DOD Official Testifies on U.S. Efforts to Help Colombia

BRIAN E. SHERIDAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, 
AND HUMAN RESOURCES

October 12, 2000

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this Committee to
discuss the implementation of the Department of Defense's portion of
the Fiscal Year 2000 supplemental appropriation that supports the
Government of Colombia's execution of Plan Colombia.

Drug abuse is an undeniable threat to our national security; one that
is measured by the thousands of lives lost in our country every year
and that costs our country billions of dollars annually. Reducing the
supply of drugs on our streets is an integral component of our
National Drug Control Strategy and the Department of Defense (DoD)
plays a key supporting role in creating the opportunity for law
enforcement agencies, both our own and those of foreign nations, to
interdict the flow of drugs into our country. DoD is committed to this
counterdrug mission.

The demand for illegal drugs in the United States, specifically for
cocaine and heroin, is met primarily from the growing fields and
production laboratories in Colombia. The vast sums of money that this
illegal activity provides have served to exacerbate current domestic
issues facing the people of Colombia. The U.S. and Colombian
Government, and our citizens, share a common objective to reach our
specific national goals -- to reduce drug abuse in our own country and
to bring peace and stability to Colombia. A significant reduction in
the flow of illegal drugs to the U.S., with the corresponding
reduction in the supply of "easy money" which supports both guerillas
and illegal self-defense forces operating in Colombia, serves the
national interests of both our countries. For these reasons, it is
absolutely necessary that the U.S. continue to support Colombia in its
effort to reduce the production and transport of cocaine and heroin
that is destined for the U.S.

Over the past two years Colombia, specifically the area east of the
Andes, has become the center of the cocaine trade, largely as a result
of successful interdiction and eradication efforts in Peru and
Bolivia. The remoteness of southern Colombia and the lack of
government control in large areas of this region has precluded
Colombian interdiction operations to the point that the expansion of
coca growing areas, especially in the Putumayo Department, has
progressed virtually unchecked. Most of the world's coca is now grown
in Colombia and over ninety percent of the cocaine consumed in the
U.S. is manufactured in or passes through Colombia. The United States,
the nation with the greatest cocaine demand, currently consumes over
200 metric tons annually from the Andean region.

DoD has been supporting Colombian counterdrug efforts for over ten
years. The additional funding provided by the FY00 Emergency
Supplemental will allow the Department to build on past programs, in
short, to accelerate the implementation of the efforts in Colombia
that ultimately proved to be successful in Peru and Bolivia. The plan
funded with the emergency supplemental is a balanced and executable
plan that will not require an appreciable increase in the number of
U.S. military personnel present in Colombia. This effort is responsive
to Plan Colombia and consistent with current U.S. policy. Furthermore,
these programs, in coordination with other interagency efforts, form
the core of a sound, responsive, and timely assistance package that
will significantly enhance Colombia's ability to conduct effective
counterdrug operations.

While I have confidence in this plan, I would like to reiterate what I
have stated in previous testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
and Armed Services Committees in February and April of this year, the
House Armed Services Committee in March and, most recently, before the
House International Relations Committee last month. Program execution
will be a challenge and results will not be evident for some time. I
also highlighted this point during numerous Hill briefings over the
last several months. The vastness of southern Colombia and the lack of
significant infrastructure pose major challenges. The sheer number of
supporting contracts required to be implemented to ensure the
long-term viability of this effort will necessitate careful management
and mandate frequent review. Some of these concerns are also reflected
in the draft GAO report, to which the Department is in the process of
formally responding. There will be setbacks and emerging challenges.
Perseverance will be required. But the plan is sound and the mission
worthwhile.

The President signed the Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction
Appropriations Act, which contained the Fiscal Year 2000 Emergency
Supplemental that provided the additional funding support for Plan
Colombia, on July 13, 2000. I signed the DoD Colombia Supplemental
Execution Plan on July 24, 2000 and the U.S. Army's 7th Special Forces
Group commenced training the second Colombian counternarcotics
battalion on July 27th. As you can see, the Department has, where
possible, moved out quickly in support of Colombian counterdrug
efforts.

Let me briefly outline the Department's programs. Of note, while
funding was appropriated in July of this year, several congressional
reporting requirements had to be met first which precluded immediately
obligating funding for some of the Department's programs. As a result,
most of the supporting contracts are just now being submitted for
review by the Department and many of the dates reflect our best
estimate of the expected delivery date. As I have already stated,
execution remains a challenge before us.

SUPPORT FOR THE PUSH INTO SOUTHERN COLOMBIA
Counternarcotics Battalion Support

The Department has commenced training the second Colombian
counternarcotics battalion using members of the U.S. Army's 7th
Special Forces Group. This training is scheduled to be completed in
the December 2000 time frame. The third battalion is currently
scheduled to begin training in early 2001. These battalions will give
the Colombian Army a complete counterdrug brigade in the
Putumayo/Caqueta region to engage what is the world's largest coca
cultivation center. Plans include positioning counternarcotics
battalions at Tres Esquinas and Larandia.

Counternarcotics Brigade Headquarters

The establishment of a counterdrug brigade headquarters is sequenced
to support the strategic and tactical operation of the counterdrug
Brigade located in southern Colombia. Department support for this
program is scheduled to begin in the first quarter of fiscal year
2001. Allocated funding will provide for training, communications
equipment, computer needs, facility modification, and similar
requirements. The counternarcotics brigade headquarters is scheduled
to be operational in February 2001.

Army Aviation Infrastructure Support

The Colombian Army does not have the infrastructure necessary to
support the number and mix of helicopters that will be provided by the
Department of State using emergency supplemental funding. DoD will
fund a variety of critical aviation infrastructure needs to support
the UH-1N, UH-1H Huey II and UH-60 helicopters that are required to
provide mobility for the counternarcotics battalions. This program
will include funding for electrical utilities and road infrastructure,
aviation fuel storage and fueling systems, security improvements,
parking aprons and helicopter pads, a maintenance hanger, an
operations facility, and a taxiway. DoD has conducted several site
surveys and hosted conferences to facilitate planning for this
challenging requirement. Support contracts are expected to be awarded
in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001 and continue through 2002.

Military Reform

For some time the Department has been managing a contractor-led
endeavor to provide the necessary assistance to Colombia to support
the government's effort to restructure its military establishment so
it can successfully engage the drug threat throughout the country. The
focus of this effort is not tactical but organizational in nature,
centered at the Minister of Defense level and the uniformed services
of Colombia. The contractor's efforts have focused on restructuring
and improving military planning, logistics support for ground and air
operational assets, development of counternarcotics military doctrine,
development of counternarcotics military strategy, new concepts on
recruitment and conscription, development of an integrated
intelligence capability, improved computerization and command and
control, and similar initiatives. The program will also support
efforts to promote human rights and effect judicial reforms. This is
an on-going effort and is subject to periodic review. Supplemental
funding will be utilized to extend this program should it prove to be
necessary.

Organic Intelligence Capability

The intelligence collection capability in the region will be enhanced
to support operations by the counternarcotics battalions. This program
will provide the counternarcotics battalions with a combination of
airborne and ground tactical intelligence capabilities to directly
assist in the planning and execution of counterdrug operations. It is
scheduled to begin in the third quarter of fiscal year 2001 and be
sustained for an extended period of time.

SUPPORT FOR INTERDICTION EFFORTS

Tracker Aircraft Modification

In the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, DoD will provide for the
modification of two Colombia Air Force C-26 Merlin aircraft by
installing APG-66 air-to-air radars, Forward Looking Infrared Radars
(FLIRs), and communications equipment. The completed aircraft will
give Colombia an organic capability to terminally track and intercept
illegal smuggling aircraft that move the cocaine from the HCl labs in
southeastern Colombia to the Colombian coasts for transshipment to the
United States. These modified aircraft will replicate the terminal
radar interceptor that supported the Peruvians in their successful air
denial operation against the Peru-to-Colombia air bridge. The aircraft
modifications should be completed in the summer of 2001.

AC-47 Aircraft Modifications

Commencing in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001, the Department
will support the installation of a FLIR in one of the three
operational Colombian AC-47 aircraft. The FLIR will greatly enhance
the aircraft's ability to support night operations against drug
smuggling activities.

Funding will also support modification of an additional Colombian
DC-3, converting it into an AC-47 aircraft with FLIR, night vision
cockpit, and fire control systems. This will be the fourth operational
AC-47 in the Colombian inventory. These planes have been used
repeatedly by the Colombian military to strafe drug trafficking
aircraft. The aircraft upgrades are scheduled to be completed in the
third quarter of fiscal year 2001.

Ground Based Radar

The contract for the installation of a ground-based radar at Tres
Equinas, Colombia that will provide positive air control for the
counternarcotics brigade helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that
operate in the region is scheduled to be awarded in the first quarter
of fiscal year 2001. The Tres Equinas radar will provide improved
detection and monitoring of smuggling air activity in the Putumayo
region of Colombia, where over 70% of Colombia's coca cultivation
occurs. The program includes the upgrade of an existing TPS-70 owned
by DoD, and the installation costs for installing the radar at Tres
Esquinas. The radar site is scheduled to be operational in October of
2001.

Radar Command and Control  

The DoD supported radar command and control program will provide
Colombia a modern and operationally effective system, located in
Bogota, which will be capable of monitoring multiple radar sites
throughout Colombia. It will support positive control of Colombian Air
Force air interdiction operations throughout Colombia. The current
system is outmoded and needs to be replaced. The contract will be
awarded in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001 with completion
expected in the first quarter of fiscal year 2002.

Andean Ridge Intelligence Collection

This ongoing program supports Colombia with critical intelligence
against drug smuggling activities. It provides for collection sites
located in critical areas throughout the drug cultivation and
trafficking regions.

Colombian Ground Interdiction

The Colombian ground interdiction program is still in the initial
planning stages. Supplemental funding will be used to initiate a
Colombian program to control drug smuggling on the major roads across
the Andes and those roads feeding the northern coast and western coast
cocaine transshipment regions. This funding will start the process of
Colombia regaining control of its major roads, which currently are
routinely utilized by the drug trafficking forces. Road control is
important since it can help control cocaine and precursor chemical
smuggling across the Andes and to/from major ports. As reference,
there are 4 or 5 major roads across the Andes and these highways feed
the road network located west of the Andes. Vehicle traffic on the
highways west of the Andes serves as the principal mode of moving
chemicals and cocaine to/from the northern coast and western coast
cocaine ports and transshipment regions.

All these programs that I just outlined build on our current strategy
-- no change in DoD policy is required to execute the programs funded
by this supplemental. There is nothing new here for DoD. However,
there will be challenges to confront in the course of our efforts to
attack the center of the cocaine industry in southern Colombia. It
will not be easy, but it is worth the effort. Let me share with you my
concerns.

DoD Concerns

Colombian Military Organization

The Colombian military has limitations based on resources, training
practices, lack of joint planning and operations. They need to better
coordinate operations between the services and with the Colombian
National Police (CNP). The restructuring of the military is essential
if Colombia is to have continuing operational success against the drug
threat. President Pastrana recently announced the issuance of several
decrees that will serve to make the Colombian military a more modern,
professional and effective force. Among them is a provision giving the
armed forces leadership authority to suspend or dismiss military
personnel, regardless of rank or length of service, for poor
performance or unsatisfactory behavior, as Congress urged in the
supplemental. This is potentially an important tool for ensuring
respect for human rights -- if used appropriately. The reforms also
include a provision which, in effect, establishes a JAG corps, another
of the measures Congress sought in the supplemental. The Colombian
military needs help and, as was previously outlined, we plan to use a
small portion of supplemental funding towards this end.

Human Rights

I am also concerned, as are Members of Congress and representatives
throughout the interagency, about human rights. The human rights
practices and procedures that the U.S. government has put in place, in
response to legislative enactments, and the example set by the small
number of our troops training Colombian forces has had an impact, as
have President Pastrana's reforms. Armed forces cooperation with the
civilian court system in prosecuting human rights violations committed
by military personnel is improving. Some military officers accused of
collaboration with or tolerance of illegal self defense force
activities have been dismissed, while others face prosecution. The
armed forces have demonstrated greater aggressiveness recently in
seeking out and attacking illegal self-defense forces. Clearly, the
Colombian Armed Forces have come a long way, yet no one would dispute
that more must be done. I am also alarmed by the reported dramatic
increase in human rights violations attributed to both the illegal
self-defense forces and insurgents -- this is symptomatic of
Colombia's crisis in general and, as I see it, a call to action. We
continue to press the Government of Colombia for sustained progress
and concrete results in its efforts to improve the human rights
climate, and our assistance package contains a variety of human rights
elements in support of this goal.

Counterdrug vs. Counter Insurgency

Lastly, let me address the "targets" of this supplemental package, and
our source zone strategy as a whole. The targets are the
narco-traffickers, those individuals and organizations that are
involved in the cultivation of coca or opium poppy and the subsequent
production and transportation of cocaine and heroin to the U.S. Only
those armed elements that forcibly inhibit or confront counterdrug
operations will be engaged, be they narco-traffickers, insurgent
organizations, or illegal self-defense forces.

I know that some are concerned that we are being drawn into a
quagmire. Let me assure you, we are not. There are numerous
restrictions, constraints, and reviews that are involved in the
approval of the deployment of U.S. military personnel on counterdrug
missions in Colombia. It suffices to say, the process is
comprehensive, involving reviews by the Embassy in Bogota and U.S.
Southern Command in Miami as well as the Joint Staff and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. I personally look not only at who is
deploying and what they are doing, but at the specific locations to
which they are going. Furthermore, each and every deployment order
states, in no uncertain terms, that DoD personnel are not to accompany
host nation personnel on operational missions. This will not change.
As I have said, the execution of this increased support does not
require a change in U.S. policy. Is there risk to U.S. personnel
providing counterdrug support? Yes, there is. However, we are
aggressively working to minimize that risk.

In summary, the Department of Defense supports this additional
assistance for Colombia. U.S. Southern Command and my office
participated extensively in its formulation. It integrates fully our
source zone strategy, affording the opportunity to enhance those
counterdrug programs that have proven successful in Peru and Bolivia.
Execution will be a challenge and it will take some time before
measurable results are achieved. There will be setbacks and
perseverance will be required. However, President Pastrana has asked
for international support to address an internal problem that has
international dimensions -- fueled in part by our country's demand for
illegal drugs. We can, and should, provide this assistance. It is time
to move forward.