SUBJECT:  Middle East Postcrisis Issues







Middle East Postcrisis Issues (U)

Number 1



This edition of Middle East Postcrisis Issues,  the first in the

the series, has three

topics:I



ù Military/Scientific and Tcchnical Issues.

  ù Political/Intecrnal Stability Issues

  ù Economic,/Industrial Issues.



This edition will focus primarily on Iraqi mi1itary and political

development and postwar reconstruction. Future editions will

high1ight othcr

key regional military, cconomic, and

politlcal concerns.



 Articles in this issue include information as of 22 March 1991.





[b.2.]





















Iraq's Chemical Warfare Capability: Lack of Use Durmg the War



The major factors that precluded lraqi chemical wafare use wcre

fear of

Coalition retaliation and fundamental miscalculations the Iraqi

Ieadership

madc regarding how the Coalition would prosecute the war and how

effechvely

Iraqi forces could respond



DIA has no evidence that chemical weapons were deployed to the

Kuwaiti

Theater of Oprations (KTO). Iraq probably feared Coalition

retaliation and

most likely bclieved that both Israel and thc Coalition would use

chemical

or nuclear weapons if provoked by Iraqi chemical attacks. Baghdad

probably

concluded that, since these weapons could be delivered anywhere in

Iraq, the

cosequenccs of any chemical attack would be too severe to justify

CW use; this may have led to an early dccision not to use

chemicals.



Equally likely, the Iraqis probably believed they would have days

or even

weeks to move chcmical wcapons into the KTO once the war began.

Thus, the

Iraqis miscalculated the Coalition speed of advance; the degree to

which

their Air Force, artillery assets, and surface-to-surface missile

systems

would bc attrited; and the degree to which their resupply

capability would

bc degraded. The Coalition air campaign eliminated Iraq's preferred

means

of chemical delivery (its Air Force) and made timely ammunition

supply

impossible. The

air campaign also destroyed all known and suspctod CW storage in

Iraq.



In addition, Coalition bombing heavily damaged Iraq's command,

control,

cornmunications, and intelligence (C3I) systems. Iqaqi commanders

could not

control their forces, in part because of an intelligence system

failure to

evaluate the developing situation. Allied air superiority

established at the

start of the air campaign denied Iraq information on Coalition

force

dispositions, making fire planning practically impossible. The

limitcd

information available may have resulted in a decision not to

disperse

chernicals within the theater until the ground battle began and

Coalition

force dispositions became better defined.



Destruction of Iraqi chemical weapon production facilities quite

likely

swayed the decision not to use chemicals. Chemical agents Iraq had

produced

earlier might have deteriorated in storage, or Iraq might have

miscalculatod

that its defenses would allow it time to produce and deploy

chemicals later

in the conflict.  Loss of its production facilites would have

prevented Iraq

from making agents as necded, which was the practice during the

Iran-Iraq

war.



Also likely, Saddam Husayn probably retained personal control of CW

during DESERT

STORM to allow more complete military evaluatins. In such a case,

the speed

of the

Coalition ground offensive together with C3I problems would have

complicated

and slowed chemical release further.



[b.6.]