| RUSSIA | |
| 18-20 | Russian Spy Case Update |
| 21-22 | Departmental Changes in Security |
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QUESTION: About the bugging - about the spying - is the Administration, especially the State Department, completely sure that the Russians were responsible, number one? Number two, was this bug in a place where the highest level of US foreign policy could be overheard, and was it overheard? And number three, are various employees of the State Department undergoing lie detector screenings on this particular matter?
MR. FOLEY: Number one, the person apprehended last week, Mr. Gusev, was a member of the Russian Embassy.
Number two, in terms of where the eavesdropping device was detected, I think it's a matter of public record - because it's been stated by numerous officials including Secretary Albright - that this device, though on the seventh floor of the State Department, was at a great distance in relative terms from the Secretary's own office; from her suite of offices; from the most sensitive offices in the State Department. It's a matter that's being investigated in terms of who may have had access to that room and the assessment of what might have been obtained through the listening device is ongoing.
It has been pointed out, however, that this was a device that needed to be activated by Mr. Gusev, who did not appear to have a foreknowledge of the kinds of meetings that would take place there or even whether there were going to be meetings and that therefore he was only able to activate any recording equipment when he came by and positioned himself to activate it. So that would tend to narrow the scope of the amount of information that could have been obtained.
Again, this is precisely what's being looked at right now to determine obviously how the event or the penetration occurred and the damage assessment is ongoing. But I think this gives you an idea though that, as Secretary Albright has indicated, this was not in a sensitive part of the State Department. That is a relative term. Obviously any kind of penetration is unacceptable and it is a matter that is very serious; it needs to be investigated also to put us in a position to be better able to prevent such events from occurring.
But, nevertheless, this was an incident that was detected; that was watched and that was neutralized, and we don't want to lose sight of the fact that this was a successful counter-intelligence operation in the end.
QUESTION: How about ferreting out the mole?
MR. FOLEY: I'm sorry, the premise of your question is one that I just can't share. This is a matter that is being investigated as to how the device was introduced and you're prejudging the outcome of an investigation.
QUESTION: Have you established yet whether any Russian officials at any time over the previous few years had access to or entered that room?
MR. FOLEY: That's what's being looked at, among other things. It's not something --
QUESTION: Should it be possible -- (inaudible) - to establish?
MR. FOLEY: It's not in any way, shape or form something that I can talk about now while the investigation is just underway. As Secretary Albright said last week, this had to be approached in a sequential manner during a period of several months when we were watching the activities of Mr. Gusev and putting ourselves in the best position to catch him in the act, as it were, and to neutralize the operation. That placed inherent limits on the nature of the investigation. Now that he's been apprehended and the operation was shut down, we're in a much better position to conduct a thorough investigation. But that has just begun.
QUESTION: Jim, does the US share - this is a different subject --
QUESTION: The same subject.
QUESTION: I think you've got a bug --
QUESTION: The bug --
QUESTION: What bug?
MR. FOLEY: You're bugging me.
QUESTION: That's my job. In August, the Washington Times reported that security guards working at the State Department received very scanty training in counter-terrorism and in other areas.
MR. FOLEY: Untrue.
QUESTION: Could that lack of training have contributed to the ability to bug this building?
(Hall Alarm sounds.)
MR. FOLEY: I think you've just - your question was alarming, I would say.
(Laughter.)
MR. FOLEY: First of all, Ben, the article was wrong in you paper, so for you then to ask did their lack of training contribute to what happened, obviously, no. ................
QUESTION: If I could just go back quickly to the Russian spy, have you guys figured out how long the spying had been going on and when the bug was planted?
MR. FOLEY: Again, before the investigation is completed, I'm not - at least from this podium - going to dribble out what the investigators are finding. I'm not aware that they've reached conclusions in those areas, in any event.
QUESTION: Is this an in-house investigation?
MR. FOLEY: It's an FBI investigation that Diplomatic Security is a partner of.
QUESTION: One final question on this. What security changes have you undertaken since discovering the bug in place?
MR. FOLEY: The Department has been in the process of tightening security on an ongoing basis for about the past year, year and a half. I think Secretary Albright indicated the other day that when she hired David Carpenter, who just retired from the Secret Service, to be her Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, she had in mind taking a very vigorous look at our security procedures and standards in all of our posts overseas and here at home.
And it was around the time that he came on board that our embassies were blown up in Africa, and so I know there has been a lot of focus, understandably so, on the last week about the counter-intelligence aspects of our security at the State Department, but we really face a two-pronged challenge because there are terrorist threats to our security as well.
And so in that light, under Mr. Carpenter's leadership, we've been doing quite a number of things - as the Secretary has indicated, there had been a problem with adequate funding of security in the earlier part of the '90s and she has tried to reverse that trend. We've hired quite a number of Diplomatic Security agents in the last year to two years. You've seen some of the physical security upgrades around the building. We have made improvements in construction security and in access and other areas that I can't get into.
In terms of the specific question about what we have specifically done in the last four or five days since his --
QUESTION: Since the bug was discovered.
MR. FOLEY: Oh, since it was discovered? Well, there are a number of things that have been done. Again, I can't go into all of them. One thing that you're all aware of that I would stress was not related to the discovery of the Russian incident but rather pre-dated it was the imposition of the escort policy for all visitors into the State Department. That was implemented in August but it had been in the works for quite some time.
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(The briefing was concluded at 2:40 P.M.)
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