BUGS AND THINGS Filename:0me004.90d DATE: 03 DEC 1990 TO: [ (b)(6) ] FROM: CA-SIO SUBJ: BUGS AND THINGS 1. After a number of meetings, briefings, and conversations, as well as a review of a sample of intelligence community studies and reports, the following judgements/statements on BW can be made with some confidence: o The IRAQIs have a viable BW program that is beyond the R&D phase. A significant amount of agent is probably available and can be used if Saddam so chooses. o There is uncertainty as to what degree they have been able to weaponize their BW agents. At a minimum, they have the capability to deliver using a simple aerosol dispensing device, or the proverbial terrorist with a vial. In regard to the former, members of the Intelligence Community have looked at several airborne and waterborne dispensing scenarios and found them viable, if not somewhat unpredictable. It is the position of the Intelligence Community, [ b.2. ] that the Iraqi variant of the SCUD may have a BW capability. Further, there is evidence of Iraqi interest in cluster warheads for delivering Botulin toxin.They do have a number of different weapons capable of delivering CW agents, and theoretically at least, weapons systems that are capable of delivering CW could be made capable of delivering BW. o Insofar as the BW agents of concern, all of the evidence would indicate Anthrax spore and Botulin Toxin. Additionally, Staphylococcal Enterotoxin, Tularemia, and Brucellosis are also possibly at least in the BW research phase. o There are four suspect BW production facilities. We are unsure of the role of three, but they would certainly merit targeting consideration. The fourth facility, Salman Pak, is virtually a certainty. o Insofar as storage, there are 17 facilities which contain 34 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers which are candidates for BW storage/fill facilities. Some of the bunkers (16 at 8 locations) are air conditioned/refrigerated, the remaining 18 are not. Four of these special bunkers, two of each type are located at Salman Pak. At least in that facility, there is a high likelihood of, at a minimum, storage at the bunkers. There is far less certainty as to exact nature of the bunkers at the other facilities, all ammo depots which appear to be for general explosives storage. o If the BW agents have been weaponized, we are uncertain as to where the weapons fill takes place. Again, the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers are a candidate, however, the internal layout of the bunker does not appear to be conducive due to the lack of maneuvering room. On the other hand, there is sufficient space to handle smaller weapons components, for example, the warhead section of a missile vice the entire missile. o There is uncertainty as to doctrinally driven dispersal considerations. Following the Soviet model the Iraqis would disperse these agents, first to insure their survival for future use/ deterrence, and secondly, for safety reasons. Mitigating against dispersal is the requirement for special handling. On balance the various considerations might tip slightly in favor of dispersal, but this is by no means a certainty. A point to be made here, is that once the agent has been filled in a warhead/weapon, and then later sealed, the amount of special handling required is minimal. o The greatest uncertainty by far, as would be expected, is when, and if, they would resort to the use of BW weapons. Needless to say any number of scenarios and excursions could be envisioned for an Iraqi use of BW agents in a precursor, preemptive, retaliatory, or desperation role. As with any weapon, the benefit vs. risk (from Hussein's perspective) would have to be weighed, with considerable insight into the thought processes at work (his). For example, the loss of Kuwait might not be considered sufficient for resorting to BW, where as any action that posed a threat to Hussein himself or his regime might. Another scenario might be an excursion of the DT small waterborne craft BW agent dispensing scenario. Under such a scenario BW agents could be dispersed from aerosol devices carried on small boats upwind from U.S. amphibious forces in the Gulf several days prior to January 15, or upon indication that these forces are massing for an amphibious assault. The various scenarios that can be envisioned must be looked at analytically to test their viability. 2. The above provides an overview of what is known and what is not known, and thus the intelligence uncertainties, insofar as Iraqi BW and its threat to DESERT SHIELD. In conducting an informal survey of the community to determine what might be available in the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], in the way of [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ], as well as other [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] against the BW problem, the following observations can be made: o [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 3. As an aside, in undertaking this effort a limited, albeit cursory [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] to determine what was being accomplished in these areas that might aid in the BW effort. In [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] the overall problem is probably being addressed at a feasible level, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Salman Pak and the other facilities where the special bunkers are located [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] particularly if tensions escalate. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] would be particularly useful to determine if the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers are in fact active. Efforts were made [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] but due to the [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] this effort was unsuccessful. It is unlikely [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] would be much better. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] would certainly be useful but [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] this would be [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Again, even if we were able to determine that the bunkers were in fact active, that would not necessarily confirm that they were BW associated. It would however provide a supporting point for [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] effort against them. 4. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] we have been hampered by our inability to have [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] . However, we deem it unlikely, due to [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] would be particularly helpful in this area. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] . In this regard, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] are essential. For example, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] medicines that the Iraqis are continuing to obtain, both as fulfillment of contractual obligations (recent dealings with the Swiss, $15,000,000 contract, as reported in news media), as well as the reported barter for hostages. Procurement of unusually large amounts of antibiotics [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] . Further, large amounts of certain types [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bacteriological strains and resistance. The same would hold true for immunizing and prophylactic agents. Additionally, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] We deem it extremely important. Finally certain proteins, antibodies, and other telltale traces of immunization, or exposure, to various agents remain present in the blood, body fluids, and waste products of individuals after such exposure or immunization. It is likely that only Hussein, his inner circle, workers at facilities where agents are produced, and key members of the military to include high ranking members of the Republican Guard and his personnel guard have been pre-immunized. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 5. Finally, by way of observation, a number of factors need to be considered by U.S. planners. A debate is apparently underway as to the wisdom of targeting BW/CW facilities. It is clearly understood that the decision is a planning/policymaking decision weighing the risk versus gain. Leaving the weapons in the hands of Hussein through a period of conflict leaves him the option of invoking BW blackmail at any time he decides to do so. Further, his past history of employing chemical weapons, in both tactical and operational situations, could suggest that given the alternative of defeat, and the potential for the fall of his regime, he would employ BW weapons, the desperation scenario. Conversely, it must be noted that his employment of CW against both the Iranians and Kurds, unlike what would be the case against the U.S. was a relatively risk free operation on his part since neither had the capability to respond massively to such use. In any case, his history shows a demonstrated willingness to use weapons that are deemed unsuitable and banned by treaty. If the suspect BW facilities are struck by air, even with the most precise execution, planners must make allowances for the possibility that some agent may be released. The amount would depend on the method and precision of the attack, and the Iraqis own safety precautions. Available information indicates that U.S. and Allied aircraft are "leaky", and thus any aircrews that would be at risk of coming into contact with contaminated plums should be protected by MOPP 4 gear. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Further, it is our understanding that insufficient antibiotics and inoculation material is available to protect U.S. forces where protection is available. Again, we recommend, based on Hussein's history, that every effort be made to get as much protection forward, even if marginal at best. [ (b)(6) ]