities would have prevented Iraq from making agent as needed, which was its practice during the Iran-Iraq war. It is also likely that Saddam Husayn retained personal control of CW during the war, in order to allow a more complete evaluation of the military situation. However, the speed of the ground offensive, together with C3 problems, may have made this retention a significant factor, since release of chemicals would then have been more complicated and slower. It could-be that mistrust of any units but Republican Guard forces was a factor in this high level retention. Other Factors Iraq lost their air ability to deliver chemicals on the first day of the war, one method of chemical delivery preferred during the Iran-Iraq war. Artillery and MRLs then became the only sustainable means of delivering chemicals. Iraq also had a limited number of SCUD and SCUD-type missile warheads available that could have been used to deliver chemical agents. However, artillery, MRLs and SCUDs were attrited heavily during the allied air campaign. Iraq was not able to fully supply its ground forces in the KTO during the war. Deployment of chemical ammunition would have had to compete for scarce transportation resources with all the other needs of the Iraqi forces. Large transfers of chemical munitions to the KTO may have been evaluated as too risky. The air campaign also destroyed most known and suspect CW storage in Iraq. The weather conditions during the ground offensive were poor for chemical use. Winds were strong, generally out of the south and there was some rain in the area, which would have made the effects of chemical weapons unpredictable and therefore less desirable. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] [ (b)(6) ]