CHAPTER VI - THE AIR CAMPAIGN

CONTENTS - Results

SPECIAL NOTE
"If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a future war will be just like the last one, it is to imagine that it will be so utterly different that we can afford to ignore all the lessons of the last one."

- Former RAF Marshal, Sir John Slessor, Air Power and Armies, 1936

Results

Not all the Coalition advantages enjoyed during Operation Desert Storm will be present during the next conflict. However, all modern industrial and military powers share certain universal vulnerabilities. The technological advances that make them powerful also are their great vulnerabilities: these include computer dependent C3 systems; networked air defense systems and airfields; and easily located sources of energy. When the key nodes are destroyed, such systems suffer cascading, and potentially catastrophic, failure.

The initial Operation Desert Storm air strikes attacked the entire target base nearly simultaneously to produce visible pressure and destructive effects against Iraqi centers of gravity. The highest initial priority was to establish air supremacy by degrading the Iraqi IADS, making enemy air forces ineffective, and preventing use of CW biological weapons. Achieving air supremacy allowed continuous air attacks with non-stealth aircraft against the complete range of targets. Stealth aircraft and cruise missiles allowed the Coalition to keep pressure on key leadership, as well as C2 nodes, in the more heavily defended areas, around the clock.

CINCCENT neutralized the enemy with decisive air attacks. Iraq's sophisticated air defense system was defeated by stealth, large packages of EW aircraft, decoy drones, and attack aircraft using PGMs and gravity weapons, while key nodes in the electrical power system, air defenses, C2 structure, and intelligence apparatus were attacked by stealth and conventional aircraft using PGMs and by cruise missiles. Scores of aircraft attacked Iraqi forces and facilities across the KTO and Iraq, using mostly gravity bombs and cluster bomb units, as well as PGMs (which constituted about 10 percent of the total munitions delivered). Saddam Hussein was unable to coordinate an effective response to the rest of Coalition military operations. What came after was not easy, and ground forces had to eject Saddam Hussein's forces from the KTO and secure the liberation of Kuwait, but air power set the stage and helped the Offensive Ground Campaign exploit a weakened enemy.

Assessments By Target Set

This section describes what air power, supported by some special operations and artillery attacks, accomplished by target set. These assessments cannot be definitive, because not all the data have been collected, analyzed, and examined in detail. For the most part, they must be both tentative and subjective because of the magnitude of Coalition air operations, difficulties with gathering records for each of some 60,000 attack sorties, and inaccessibility of enemy soldiers, equipment and facilities.

Leadership Command Facilities

A Strategic Air Campaign objective of overriding importance was the isolation and incapacitation of Saddam Hussein's regime. In Iraq's rigid, authoritarian society, where decision-making power is highly centralized in the hands of Saddam Hussein and a few others, destruction of the means of C2 has a particularly crippling effect on forces in the field. Bombing several leadership facilities, (i.e., places from which Saddam Hussein controlled operations), caused him and other important leaders to avoid facilities that were best suited for C3, and made them move often. This reduced the ability to communicate with their military forces, population, and the outside world. It also forced them to use less secure communications, thereby providing valuable intelligence.

Electrical Production Facilities

Attacks on Iraqi power facilities shut down their effective operation and eventually collapsed the national power grid. This had a cascading effect, reducing or eliminating the reliable supply of electricity needed to power NBC weapons production facilities, as well as other war-supporting industries; to refrigerate biotoxins and some CW agents; to power the computer systems required to integrate the air defense network; to pump fuel and oil from storage facilities into trucks, tanks, and aircraft; to operate reinforced doors at aircraft storage and maintenance facilities; and to provide the lighting and power for maintenance, planning, repairs and the loading of bombs and explosive agents. This increased Iraqi use of less-reliable backup power generators which, generally, are slow to come on line, and provide less power. Taken together, the synergistic effect of losing primary electrical power sources in the first days of the war helped reduce Iraq's ability to respond to Coalition attacks. The early disruption of electrical power undoubtedly helped keep Coalition casualties low.

Coalition planners in the theater directed that the switching system be targeted, rather than the generator halls. There were several deliberate exceptions made to this policy. For the first three days, the ATO explicitly contained specific aimpoints for strikes against electrical production facilities. Subsequent to that, the specific aimpoints were only sporadically included. When wing-level planners lacked specific guidance on which aimpoints to hit at electrical power plants, they sometimes chose to target generator halls, which are among the aimpoints listed in standard targeting manuals.

Telecommunications and Command, Control, and Communication Nodes

Saddam Hussein's ability to transmit detailed, timely orders to his senior field commanders deteriorated rapidly. The physical destruction of the Iraqi C3 capability began before H-Hour with attacks on key nodes of the air defense and C3 systems. The destruction of the Iraqi Air Force headquarters, publicized by the CENTAF commander's press briefing in late January, was one of many attacks against Iraq's ability to control combat operations effectively.

In Iraq, the civil telecommunications system was designed to serve the regime - it was an integral part of military communications. For example, approximately 60 percent of military landline communications passed through the civil telephone system. Degrading this system appears to have had an immediate effect on the ability to command military forces and secret police.

The bombing campaign seriously degraded Iraq's national communications network by destroying Saddam Hussein's preferred secure system for communicating with his fielded forces. However, this national-level capability could be repaired and thus needed to be attacked repeatedly. Also, redundancy was built into the national communications network; these other systems tended to be more vulnerable to eavesdropping but difficult to destroy because they included a dispersed network of CPs with radio transmission capability. These sites could be bombed if planners had precise targeting intelligence, but were difficult to destroy.

To deepen this isolation and incapacitation, telecommunications sites in Baghdad and elsewhere were attacked heavily during the first three days of the war Internal radio and television systems also were attacked. The Iraqis had a reduced capability to broadcast outside the country and could broadcast only sporadically inside the country.

By G-Day, regular means of electronic communication were reduced dramatically. During the Offensive Ground Campaign, communications continued to deteriorate. This also greatly improved intelligence collection against Iraqi communications.

Strategic Integrated Air Defense System

On the eve of the air campaign, Iraq's strategic IADS was dense, overlapping, and dangerous. It used a mix of Soviet and Western equipment, including radars, interceptor aircraft, SAMs, and AAA, and was tied together by a French-built, computerized C2 system, Kari. The AAA was either radar or optically guided; SAMs used either radar or IR guidance. The AAA was most dangerous below 12,000 to 15,000 feet, while Iraqi SAMs provided overlapping coverage from virtually ground level to above 40,000 feet. Coalition air operations neutralized most of the effectiveness of these systems through innovative tactics, technology, massive waves of aircraft, cruise missiles, SEAD, intelligence, and careful targeting.

Within hours of the start of combat operations, the IADS had been fragmented and individual air defense sectors forced into autonomous operations. Most hardened SOC and IOC were destroyed or neutralized within the first few days, markedly reducing the Iraqis' ability to coordinate and conduct air defense. The early warning radar net had been so badly damaged that the Iraqis were forced, in many cases, to rely on individual SAM battery radars to provide warning of attacks. After the first week, Coalition aircraft were able to operate at medium and high altitudes with virtual impunity; during the next three weeks, the Coalition lost only seven aircraft to Iraqi defenses. Not until the final few days of the war did air operations move down into the lower altitudes and higher threat posed by Iraqi battlefield defenses (handheld IR SAMs and small-caliber AAA, for example), and aircraft losses increased.

Air Forces And Airfields

The neutralization of the Iraqi Air Force occurred when Coalition air forces destroyed Iraqi aircraft in the air and on the ground. The destruction began with several air-to-air victories on the first night, and continued with the shelter-busting effort during the air campaign's second week. This effort caused the Iraqi Air Force to disperse around airfields, into civilian neighborhoods, and to fly to Iran. By the war's end, 324 of the original 750-plus Iraqi fixed-wing combat aircraft, were reported destroyed, captured, or relocated outside Iraq. According to CENTAF estimates, 109 Iraqi combat fixed-wing aircraft flew to Iran; 151 were destroyed on the ground; 33 were shot down by Coalition fighter aircraft; and 31 were captured or destroyed by ground forces (the status of others was unknown). Fewer than 300 were believed to remain in Iraq and their combat readiness was doubtful because of the disintegrated air defense C3 system, inadequate maintenance, and lack of other necessary support. Of the 594 Iraqi aircraft shelters, 375 were severely damaged or destroyed. Within six weeks, the world's sixth largest air force had been decimated.

Nuclear, Biological, And Chemical Weapons Research and Production Facilities

A key objective was degrading the threat from Iraqi NBC weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (one of Iraq's centers of gravity). Air power was one of the more effective ways to reach research and production facilities deep inside Iraq. Damage to the known nuclear weapons program was substantial. The Baghdad Nuclear Research Center was damaged, including both research reactors. However, UN inspection teams and US intelligence sources subsequently discovered Iraq's nuclear weapons program was more extensive than previously thought, and did not suffer as serious a setback as was desired.

During December, a team was formed in CONUS to determine the most effective way to attack Iraq's arsenal of CW/BW weapons. Several experiments were conducted which attempted to find a way to destroy these weapons without releasing BW agents or causing significant collateral damage. Finally, through timing of attacks and choice of munitions, planners were able to minimize the chance for toxins to spread. No chemical of biological agents were detected after the attacks and no CW/BW collateral damage was experienced.

During Operation Desert Storm, the BW program was damaged and its known key research and development facilities were destroyed. All known BW research and production capabilities were made unusable. Most of Iraq's refrigerated storage bunkers were destroyed.

Iraq's CW program was seriously damaged. At least 75 percent of Iraq's CW production capability was destroyed. At Samarra, Coalition forces destroyed or severely damaged most known primary CW production, processing, or production support buildings. All three buildings used to fill munitions at Samarra were destroyed, although the Iraqis may have moved the equipment from one building before Operation Desert Storm for safekeeping. All three precursor chemical facilities at Habbaniyah were seriously damaged. Although Iraq previously had produced and distributed many CW agents to storage sites throughout the country, the means for delivering the weapons was badly damaged. Coalition air supremacy made Iraqi Air Force delivery of these weapons unlikely; most artillery (Iraq's preferred method of delivering CW) was disabled.

Why Iraq did not use CW still is a matter of conjecture. Concerted efforts, both public and private, were made before the war to warn Saddam Hussein of severe consequences of CW use. The fact that almost no chemical munitions were distributed to Iraqi forces in the KTO suggests Saddam Hussein chose to retain tight control over this capability. UN inspections since the war have confirmed Iraq did have chemical warheads for its Scud missiles, which Iraq continued to fire until the end of the war. This suggests deterrence worked. However, Coalition attacks also disrupted the Iraqis' ability to move, load, and fire weapons, and eliminated many battlefield delivery systems. The rapid ground offensive against the already blinded and confused Iraqis made effective use of CW against the Coalition offensive almost impossible. At present, there is no conclusive answer.

Scud Production and Storage Facilities

Immediately after the war, estimates, based on imagery analysis of heavily damaged or destroyed complexes associated with Scud production, concluded Iraq's overall ability to modify or produce Scud missiles and support equipment was severely degraded and that Baghdad's overall potential to build liquid-propellant missiles had been reduced. More recently, UN inspection teams have determined most production equipment, components, and documents had been removed before the beginning of the air campaign. Recent intelligence estimates confirm that actual damage to Scud production and storage facilities is less than previously thought.

Naval Forces and Port Facilities

Coalition air strikes and naval gunfire effectively destroyed the Iraqi Navy in the first three weeks of Operation Desert Storm. While Iraq did not have major surface combatants, it did have dangerous antiship missile capabilities that could have inflicted politically significant damage to Coalition ships, giving Iraq a needed psychological victory. Approximately 87 percent (143 of 165) of Iraqi combatant naval vessels were destroyed or damaged. By 2 February, 11 of the 13 Iraqi missile-capable boats were destroyed, and the remaining Iraqi naval forces were assessed as incapable of offensive operations. The Umm Qasr Naval Base and Khawr Az-Zubayr port facility, the primary Iraqi naval operating areas, sustained substantial damage to storage facilities. Coalition air strikes also destroyed three of Iraq's seven shore-based Silkworm antiship missile launchers and an unknown number of missiles. Because of the destruction of the Iraqi naval threat, Coalition naval forces were able to move farther north in the Persian Gulf to increase the pressure on Iraqi forces, and to support better the Offensive Ground Campaign.

Oil Refining and Distribution Facilities, As Opposed To Long-Term Oil Production Capability

Reducing Iraq's ability to refine and distribute finished oil products helped reduce Iraqi military forces' mobility. Aircraft carried out about 500 sorties against Iraqi oil facilities, dropping about 1,200 tons of bombs to shut down the national refining and distribution system. This offers another illustration of the effect modern PGMs and other advanced technologies have on the nature of war. For about half the bomb load dropped on one typical refinery in Germany during World War II, the Coalition effectively stopped all Iraqi refined fuels production.

The air campaign damaged approximately 80 percent of Iraq's refining capacity, and the Iraqis closed the rest of the system to prevent its destruction. This left them with about 55 days of supply at prewar consumption rates. This figure may be misleading, however, because the synergistic effect of targeting oil refining and distribution, electricity, the road, rail and bridge infrastructure, and the national C3 network, all combined to degrade amounts of oil and lubricants Iraqi commanders received. Saddam Hussein apparently was counting on a relatively protracted conflict in which conserving Iraqi fuel supplies could be important.

Railroads and Bridges Connecting Iraqi Military Forces with Logistical Support Centers

About three fourth of the bridges between central Iraq and the KTO were severely damaged or destroyed. Iraqi LOCs into the KTO were vulnerable because destroyed at the rate of seven to 10 a week, and the supply flow into the KTO dropped precipitously. While the supply routes into the KTO were being interdicted, Iraqi supply troops also were subjected to heavy air attacks. As bridges were destroyed, long convoys of military trucks waiting to cross were stranded and attacked. Air attacks also destroyed supplies stockpiled in the KTO and severely disrupted their distribution. In an environment where literally nothing was available locally, these efforts resulted in major shortages of food for fielded forces, particularly for those units farthest forward.

The effort to cut the rail and road LOCs from central Iraq into the KTO further demonstrated the effect of advanced technology. During the early years of the Vietnam War, hundreds of USAF and Navy aircraft bombed the Thanh Hoa bridge in North Vietnam. It was not seriously damaged, and many aircraft were shot down. During Operation Linebacker I in 1972, the bridge was knocked down by just a few sorties using LGB and Walleye II, both PGMs. The Operation Desert Storm air campaign saw the use of improved PGMs, including LGB, Maverick, and Standoff Land-Attack Missiles (SLAM).

Video footage of Iraqi bridges falling to LGB became commonplace during briefings and on the television news. Not every PGM hit its intended target. But so many bridges were knocked down (41 major bridges and 31 pontoon bridges) and so many supply lines cut that the effect on the Iraqi forces in the KTO was severe.

In addition, the air campaign effectively interdicted LOCs within the KTO and destroyed thin-skinned tankers and other vehicles that supplied food and water. This was made possible in part by the lack of cover for moving vehicles in the desert and by US night vision capabilities that exploited this advantage even at night.

Iraqi Military Units, Including Republican Guards in the KTO

Iraqi forces in the KTO posed a serious threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf states; until they either evacuated Kuwait, were ejected, or destroyed, Kuwait could not be liberated. The air campaign worked towards all three possibilities. Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw his forces; however, the Coalition began direct air attacks to degrade the more important capabilities and assets (especially armor and artillery) and to prepare for Coalition ground forces to reoccupy Kuwait. The degree to which these objectives were accomplished was virtually unprecedented in warfare. In less than six weeks, a combat experienced army of several hundred thousand troops, with thousands of tanks, other armored vehicles, and artillery pieces, dug into well-sited and constructed defensive positions, was severely degraded and weakened from the air. The Iraqi forces' overall combat effectiveness was reduced dramatically.

CINCCENT's Operation Desert Storm OPORD identified the Republican Guard as an Iraqi center of gravity. Primary targets included armor and artillery, because these represented a major threat to Coalition forces; logistics installations such as fuel, ammunition and supply dumps; and C3 facilities such as CPs. Not every Republican Guard division was hit equally hard; those in the path of the planned Coalition ground forces received the brunt of the attacks. Other divisions, such as those south of Al-Basrah, received less damage. The Republican Guard was not as heavily targeted as were the front-line regular Army divisions the Coalition ground forces would encounter first, for a number of reasons - they were farther from Coalition bases and better equipped than front-line forces, which required longer flights with more airborne support, and risked higher aircraft attrition. More importantly, CINCCENT directed that comparatively greater damage be inflicted on the front-line forces to reduce Coalition ground forces' casualties.

Military Production and Storage

Military production and storage areas made up 15 percent of the total Strategic Air Campaign targets, attacked by about 2,750 sorties. By the end of the war, military production facilities had been severely damaged. At least 30 percent of Iraq's conventional weapons production capability, which made small arms, artillery, small- and large-caliber ammunition, electronic and optical systems, and repaired armored vehicles, was damaged or destroyed.

Supply depots were so numerous and large that they could not be eliminated; however, they were methodically attacked throughout the war, resulting in moderate reduction in stored materials. As an example, the massive military supply complex at At-Taji occupied more than 10 square miles. Thousands of targets were within its confines, and it was struck repeatedly. On 29 January, as another example, B-52s hit the ammunition storage facility at Ar-Rumaylah, touching off a tremendous explosion - the equivalent of an erupting volcano.

EPW Assessments

One benefit of the rapid Coalition ground advance was the capture or surrender of many Iraqi senior officers and thousands of Iraqi troops. The officers provided Coalition intelligence debriefers with a unique perspective.

According to sources from four different Iraqi Army and Republican Guard armor, infantry, and antiaircraft units, for example, the air campaign's effect was telling. According to selected EPW reports, in some divisions, up to half the personnel who had deployed to the KTO deserted because of shortages of food and water, hardships caused by the bombing, or fear of being killed or wounded. Selected senior officer EPW also described very high (roughly 77 percent) attrition rates for tanks or wheeled vehicles in particular units. Not all units suffered attrition rates as high as this. For example, senior EPWs from other Iraqi units, such as the 50th Armored Brigade, 12th Armored Division, and the 8th Mechanized Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, reported lower attrition rates.

An indirect impact of Coalition air supremacy was reflected in the Iraqis' ignorance of Coalition dispositions and operations. This was important in preparing for and executing the ground campaign's left hook. In addition, although some units did relocate, one senior officer said that, after the start of Operation Desert Storm, he could no longer safely move his forces because of the threat of air attack. The Iraqis' problems were compounded by the inability to train their forces and maintain their equipment. The air interdiction effort and degradation of the supply system stressed the Iraqi forces to and, in some cases, beyond the breaking point. Experienced armor officers were visibly shaken when they described helplessly watching the progressive destruction of their forces from the air.

The EPWs agreed almost unanimously that PSYOP at the battlefield level had a substantial effect on front line forces' morale. Air strikes made it impossible for Iraqi commanders to stop the flow of soldiers deserting from some units.

Safwan Revelations

On 3 March, CINCCENT met with Iraqi senior military officers, including the III Corps commander, to finalize cease-fire terms. After the Iraqis informed CINCCENT about the status of Coalition Prisoners of War (POW) in Iraqi hands, the Iraqis asked for an accounting of the Iraqi EPWs the Coalition held. When CINCCENT replied the counting was still going on, but the number exceeded 58,000, the Iraqi vice chief of staff, according to eyewitness accounts, appeared stunned. When he asked the III Corps commander if this were possible, he replied that it was possible, but he did not know. The discussion then turned to establishing a no-contact line to separate Coalition and Iraqi forces. When CINCCENT presented his proposed line, the Iraqi vice chief of staff asked why it was drawn behind the Iraqi troops. CINCCENT said this was the forward line of the Coalition advance. The Iraqi officer, again looking stunned, turned to the III Corps commander, who again replied that it was possible, but he did not know. Thus, three days after hostilities ended, the Iraqi senior military leadership did not know how many men they had lost or where the Coalition forces were. While their ignorance may in part reflect the weaknesses of a totalitarian system in which bad news travels slowly, it undoubtedly also reflects the crippling of Iraqi intelligence and communications by the air campaign, the effectiveness of the deception actions at all levels, and the sweep, speed, and boldness of the ground campaign.

Operational Considerations

Air Superiority and Air Supremacy

Throughout Operation Desert Shield, Coalition air forces were flying defensive counter air sorties to ensure the arrival and movement of forces into the AOR remained unimpeded by hostile attack. These missions typically lasted several hours, with fighters patrolling the border and refueling periodically to maintain an around the clock umbrella over Coalition forces.

Once Operation Desert Storm began, defensive counter air patrols continued; while additional offensive counter air fighter sweeps and strike package escorts into Iraq sought out and engaged Iraqi Air Force opposition. Assisted by AWACS and E-2Cs, these fighters achieved and maintained air superiority throughout the Persian Gulf War. Table \JI-8 depicts air-to-air victories officially credited to Coalition air forces.

The air campaign's pre-eminent initial objective was the fragmentation and virtual destruction of the Iraqi IADS, which was paralyzed in Operation Desert Storm s early hours. It is difficult, if not virtually impossible, for a modern, mechanized army to operate effectively once control of the sky above it is lost.

American ground forces have not had to fight without air superiority since World War II; the last time an American soldier was killed by enemy aircraft attack was during the Korean War. Dominance of the airspace is not, however, an end in itself, but something to allow other forces to operate more effectively. Air supremacy allowed Coalition land, sea and air forces to maneuver, deploy, resupply, stockpile and fight as they desired - a luxury the enemy did not have.

In future conflicts against a sophisticated military, the battle for air supremacy will be a key determinant. The fate of the Iraqi military machine will be remembered for decades. The Soviet Air Force Chief of Staff, General A. Malyukov, remarked after the war: "The war in the Persian Gulf provided a textbook example of what air supremacy means both for the country that gained it, and for the country ceding it."

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Coalition aircraft conducting air defense suppression missions saturated Iraqi airspace with jammers, shooters, and bombers. Iraqi defenses that attempted to engage were disrupted, and risked being destroyed.

EF-11 1As and EA-6Bs were used in stand-off and close-in orbits to jam early warning, acquisition, and GCI radars. EC-1 30H Compass Call aircraft jammed radio communications, data links, and navigation systems. F-4Gs, F-16s, EA-6Bs, A-6Es, A-7Es, and F/A-1 8s used HARMs to destroy acquisition, GCI, and target tracking radars. Various aircraft dropped bombs on air defense emplacements and control facilities. SEAD forces and bomb droppers caused confusion, hesitation, and loss of capability, which degraded Iraqi air defense capability.

Navy, Marine, and USAF aircraft used HARMs during Operations Desert Storm USAF F-4Gs used most of the HARMs. For Navy and USMC HARM-shooters, initial tactics were based on the pre-emptive use of HARMs and Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). Typically, the use of HARMs in the preemptive mode was more common when supporting attacks on heavily defended strategic targets inside Iraq. The target-of-opportunity mode was more frequently used during operations against less well-defended targets and fielded forces in the KTO. More than half of all HARMs used were expended during the first week of the war, with another third expended from 6 to 13 February when the emphasis on attacking Iraqi forces in the KTO increased. Both of these periods also saw a significant concentration of strike efforts on heavily defended strategic targets. By the end of the conflict, reactive HARMs and ECM became common as a result of combat experience and the perceived need to husband HARMs.

Because of the extensive air defense threat, coordination among the Services to provide mutual support was essential to Operation Desert Storm's success. The JFACC tasked apportioned SEAD sorties, guaranteeing a coordinated, effective, and prioritized SEAD effort. Almost all Coalition aircraft contributed. In their first combat use, ATACMS demonstrated a rapid response capability. A Multiple Launch Rocket System launcher, armed with ATACMS, received a fire mission while moving in convoy, occupied a hasty firing position, computed firing data and launched a missile that neutralized an SA-2 site. On 20 February, an Army attack helicopter battalion conducted a deep strike in the Iraqi 45th Infantry Division rear area - EF-11 1As, F-4Gs, and EC-1 30Hs provided SEAD support on the way in, which helped the helicopters safely complete the mission.

SEAD tactics changed during the conflict, especially in the KTO. By using the APR-47 electromagnetic sensor system to see and attack threats as they came on the air, the F-4Gs conserved HARMs when threat activity diminished. The F-4Gs then were more available to support attack flights as they serviced kill boxes. For example, F-4Gs located and attacked mobile SA-6s deployed with the Republican Guards.

The attacks on the Iraqi electronic order of battle (EOB) affected every aspect of air supremacy operation. Using Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System, USMC EA-6Bs provided near-real-time (NRT) updates to the threat EOB.

The EC-130Hs also made major contributions, flying from both Bateen, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Incirlik, Turkey. Jamming enemy radio communications, data links, and enemy navigation systems, EC-130Hs disrupted air-to-air and air-to-ground Iraqi C3 networks.

EF-111As flew from At-Taif, and from Incirlik. They were part of the initial surge of aircraft across the Iraqi border the first night of the war, and established orbits to escort strike packages into the H-3 and Baghdad areas. They jammed EW, height finder, GCI, and target-acquisition radars, and were effective in tricking the enemy into opening fire at false radar returns in areas where there were no Coalition aircraft.

The F-4G and the F-16 (in the SEAD role) flew from Shaikh Isa and from Incirlik, firing 1,061 HARMs. F-4Gs were among the first aircraft to cross the Iraqi border to protect strike flights in the Baghdad and H-2/H-3 areas. During the latter stages of the war, with the remaining Iraqi radars rarely emitting, F-4G aircrews used AGM-65D Maverick missiles against non-emitting radar targets.

Electronics intelligence data for the period 16 January to 10 February shows a high level of EOB activity initially, with a dramatic decrease 48 to 72 hours into the war. SAM operators frequently fired with limited or no radar guidance, reducing their overall effectiveness. This much reduced level continued for the remainder of the war.

Aircraft Sorties

The 43-day air campaign against Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait involved more than 2,780 US fixed-wing aircraft, which flew more than 112,000 individual sorties. To support this enormous undertaking, the USAF committed more than 1,300 aircraft (about half of the Coalition total), the USMC about 240 aircraft (about nine percent of the total), and Coalition partners more than 600 aircraft (about 25 percent of the total). The Navy deployed six aircraft carriers to the theater, with more than 400 aircraft, or about 16 percent of the Coalition total. (For more details on specific weapons systems, see Appendix T.)

Technological Revolution

Technological breakthroughs revolutionized air warfare. Because of its precision delivery capability and low-observable, or stealth technology, planners assigned F-117As to attack the most heavily defended, high-value, and hardened targets. Forty-two F-117As flew approximately two percent of Coalition fixed-wing attack sorties, and struck about 40 percent of the strategic targets. This advanced technological capability allowed aircrews to strike more targets using fewer aircraft.

The development and improvement of PGMs that use IR, electro-optical (EO), electromagnetic radiation, or laser guidance, improved the effectiveness and efficiency of air attacks. These technological breakthroughs, with improvements in such areas as electronic warfare and C31, combined to provide the Coalition an overwhelming air warfare capability.

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

Unmanned TLAMs attacked high value targets day and night, helping deprive the Iraqi leadership of respite from attack, especially early in the air campaign. TLAMs were launched by surface warships and submarines at targets 450 to 700 miles away.

Two types of TLAM were used during Operation Desert Storm: The conventional missile with a unitary warhead (TLAM-C); and, a variant equipped with submunitions (TLAM-D). The TLAM-C delivered single, 1,000-lb warheads. The TLAM-D dispensed up to 166 armor-piercing, fragmentation, or incendiary bomblets in 24 packages.

By the war's end, the Navy had fired 288 TLAMs from 16 surface ships and two submarines - an important part of the air campaign. TLAM missions required no airborne aircraft support.

GBU-28

The GBU-28, a 4,700-lb deep-penetrator LGB, was not even in the early stages of research when Kuwait was invaded. The USAF did not ask industry for ideas until the week after combat operations started. Its rapid development and combat delivery were impressive.

The bomb was fabricated starting on 1 February, using surplus 8-inch artillery tubes. The official go-ahead for the project was issued on 14 February, and explosives for the initial units were hand-loaded by laboratory personnel into a bomb body that was partially buried upright in the ground outside the laboratory in New York.

The first two units were delivered to the USAF on 16 and 17 February, and the first flight to test the guidance software and fin configuration was conducted on 20 February. These tests were successful and the program proceeded, with a contract let on 22 February. A sled test on 26 February proved that the bomb could penetrate over 20 feet of concrete, while an earlier flight test had demonstrated the bomb's ability to penetrate more than 100 feet of earth. The first two operational bombs were delivered to the theater on 27 February - and were used in combat just before the cease-fire.

The Counter-Scud Effort

Long before the offensive, it was recognized that Saddam Hussein was likely to attack Israel with Scuds in the event of hostilities. Accordingly, considerable thought was given to how Israel could be protected from such attacks without Israel's own forces entering the war. Although there was never any doubt about the willingness of Israel's highly capable forces to take on this mission, the President realized this was precisely what Saddam Hussein hoped to achieve. At a minimum, this almost certainly would have led to a war between Israel and Jordan and allowed Saddam Hussein to change the complexion of the war from the liberation of Kuwait to another Arab-Israeli conflict. It might easily have brought down the government of Jordan and replaced it with a radical one. The Coalition's unity would be tested severely, with potentially major repercussions.

Accordingly, the President directed that unprecedented steps be taken to persuade Israel not to exercise its unquestioned right to respond to Iraqi attacks. A special, secure communications link established between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD) before the offensive began enabled immediate and frequent contact between senior US and Israeli officials. Early warning of Iraqi Scud missile attacks on this link gave the Israeli populace as much as five minutes to take shelter before missile impact. The President offered and Israel agreed to accept four US Patriot batteries manned with US troops which deployed from Europe in record time. Delivery of Israeli-manned Patriot batteries was accelerated.

One air campaign target was Iraq's strategic offensive capability, including Scud production, assembly and storage, and launch sites. The first counter-Scud missions were flown on D-Day against fixed launch complexes and Scud support depots. By the third day of air operations, attacks had begun on ballistic missile production and storage capability.

On the second day of Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi Scud missiles struck Tel Aviv and Haifa, Israel. Seven people were slightly injured by broken glass, but the political and emotional impact was tremendous. There was concern Saddam Hussein might use CW against Israel. In fact, 11 trucks were observed departing the Samarra CW storage facility in Iraq, heightening speculation about Iraqi CW preparations. Concern intensified that if the Scud threat were left unchecked, Israel might be forced to strike back.

When Iraq launched another Scud attack on Tel Aviv on 19 January, the pressure to respond was intense. A target intelligence officer assigned to the Black Hole identified what he believed to be a Scud launch site and recommended that F-15Es, loaded with CBU-89s and CBU-87s, strike the location. After this strike by the 4th TFW, which reported secondary explosions, there was a break of 85 hours before the Iraqis launched a single Scud against Israel, and more than five days before another mass launch.

The fourth day saw increased effort to locate, disrupt operations, and destroy mobile Scud missiles. Many sorties were diverted or replanned from their intended targets to hunt for and suppress the Scuds. Although the strategic target list included Scud missile capabilities only as one of several higher priority target sets Scud suppression missions quickly took up an increasing share of air operations. Despite the poor weather conditions that caused the cancellation of nearly 300 sorties on 20 January, the JFACC kept planes on both air and ground alert for rapid response to Scud launches.

The Scud crews had several initial advantages. They fired from pre-surveyed launch positions. Mobile erector launchers are only about as large as a medium-sized truck and moved constantly. This enabled crews to set up relatively quickly, fire, and move before Coalition forces could respond. The area of western Iraq from which the missiles that struck Israel were launched is rugged, a good setting in which to conceal mobile launchers in ravines, beneath highway underpasses, or in culverts.

Scud launchers could be reconfigured and moving within a few minutes after a launch. Within 10 minutes after launch, a mobile Scud launcher could be anywhere within five miles of the launch site. If the Iraqi Scud crew were given five more minutes, it could be anywhere within nine miles of the launch point - 12 miles if it traveled on a road. Destruction of mobile Scud launchers depended on time - the faster strike aircraft could get to the target the better the chance of destroying the launcher. (See Appendix K and Appendix T for additional discussion of Scud launch detection.)

A considerable segment of the available intelligence-gathering capability was shifted to counter-Scud operations, including reconnaissance aircraft (U-2/TR-1s and RF-4Cs). Intelligence originally had estimated Iraq had 36 mobile Scud launchers, 33 of which were believed operational. Ad hoc groups were formed to develop options to the seemingly intractable problem of how to find and destroy Scuds. A special planning cell was set up in the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, headed by a Joint Staff flag officer, to give the Israelis a chance to analyze the available intelligence, and elicit their ideas. When one Scud hit a residential section in Tel Aviv on 22 January, killing three Israelis and injuring dozens more, the problem took on even greater urgency.

The next week saw an intense effort in western Iraq to eliminate the mobile Scud launchers. B-52s bombed suspected Scud hide sites and support facilities at H-2 and H-3 airfields in western Iraq during the day and at night. During the day, A-10s and F-16s patrolled the area; at night, LANTIRN-equipped F-16s and F-15Es, and FLIR-equipped A-6Es took up the task. Pilots often received target coordinates or patrol areas, based on the most up-to-date information, as they headed out to the planes. Using Defense Support Program (DSP) early warning information and other indications, CENTCOM directed aircraft to attack the launchers. JSTARS helped detect and report destruction of several possible mobile launchers north of the KTO on D + 5. By D + 10, the weather had cleared and A-10s joined in what came to be called the Great Scud Hunt.

The Scud-hunting effort in southeast Iraq was similar to that in the west. The search area was nearly as large, and the mobile Scud launchers were difficult to find. However, Coalition tactics made it dangerous for Scud transporters, and any other vehicles, to move; JSTARS and other surveillance assets alerted ground- and airborne-alert aircraft to vehicular movement, resulting in rapid attack in many cases. Following Scud launches, attack aircraft were concentrated in the launch area to search for and attack suspect vehicles.

By early February, the counter-Scud effort seemed to be having an effect, although no destruction of mobile launchers had been confirmed. The daily CENTCOM chronology for this period contains numerous entries such as, "one Scud launched towards Israel, no damage," and "Patriots destroyed the only Scud launched at Saudi Arabia." As more intelligence assets were brought to bear on the problem, specific Scud operating areas (Scud boxes) were more clearly defined; Coalition striking power was concentrated there. On 19 February, Coalition aircraft began dropping CBU-89 area denial mines into suspected operating areas, to hamper the launchers' mobility. A key element in this effort was small SOF groups on the ground who provided vital information about the Scuds.

On 25 February, a Scud struck a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 US soldiers and wounding almost 100 more. When the war ended, intelligence analysis showed the Iraqis had fired 88 modified Scuds, 42 towards Israel and 46 at Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states.

Patriot Defender Missile Defense System

Scud ballistic missiles were the main weapon system with which Saddam Hussein took significant offensive action against Coalition forces, and the only one to offer him a possible opportunity, through the attacks on Israel, to achieve a strategic objective. Had they been more accurate or able to penetrate more successfully, they might have inflicted serious damage on military targets, including the large troop concentrations at Saudi ports at the start of the war. The Army's Patriot Defender missile defense system not only helped defeat the psychological threat of Iraq's Scuds, instilling a feeling of confidence in people in the targeted areas, but also almost certainly reduced civilian casualties. Scud attacks resulted in substantial property damage, including that caused by falling debris from the Patriots themselves.

Weather

The worst weather in at least 14 years (the time the USAF has kept records of Iraqi weather patterns) was a factor during all phases of the war. Although no TLAM attack was canceled by poor weather, approximately 15 percent of scheduled aircraft attacks or ties during the first 10 days were canceled because of poor visibility or low overcast sky conditions. Cloud ceilings of 5,000 to 7,000 feet were common, especially during the ground campaign's last few days. These conditions also had a negative effect on the ability to collect imagery and hindered the BDA process.

Before the air campaign began, forecasters warned the Baghdad region's weather would deteriorate the evening of 18 January as a frontal system moved into Iraq. A morning F-16 mission scheduled to strike the At-Taji Rocket Production Facility north of Baghdad, for example, was diverted to an alternate target, the Ar-Rumaylah airfield, because of a solid undercast. However, mission results could not be assessed for several days because of cloud cover.

Weather and cloud cover also affected the delivery of LGB. Clouds could interfere with the laser beam used to illuminate targets, causing the LGB to lose guidance. Since JFACC directives required aircrews to avoid collateral damage, some aircraft returned to base with their weapons.

The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) helped the JFACC plan the most effective use of systems whose performance was affected by high humidity, fog, rain, and low clouds. DMSP was so important the JFACC kept a light table next to his desk to review the latest DMSP data, and the TACC waited for the latest DMSP images before finalizing the daily ATO.

An example on 24 January illustrates DMSP's value. Two DMSP images, only an hour and 40 minutes apart, showed cloudy skies over Baghdad clearing while sunny skies in Al-Basrah gave way to cloud cover. This type of timely, cloud cover assessment allowed the JFACC to make adjustments in the MAP, and Coalition aircrews to make tactical adjustments, in order to put more bombs on target.

Air Refueling

Aerial refueling was crucial throughout the crisis; the thousands of airlift missions to the Gulf, and the hundreds of combat aircraft deployments, could not have been accomplished without the KC-1 35s and KC-1 0s of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) tanker force.

Likewise, the air campaign could not have been conducted without the efforts of USAF KC-135s and KC-10s, USMC KC-130s, Navy KA-6s and tanker-configured S-3s, Saudi KE-3s, French KC-135s, and RAF Tristars and VC-1 0s. The single largest source of aerial refueling support came from SAC's tanker fleet; by the end of the war, SAC had committed 46 KC-1 0s and 262 KC-1 35s to Operation Desert Storm. Most combat sorties Coalition aircraft flew required one or more aerial refuelings. Navy, USMC, and other Coalition tankers flew more than 4,000 sorties, while USAF tankers flew more than 15,000. Approximately 16 percent of USAF tanker missions supported Navy or USMC aircraft.

The mission's importance cannot be described by merely reciting the numbers of sorties, aircraft refueled, or gallons of fuel dispensed. The strike packages that hit Iraq on the first night of the war were able to reach their targets only because of repeated aerial refuelings going to and returning from their targets. The fighters that patrolled Iraqi airspace and kept the Iraqi Air Force on the ground needed several refuelings. By themselves, most attack aircraft are limited to a few hours' flight; with aerial refueling, their range and endurance is limited only by crew stamina. Missions by bombers and attack aircraft, AWACS, reconnaissance, EW, and special operations aircraft were either made possible or improved by aerial refueling.

Scheduling and coordinating refueling support for attack air craft were major tasks. At JFACC headquarters, coordinating refueling was a separate event that took place after MAP strike sortie planning was completed. AWACS and E-2s played a key role in air refueling, but it was a major challenge. Initially, the air refueling plan was to have the tankers and receivers operate almost independently, with AWACS providing limited assistance, on request. However, this became unwieldy because of the large numbers of tankers and receivers. Eventually, an AWACS weapons director was assigned full time responsibility for tanker control. Also, the complexity of the air refueling task dictated that a tanker liaison be added to the AWACS airborne command element team on one of the five AWACS airborne at any given time.

One limiting factor for tanker operations was a lack of multipoint-equipped land-based tankers, although quick flow procedures for cycling aircraft off a single boom worked adequately in most cases. Airspace congestion also was a limiting factor. Strike package size sometimes was constrained by the number of tankers that could be scheduled into the heavily congested air refueling tracks. This was another Coalition air operation made more efficient through the unity of effort provided by the JFACC and the ATO. That there were no midair collisions between different packages was a tribute to the skill and professionalism of Coalition aircrews and the firm control of available airspace.

The Red Sea battle force was allocated about twice as many tanker sorties as the Persian Gulf battle force, because of greater flight distances to assigned targets and because initial strike plans required two carriers to strike targets simultaneously from the Red Sea. Most tankers used for these sorties were either KC-135Es or KC-135Rs. To increase availability of refueling hoses, Navy KA-6 and specially equipped S-3s accompanied many KC-135 formations.

SPECIAL NOTE
On the afternoon of 17 January, two Air Force Reserve KC-135 tanker crews were orbiting near the Iraqi border, awaiting post-strike refueling requirements. An E-3A advised that a flight of four F-16s, some with battle damage and all low on fuel, were coming back from deep in central Iraq and needed immediate assistance. The two KC-135E tankers turned northwards into Iraq and towards the F-16s. Inside Iraqi airspace without fighter escort, and lacking good intelligence on the possible antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile threat along the route, they located and joined up with the F-16s and provided enough fuel for the safe recovery of one battle-damaged and three fuel-starved aircraft.

- CENTAF After Action Reports

Processing large strike packages through the single-boom tankers was time consuming; by the time the last aircraft had refueled, the first aircraft had burned up much of the fuel it had received. Tanking procedures evolved to include Navy organic tankers with the strike packages; the Navy tankers refueled from the USAF single-point and RAF multi-point tankers and helped refuel the rest of the strike package en route to the target.

Practice during Operation Desert Shield allowed other Services' pilots to become accustomed to refueling from the large USAF tankers. During Operation Desert Storm, this familiarity paid off, especially when tankers escorted attack aircraft over enemy territory to extend their range.

Strike packages from the Persian Gulf carriers evolved away from a reliance on ATO-scheduled tanking as the carriers moved north in the Gulf. The reduction in the range to targets and the consequent shift to normal carrier launch and recovery operations on 4 February substantially decreased the requirement for land-based refueling aircraft. After the fleet's arrival in the northernmost carrier operating areas on 14 February, Navy refueling aircraft provided virtually all refueling for Persian Gulf naval air strikes.

The USMC maintained 20 KC-130 refuelers in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia to support fighter, attack, and helicopter missions. Usually operating in a cell of three to five aircraft, the KC-130s refueled strike packages before and after missions in southern or central Iraq, flying 1,271 missions.

SPECIAL NOTE
"The many strike rehearsals flown by USS Kennedy and USS Saratoga really paid off that first night. It went just like clockwork. We launched right on time at 0115; over 70 aircraft from the two carriers. The Air Force tankers were right on time, on altitude and on speed. We were really pumped up as we hit the tankers for that first drink heading north toward the Iraqi border."

- Red Sea Battle Force Air Wing Commander

Aerial refueling operations normally are conducted in a no- or low-threat area, for obvious reasons. During Operation Desert Storm, however, Coalition tankers occasionally had to fly over hostile territory to enable strike forces to reach their targets, or to prevent the loss of fuel-starved Coalition aircraft. They flew over southern Iraq, for example, to refuel the fighters flying barrier patrols between Iraq and Iran. An SA-8 SAM exploded above a JTF Proven Force KC-135 tanker flying out of Incirlik.

Aerial refueling coordination with carrier-based aircraft was complicated by two requirements: JP-5 fuel which, because of its relatively high combustion temperature is used aboard ships for safety considerations, and basket adapters to fit KC-135 tankers for probe refueling. KC-10 tankers had the flexibility while airborne to refuel aircraft with either a basket or boom configuration, but the KC-135 had to be configured with a basket adapter before takeoff to refuel Navy, USMC, or most other Coalition aircraft.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Airborne reconnaissance and surveillance played a key role in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Coalition's ability to monitor and control the battle area confirmed the Iraqis' ignorance of what Coalition forces were doing.

E-3B AWACS aircraft (among the first US assets to arrive in Saudi Arabia) maintained one to three 24-hour surveillance orbits during Operation Desert Shield. For Operation Desert Storm, this was expanded so the United States manned five orbits (four in Saudi Arabia and one in Turkey) and the RSAF manned one to three With these orbits, AWACS provided comprehensive radar coverage 24 hours a day throughout the war. AWACS gave early warning of Iraqi air attack or other Iraqi Air Force movements, and helped control engagement of Iraqi aircraft. It also supported Coalition strike packages, and provided airborne surveillance and threat warning for other airborne assets such as SOF and CSAR missions.

U-2R and TR-1 aircraft provided valuable reconnaissance using a variety of sensors, and satisfied imagery collection requirements that could not be met by other collection sources. Initially, the aircraft remained over friendly territory but, when air supremacy was achieved, missions began to fly over Iraq.

RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft was the first on-scene airborne reconnaissance system, flying the first operational sortie en route from Hellenikon Air Base, Greece, to Riyadh on 9 August.

Naval electronic reconnaissance squadrons provided crucial support to Coalition forces beginning 7 August.

The 3rd MAW also flew the Senior Warrior package aboard a USMC Reserve KC-130T in support of MARCENT and the CENTCOM intelligence gathering effort.

Though still in development, CINCCENT requested E-8 JSTARS to be deployed in mid-December to give Coalition forces a tactical edge in combat. JSTARS provided theater commanders and other tactical users an NRT capability to locate and track moving ground targets across a wide area and quickly relay this information to air and ground commanders. The two JSTARS aircraft flew an 11-to-13 hour mission daily throughout Operation Desert Storm, with all sorties taking off in late afternoon or early evening. The aircraft usually flew in an eastern orbit just south of the KTO, where they were able to monitor ground activity. They also operated from a western orbit in northern Saudi Arabia near the Iraq/Jordan border to detect and track Scud launchers. An orbit in north central Saudi Arabia supported the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps before and during the Offensive Ground Campaign.

JSTARS tasking for the air campaign was to locate and target high-value armor, army forces, and resupply activity in the KTO (including the area encompassing the Republican Guard and secondary echelon forces). JSTARS also was tasked to find and target Scud locations, gather intelligence on the movement of forces within the KTO and eastern Iraq, and validate targets for other weapons systems. For the ground campaign, JSTARS was tasked to locate and target movement within the second echelon forces with emphasis on the Republican Guard, provide intelligence on the movement of forces within the KTO and eastern Iraq, and respond to immediate requests for support of engaged ground forces.

The information JSTARS provided during the ground offensive allowed CINCCENT to make key operational decisions at crucial moments. JSTARS found significant target groups, such as convoys. JSTARS detected the Republican Guard movement and massive retreats from Kuwait City during the ground offensive which gave CINCCENT the opportunity to press the attack and destroy the Iraqi forces while they were moving.

Navy E-2C aircraft were the first US airborne early warning (AEW) and C2 assets in theater. They provided continuous AEW, and were deployed to Bahrain during Operation Desert Shield to fill AWACS radar surveillance gaps. During Operation Desert Storm they primarily operated off aircraft carriers.

The E-2C was crucial for carrier-based naval aviation - it synthesized information, analyzed and corrected battlefield problems, and provided a more complete picture for strike leaders and warfare commanders. E-2Cs flew around the clock from carrier battle groups in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, fusing tactical and strategic intelligence from AWACS, Aegis, and other assets to produce a comprehensive picture of the KTO. Airborne controllers provided tailored tactical control, intelligence filtering, and friendly forces deconfliction, and improved the situational awareness for Navy strike groups as well as other Coalition forces.

P-3 and S-3 aircraft made important contributions to maritime interception force operations, antisurface warfare, strike support, and the counter-Scud campaign. The Navy and USMC both used EA-6Bs to good effect.

Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) Forward Area Rearming and Refueling Points (FARPs)

Both the USMC and USAF attempted to base their primary attack assets at a home base, but also operated from FOLs to get closer to the target areas. The USAF based its A-10s at King Fahd International Airport in Saudi Arabia and operated from two FOLs, especially King Khalid Military City, while the USMC AV-8Bs operated from King 'Abd Al-'Aziz Naval Base as well as additional FOLs and forward area rearming and refueling points (FARP) near the Kuwaiti-Saudi border.

Before G-Day, the USMC established FARP for both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in northern Saudi Arabia. These locations allowed quicker aircraft response times. Fixed-wing sites were established at Al-Jubayl for F/A-18s and at Tanajib for AV-8Bs and OV-10s. The assets needed to refuel, rearm, and provide normal maintenance were at these sites; intelligence briefings and debriefings also were conducted. At Tanajib, an ARAMCO facility 35 miles south of the Kuwaiti border, AV-8B operations began on 18 February. AV-8Bs were able to rearm and refuel within 17 to 25 minutes and could reach the Kuwait border in five to seven minutes. The FARP allowed AV-8B aircraft to range farther north, without aerial refueling. These locations proved extremely valuable in attacking Iraqi troops in the I MEF area. FARP also allowed returning pilots an additional base for low fuel and other problems.

USMC rotary wing squadrons also deployed forward. AH-1s maintained a strip alert of four aircraft at Ras Al-Mish'ab, 27 miles south of the Kuwaiti border, beginning on D-Day. These aircraft responded to close-in fire support requests at Al-Khafji and during the ground offensive. Helicopter squadrons also deployed to Tanajib on 2 February, and on 16 February to a USMC expeditionary base in the desert, south of the "elbow," the bend in the Kuwaiti border. This base, which included an AM-2 matting air strip, was named Lonesome Dove.

HUMINT Assistance to Targeting Process

Identifying military targets was difficult; however, information acquired by HUMINT operations improved targeting and destruction of significant military facilities in Baghdad, including the MOD and various communications nodes. In addition to blueprints and plans, HUMINT sources provided detailed memory sketches and were able to pinpoint on maps and photographs key locations, which subsequently were targeted.

Sources detailed the locations of bunkers underneath key facilities, including the Iraqi Air Force headquarters, which was composed of several main buildings and five underground bunkers, and the Iraqi practice of stringing coaxial communications cable under bridges rather than under the river beds in Baghdad and southern Iraq. This information was the deciding factor in the decision to target key bridges in Baghdad. Sources identified the communications center in Baghdad; less than 12 hours later, this facility was destroyed. Information obtained from EPWs also helped planners direct effective air attacks against troops and logistics targets.

Battle Damage Assessment

While the intelligence support to CENTCOM was considered an overall success, the BDA process was only a limited success. The following recounts some of the problems and successes with BDA support for the air campaign (see Appendix C).

The BDA process at the theater level suffered from a lack of adequate systems, procedures, and manpower and had difficulty trying to keep pace with the size, speed, and scope of the air campaign. Not since Vietnam had the DOD Intelligence Community been faced with such a large scale BDA challenge. With the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, DIA began extensive preparations to provide BDA to CENTCOM. These preparations included 13 DIA-led end-to-end exercises of imagery dissemination, and training for DIA personnel, as well as other participants. CENTCOM and its components took part in these preparations; however, not all aspects of the BDA architecture, especially within theater, were tested fully before Operation Desert Storm.

Further, the BDA process was not fully synchronized with the attack planning process. The air operations tempo and the massive number of targets outstripped the established system for collecting and reporting intelligence. This complicated the intelligence collection strategy and generally delayed BDA analysis and reporting. Additionally, BDA primarily relied on imagery and was severely hampered by bad weather. Even some of the better imagery analysts had difficulty assessing degrees of damage for targets not catastrophically destroyed.

Coupled with massive, fast-paced air attacks, it was difficult to provide aim point and damage criteria specifics in the MAP and ATO. Instead, planners at the air wing level often were forced to rely on cockpit video, pilot reports, and limited organic intelligence and planning capabilities to choose the best attack options and aimpoints. Doing that required access to recent target imagery and BDA information, which often were neither timely nor adequate. At times, this led to unnecessary restrikes.

At the tactical level, few assets were available to collect BDA after artillery or air strikes. Frustration at this level was increased by the competition at higher echelons for limited national intelligence collection assets. Further, communications down to the tactical level often were not adequate to pass reconnaissance results. Moreover, the disseminated BDA often was not useful to some tactical commanders. There was no system specifically designed to provide feedback from the tactical user to the national level producer.

Although BDA inputs from many different intelligence agencies were frequent and often timely, fusion of the BDA at the theater level posed problems. throughout the war, damage assessment and intelligence information to support decisions to restrike particular targets were piecemeal affairs, requiring individual users, whether on a carrier or in Riyadh, to synthesize assessments independently.

The desire not to overstate operational accomplishments led to assessing damage based only on what could be proven using imagery. In some cases, this seems to have precluded making rapid judgments about what probably had been accomplished.

This practice did not serve well the needs of commanders operating under combat time pressures. They could not wait for in-depth analysis; decisions had to be made based on judgment. Consequently, planners were forced to make their own assessments of how attacks were succeeding, and whether restrikes were needed. In addition, some agencies doing BDA did not have some essential planning data, such as, the desired aimpoint, weapon destruction information, the target list priority, or the desired damage level.

Finally, neither training doctrine nor training standards existed; consequently, damage analysts were too few and not adequately trained to assess the effects of penetrating weapons or special weapons which typically reveal little visible damage beyond the entry hole.

The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) provided Checkmate with vulnerability analyses of Iraqi underground facilities. These analyses were submitted in a report format designed as a quick reference for attack planning. Requests for DNA assistance from Checkmate were handled on a rapid reaction basis; DNA's assessments usually were provided directly to the Checkmate staff within hours of the request. In addition, DNA received BDA data and provided munitions effectiveness assessments to Checkmate and DIA to help CENTCOM planning. (For additional assessment of BDA, see Appendix C.)

Ultimately CINCCENT relied upon a synergistic approach to determine BDA across the board and within individual target categories. He meshed BDA assessments from DIA and other national agencies and tactical reconnaissance (which tended to be conservative) with mission reports (which tended to be inflated) and gun camera imagery to provide a balanced assessment of the air campaign.

Space Systems

The war with Iraq was the first conflict in history to make comprehensive use of space systems support. All of the following helped the Coalition's air, ground, and naval forces: The DMSP weather satellites; US LandSAT multi-spectral imagery satellites; the GPS; DSP early warning satellites; the tactical receive, equipment and related applications satellite broadcast; the Tactical Information Broadcast Service; as well as communications satellites. Space systems communications played a central role in the effective use of advanced weapon systems. (For more detailed discussion, see Appendices K and T.)

The largely featureless KTO terrain made precise electronic navigation crucial to many missions and functions. GPS was used by TLAM launch platforms to obtain accurate firing positions; by artillery for accurate targeting; by aircraft for more precise navigation; by SLAM for flight guidance; by minesweeping ships and helicopters to maintain accurate sweep lanes; by Navy CSAR and USMC medical evacuation helicopters to locate downed airmen or injured ground troops; and by many other units to provide grid locations for navigation aids and radars.

DSP was the primary Scud launch detection system during Operation Desert Storm. The DSP constellation and associated ground station processing provided crucial warning data of Scud launches. This data was disseminated by a variety of means. The national military command center used DSP data to provide military and civilian warning to Israel and the Gulf states.

Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage

From the beginning, Coalition objectives made a clear distinction between the regime and the Iraqi populace - the regime and its military capabilities were the target; the Iraqi people were not.

Coalition planners followed stringent procedures to select and attack targets. Attack routes were planned to minimize the results of errant ordnance; the norm was to use PGMs, rather than less-accurate gravity weapons, in built-up or populated areas. Attack procedures specified that if the pilot could not positively identify his target or was not confident the weapon would guide properly (because of clouds, for example), he could not deliver that weapon. Several attack sorties were forced to return with their bombs for this reason.

Coalition planners recognized not all weapons would perform in every case as designed and, despite all efforts to prevent collateral damage, some would occur. Although the death or injury of any civilian is regrettable, the apparently low number clearly reflects Coalition efforts to minimize civilian casualties.

As discussed in Appendix O (The Role of Law of War), the problem of collateral civilian casualties was worsened by Saddam Hussein's failure to carry out routine air raid precautions to protect the civilian population and his conscious use of civilians to shield military objectives from attack.

There is also a probability that some casualties occurred when unexploded Iraqi SAMs or AAA fell back to earth. The often dense fire the Iraqis expended in attempts to shoot down Coalition aircraft and cruise missiles almost certainly caused some destruction on the ground from malfunctioning fuses or self-destruction features, as well as the simple impact of spent rounds.

Aircraft Vulnerabilities to SAMs and AAA

All aircraft are vulnerable to radar-guided weapons unless the radar tracking system can be denied crucial information such as altitude, heading, and speed. Coalition aircraft denied much of this information through stealth, jamming or chaff, and attacks on the radar systems (using bombs and missiles). Coalition aircraft also had to nullify the Iraqis' IR tracking systems; this was more difficult because jet exhausts produce heat. IR sensors cannot be jammed, but they can be defeated or fooled by flares the sensors detect.

The Coalition's aggressive SEAD defeated most Iraqi radar systems. This enabled Coalition aircraft to conduct operations in the middle altitudes (about 15,000 feet) in relative safety because they were less vulnerable to IR-guided SAMs or unguided AAA. One of the greater dangers Coalition pilots faced was from IR- or EO-guided SAMs while they were flying at relatively low altitudes, supporting Coalition ground forces. Although sortie rates were relatively constant, approximately half of its fixed-wing combat losses occurred during either the first week of Operation Desert Storm (17 aircraft), before enemy defenses had been suppressed, or during the last week (eight aircraft), when aircraft were operating at lower altitudes in the IR SAM threat region.

SPECIAL NOTE
On the last day of the war, an A-10 pilot from the 511th Tactical Fighter Squadron was awaiting his next mission. Instead of an attack on the enemy, however, his last mission of the war offered a sobering reminder of the cost of freedom. It is best told in his own words: "As we're on our way out the door [to his plane], I overhear that there's a hog [A-10 Warthog] coming in with battle damage. He's been hit by an infrared surface-to-air missile in the tail, and he's flying [with] no hydraulics. Tower asks if we would mind flying a CAP over the airfield while he comes in, [so] we take off. We are overhead when he comes across the threshold [the end of the runway]. He is lined up and everything looks good. All of a sudden the aircraft hits the threshold very hard, all three gear collapse and shear out from under him. The aircraft bounces about 40 to 50 feet into the air. It then rolls into the wind, to the right. The flight lead starts yelling into the radio, and someone on the ground yells for him to punch out. It is too late, though, he is probably unconscious from the hard landing. The aircraft rolls and hits nose first. He didn't have a chance - the aircraft instantly goes up into a ball of flame...We park our jets and go through debrief. Not more than two words are said. The next day the war is over, and we have won a big victory. Some have paid a higher price than others."

- 511 Tactical Fighter Squadron, Unit History

Coalition Fixed-Wing Aircraft Combat Losses

 Ten aircraft were lost during the final 10 days of the war (19 to 28 February), all in the KTO. During this period, Coalition aircraft often operated at lower altitudes, where the Iraqi defensive threat was still potent, to get below the prevalent bad weather and to support the ground forces better. This not only exposed the aircrews to battlefield defenses, such as hand-held IR SAMs that were not a threat at the middle altitudes, but also reduced aircrew reaction time and ability to evade SAMs.

Observations

Accomplishments