Estimating levels of destruction inflicted on the enemy always has
been difficult. This was especially true during Operation Desert
Storm, with its fast moving, high-speed air, sea, and ground
campaigns, which involved massive attacks throughout the theater of
operations, using a wide variety of equipment and munitions. These
difficulties were compounded by the fact that some new precision
weapons allowed Coalition forces to place ordnance on targets in ways
that made determination of actual damage difficult, and by the fact
not all platforms had sensors and equipment to record the effects of
their weapons. For example, PGMs gave pilots the unique ability to
target precisely and strike sections of buildings or hardened
shelters, significantly complicating bomb damage assessment. BDA was,
therefore, by no means a precise science. It is quite possible that
assessments of Iraqi losses during the course of the war, at various
times, overestimated or underestimated actual results. Thus the
estimates of Iraqi losses presented in this chapter and elsewhere in
the report must be read in the proper context. The loss estimates
shown in this report are accurate portrayals of the information
provided to decision makers at the time. They were intended at the
time to represent the best estimates of Iraq's losses then available.
They were used at the time by decision makers as one input into a
decision making process that relied fundamentally on the exercise of
professional military judgment. That, after all, is the primary
purpose of military intelligence - to assist commanders in the field
in making informed judgments.
It is possible the levels of damage never will be known with
precision. That said, it is important to note that, even with these
limitations, probably no set of American commanders has had more
information available about the battlefield and enemy forces than the
commanders of Operation Desert Storm. Tactical BDA was good enough to
help CINCCENT make informed decisions. In retrospect, Operation Desert
Storm's success strongly suggests the decisions were sound. In the
end, it was professional military judgment - assisted by BDA and other
information that chose the right time to begin the ground
offensive.
Two different BDA methodologies, based on fundamentally distinct
purposes and guidance were used in the two principal periods of
conflict during the Persian Gulf War. Before G-Day, 24 February, BDA
estimates were designed to help CINCCENT determine when Iraqi forces
in the KTO had been reduced to about half of their overall combat
effectiveness - the point when he would be confident in starting the
ground offensive. Consequently, ARCENT attempted to track carefully
the number of tanks, APC, and artillery pieces destroyed, primarily by
air attack, to produce an approximate measure of Iraqi unit
degradation. This was one estimate available to CINCCENT for
evaluating Iraqi combat effectiveness. He and his staff also used
other information such as bridge destruction, communications
degradation, estimates of supplies available, troop physical condition
and morale, EPW debriefings, the results of the battle of Khafji
intelligence reports and assessments, and destruction of other
vehicles.
After G-Day, the emphasis shifted to ground combat. Estimates of
Iraqi losses were based on reports from advancing ground units as well
as reports from air units. There was a fast-paced accounting of
destroyed or captured tanks, APC, and artillery pieces with little
attempt to determine if the equipment was destroyed by ground, air, or
sea assets, or if the equipment were in working order or in use when
destroyed. (For additional discussion of BDA during the Offensive
Ground Campaign, see Chapter VIII.)
In connection with this report's preparation, there were extensive
searches for any information available after cessation of hostilities
that would improve the wartime estimates of Iraqi equipment losses.
Postwar surveys were made of selected parts of the KTO, but none
covered parts of the theater large enough to permit calculation of
comprehensive estimates of overall losses. Many relevant areas were in
Iraq itself, and thus inaccessible after the Coalition withdrew. Many
parts of Kuwait also were difficult to study because of problems such
as the lack of transportation infrastructure and danger from
unexploded ordnance. The two analyses based on survey data that were
completed after the war cover very small, and not necessarily
representative areas. In the case of one study, many of the vehicles
had been abandoned without substantial damage and less than half of
the tanks destroyed appeared to have been destroyed from the air.
However, the sample was small and may not have been representative.
Efforts to analyze the available data further are continuing.
At Coalition airfields and on board Coalition warships all across
the Gulf region, the first hours after midnight 17 January were marked
by activity with a new sense of urgency. At the air bases and on
flight decks, crews prepared to launch the biggest air strike since
World War II. On other warships, sailors were preparing TLAMs for
their first combat launch. In cramped compartments, dozens of B-52
crew members, some of whom had left US bases hours earlier, prepared
for combat. More than 160 aerial tankers orbited outside Iraqi early
warning radar range and refueled hundreds of Coalition aircraft.
Shifts of RC-135, U-2RI and TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft maintained
normal 24-hour orbits to provide intelligence coverage of Iraq and
Kuwait. E-3 AWACS and E-2Cs orbited over Saudi Arabia, powerful radars
probed deep into Iraq and crews watched for Iraqi reactions.
Meanwhile, the initial attack packages marshaled south of the Iraqi
and Jordanian early warning and ground control intercept (GCI)
coverage. As H-Hour approached, the entire attack armada moved north,
led by a fighter sweep of F-15s and F-14s. As the attack packages flew
past, each AWACS moved forward to its wartime orbit. The huge air
armada, comprising hundreds of aircraft from many different nations
and Services, headed into the dark and threatening hostile
airspace.
Even before the fighters struck Iraqi targets, three USAF MH-53J
Pave Low special operations helicopters from the 1st Special
Operations Wing (SOW) led nine Army AH-64 attack helicopters from the
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) on a mission into southern Iraq.
Shortly before H-Hour, the helicopters, organized as Task Force (TF)
Normandy, completed the long, earth-hugging flight and sighted the
assigned targets, two early warning radar sites inside Iraq. This
mission was possible because of technological advances in night- and
low-light vision devices, precise navigational capability resulting
from space-based systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS)
satellites, and highly trained crews.
Commitment to hostilities occurred at approximately H-90 minutes
when US warships launched TLAM cruise missiles toward targets in
Baghdad. At approximately H-22 minutes, the AH-64s struck the opening
blow of the conflict by destroying the radar sites with Hellfire
missiles. Above and in front of TF Normandy, F-117 stealth fighters
from the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) already had passed the early
warning sites and were well inside Iraqi radar coverage when the
attacks occurred. The timing of the helicopter attacks was determined
by the projected time when Iraqi air defense radar would detect the
EF-111s scheduled to support air attacks on the Baghdad area. Its job
complete, TF Normandy headed for home. Nine minutes before H-Hour, an
F-117A dropped the first bomb of the war, striking a hardened air
defense intercept operations center (IOC) in southern Iraq, then
continued on to drop a second bomb on a regional air defense sector
operations center (SOC) in western Iraq. The helicopter and F-117A
attacks created gaps in Iraqi radar coverage and in the C2 network for
the non-stealth aircraft which followed. Meanwhile, other F-117As were
about to destroy several high-priority targets.
At H-Hour, 0300, two F-11 7As dropped the first bombs on Baghdad.
Shortly thereafter, TLAMs began to strike targets in the Baghdad area.
Each F-117A carried two 2,000-lb hardened, penetrating laser-guided
bombs (LGBs) and, within the offensive's first minutes, bombed crucial
installations in Baghdad and elsewhere. Each aircraft had an
individual route through the Iraqi air defense system and a tailored
target attack plan. The F-117A by virtue of its stealth
characteristics allowed operations without the full range of support
assets required by non-stealthy aircraft. Typically, F-117A sorties
used no direct airborne support other than tankers.
An initial Coalition air task was to fragment and eventually destroy
the Iraqi IADS. The initial fragmentation was accomplished by the
early attacks by Apache helicopters, F-117As, cruise missiles, F-15Fs,
and GR-1s. Once the IADS was nullified, the enemy became increasingly
vulnerable to attack and destruction from the air.
F-117As reached into the heart of downtown Baghdad to strike the
Iraqi Air Force headquarters accurately. Ignoring flak, tracers, and
SAMs, they systematically hit vital targets. One pilot high over
Baghdad that night reported seeing Iraqi AAA wildly spraying fire over
Baghdad, hitting the tops of buildings. AAA fire and expended SAMs
probably caused some collateral damage inside the capital. Because of
the density of the threat and the requirement to minimize collateral
damage, F-117As, attacking at night, were the only manned aircraft to
attack central Baghdad targets. The only weapon system used for
daylight attacks on central Baghdad were TLAMs, which also struck at
night. F-16s, B-52s, F/A-18s, A-6s, and A7s attacked targets in the
outskirts of the city. RF-4s, TR-1s, and U-2s flew over Baghdad later
in the war, when the threat was reduced.
First-day TLAM attacks, launched from cruisers, destroyers, and
battleships in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, were coordinated with
F-1 17A and other manned aircraft during the initial attacks as part
of the carefully crafted Strategic Air Campaign. The Aegis cruiser USS
San Jacinto (CG 56) fired the first TLAM from the Red Sea. USS Bunker
Hill (CG 52) followed moments later from the Persian Gulf. In the
first 24 hours, 116 TLAMs from seven warships hit 16 heavily defended
targets in Baghdad and its vicinity, damaging electrical power
facilities and C2 capabilities.
Conventional ALCMs also were used in the opening hours of the air
campaign. B-52s that had taken from Barksdale AFB, LA, more than 11
hours before H-Hour launched 35 ALCMs to attack military
communications sites and power generation and transmission
facilities.
Nearly 700 combat aircraft, including fighters, bombers, and FW
aircraft (jammers and high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM)
shooters) entered Iraqi airspace that night. As they began their
attacks, they benefited from encountering a foe who already was
reeling and partly blinded from the opening strikes.
Strike packages were as small as a single F-117A or could contain
more than 50 aircraft. The strike package against the Ahmad Al-Jabir
Airfield complex, for example, consisted of 16 Low-Altitude Navigation
Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN)-equipped F-16s with MK-84
bombs, escorted by four F-4Gs configured with HARMs for SEAD, an EA-6B
EW jammer, and four F/A-18s configured for the strike-fighter dual
role. Supporting these strike packages were many tanker aircraft,
including KC-135s, KC-10s, KA-6s, and KC-130s, which were airborne and
waiting outside Iraqi airspace.
From the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and from bases along the
Persian Gulf, Navy and Marine aircraft headed towards their targets
near Baghdad and in southwestern and southeastern Iraq. Nineteen USAF
F-15Es headed for Scud missile sites in western Iraq, passing through
the gap the helicopters and F-117s had blown in the Iraqi defenses.
From bases across Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, other aircraft
prepared to strike strategic centers of gravity throughout Iraq.
An overall depiction of the Coalition air armada at H-Hour would
show a multipronged effort. Navy aircraft from the Red Sea carriers
USS John F. Kennedy and USS Saratoga, to ether with USAF and RAF
aircraft, were preparing to strike targets near Baghdad and at heavily
defended airfields in western Iraq. Their targets included Scud
missile sites, airfields, and air defenses. Navy aircraft also flew
many SEAD and EW missions. In southeastern Iraq, between Baghdad and
Kuwait, targets such as airfields, port facilities, and air defenses
were attacked by Navy aircraft and other Coalition forces, including
RAF, RSAF, and Kuwaiti Air Force aircraft, based in eastern Saudi
Arabia. Coming up the middle were Coalition air forces striking fixed
targets in southern and central Iraq.
The first missions conducted to suppress enemy air defenses were
difficult yet vital. At one time during that first hour, the lead F-4G
flight countered more than 15 radar sites and several different type
SAMs. More than 200 HARMs were fired against Iraqi radars, 100 by USMC
F/A-18s alone. USAF EF-11 1s and F-4Gs, Navy and USMC EA-6Bs, A-6s,
A-7s, and F IA-1 8s, determined threat locations then jammed enemy
radar installations or attacked them with HARMs, while EC-130 Compass
Call aircraft jammed enemy communications. These SEAD efforts helped
keep Coalition losses low; in fact, most missions were possible only
because of the SEAD aircraft.
One effective tactic to fool enemy air defenses involved Navy and
Marine Corps (USMC) tactical air launched decoys (TALDs). The decoys
caused Iraqi defenders to turn on their radars, revealing their
locations and making them vulnerable to Coalition SEAD aircraft. The
tactic confused the Iraqis and helped divert their defensive
effort.
The joint SEAD effort also used 10 long-range Army tactical missile
system (ATACMS) missiles to attack an Iraqi air defense site with good
success. Overall, Coalition SEAD was highly successful and
instrumental in limiting aircraft losses.
Fortunately, all but one plane (an F/A-18 from the USS Saratoga)
returned safely. But no one had any illusions that this would be quick
or easy, that victory would be achieved without hard fighting and
losses. Indeed, even as the air campaign's first wave of aircraft
headed for home, the second wave was preparing to strike its
targets.
By nightfall on the first day of Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqis
had suffered serious damage to the strategic C3 network, the formerly
robust strategic air defense system, and key leadership facilities.
Part of the known NBC long-term threat already had been degraded, and
Coalition air forces had defeated Iraqi Air Force attempts to offer a
coordinated resistance.
On D-Day, JTF Proven Force concentrated on targets in northern Iraq
in the Mosul, Kirkuk, Tikrit, Quayyarah, and Erbil areas. The EC-130,
KC-135, and EF-111A aircraft, along with their F-15 protection,
established orbits north of the border. The F-111Es turned south and
arrived over their targets at 0410 on 18 January.
A strike package hit the oil facility at Habbaniyah and the airfield
at At-Taqaddum with 32 F-16s; 16 F-15s provided air cover, while four
EF-111s and eight F-4Gs provided jamming and SEAD support. Over Saudi
Arabia and the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the AWACS and E-2C
surveillance planes watched the missions and identified who was
friendly. During this particular F-16 mission, the AWACS controllers
were able to alert the covering F-15s that two Iraqi MiG-29s were in
the area and, in the ensuing action, the F-15s shot them both down.
One victory went to a USMC exchange officer flying with the USAF's
58th Tactical Fighter Squadron.
Air superiority, or the dominance of a group of aircraft in a given
time and space without prohibitive interference by the opposing force,
was effectively gained in the first hours of the war. Coalition
aircraft demonstrated they could control airspace of their choosing -
the Iraqi Air Force could not coordinate an effective defense. Air
supremacy (the degree of air superiority wherein the enemy is
incapable of effective interference) would be announced on 27
January.
JTF Proven Force aircrews flew their first combat missions shortly
after midnight 18 January, when F-111Es raced into Iraq at low level
to destroy four EW radar sites in northern Iraq and open an electronic
gate. The sky was overcast at 3,000 feet with visibility at three
miles with fog. Despite the poor weather, the F-111E crews found the
targets and delivered their ordnance, encountering little Iraqi
resistance. These, and subsequent missions forced Iraqi commanders to
contend with attacks from all directions and to respond to a second
air front as well as a potential second ground front. This pressured
Iraq from the north, surrounded and forced them to retain forces in
the northern region.
Early in Operation Desert Storm planning, CINCCENT had identified
the RGFC as a key target; Phase 111 attacks on the ~GFC and frontline
armored forces in Kuwait began the first day. The RGFC began to feel
real pressure starting the next day, when Coalition aircraft struck
three divisions, the Tawakalna Mechanized Infantry Division, and the
Hammurabi and Al-Madinah armored divisions, repeatedly throughout that
day and the next.
During these two days, the three divisions were targeted for strikes
by 214 F-16s, 36 F/A-18s, eight F-15Es, and 31 B-52s. Not included in
these totals are missions not targeted directly against these
divisions but which nonetheless affected their combat capability, such
as air strikes against communications nodes outside the KTO.
The Navy attacked Iraqi naval installations near Umm Qasr, hit
hangars and parking ramp areas at Shlaybah and Ahmad Al-Jabir
airfields during the late morning, and struck 17 oil, electric, and
leadership targets with TLAMs.
SPECIAL NOTE: ATO Planned Attack Sorties Against The
RGFC
|
<![CDATA[
D + 1 D + 2
TAWAKALNA 90 F-16s, 8 F/A-18s, 3 B-52s 36 F-1 6s, 3 B-52s
HAMMURABI 16 F/A-18s, 3 B-52s 42 F-16s, 6 F/A-18s,
8 F-15Es, 12 B-52s
AL-MADINAH 24 F-16s, 3 B-52s 2 F-16s, 6 F/A-18S, 7 B-52s
]]>
|
D + 1, Night
Darkness on D + 1 did not mean the Iraqis would gain any respite.
Coalition forward looking infrared (FLIR)- and radar- equipped
aircraft attacked bridges behind the Republican Guards, to cut them
off from their supply bases. Seven B-52 sorties took off from bases in
the CONUS and bombed RGFC divisional elements in the KTO. An hour
before midnight, a dozen F-117s bombed key C3, leadership, and
strategic air defense installations, including the ministries of
Defense, Information, and Internal Security in downtown Baghdad.
By the end of the second day, Navy warships had fired 216 TLAMs, 64
percent of those fired during Operation Desert Storm, in support of
the air campaign, while continuing to engage surface combatants,
antiship missile bases and to track and destroy floating mines in the
Persian Gulf. On 17 and 18 January, the Persian Gulf battle force flew
more than half of its initial strikes against Iraqi naval facilities,
coastal defense sites, and fortified oil platforms Iraq used in
surveillance and small boat operations. Specific targets included the
port facility, naval base, and Styx missile storage facility at Umm
Qasr; the coastal defense sites at Al-Faw, Mina `Abd Allah, Al-Qaruh
Island and Umm Al-Maradim; the Mina Al-Bakr oil terminal and platform;
and the Khawr Al-'Amayah oil platform. Naval aircraft flying from the
Red Sea and Persian Gulf battle groups completed 1,100 sorties in
support of the air campaign. USMC attack aircraft began shaping the
battlefield during the first two days. F1A-18s-18s, A-6s, and AV-8Bs
attacked and destroyed armored vehicles, tanks, artillery, and Free
Rocket Over Ground batteries throughout southern and central Kuwait.
USMC F/A-18 and EA-6B aircraft struck Tallil airfield and bombed the
Republican Guard's Al-Madinah Division as well as a Republican Guard
armored battalion. AV-8Bs nearly tripled their sorties from the first
day, flying 55 missions against Iraqi front-line artillery battalions
on the eastern side of Kuwait.
RAF GR-1s continued attacking Iraqi airfields, while A-6s attacked
electricity related and C3 targets in the Al-Basrah, Az-Zubayr, and
Al-Hadithah area. B-52s again bombed Republican Guard formations and
began striking industrial targets, with eight sorties targeted against
Iraqi oil installations in isolated areas where there was little
probability of collateral damage. Finally, at 0300, the dividing line
between D + 1 and D + 2, 10 F-117 sorties struck 17 C3, air defense,
and leadership targets around Baghdad and At-Taji.
D-Day through D + 6: Summary of Week One (17-23 January)
At the end of Operation Desert Storm's first week, substantial
results had been accomplished against several target categories,
according to CENTCOM and intelligence reports. Many important targets
had been destroyed by the first two days' operations, affecting
several key Iraqi capabilities. The Coalition enjoyed air superiority,
primarily because the Iraqi Air Force was not vigorously contesting
the air campaign; still, the Iraqi Air Force remained a potential
threat. Iraq's strategic air defenses and C3 network had been
fragmented, partly as a result of damage to the Iraqi national
electric power grid. Iraq's known nuclear and BW programs, as well as
its stocks of deployable CW were under daily attack. National
political and military leadership was becoming increasingly cut off
and isolated from preferred, secure means to direct operations. Iraqi
ground and naval forces in the KTO were attacked from the beginning,
to eliminate their ability to conduct substantial offensive operations
and reduce their ability to oppose later military operations.
In combination with the naval embargo, the Strategic Air Campaign's
early effect on Iraqi war support infrastructure was substantial.
Iraq's internal fuels refining and production capability was shut
down, limiting its ability to produce fuel for its tanks, planes, and
war-supporting infrastructure and resulting in government imposed
rationing of pre-attack inventory. Saddam Hussein's internal
telecommunications capability was so badly damaged that, while he
could broadcast televised propaganda to the world by portable
satellite uplinks, he was limited in the use of telecommunications to
influence the Iraqi populace.
During the first week, aircraft attacked Iraqi facilities throughout
Iraq and Kuwait. USAF F-117As, F-16s, B-52s, A-10s, and F-4Gs, Navy
and USMC A-6Es and F/A-18s, USMC AV-8Bs, and Navy A-7s attacked air
defense radars, communications nodes, and military headquarters.
During the first 24 hours alone, for example, 3rd MAW flew four major
strategic strike packages. Another three waves hit such targets as the
bridges in Al-Basrah and the RGFC Al-Madinah Division on days two and
three. Aircraft such as RAF and RSAF GR-1 fighter-bombers attacked
Iraqi airfields to destroy aircraft and bomb support facilities, and
to suppress air defenses. USAF F-15s, Navy F-14s, and Navy and USMC
F/A-18s provided CAP and sweeps for attack packages and played an
important role in establishing air supremacy quickly. USAF A-10s
performed Scud-hunter and antitank missions.
The Iraqi Air Force had lost 39 aircraft, 14 of them in air-to-air
combat. The Coalition's technology provided the ability to detect and
destroy enemy fighters from beyond visual range. Coalition aircraft
losses had been remarkably light, due in large measure to the
successful initial attacks that quickly seized the initiative. Eleven
US aircraft had been lost in combat, while other Coalition forces had
lost six, most notably four RAF GR-1 Tornados lost on low-level
airfield attack missions. With the possible exception of one F/A-18
loss still under investigation, all Coalition losses were inflicted by
ground-based air defenses (antiaircraft fire or SAMs).
SPECIAL NOTE
| On 19 January, as more than 70 F-16s, along with F-15 escorts and
EF-111 and F-4G support, headed toward Baghdad, the weather steadily
worsened. Just after the package broke out of the weather north of the
Iraqi border, antiaircraft artillery (AAA) fire disrupted the
formation. About a fourth of the pilots could not find the rest of the
formation and had to return home. The first group to strike were the
F-16s from the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, which hit the nuclear
research facility near Baghdad. Unfortunately for the following F-16s,
the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense package of F-4Gs had fired all
its high-speed antiradiation missiles and left the area, as did the
covering F-15s. That left the F16s from the 614th Tactical Fighter
Squadron with no air cover and no electronic support assets. The F-16s
immediately came under heavy surface-to-air missile and AAA fire --
two were shot down.
- 401 Tactical Fighter Wing Report |
Perhaps the most significant tactical issue to arise in planning the
air campaign concerned Coalition aircraft flying above the AAA and
hand-held SAMs threat. Despite the strong peacetime emphasis on
training for low-level delivery tactics, which exploit terrain to
reduce aircraft detectability to radar and hence vulnerability to SAMs
and to increase weapon delivery accuracy under the weather, the
density of the Iraqi AAA and the dangers posed by unaimed barrage fire
to low flying aircraft drove some aircraft to higher altitude delivery
tactics. After the initial attacks on Iraqi air defense nodes
succeeded in largely neutralizing the SAMs able to engage at medium
and high altitudes, a virtual sanctuary existed for Coalition aircraft
above 10,000 feet, allowing medium-altitude delivery tactics.
Two factors slowed progress of the air campaign in its first week:
bad weather and a greater-than-expected effort against Scuds. A
weather front stalled over Iraq on the third day of the conflict, and
disrupted operations for the next three days. Many sorties were
canceled, others were diverted to different and sometimes less
important targets; some missions were less effective even when they
got to their assigned targets, or flew into greater danger.
Because the effort to suppress Scud attacks proved more difficult
than originally anticipated, greater emphasis against Iraqi Scuds
began on the third day; this effort also took sorties away from other
planned targets. Although the Army s Patriot air defense missile
system experienced operational success against Scuds, the Coalition
still fated an urgent requirement to prevent launches, and the Iraqi
ability to hide before and after launch proved considerable.
D + 10 (27 January - CINCCENT Declares Air Supremacy)
The air superiority gained in the first days of Operation Desert
Storm, and the air supremacy declared on D + 10, against some of the
more heavily defended airspace in the history of warfare, granted
Coalition aircraft a safety and freedom that permitted operations at
high and medium altitudes over Iraq with virtual impunity. Air attacks
continued on strategic targets in Iraq and to cut off and destroy the
combat effectiveness of the Iraqi army in the KTO. For example, in
Iraq, Coalition air forces continued to target Scud production and
storage facilities, airfield facilities at H-2, Tallil, and Shaykhah
Mazhar as well as the air defense headquarters, the Ministry of
Industry and Military Industrialization and several secret police and
intelligence headquarters buildings in Baghdad. In the KTO air forces
targeted the Ar-Rumaylah ammunition storage area, the Al-Basrah radio
relay and TV transmission facility, divisional logistics sites, and
directed hundreds of sorties against Iraqi army artillery, armor, and
support units.
The Iraqi Air Force was expected to react to Coalition attacks.
However, Coalition fighter pilots were confident they would prevail.
Although the Coalition had air superiority at the end of D-Day,
commanders wanted to guarantee the Iraqi Air Force would stay out of
the fight; they wanted no surprises.
When Iraqi aircraft challenged the Coalition and suffered high
losses, Iraq tried to shelter its aircraft. Iraqi doctrine envisioned
keeping the Iraqi Air Force as a kind of strategic reserve, a role it
had fulfilled during the war with Iran. Saddam Hussein thought his Air
Force would be safe inside the extensive Iraqi aircraft shelter
system.
For the first week of the war the Iraqi Air Force averaged only
about 30 fighter sorties a day; it did not lose many airplanes that
week because it did not fly much. Coalition planners considered the
Iraqis might suddenly launch an aerial offensive, a last-gasp
expenditure of the air force in an effort to engage Israel, attack
Dhahran or Riyadh, cause significant Coalition ground casualties
(perhaps through a CW attack), or strike a Fleet element in hopes of
severely damaging a carrier. Any of these possibilities was highly
undesirable in its own right, but, in addition, might galvanize
western public opinion against the war, or split the Coalition. To
preclude this possibility, the Coalition began attacking the hardened
aircraft shelters.
This was a difficult task. The Iraqis had 594 shelters, some of
which were believed to be hardened in a manner similar to missile
silos, able to withstand the effects and blastover-pressures that
would accompany nearby air-burst detonation of tactical nuclear
weapons. Although Iraqi airfields had been attacked since the first
hours of the war, the early emphasis was on denying the the use of the
runways, not on destroying the shelters (except those suspected of
hiding Scud missiles). On 23 January, however, the JFACC changed the
tactic and started attacking directly the aircraft hidden in shelters
using 2,000-lb case-hardened penetrating LGBs. F-117As attacked Balad
and other airfields. F-111s and RAF Tornados and Buccaneers attacked
the shelters from medium-altitudes, which gave the crews a better,
longer look at their targets than low-altitude attacks. Other
Coalition aircraft provided SEAD support and fighter cover.
The impact was dramatic. Post-strike target photos revealed the
progressive destruction of the Iraqi Air Force. Each F-111 carried up
to four bombs. In one attack, 20 F-111s made two passes each on an
airfield, delivering PGMs directly on command bunkers and aircraft
shelters, within seven minutes. This equates to a weapon impact about
every five seconds. Most of these case hardened bombs penetrated many
feet of reinforced concrete and detonated inside the shelters, causing
catastrophic explosions that destroyed the shelters and their contents
from the inside out. Concrete and steel blast doors weighing as much
as 60 tons were hurled up to 250 feet. In some cases, the bombs
penetrated the roof and the floor of the shelter before detonation,
crushing aircraft between the floor and ceiling.
Although the Iraqis had flown a few aircraft to Iran before
Operation Desert Storm, most had been cargo or transport aircraft. On
26 January, however, the Iraqis suddenly began a mass exodus of their
more capable combat aircraft to Iran. During the next three days,
CENTCOM estimated nearly 80 combat aircraft fled across the border.
The Coalition responded by establishing barrier air patrols between
Baghdad and the Iranian border with F-15s, and later with F-14s, which
resulted in several MiG-23s being shot down. No Iraqi aircraft entered
Iranian airspace for several days. However, when the patrols were
reduced, the Iraqis resumed the flights. Between 6 and 10 February,
more than 40 aircraft fled to Iran, where aircraft and pilots were
interned by the Iranian government. The Coalition then increased the
patrols and prevented most aircraft from leaving Iraq.
Meanwhile, in further attempts to prevent the air force's
annihilation, the Iraqis also dispersed their aircraft around
airfields, onto public roads, into civilian neighborhoods, and even in
the shadows of ancient historical structures. Perhaps they guessed
Coalition aircrews would not risk killing civilians or damaging
historical monuments to destroy isolated aircraft. Although some
dispersed aircraft were attacked during the remainder of the war, the
Coalition considered them a low priority because they were difficult
to service, launch, and maintain; they were effectively out of the
fight. By 27 January, CINCCENT was able to announce the Iraqi Air
Force was combat ineffective air supremacy had been secured.
SEAD Operations
Establishment of air superiority in the KTO, planned as the second
phase of the campaign, took place in conjunction with Phase I. The
targets included Iraqi air defense weapons systems able to disrupt
Coalition air strikes against Iraq and Kuwait. Particular emphasis was
placed on enemy SAM systems, including mobile launchers, AAA, early
warning and target tracking radars, and C2 links that tied these
systems together. Phase II was a combined operation involving the
aircraft of several Coalition nations as well as Army, Navy, USMC and
USAF assets. EW aircraft, dedicated to SEAD missions, were the heart
and soul of Phase II operations.
In the early days of the air campaign, EA-6Bs, A-6Es, and F/A-18s
escorted large strike packages into southern Iraq. The F/A-18s, A-6Es,
A-7s, and S-3s successfully used TALDs to saturate, confuse, and
deceive the air defense system. This tandem combination of soft and
hard kill capability proved successful - no Coalition losses to
radar-guided SAMs occurred during SEAD escort.
EA-6Bs and EF-111s also were highly effective in jamming Iraqi
low-frequency early warning and higher frequency target-track and
acquisition radars throughout the early air campaign, providing an
umbrella for strikes. This jamming tactic was reduced as the war
evolved because of the apparent success of HARMs and hard-kill weapons
Coalition air forces delivered.
The carefully planned, large-scale SEAD operation, begun during the
opening moments of the war, was successful. During the latter part of
the war, many sites not destroyed by HARMs or bombs were wary about
turning on radars for fear of being attacked. Although some
target-acquisition and target-track radars were not destroyed, enemy
radar activity decreased as the war progressed; consequently, the
number of HARMs fired also declined. The captured commander of an
Iraqi armored unit stated a fear of instant retaliation if his radars
or radios were turned on. With this disruption of SAM and AAA radars,
Coalition forces were able to operate at medium to high altitudes,
staying out of the low altitude, highly lethal AAA and infrared (IR)
SAM environment. SEAD helped degrade air defense capabilities and
command links, stopping the effective flow of information throughout
the Iraqi chain of command.
D + 7 through D + 13: Summary Of Week Two (24 - 30 January)
As the bad weather that disrupted air operations during the first
week of Operation Desert Storm cleared, the Coalition intensified its
air attacks. The most notable aspects of week two operations were the
interdiction of Iraqi LOCs in the KTO, the start of hardened aircraft
shelter destruction, and the direct attacks on Iraqi forces in the
KTO. Additional Coalition members began or increased their
participation - the Qatari Emirates Air Force began flying combat
missions and the FAF extended its combat operations into Iraq. Air
attacks against strategic targets continued. The Iraqi strategic air
defense system was so badly fragmented that only three of 16 IOC were
fully operational. The anti-Scud effort continued unabated, although
Iraq continued to launch Scuds at both Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Coalition air losses were extremely light, with only three aircraft
(an F-16, an AV-8B, and an RAF GR-1) lost to enemy action in seven
days' operations. The Iraqi Air Force lost 11 aircraft in air-to-air
combat.
On 25 January, Saddam Hussein began fouling the Gulf with millions
of barrels of heavy, black crude oil. The damage inflicted through
pumping crude oil directly into the Gulf was unprecedented. Iraq's
intent may have been to block Coalition amphibious operations, or to
threaten Saudi desalinization plants. Whatever the motive, the impact
would have been even worse except for the Coalition's actions. Two
F-111Fs used 2,000-lb GBU-15 bombs to destroy the pumping system and
manifolds, cutting off the flow of oil into the Persian Gulf
waters.
Air operations to cut Iraqi movements into the KTO began in earnest
during week two. On the 27 January, eight bridges were dropped or
substantially damaged. These strikes not only caused traffic backups,
which themselves became lucrative targets, but also further degraded
Iraqi C3 because some bridges carried communications cables. Once
again, the ability of Coalition aircraft, especially F-l 11Fs, A-6s,
F-15Es, F/A-18s, and RAF GR-1 (in cooperation with RAF Buccaneers), to
deliver PGMs with extraordinary accuracy was a key factor in this
effort.
Also on 27 January, Coalition air planners increased emphasis on the
isolation and destruction of the Republican Guard and Iraqi Army in
the KTO. The Republican Guard, Iraqi armor, artillery, C3, and
logistics throughout the KTO were marked for heavy attacks.
D + 12 through D + 14 (29 - 31 January) - The Battle Of Al-Khafji
On 2 January, the Iraqis launched several small attacks into Saudi
Arabia and captured the undefended, evacuated border town of
Al-Khafji. Coalition air power played a key role in defeating these
attacks, which ended with an important Coalition victory during the
air campaign's third week. Other than Scud attacks on Saudi and
Israeli cities, this was the only noteworthy Iraqi offensive action.
Saddam Hussein's exact purpose is not known, although he might have
sought to probe Coalition forces or provoke a large-scale ground
battle. EPW reports show a major objective was to capture American
troops. Although Iraqi forces occupied the nearly deserted town, their
ultimate defeat said much about their combat capabilities 12 days into
the air campaign (Coalition ground actions in Al-Khafji are discussed
in more detail in Appendices I and J).
During the night of 29 and 30 January, Iraqi armored and mechanized
infantry forces began several battalion-sized attacks against
Coalition ground forces, including elements of the Saudi Arabian
National Guard and USMC forces. The eastern most Iraqi force occupied
the Saudi Arabian border town of Al-Khafji. Despite being outgunned by
the heavier Iraqi forces, Coalition ground forces offered stiff
resistance. Saudi M60 tanks destroyed Iraqi tanks and armored
personnel carriers. Farther to the west at Al-Wafrah and across the
southwestern corner of Kuwait, the USMC inflicted substantial losses
on the Iraqis, using Light Armor Vehicles equipped with TOW anti-tank
missiles.
The Iraqi forces were from the 5th Mechanized and the 3rd Armored
divisions of the regular army, equipped with several hundred tanks and
other armored vehicles, but they had no air support.
While Coalition ground forces were fighting the advancing Iraqis,
Coalition air power had a major effect on the battle. While USMC
helicopter gunships provided close-in fire support, a steady stream of
Coalition fixed-wing aircraft struck the Iraqis. AV-8Bs, A-6s, and
F/A-18s, working with OV-10 forward air controllers (FACs), delivered
general purpose and cluster bombs against Iraqi troops near Coalition
ground forces. A-6s used radar beacons broadcasting from special
forces on the ground to guide their bombing of Iraqi artillery
positions, while A-10s using Maverick missiles and LANTIRN-equipped
F-16s using CBU-87 combined effects munitions attacked armor and
vehicles. Three AC-130 gunships from the 1st SOW delivered minigun and
cannon fire against vehicles an3armored personnel carriers; one AC-130
was shot down. The combination of dogged resistance by the 9 round
forces and the constant pounding from Coalition air forces stopped the
Iraqi advance.
During daylight on 30 January, Coalition ground and air forces
continued to maul the Iraqis, demonstrating the degree to which
Coalition military power was coordinated and integrated. That night,
Saudi Arabian and Qatari armored elements launched a counter strike
against the Iraqis holding Al-Khafji; by midday on 31 January, they
had destroyed the remaining Iraqi forces in the town, taking several
hundred EPWs.
SPECIAL NOTE
| On 30 January, two Iraqi divisions were detected marshaling for a
follow-on attack into Al-Khafji. This offered Coalition air power a
lucrative target and, shortly after nightfall, Coalition aircraft took
full advantage of their night combat capabilities. Heavy Coalition air
attacks were directed onto the two Iraqi divisions. B-52s dropped
armor-sensing mines, AV-8Bs, A-6s, and FIA-18s delivered cluster and
precision munitions, A-10s and F-16s fired Maverick missiles, and F-1
SEs and F-16s dropped combined effects munitions. In some cases, when
Iraqi vehicles were found in columns, the first aircraft took out the
lead and trail vehicles, trapping the rest of the vehicles for
follow-on attacks. In another case, the Tactical Air Control Center
used Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft to redirect a three-
ship B-52 formation to strike Iraqi armor north of Al-Khafji. The
strike caught more than 80 Iraqi vehicles in column and broke it
apart, making it easier for other aircraft to destroy the rest of the
column.
- CENTCOM Messages and Unit Reports
|
This ended the ground engagements of the battle of Al-Khafji, but a
lesser known aspect had taken place that night, 30-31 January, farther
north, inside occupied Kuwait. During the daylight hours of 30
January, while Coalition aircraft conducted tactical strikes on Iraqi
forces in contact with Coalition ground forces, manned and unmanned
reconnaissance, and intelligence assets gathered a clearer picture of
what was going on behind the leading Iraqi elements. New
reconnaissance technologies such as the TR-1, Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and Navy and USMC unmanned aerial
vehicles played an important role.
For eight hours, throughout the night Coalition air power
systematically attacked and decimated the two divisions; by daybreak
the divisions were retreating in disarray. If they had been able to
attack into Saudi Arabia in good order, they might have precipitated a
large-scale ground engagement and caused significant Coalition
casualties. Instead, they were repulsed. III Corps suffered numerous
casualties and lost a substantial number of tanks and an undetermined
number of other vehicles, according to combat unit and intelligence
reports.
The Battle of Al-Khafji was important for the Coalition; the only
ground offensive operation Saddam Hussein mounted had been defeated.
The Pan-Arab forces had defeated the Iraqis in a pitched battle,
launching a difficult night counterattack against enemy armor. The
destruction inflicted on two Iraqi divisions by Coalition aircraft
seemed to presage what awaited any Iraqi force that left dug-in
defenses to conduct a mobile operation. The strategic significance:
Any Iraqi unit that moved probably would be struck from the air. Any
unit that remained in place eventually would be struck either from the
air, or by the impending ground assault.
D + 20 (6-7 February - Emphasis On Degrading The Iraqi Army And
Navy)
During the air campaign's 21st day, attacks continued across the
theater, although CINCCENT was shifting the emphasis from strategic
targets in Iraq to direct attacks on Iraqi forces in the KTO. Map
V1-10 depicts the D + 20 planned sorties during 6 to 7 February, 1700
to 0025 hours. These attacks were roughly concentrated in four
geographic regions - strategic targets in Baghdad; strategic targets
in northern Iraqi Scud-related targets in the southwest and southeast
of Iraqi direct attack on Iraqi forces in the KTO.
Attacks in northern Iraq were planned primarily against airfields
and hardened aircraft shelters, CW and nuclear weapons storage and
production facilities. As examples, a dozen F-111s from At-Taif bombed
the nuclear production and storage facilities at Mosul (Al-Mawsil);
JTF Proven Force F-111s hit communications transmitters and a railroad
station near Kirkuk.
Attacks in and near Baghdad concentrated on leadership, C2, and
airfields. F117A sorties were planned against leadership command
facilities and a Signals Intelligence facility in Baghdad. Other
F-117As were scheduled to bomb leadership facilities and hardened
aircraft shelters at Ar-Rashid and Balad Southeast airfields near
Baghdad. B-52s were tasked to bomb the military production plant at
Habbaniyah. More than a dozen A-6s and F/A-18s were scheduled to
attack the SAM production and support facility at Al-Falliyah.
Concurrently, Red Sea Battle Force aircraft were bombing targets north
of Baghdad in the target complexes around Samarra.
During the same period, taking advantage of night detection and
targeting systems, dozens of F-1 5Es and LANTIRN-equipped F-16s were
scheduled to respond to JSTARS and AWACS, which would direct attacks
on Scud launchers and transporters, and other targets of opportunity
such as convoys and Iraqi Army forces.
Meanwhile, waves of attacks were to take place in the KTO against
Iraqi armored and mechanized units, personnel, artillery, headquarters
facilities, C2 facilities, supply vehicles and bridges, and storage
areas. MC-130s were to drop 15,000-lb BLU-82 bombs against front line
Iraqi positions in southern Kuwait. Silkworm missile sites and an
infantry division at Al-Faw were scheduled for attacks by A-6sand
B-52s. Scores of sorties by B-52s, AV-8Bs, F-16s/ A-10s, F/A-18s,
A-6s, A-7s, and an AC-130 were directed to attack Iraqi ground forces
in kill boxes inside Kuwait.
Cutting Off The Iraqi Army
Air interdiction attacks were planned to reduce and slow resupply
for the forces in the KTO, which were almost totally dependent on
outside sources for supplies, including food and water. The Iraqis
had extensive stockpiles in rear areas which were only moderately
degraded by air attacks - but air attacks dramatically slowed
resupply. The key interdiction targets were identified as about 40 of
the 54 bridges across the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, along with
railroad marshaling yards, fuel depots and supply concentration areas.
Truck convoys also were hit.
Cutting the one rail line running south from Al-Basrah through
Az-Zubayr to the KTO and the bridges over the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers reduced the ability of the Iraqi army to resupply the theater.
Once stockpiled supplies had been destroyed from the air or consumed,
the Iraqi army would be unable to sustain itself.
Interdiction attacks reduced the flow of supplies from Baghdad to
the KTO and made supply movements with in the KTO extremely difficult
and slow. By 4 February (D + 18), intelligence estimated the amount of
supplies reaching Iraqi forces in the KTO was below the level needed
to sustain combat operations. One captured senior Iraqi infantry
officer said that one week after the bombing began, there was no more
resupply. Food shortages apparently caused desertion rates to
escalate. Air interdiction attacks left most of the Iraqi army in the
KTO weak and demoralized, although frontline forces in Kuwait bore the
brunt of these privations. These and other air attacks, according to
Military Intelligence reports, psychologically disarmed some Iraqi
soldiers.
Degrading the Iraqi Army
Beginning on D-Day, Coalition air power, naval gunfire bombardment
from the Gulf, and ground based artillery and rocket systems
methodically struck Iraqi armor, artillery, and infantry forces.
During the war, more than 35,000 attack sorties were flown against KTO
targets, including 5,600 against Republican Guard forces. Artillery,
CPs, C2 facilities, armor, and logistics installations were hit daily.
As the ground offensive approached, more sorties were allocated to
battlefield preparation and breaching operations. B-52s and USMC A-6s
were used along enemy front lines in conjunction with MC-130s and
other aircraft to deliver more than 21 million psychological warfare
leaflets to warn Iraqi forces of what to expect if they did not leave
Kuwait.
SPECIAL NOTE
| The executive officer of Marine Attack Squadron 311, and his
division went on standby alert for the first morning of the war. At
0740 an OV-10 reported Iraqi artillery was firing on the Saudi town of
Al-Khafji. The major led his four AV8Bs, each loaded with four 1,000
pound bombs, Sidewinder missiles, and guns, north over the Persian
Gulf. From their position 20,000 feet over the sea they could see
smoke from burning oil tanks billowing 10,000 feet into the air. The
OV-10 controller briefed the AV-8Bs, which then rolled in on six Iraqi
artillery pieces. From out of the morning sun, the AV-8B pilots
watched artillery tubes tossed high into the air from the impact of
their bombs, then they headed back to base. The AV-8Bs' first combat
mission was a success.
- Marine Attack Group 13 (Forward), Commanding Officer Report
|
Kill Boxes
Locating and destroying the enemy in the tight confines of the KTO,
while deconflicting Coalition air strikes, was a major concern. With
the large number of Coalition aircraft operating over the KTO,
especially in bad weather and the limited visibility caused by the
smoke from burning oil fields, it was imperative to separate air
strike elements, both to prevent the inefficiency of striking the same
target and to prevent fratricide or mid-air collisions. Before
Operation Desert Storm began, air planners devised a kill box
system.
Kill boxes were assigned on the ATO and aircraft operating in them
were allowed to locate and attack targets of opportunity. The boxes
were 30 miles on a side (more than three times the size of New York
City) and were subdivided into four quadrants to be assigned to a
flight for a specified period of time. This system not only
deconflicted the many Coalition aircraft operating in the region but
also simplified the task of locating targets. When possible, airborne
FACs and strike units were assigned repeatedly to a specific kill box
increasing their familiarity with its features and terrain and making
operations more effective. Within the I MEF area of operations, the
kill boxes were further subdivided into maneuver boxes and fire
support boxes, which simplified the task of coordinating and
controlling air strikes at known locations.
Destroying the Iraqi Navy
The maritime campaign plan called for neutralization and destruction
of Iraqi naval combatants and Iraqi mine layers. This effort was
considered a prerequisite to moving Coalition naval forces into the
northern Persian Gulf to support the anticipated ground offensive and
a possible amphibious assault. (See Chapter VII, Maritime Campaign,
for detailed description of naval operations.) To carry out these
attacks, Navy commanders used, in addition to Coalition warships,
carrier-based aircraft (A-6Es, F/A-18s, F-14s, and S-3A/Bs), MPA
(P-3Cs and RAF Nimrods), helicopters (Navy SH-60Bs, RAF Lynxes, and
Army OH-58Ds), and land-based Coalition aircraft (CAF CF-18s). These
assets used such weapons as Mark 80 series 500- and 1,000-lb bombs,
1,000-lb LGBs, Skipper air-to-surface missiles, Zuni 5-inch rockets,
and MK-20 Rockeye 500-lb cluster bombs. Sea Skua helicopters launched
air-to-surface missiles, and used .50 caliber and 20-mm aircraft
machine guns. By 2 February, the Iraqi navy was assessed as being
incapable of offensive action.
D + 14 through D + 20: Summary Of Week Three (31 January - 6 February)
Week three focused attacks on the Republican Guard and other Iraqi
forces in the KTO, with the overall emphasis shifting from strategic
attacks towards KTO objectives. JTF Proven Force kept up the pressure
over northern and central Iraq. The Iraqi Navy was eliminated as a
fighting force.
Convoys jammed up behind destroyed bridges and made large numbers of
Iraqi supply vehicles vulnerable to destruction. Newly implemented FAC
techniques, such as operating special scout FACs within designated
geographic kill boxes, increased the efficiency and destructiveness of
battlefield air operations. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) were
mounted to weaken Iraqi morale and increase desertion. These included
operations such as leaflet drops to warn Iraqi units of impending
attacks (to spur desertion), and the use of BLU-82 bombs to send a
threatening signal to Iraqi ground soldiers.
Coalition losses during this week were again quite low, with only
three planes (an A-10, an AC-130, and A-6E) lost to enemy action.
Continuing to Disrupt Iraqi C3
Some bridges between Baghdad and the KTO were used not only to move
supplies but also as conduits for Iraqi communications cables.
Bombing these bridges would help cut the supply line, and a link in
the Iraqi military communications network into the KTO. The fiber
optic network Saddam Hussein used to communicate with his field
commanders also included many switching stations (one of which was in
the basement of the Ar-Rashid Hotel) and dozens of relay sites along
the oil pipeline from Baghdad through Al-Basrah to the south of Iraq.
However, hitting some of these targets was not desirable, despite
their military significance, because of possible collateral damage.
By mid-February, according to CENTCOM and EPW reports,
communications between corps and division headquarters and their
subordinate units along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border had become sporadic.
In many instances, Iraqi commanders had to use messengers to
communicate with other units and with different command levels. Some
captured Iraqi commanders indicated they had no communications at all
with their headquarters for more than a week before G-Day.
Armored Vehicle Destruction
It was necessary to reduce Iraqi armored and mechanized forces
because they were a threat to Coalition ground forces du ring the
final phase of the war. Not only were they the underpinning of Iraq's
position in Kuwait, but they also strengthened Iraq's ability to
threaten its Gulf neighbors.
Locating and destroying this equipment was difficult. In many cases,
tanks and artillery pieces were spread out, dug in up to their
turrets, sandbagged and surrounded by berms, trading mobility for
supposed survivability.
Before the war, reconnaissance systems provided extremely accurate
depictions of the Iraqi deployments, and planners realized there might
be ways to exploit the Iraqis' visible and predictable deployment
patterns. A F-16 pilot from the 614th TFS said "Flying in the area of
the Republican Guard was a fighter pilot's dream come true. There were
revetments full of tanks, armored personnel carriers, ammunition, AAA
and artillery as far as the eye could see." In some areas, CENTCOM
reported during the war that air power damaged or destroyed a large
percentage of the Iraqi armored vehicles.
Aircrews learned that desert conditions created some unique
opportunities for weapons that use thermal imaging or IR seekers. In
early February, F-111 crews returning to base near sunset noted the
presence of buried armor could be detected by FLIR equipment, because
the metallic surfaces cooled slower than the surrounding sand. On 8
February, F-111Fs tried a new tactic, that informally became known as
"tank plinking," in which an F-111, carrying four GBU-12, 500-lb LGBs,
located and bombed individual Iraqi tanks.
The JFACC was satisfied with the results of these efforts. Soon,
A-6Es and F-15Es joined the fray and achieved similar results. There
were several instances, according to JFACC staff reports, when two
F-15Es carrying 16 bombs were believed to have destroyed 16 tanks.
These tactics demonstrate the creativity of American airmen and are a
good example of excellent technology being improved on by outstanding
personnel. The F-111 was designed to conduct long-range, strategic
bombing runs, not to destroy tanks one by one. Yet when the need
arose, crews responded and developed a tactic (permitted by air
supremacy) that helped meet a vital objective. A-6Es and A-10s, on the
other hand, do train for day and night attacks on armored vehicles.
The AGM-65 Maverick missiles fired from A-10, F-16, AV-8, and
F/A-18) had electro-optical, IR, or laser seekers, and were effective
against tanks. The Coalition fired more than 5,100 AGM-65s; A-10s
fired 4,801. In fact, more than 90 percent of the tank kills credited
to the A-10 were achieved with IR Mavericks and not with its 30mm
GAU-8 gun. (This was in part a factor of the Iraqi AAA threat, which
forced the aircraft to operate at altitudes where the gun was less
effective.) More importantly, the innovative and aggressive use of
PGMs sped the destruction of Iraq's armored forces in the KTO. (For
more details on AGM-65, see Appendix T.)
Tanks Abandoned
An Iraqi officer commented that during the war with Iran, the tank
had been the soldier's friend, keeping him safe from enemy fire during
cold desert nights. During the Operation Desert Storm air campaign,
the tank was his enemy because high flying aircraft could destroy it
without warning, even at night. As a result, soldiers would leave
their vehicles and live in trenches a hundred yards away. Some US
ground forces commanders reported that many enemy tank crews had
abandoned their tanks presumably in part because of Coalition air and
artillery attacks. We do not know if this was a widespread
phenomenon.
Psychological Operations Impact
Millions of PSYOP leaflets were dropped; they called on the Iraqis
not only to surrender, but also warned them to stay away from their
equipment because it was the target of Coalition air strikes. Most
leaflets were dropped by MC-130s. F-16s and other aircraft flew
several missions a day carrying the MK 129 leaflet container,
showering the Iraqi troops with messages and warnings. USMC A-6s
dropped another version of the leaflet in Kuwait. UH-1N used
loudspeakers and Arab linguists to convince Iraqi soldiers to
surrender along the Kuwait border. One leaflet depicted a mosque and a
schoolyard, in which Saddam Hussein had liberally interspersed tanks,
AAA guns, and other military equipment. The message to the Iraqi
soldier was that Saddam Hussein was deliberately endangering their
religion and families.
The detonation of several 15,000-lb bombs, dropped from MC-130
special operations planes, also seemed to have a psychological effect
on Iraqi troops. Senior Iraqi officer EPWs frequently commented their
troops also were terrified of B-52s, and could clearly see and hear
their strikes, even when miles away. (PSYOP are discussed in greater
detail in Appendix J.)
CINCCENT assigned ARCENT responsibility for estimating attrition
inflicted by aerial attack on three types of Iraqi ground equipment.
Table V1-4 shows the estimates that ARCENT prepared during the war of
attrition. These estimates were among several tools used by CINCCENT
in making his decision on when to begin the Offensive Ground Campaign.
The objective of the battlefield preparation phase of the air campaign
was to reduce Iraqi capabilities in the KTO by about 50 percent in
preparation for ground operations. Consequently, BDA methodology was
focused on developing estimates of Iraqi equipment that contributed to
those capabilities. In this methodology, the estimates began by using
flying unit reports of equipment destruction. A-10, F-111, and F-15E
reports accounted for most ARCENT taunted claims, although other
aircraft also were involved. Pilot reports had to be supported by
either an aircraft generated video tape recording (VTR), or imagery
produced by other sources. The unit's mission reports and imagery were
reviewed by a Ground Liaison Officer (GLO). If the GLO confirmed the
claim, ARCENT then adjusted the estimates to account for imprecision
in the pilot reports and the imagery. For example, an A-10 mission
report of a destroyed tank was counted as one third of a tank
destroyed. An F-111 report would be counted as one half of the
report's claim.
These adjustment factors were changed several times during Operation
Desert Storm. BDA methodology is addressed in more detail in this
chapter in the section entitled, "Evaluating the Results of the Air
Campaign."
D + 21 through D + 27: Summary Of Week Four (7 - 13 February)
Week four maintained the emphasis on attacking Iraqi forces in the
KTO. It was notable for the full implementation of tank plinking
attacks on enemy armor forces, and for a strategic attack on an
alternate military command bunker in which, regrettably, Iraqi
civilians were killed.
Because of Coalition air superiority, the Iraqi Air Force was unable
to gather intelligence about, or interfere with, the westward flanking
movement Coalition ground forces were making as they prepared to
execute the ground offensive. The air campaign had degraded the combat
effectiveness of major parts of the Iraqi Army in the KTO.
The Strategic Air Campaign continued, although at a lower level of
effort because of the focus on direct air attacks on deployed Iraqi
forces. After four weeks of intense air attack, Iraq was strategically
crippled. Its navy had been eliminated as an effective combat force,
much of its air force either interned in neutral Iran or destroyed in
Iraq, and its strategic air defenses neutralized. Iraq's forces and
military capabilities were vulnerable to Coalition air power. The
national electric grid had collapsed and refined oil products
production halted. NBC facilities and systems had been struck, and
Iraq's ability to produce CW munitions and agents badly damaged. Based
on the reduced frequency of Scud launches after mobile Scud-hunting
air operations began, the combined effects of the counter-Scud effort
and the continued degradation of Iraqi military capabilities appeared
to reduce Iraq's ability to launch missiles. Table VI-10 shows that
during the first 10 days of Operation Desert Storm, Scud launches
averaged five a day; during February, the average was slightly more
than one a day.
Careful targeting and use of PGMs minimized collateral damage and
civilian casualties, reflecting US policy that Saddam Hussein and his
military machine, not the Iraqi people, were the enemy. Regrettably,
there were civilian casualties. One of the more publicized incidents
was the destruction of the Al-Firdus district bomb shelter and
alternate military CP in Baghdad on the night of 13-14 February. The
Al Firdus bunker originally was constructed as a bomb shelter, but had
been modified to serve as part of the national C3 network providing C2
of Iraqi forces.
When Coalition intelligence sources reported the bunker had been
activated and its communications capabilities were being used by
senior Iraqi military officials, Al Firdus was placed on the MAP. The
attack was carried out by two F-11 7s, which each dropped one
case-hardened penetrating 2,000-lb LGB, which set the bunker afire and
destroyed it. Unfortunately, Iraqi authorities had permitted several
hundred civilians into the facility, many of whom were killed or
seriously injured. Intelligence had reported there were no civilians
using the bomb shelter facilities. The resultant loss of civilian life
led to a review of targeting policies, which were determined to be
proper. (See Appendix O, The Role of Law of War, for further
discussion.)
Coalition aircraft losses remained low during the week's operations.
Two AV-8Bs and an RSAF F-5 were shot down. Iraqi air-to-air losses
also were light (five aircraft shot down) because they continued to
avoid combat.
D + 28 through D + 34: Week Five (14 - 20 February)
During Week Five, heavy attacks continued to focus on Iraqi forces
in the KTO, while operations against strategic targets and the SEAD
effort continued. Iraq's strategic air defenses remained quiescent,
with only six of the more than 70 operations centers and reporting
posts active. JTF Proven Force struck NBC and missile production
facilities in Kirkuk and Mosul in northern Iraq. The counter-Scud
effort continued with direct attacks on suspected Scud launch
vehicles, mining and bombing of suspected launch and hide areas, and
nairborne alert sorties to search for targets of opportunity. These
efforts appeared to make Scud movements more dangerous and probably
narrowed the mobile launchers' operating areas.
Interdiction of LOCs leading into the KTO continued, as Coalition
aircraft attacked pontoon bridges, which replaced previously destroyed
fixed bridges. The Iraqis' heavy vehicle losses led to the use of
civilian vehicles, even garbage trucks, to transport supplies to the
KTO.
The emphasis was now shifting to attacks on front line Iraqi units
and direct battlefield preparation for the impending ground offensive.
While the antiarmor effort continued to damage or destroy a number of
armored vehicles every night, other aircraft struck front line
defenses and vehicles during the day. AV-8Bs dropped napalm on Iraqi
fire trenches by day while, after dark, F-117s destroyed the pumps
that supplied crude oil to the trenches. B-52 mine-breaching strikes
continued, while MC-130s dropped the giant BLU-82.
The greatest threat to Coalition aircraft remained ground-based
defenses; during the week, the Coalition lost five aircraft: An OA-10,
two A-10s, an F-16 and an RAF GR-1. The loss of two A-10s on the same
day while attacking the same Republican Guard target led to
restrictions on the use of A-10s in the higher threat areas. Again,
due to the Iraqi Air Force's almost total incapacitation in the face
of Coalition air supremacy, the remaining fixed-wing force did not fly
any combat sorties. Many Iraqi EPWs commented on the lack of air
support they received during the war.
Summary of the Air Campaign, On The Eve Of The Offensive Ground Campaign
The Operation Desert Storm air campaign helped isolate Iraq's
leadership seriously degraded the ability to conduct effective
offensive and defensive operations, and reduced the threat to regional
stability and security. Nearly 100,000 combat and support sorties were
flown and 288 TLAMs and 35 ALCMs launched before G-Day. Of all sorties
flown, 60 percent were combat missions. Damage to Iraqi forces was
extensive, and Iraqi C2 was disrupted radically. In some cases, corps,
division and brigade commanders lost touch with their commands.
Moderate amounts of equipment and supplies Iraq positioned to support
the KTO were destroyed, and the road nets on which replenishment had
to pass were degraded. Interdiction operations against fielded forces
during Phase III sapped Iraqi forces' morale - according to
intelligence reports in the week before the ground offensive,
confirmed by subsequent reports from captured Iraqi officers,
desertion rates were substantial. Phase III greatly reduced Saddam
Hussein's ability to bring the strength of his army to bear against
the Coalition forces. At the end of a month of bombardment, Iraqi
forces remained in Kuwait; however, most were in poor condition with
heavy desertions, low morale, and a severely degraded capability to
coordinate an effective defense.
By G-Day, CENTCOM intelligence estimated Iraqi front line divisions
had been reduced in effectiveness by approximately 50 percent due to
desertion, supply degradation, and casualties the air campaign
inflicted. Air attacks had been so effective that some Iraqi forces in
the KTO were largely immobilized, cut off from effective C2,
increasingly isolated from their supply sources, and demoralized. Not
only were the front line forces unaware of the overall situation, but
some Iraqi leadership and command elements also were unaware of the
condition of their forces. CENTCOM estimated the combat effectiveness
of Iraqi forces, before G-Day, was reduced by approximately 25 percent
in the rear (which principally were the more potent Republican Guard
forces), and by about half in the front echelon of regular army units.
The Republican Guards were not attacked more heavily because of
targeting priorities, as well as resource and BDA limitations.
Nonetheless, when Coalition ground forces launched their offensive,
they were met by an Iraqi army already demoralized and severely
degraded in combat effectiveness. The CJCS subsequently said, "...air
power took a terrible toll, not only by destroying equipment, but by
breaking formations and breaking the will of the Iraqi armed
forces.
D + 38 (24 February - The Strategic Air Campaign Continues, And
Air Operations Begin In Direct Support Of The Offensive Ground
Campaign)
Overview
During the Offensive Ground Campaign's four days, strategic air
operations continued throughout Iraq and Kuwait. RAF GR-1s and
Buccaneers, escorted by F-4Gs, bombed hardened aircraft shelters at
Tallil and Jalibah airfields. A large package of F-16s and F-4Es
escorted by F-15s, EF-111s, and F-4Gs attacked the Al Mawsil military
research and production facility in northern Iraq. F-1 6s bombed the
Shahiyat liquid fuel research and development facility. F-15Es sat
ground alert and flew airborne alert ready for rapid response to Scud
targeting by JSTARS and other surveillance systems. LANTIRN-equipped
F-16s also flew in response to JSTARS target advisories during the
night. B-52s bombed C3 sites in southern Iraq.
Interdiction attacks also continued to disrupt the movement and
resupply of Iraqi forces in the KTO. F-16s and A-10s, responding to
JSTARS targeting, flew armed reconnaissance along Iraqi roads.
Restrikes were conducted against bridges to curtail Iraqi
reconstruction.
Battlefield air attack sorties increased to support ground forces.
On G-Day, scores of ground attack aircraft assigned to kill boxes
attacked artillery, armor, APC, supply vehicles, CPs, and troops.
F/A-18s and A-6s with EA-6B SEAD, E-2 early warning and C2, and KA-6
refueling support, attacked ZSU-23-4 AAA and SAM batteries in the KTO.
Sections of AV-8Bs attacked Faylaka Island about every half hour
throughout the day in preparation for the pending Coalition
occupation. RSAF F-5s, United Arab Emirates Air Force M2000s, and
Kuwaiti Air Force (KAF) F-1s attacked artillery batteries and other
Iraqi forces in the KTO. F-1 6s and Tornados bombed sites used to pump
oil into trenches along planned Coalition ground attack corridors.
Italian GR-1s and FAF F-1s and Jaguars struck artillery, armor, and
troops in the KTO.
Battlefield Air Operations
Coalition air forces provided invaluable assistance to CINCCENT's
ground scheme of maneuver. But the ground offensive's speed required
innovative actions beyond what is considered to be the norm for
combined arms operations. For example, determining the exact position
of the forward edge of Coalition ground forces was difficult because
they moved faster than anticipated. Ground liaison officers, air
liaison officers, and airborne C2 posts (such as FACs, AWACS, and
ABCCC) worked to deconflict the movements and attacks in the KTO. In
effect, each attack was deconflicted on a case-by-case basis.
Air attacks used in conjunction with ground forces will be discussed
in three categories. These operations over and around the battlefield
can be described as interdiction, close air support (CAS), and
breaching operations support.
Air Interdiction
By the ground offensive's start, Coalition air interdiction of Iraqi
LOCs had destroyed key logistical system elements. Interdiction of
supply lines to the KTO reduced deliveries to a trickle. These and
direct attacks on Iraqi supply points and transportation resulted in
major supply shortages for fielded Iraqi forces in Kuwait, although
the Republican Guards and other high priority units in Iraq appeared
to suffer less. The effort to disrupt, delay, and destroy enemy forces
and capabilities before they could be used against friendly forces
continued, but the focus shifted to Iraqi systems nearer to Coalition
forces. Air power engaged Iraqi supply elements that attempted to move
food, fuel, and ammunition. Combat elements that attempted to shift
position, retreat or advance, were identified by Coalition
reconnaissance and surveillance systems such as U-2, TR-1, JSTARS, and
RC-1 35s and were subjected to air attack. Iraqi forces thus were on
the horns of a dilemma: if they remained in position, they would be
struck either from the air or by advancing Coalition ground forces; if
they tried to move, they made themselves extremely vulnerable to
patrolling Coalition aircraft, including attack helicopters.
One of the more important targets for Coalition aircraft was Iraqi
artillery because of its long range and ability to fire chemical
projectiles. Two days before ground operations started, air planners,
in response to a request from the VII Corps commander, switched the
F-111s from the Republican Guard to the Iraqi 47th Infantry Division
artillery, because that unit had an abnormally large artillery
component (204 instead of the normal complement of 72 pieces) and was
in a position to fire on either the Egyptian forces or VII Corps. In
less than a day, many artillery pieces were destroyed as a result of
air strikes and artillery raids. Thirty-six hours later, when the VII
Corps began its breaching operation, Iraqi artillery near the
breaching site was ineffectual, and the Corps completed breaching
operations with minimal casualties. Large numbers of Iraqi soldiers
began surrendering to advancing Coalition forces throughout G-Day. By
day's end, more than 8,000 had been collected, and their condition
said much about the effectiveness of Coalition efforts. Many were weak
from hunger, sick, lice-infested, demoralized or in shock.
Another example of interdiction operations occurred on the night of
G + 2, when JSTARS detected large numbers of Iraqi vehicles moving
from Kuwait towards Iraq. III Corps, trying to reach Al-Basrah and
avoid destruction by I MEF and the Arab Joint Forces Command-East
(JFC-E) forces, became enmeshed with Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait
City. North and west of Kuwait City the roads and causeways formed a
bottleneck and the mass of vehicles presented a lucrative target for
Coalition airpower. Coalition commanders, aware that forces escaping
with their combat equipment could regroup and pose a danger to
Coalition ground forces, focused repeated air strikes in the area.
Striking first at night, then into the daylight hours, Coalition
aircraft destroyed a large number of vehicles, many abandoned by their
crews who fled into the desert.
Military formations - particularly armored units in the open desert-
exposed to constant attack from the air suffer losses and degradation
of combat effectiveness. The many different Coalition air power
elements served to magnify this effect on the Iraqis. One Iraqi
officer stated he surrendered because of B-52 strikes. "But your
position was never attacked by B-52s," his interrogator exclaimed
"That is true," the Iraqi officer stated, "but I saw one that had been
attacked." After one BLU-82 bombing of an Iraqi minefield, leaflets
were dropped on Iraqi troops that had witnessed the explosion, warning
they would be next. Not knowing the bomb had been targeted on a
minefield, mass defections resulted, including virtually the entire
staff of one Iraqi battalion.
SPECIAL NOTE
| On 24 February, an Air Force captain leading a flight of four F-16s
from the 10th Tactical Fighter Squadron was redirected to support a
16-member Special Forces (SF) team in trouble more than 135 miles from
the flight's original target The SF team was surrounded by a
company-size Iraqi force. The lead pilot directed his flight to attack
the approaching enemy troops. With disregard for intense enemy 23-mm
and 37-mm anti-aircraft fire, his flight made multiple attacks,
placing cluster bomb munitions on target - as close as 200 meters from
friendly positions. On the last pass, while low on fuel, the captain
put his bombs exactly on target, causing numerous enemy casualties and
forcing the remaining enemy troops to retreat. Army helicopters
extracted the SF team without a single Coalition casualty.
- 50th Tactical Fighter Wing Report |
Close Air Support
The USAF, Navy, and USMC provided FACs and air naval gunfire liaison
companies (ANGLICOs) to select and identify targets, and to guide
strike aircraft to them; this procedure is the principal means for
controlling CAS. The USAF and USMC used FACs with the ground forces,
and in a liaison role with non-US Coalition ground forces; for
example, a USAF officer accompanied the 4th Egyptian Armored Division.
The USMC positioned tactical air control parties from 1st ANGLICO team
with JFCE.
During the months before Operation Desert Storm, Coalition aircraft
flew simulated CAS sorties under the direction of the 1st ANGLICO
FACs. This practice paid dividends at the battle of Al-Khafji.
Airborne FACs also were used extensively the USMC used the F/A-18D and
the OV-10, while the USAF used OA-10s. The F-16s also performed FAC
duties informally called Killer Scouts.
Locating and marking targets in this phase of the air war was
crucial to effective CAS. FACs marked targets with a white phosphorus
rocket or a laser designator so attack pilots could find and strike
dug-in artillery, armor and troops. FACs sped and improved the
effectiveness of attacks on ground forces in the KTO.
The basic CAS plan during the ground offensive involved multi-sortie
surge operations, particularly by those aircraft designed for CAS
operations and operating from forward operating locations (FOLs) near
the battlefield, the A-10s and AV-8Bs. Since Iraqi artillery posed the
greatest immediate threat to ground forces penetrating the minefield
breaches and obstacle belt, it was a prime Coalition aircraft target.
USMC aircraft began increased operations into Kuwait two days before
the ground offensive. Operations were based on a system in which
fixed-wing aircraft were launched according to schedule, instead of
against specific targets, and flew to a series of stacks or holding
points. AV-8Bs, for example, flew to a stack east of the battle zone
and orbited for approximately 20 minutes while awaiting tasking. If no
CAS were needed at that moment they were sent deeper into the KTO to
receive targeting from a FAC in a kill box. During the daytime, a
section of two USMC aircraft entered the stack every seven and a half
minutes; at night, a section of A-6s or other USMC aircraft checked
into the stack every 15 minutes. To the east and west, EA-6Bs orbited
to provide jamming and EW support, effectively blocking Iraqi
battlefield radars.
With the concurrence of the JFACC, I MEF used a high density air
control zone (HIDACZ) to coordinate and control the large number of
aircraft, artillery, and rockets within I MEF's AOR. Aircraft
conducting interdiction or CAS missions within the HIDACZ worked with
Marine Air Command and Control Systems for air traffic control and FAC
handoffs. The HIDACZ size and shape was under continuous negotiation
with the JFACC as other users requested the airspace. Despite some
airspace dimensions restrictions, the HIDACZ effectively gave the
Marine ground commander a flexible means of coordinating and
controlling battlefield air attacks.
As G-Day approached, the JFACC modified the directions to Coalition
pilots Instead of remaining in the relative safety of the medium
altitudes from which they bombed strategic and interdiction targets,
they were to press home their attacks at lower altitudes. However, the
effects of Coalition operations against Iraqi forces before G-Day, and
the overall light resistance by Iraqi forces, limited the amount of
CAS Coalition ground forces needed.
Breaching Operations
Coalition ground forces south of Kuwait faced a series of formidable
defensive positions the Iraqis built during the five months before
Operation Desert Storm. Coalition air power was used in several ways
to help disrupt these defenses. B-52s bombed the minefields with
750-lb M-117 and 500-lb MK-82 bombs; MC-130s dropped 15,000-lb BLU-82
bombs to create over-pressure and detonate mines. A few days before
G-Day, USMC AV-8Bs dropped napalm on the Iraqi fire trenches and
attacked the pumping stations to ignite and burn off the oil, while
fuel air explosives also were used against minefields. F-117As dropped
500-lb LGBs on oil pipes and distribution points in the fire trenches.
Despite the extensive bombing to reduce the size of the Iraqi
minefields and obstacles, these bombing efforts were not always
effective. Most ground units used their organic countermine and
counterobstacle equipment to breach enemy minefields and obstacles.
Effect Of Weather and Oil Well Fires
Air attacks were affected by the weather, which turned bad on G-Day
and stayed that way until hostilities ended. Conditions varied from
solid cloud cover with severe icing from the surface up to 35,000
feet, to crystal blue sky above a thick carpet of ground fog that
totally obscured targets. This forced pi lots to make choices about
the feasibility of some missions. To acquire targets visually, pilots
had to go under the cloud layer, which made them vulnerable to Iraqi
ground forces and to air defense weapons. On the first day of the
ground offensive the Coalition lost four airplanes to Iraqi ground
fire. Some A-10 pilots noted their green aircraft were quite visible
to ground forces, because the dark paint made them stand out against
the overcast skies. Fortunately, the effect of these problems was
ameliorated by the speed of the ground advance, the rapid collapse of
the Iraqis and the ceasefire.
Just before and during the Offensive Ground Campaign, Iraqi forces
detonated charges placed around Kuwaiti well heads, pipelines, and oil
facilities. Thick, viscous pools of crude oil many acres wide formed
from some ruptured pipes while more than 700 oil wells burned
furiously, sending great balls of flames and clouds of thick, greasy
smoke into the air. The fumes and vapors were noxious and the clouds
of smoke were a hazard to flying. Weapons also were affected.
Sensitive optical devices such as seeker heads on missiles that
earlier had been affected by gritty, windblown sand, also were
affected by filmy drops of oil.
D + 35 through D + 42: Week Six (21-28 February)
During the four days before the ground offensive, the Coalition
continued heavy emphasis on interdiction of the KTO and destruction of
Iraqi forces in their defensive positions. Nearly 90 percent of all
combat sorties were targeted into the KTO against armor, artillery,
and other elements that threatened Coalition ground forces. According
to CENTCOM rough estimates at the time, based only on pilot reports,
air attacks on 23 February destroyed 178 tanks, 97 APCs, 202 vehicles,
201 artillery pieces or multiple rocket launchers, 66 revetments,
buildings, and bunkers, and two AAA/SAM facilities.
Because of the Coalition ground forces' rapid advance, and the light
resistance most ground elements met, relatively more air effort was
expended on interdiction than on direct battlefield support. By G-Day,
thousands of Iraqi soldiers had deserted, either returning home or
crossing the border to surrender to Coalition forces.
Bad weather caused cancellation or diversion of many planned
sorties, and forced many others to operate at lower altitudes and use
attack profiles that increased their exposure to Iraqi air defenses.
The combination of poor weather, the smoke and haze caused by Saddam
Hussein's deliberate torching of hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells, the
fluid nature of the rapid ground advance, and the Coalition decision
to operate and fight at night placed severe demands on Coalition
forces and played a role in the few instances of fratricide that
occurred.
Coalition air forces continued to strike strategic targets until the
last moments of the war. Airfields were hit to prevent any Iraqi Air
Force attempt to interfere with Coalition operations. Scuds remained a
key target. Other attacks continued against NBC, missile production,
and C3 targets, including a mission just before the cease-fire that
used a specially developed hard-target penetration bomb (the 4,700-lb
GBU-28) to destroy a leadership C3 bunker near At-Taji.
The Coalition lost eight aircraft during this final week of the war:
Three AV-8Bs, one OV-10, one OA-10, one A-10, and two F-16s. Several
US and UK troops were killed, wounded, or themselves captured in
attempts to reach and rescue downed pilots. (CSAR Operations are
discussed in Appendix J.)
The first wave of attackers actually encompassed three separate
groups that included 30 F-117s and 54 TLAMs. Within the first five
minutes, nearly 20 air defense, C3, electrical, and leadership nodes
had been struck in Baghdad; within an hour, another 25 similar targets
had been struck, as well as electric distribution and CW sites. By the
end of the first 24 hours, nearly four dozen key targets in or near
the enemy capital had been hit. These installations included more than
a dozen leadership targets, a similar number of air defense and
electric distribution facilities, 10 C3 nodes, and installations in
several other target sets. This was not a gradual rolling back of the
Iraqi air defense system The nearly simultaneous suppression of so
many vital centers helped cripple Iraq's air defense system, and began
seriously to disrupt the LOCs between Saddam Hussein and his forces in
the KTO and southeastern Iraq. Nonetheless, the Iraqis always retained
some ability to recover at least partially, given enough time and
resources. Consequently, target categories required constant
monitoring to measure residual capability and recovery attempts.
Restrikes and attacks on new targets were used to maintain the
pressure. As a result, according to DIA and CENTCOM intelligence
reports, it became increasingly difficult for the Iraqi political and
military leadership to organize coherent, timely, and integrated
responses to Coalition actions. In part, this was due to physical
destruction of hardware and systems, such as C3 links or CPs. It also
was due to the psychological impact of the Coalition attacks. Leaders
could not gather timely information on what was happening. When they
did get information, they learned specific parts of the Iraqi
government and military leadership had been destroyed, sometimes to
the extent that individual offices had been bombed and eliminated.
