East Asia and the United States: Current Status and Five-Year Outlook

September 2000

The views expressed are those of individuals and do not represent official US intelligence of policy positions. The NIC routinely sponsors such unclassified conferences with outside experts to gain knowledge and insight to sharpen the level of debate on critical issues.

Contents

Introduction
Japanese Attitudes and Approaches Toward US Policies and Presence in the Region
Trends in Chinese Assessments of the United States, 2000-2005
US-ROK Relations: Trends at the Opening of the 21st Century
Southeast Asian Perspectives
Convergence/Divergence in Political Interests, Values, and Policies
Economic Interests, Values, and Policies
The Perils of Being Number 1: East Asian Trends and US Policies to 2025
Appendix A: Conference Schedule
Appendix B: Participants
Appendix C: References

Southeast Asia

Introduction

The National Intelligence Council and the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress held a one-day unclassified conference on this topic on 17 February 2000, at the Thomas Jefferson Building of the Library of Congress. Seven papers by nongovernment specialists and 11 commentaries by Intelligence Community specialists examined:

Sixty US Intelligence Community, other Executive Branch, congressional, and nongovernment experts participated actively in discussions following the formal papers and commentaries, reinforcing the findings presented below.

Overview

Conference participants judged that developing trends presage more divergence between the United States and key East Asian countries and more difficulties for US policy and interests.

This situation will come despite continued strong regional dependence on the US economy and general support for a continued US military presence in the region. Acknowledging US superpower status well into the 21st century, regional powers do not seek to confront the United States militarily or to cut off advantageous economic ties with the dynamic US economy. Regional states also will continue to conform to varying degrees with US-backed international norms and international organizations. Meanwhile, the ability of regional countries to work together against US policies and interests will be offset to some degree by intraregional rivalries (notably between China and Japan), and by diverging interests (for example, Southeast Asian agricultural exporters support US-backed efforts to open world farm markets while Japan and South Korea remain strongly opposed).

Nevertheless, growing regional resistance to US policies and interests is likely. It will be strong and uniform in resisting expected US unilateral actions, especially regarding political issues and values such as human rights and democracy, that will be seen to serve US interests at the expense of that national sovereignty of regional states. Greater friction will also arise as a result on an expected downturn in the US economy, anticipated difficulties in US-China relations, and greater debate between the United States and Japanese and South Korean allies over military bases, host nation support, and other alliance arrangements. Among possible developments that could seriously worsen the outlook for the United States, military crises over the Taiwan Strait or power arrangements in a newly reunified Korean peninsula are likely to polarize regional opinion, sharply reducing support for US security policy and regional military presence.

Determinants
East Asian policies toward the United States will be driven strongly by the uncertain regional security environment, the nascent revival of regional economies after the Asian economic crisis, and trends in international politics and norms that affect East Asian authoritarian and democratic governments differently but underline strong regional nationalistic pride and assertiveness.

Uncertainty Over Regional Security Trends
After the Cold War, many in the region feared a US withdrawal. While still present in some quarters, this concern has been superseded by regional angst over US unilateralism--the use of political, economic, and especially military coercion in unexpected ways to achieve goals that in the past East Asian observers would not have expected to warrant such a strong US effort. The 1999 US intervention in Kosovo reinforced this new regional view of US power and unpredictability.

Adding to uncertainty over the regional security environment are the rise of China as an economic and increasingly capable military power; the implications of Japan's stagnant economy for its regional leadership aspirations and capabilities; and continuing uncertainty over regional hot spots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and Indonesia.

In response, all regional powers are expected to continue actively "hedging"--using diplomacy, military preparations, and other means to ensure that their particular interests will be safeguarded in case the security situation should change for the worse. Thus, conference participants noted that they expect the United States to remain in the lead in this regard, pursuing a policy of engagement with China while fostering stronger alliances in Asia in case of Sino-US confrontation. China in turn will continue to pursue engagement with the United States but also will strive to develop ties with Russia and others useful in countering possible US pressure against it. Roughly similar patterns will develop in Japan's ambivalent relationship with China, emerging Japanese hedging efforts regarding the alliance with the United States, South Korea's dealing with North Korea and other powers concerned with the peninsula, and the dealings of Southeast Asian countries with China. While driven by regional security uncertainty, the active hedging is expected to continue to add to it.

Economic Recovery
The Asian economic crisis not only hit regional economies hard but also seriously undermined social stability, challenged the standing of political regimes whose legitimacy rests heavily on providing economic growth, and undermined national security. It prompted widespread popular and elite resentment over economic globalization and US-backed IMF rescue efforts. Nonetheless, regional governments have acknowledged the need to accommodate these trends. Conference participants expected these governments will continue to recognize the importance of the US market, investment, and technology for the economic growth of their nations. Their economic concerns are pragmatic, focusing on the consequences of a possible downturn in the US economy in the next few years, Japan's continued slow growth, and possible intensified competition between Chinese and Southeast Asian manufacturers looking to export to the same markets.

Political Issues and International Norms
Growing international pressures for freer flow of ideas and information, and the concurrent development of greater political pluralism, democracy, and respect for human rights will continue to challenge East Asian authoritarian regimes. They also will complicate the decision-making processes in democratic countries like Japan that previously had been dominated by political elites and now must take account of a broader array of interest and opinion groups.

Conference participants expect several regional authoritarian governments to continue to preserve their prerogatives of power and resist trends toward democracy. Regional states in general, however, are likely to accommodate international trends and norms regarding the freer flow of information, more open markets, and common efforts to improve the environment and fight international crime and disease. Their support for international organizations and regional organizations likewise probably will continue.

Implications for the United States

Conference participants judged that these regional security, economic, and political trends will cause regional states to diverge increasingly from US interests and policies in the future. They acknowledged that the importance of these differences for the United States will remain offset by the continuing strong convergence of US and regional interests in two key areas:

Anticipated Problems for US Interests
Security Issues. China will work against US efforts to strengthen its position in the region. Notably, Beijing will press against and challenge US support for Taiwan, US efforts to build missile defenses in the region, and US efforts to strengthen the alliance with Japan. It probably will work against a US military presence in Korea after reunification and will continue to support South Korea's refusal to be part of the US theater missile defense efforts in the region. It will seek opportunities to work with Russia against US security interests in the region.

Japan and South Korea strongly support their respective alliances with the United States and are currently cooperating closely with Washington in trilateral efforts to deal with North Korea. Yet, like many other US allies, both Tokyo and Seoul chafe over the asymmetry in their alliance relationship with the US superpower. They seek adjustments in the US military presence that would accommodate their nationalistic or local concerns. Hedging in response to perceived US unilateralism and regional security unpredictability probably will prompt them to diverge from the United States over China and possibly North Korea.

Southeast Asian countries see the United States as being much less committed to Southeast Asia as opposed to Northeast Asia, and thus their main concern is that the United States might pull back from the region. They also become concerned when they perceive the United States and China are moving toward confrontation, as none of the states see their interests well served by choosing sides between these two key powers in such a standoff.

Economic Issues. Support in the region is broad to resist perceived self-serving US trade or other economic policies in international organizations or elsewhere that infringe on the interests of East Asian countries. Thus, President Clinton's efforts to promote labor and environmental standards during the Seattle WTO meeting last November found few endorsements in the region, while many gloated over the US embarrassment regarding the chaotic and inconclusive meeting. Meanwhile, longstanding differences over trade policies will persist and most likely worsen in the event a US economic downturn reduces US willingness to absorb large trade deficits with East Asian countries. Though most regional governments will go along with the greater economic opening supported by the United States, authoritarian states like China will endeavor to curb the free flow of information, and Japan, South Korea, and others will try to preserve their protected agricultural sectors despite US pressures.

Intra-Asian trade and investment is growing again after the economic crisis and is likely to promote more efforts at greater Asian economic integration that exclude the United States. Japan also can be expected to pursue more actively its interest in Asian economic mechanisms exclusive of the West. Japan and others will promote East Asian candidates for international economic organizations that heretofore were Western reserves--complicating US policy in these instances.

Political Issues and Values. East Asian authoritarian governments will resist US efforts to press for greater democracy and human rights in their countries. Such US efforts will also receive scant support from other regional powers--even other democracies. Their strong nationalistic sensitivities and concern over fragile regional stability will prompt them to eschew support for such "interventionism" except in extreme cases.

US efforts to promote its leadership in broader international efforts to foster US-backed political or other norms may also meet with resistance, even from US allies. Regional leaders probably will tacitly welcome failures of perceived overbearing US pressures in these areas in hopes that such comeuppance will cause the United States to be more consultative and collaborative in its policy toward the region.

How Will East Asian Countries Cooperate Against the United States?
Regional support for continued close economic ties to the United States and general support for the US military presence will limit interest in actively working against US policies in these areas. Moreover, regional powers probably will continue to be at cross purposes in their reaction to many US policies and interests. On US theater missile defense efforts, for example, Japan will continue support while China will strongly oppose and South Korea probably will remain on the sidelines in the debate. Japan's push for an Asian monetary fund and a seat on the UN Security Council seems to complicate US leadership in Asia--a broad Chinese objective, but they also work against China's concurrent objective to curb Japan's regional and global power and influence. South Korean and Japanese resistance to US-backed liberalization of agricultural trade is opposed by agricultural exporters in Southeast Asia.

Regional countries are most likely to find common ground against perceived US intervention in symbolic and political areas (for example, human rights and labor rights) that challenge the sovereignty and national dignity of East Asian countries. Regional leaders and commentators also are likely to gloat over US setbacks in other areas of perceived unilateralism, if only in the hope that such setbacks will prompt US policy makers to be more consultative and accommodating of regional interests in formulating future policies.

What Could Make Things Worse?

Among possible developments that could seriously worsen the outlook for the United States, military crises over the Taiwan Strait or power arrangements in a newly reunified Korean peninsula most likely would polarize regional opinion, sharply reducing support for US security policy and regional military presence.

Japanese Attitudes and Approaches Toward US Policies and Presence in the Region

by Susumu Awanohara

My task here is to examine the trends in Japanese attitudes toward US policies and presence in the region. During 1998-99, when I freelanced and helped a major Japanese business publication and a premier Japanese television station, I was struck by some preconceived notions held by editors and directors/producers about the situation in the United States or about American attitudes. Often the journalists came to the United States not to find out but to have people act out the prewritten script. These were journalists in the mainstream, not extremists of any kind. For example, editors of my publication once wanted me to do a "VIP interview" (meaning it had to be with someone who is a big name in Japan as well as in the United States) as a US angle for a special magazine issue on China. The interview was to demonstrate that, despite appearance of tension and friction, the United States and China were really good friends and were intending to establish a condominium in the region, isolating Japan. The editors had in mind a former secretary of state as an interviewee but I deliberately chose a former ambassador to Japan who I knew would patiently refute some of the editors' notions while showing a degree of understanding as to why President Clinton might have induced the Japanese to acquire them.

The TV station I was helping shot several major features on the financial crisis that gripped the world from 1997 through 1998. Like the editors of my publication, the TV directors and producers came with set notions. Clearly, they were more inclined to blame international liquidity movements--part of the "casino capitalism" of the West--rather than the "crony capitalism" of Asia for the Asian currency crisis. Many TV personnel saw Western conspiracy in the Asian crisis, although the extent of the conspiracy differed with each individual. In the extreme, directors and producers suspected that the US Treasury and the IMF represented Wall Street's interests:

Another popular economic theme among both the editors and directors/producers was that the Japanese financial bubble of the late 1980s had been touched off by the Plaza Accord of 1985, the implication being that Japan's "lost decade" was caused--intentionally or otherwise--by the United States. My editors subscribed to this view but had the sense to ask former Secretary of State James Baker to respond to such a view in another VIP interview. (Secretary Baker did a pretty convincing job of rebutting the allegation, while stressing that he was a friend of Japan who coined the term "global partnership.")

What struck me further was that Japanese "policymakers"--I include bureaucrats and politicians in this category--had notions quite similar to those of "opinionmakers" such as my journalistic colleagues. This is perhaps not surprising since former officials (notably Messrs. Hisahiko Okazaki and Yukio Okamoto) and even incumbent officials (Taichi Sakaiya, Ichizo Ohara, and of course, Shintaro Ishihara) are quite active in the media as opinionmakers, and conversely, in a new trend, some opinionmakers are becoming policymakers (Yuriko Koike and Nobuteru Ishihara). But bureaucrats and politicians form a group distinct from opinionmakers. The policymakers I spoke to tended to be less forthcoming with their honne (as opposed to tatemae) views. So, it was only from policymakers, whom I got to know quite well, that I heard of suspicions and conspiracy theories about US intentions. Operating in the real world, however, policymakers tend to be relatively pragmatic; even when their views of the United States no longer justify existing policy, they will take time changing that policy.

As I prepared myself mentally for the project, I had several questions to answer and hypotheses to test. My sense was that anti-American or America-defying rhetoric among opinion leaders was louder and more widespread than in the late-1970s when I followed Japanese opinions. Is this true? And if so why? America-defying attitude seemed more pronounced among officials now than it was a decade or so ago. Is this true, and does it matter? How do opinionmakers and policymakers influence each other? If we are interested ultimately in Japanese policy (rather than attitude), inertia among government officials is so strong that policy will not change easily in the short term. One notable domestic trend is that politicians are trying to make--and succeeding in making--greater input into policy, while the position of bureaucrats is diminishing. How does this affect Japanese policy generally and policy toward the United States?

Plan of the Paper

I set out to look for information on three groups: the general public, opinionmakers and policymakers. For the purposes of this paper, I will consider opinion makers and policymakers to belong to the "elite" in contrast to the "general public" (though there is some overlap in the two categories). Also, the two major subgroups among policymakers are politicians and bureaucrats as I have stated. I have not been all that successful in gathering the information and in answering the questions I posed for myself. But the intention was to examine the perceptions/attitudes of the three groups concerning the United States and US policy, focusing on three or four topics: economics, politics (diplomacy), security, and where relevant, culture.

To anticipate:

In sum, I am reasonably optimistic in the sense that I see little chance of a major downturn in Japanese perceptions and attitudes toward the United States, although Washington--particularly the Democrats--could provoke this downturn. I am pessimistic if US expectations are higher and if the United States is wondering if Japan would all of a sudden become a staunch ally.

Public Opinion

After a big dip, public opinion is on the mend. Since late 1995, when Japanese public feelings toward the United States reached a nadir, those feelings have recovered considerably. Responses to key survey questions show similarity between 1999 and years when public sentiment toward the United States was most favorable.

In its 1995 survey on US-Japan relations (published in early 1996), those Japanese calling relations with the US "bad" (32 percent) exceeded those characterizing it as "good" or "very good" (23 percent) for the first time since the Yomiuri Shimbun, with help from Gallop, started its survey of public opinion on US-Japan relations in 1978. A graph drawn from Yomiuri surveys over the years shows that the curve indicating "good" has gradually declined from the peak of 53 percent in 1984, while the curve indicating "bad" has climbed gradually from the trough of 8.1 percent, also in 1984 (see graph published January 2000 with the 1999 survey results). Incidentally, the view of Japan from the United States showed similar trends of deterioration, although they were less extreme than on the Japanese side: Americans characterizing relations with Japan as bad were lower in proportion to the total than Japanese feeling negative about the relationship, while generally a higher proportion of respondents considered the relationship as good in the United States as in Japan. Clearly, the Japanese have been more concerned about the bilateral relationship than Americans were.

Commenting on the 1995 survey, the Yomiuri identified two "gaps" in the two nations' perceptions of the other side. One gap was caused by Japanese self-confidence, according to the Yomiuri. Many Japanese felt in 1995 that the United States had been Japan's "parent," "teacher," or "big brother/sister" in earlier postwar years but was now a "friend," "teammate," or most frequently, a "rival." Speaking of rivals, while the Japanese thought that China would emerge as their biggest economic rival, followed by the United States, the Americans said overwhelmingly that Japan would become--or already was--the biggest rival economically. In other words, Japan had caught up with the United States and had little to learn from it. The second gap was found in the Japanese attitude towards defense, the Yomiuri said. While the Japanese respondents wanted a reduction of US military presence in Japan and the region, at the same time they expressed their faith that the United States would come to their aid in case of an attack by another power on Japan. The Yomiuri saw this second gap as particularly naive: "Such a selfish argument does not pass muster in the cool and hard international community," the newspaper commented.

In a similar survey conducted in late 1999 and published early this year, sentiment in the two countries about the other continued to improve dramatically, showing remarkable resemblance to pre-1995 conditions. Japanese thinking that bilateral relations were good were back up to 52.2 percent, and those Japanese thinking they were bad accounted for only 9.8 percent. Judging from these numbers, 1999 was very much like 1984. A quick look at the 1999 questions and answers shows that Japanese respect for the United States--its economic as well as military might--has been restored. Questions and answers indicate clearly that the Japanese feel more exposed to, if not outright threatened by, hostile or potentially hostile neighbors (notably North Korea and China) and that they believe that the United States would come to their aid in case of trouble with these neighbors. Whether or not the Japanese are now willing to pay the cost of US protection in the form of a military presence in Japanese soil does not come out clearly in this survey.

A brief review of major recent events in the bilateral relations helps to explain the contrasting survey results in 1996 and 2000, at least superficially. As the Cold War ended at the turn of the decade and there was no longer need to maintain the anti-Soviet stance at all cost, economic friction between the two countries became more severe, with accusatory words at each other escalating. The Structural Impediments Initiative talks (under President Bush) were tough, but Japanese negotiators still used positive gaiatsu to fight their domestic nemeses. But the Framework talks (under President Clinton) had few positive aspects for the Japanese side; the Japanese argued rather successfully that the United States wanted "managed trade" and rebuffed US pressures. 1995 was a particularly trying year for US-Japan relations: difficult auto talks were concluded without making either party very happy. Led by then MITI chief Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Japanese negotiators got particularly tough, stiffing the US side when they thought its demands were unreasonable (rifujin). The word rifujin was much used by bureaucrats during this period and beyond; it carried the connotation that in earlier days, the Japanese side had caved in to US demands even if they were unreasonable. The rape incident in Okinawa involving a local schoolgirl and US servicemen stationed in the island prefecture poured gasoline on the smoldering relationship. In some ways it was also cathartic, however.

Improvements began in 1996. The bilateral security treaty was reaffirmed in a Clinton-Hashimoto summit in spring. The trimming of the US presence in Okinawa, including the return of the Futenma helicopter base, was announced just before the summit and had a noticeable positive effect on public opinion. Partly because of this focus on security ties and partly because the major trade issues had now been dealt with, economic issues went on the back burner.

Assessment of US-Japan Relations

The bilateral relations got considerable help from third parties, such as China and North Korea. China's firing of missiles across the Taiwan Strait in the spring of 1996 vindicated Tokyo's move to reaffirm and strengthen security ties to the United States. North Korea's shooting of missiles over Japan itself naturally had an even more positive effect on Japanese views of the alliance, although both cases left some Japanese unhappy with Washington (either because they feared having to take sides in the US-China conflict or because they felt that the US response to P'yongyang's missile threat was not sufficiently indignant). For the reasons already alluded to, the Asian currency crisis did not bring together the United States and Japan. In addition, Japan's proposal to set up an Asian Monetary Fund provoked a US reaction similar to one against Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's notion of an East Asian Economic Grouping. President Clinton's China trip in 1998 was a big minus in the Japanese mind. The US President termed China a strategic partner and, together with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, chastised Japan for its economic missteps. Furthermore, concurring with the Chinese, Clinton decided not to stop in Japan before or after his long stay in China. In 1999, the Diet passed bills needed to implement the new guidelines of US-Japan security relationship.

We now return to the 1999 survey to summarize what the Japanese public is thinking of the United States and its policies in the economic, political, and security spheres.

Economy
The US economy will remain strong (51.7 percent) or will get even stronger (25.5 percent), the Japanese public thinks. But somewhat more Japanese (55.7 percent) than Americans (52.8 percent) are afraid that the US stock market will fall in the near future. (My sense has been that among Japanese elites, the expectation of a US stock market crash is even stronger than among the general public.)

Politics
The United States will retain its superpower status and will remain the world's leader. (The survey was not detailed enough to capture the growing sense among the elites that the United States no longer transcends its narrow interests to lead.) The United States is the most trustworthy foreign nation (43.9 percent). The United States had the highest score, whereas only 15 percent of Americans trusted Japan the most, with Japan coming in the 7th place, after Canada, Britain, Australia, and others. The United States will remain the most important country for Japan, both politically and economically.

Security
Korean Peninsula (78.6 percent), China/Taiwan (25.1 percent) and Russia (18.6 percent) pose a military threat to Japan. In particular, North Korea's Taepo Dong missile is dangerous for Japan (86.7 percent). If Japan is attacked, the United States will come to its aid (77.3 percent). Against this, 66.9 percent of American respondents said that in case of an attack on Japan, the United States should provide help.

All in all, Japanese feelings appear favorable towards the United States. But as they are at historic highs, so they are unlikely to get much better.

Opinionmakers
"Opinionmakers are all over the map," said an academic I spoke to during a recent trip to Japan. The opinionmakers are saying anything they like, breaking all sorts of taboos, but, more likely than not, only to shock and provoke others. Often the proponents are not willing to stake a lot to turn their ideas into reality. The lifting of taboos seems to have accelerated with the criticism not only of politicians but also of bureaucrats, particularly Ministry of Finance bureaucrats--the cream of the crop in an earlier age. There is no more inhibition about attacking anybody. Nothing is sacred (except maybe the imperial family to some Japanese).

Does anything anybody says matter? Does it have a bearing on Japanese policy? Some experts I interviewed said "No" and "No." They felt there was no pattern or meaning. As one of them explained:

Opinionmakers have always said that America is arrogant, overbearing, etc. and that Japan should have a mind and a policy of its own, although the decibel level may be higher today. But policymakers operate in a world that is quite separate from that of opinion makers so there is not much point in studying the views of the latter. Policymakers--even one that were firebrands as opinionmakers--become realistic and say we must work it out with the Americans.

Other experts are less dismissive of the views of opinionmakers. They feel that there are some patterns in what opinionmakers say, and these are connected to both what the public is feeling/thinking and what the policymakers feel, think, and ultimately do. But I did not come across interesting and convincing views on how these elements are structurally connected. One observer thought that a major change, or "discontinuity," is taking place before our eyes, and that the multitude of revisionist books and Democrat leader Yukio Hatoyama calling for constitutional revision are signals of this. Citing John Dower's new book Embracing Defeat, this observer recalled that there had been a major discontinuity of Japanese attitude--a sudden leap from the wartime repulsion towards America to the embracing of everything American--after their defeat in 1945. Could what we are witnessing be a correction of this "embrace," and if so, should the United States respond in some way?

The pattern that some experts see is that there is the big middle (bigger than it used to be), and the left and the right. This is not a great surprise (and may not even be the most interesting framework to analyze Japanese opinions today). The middle has grown and the left has shrunk after the virtual disappearance of the Socialist Party, while the right is active and noisy albeit lacking in common themes and unity. (The term right is probably much too general, but I am not familiar enough with people and groups that tend to come under this heading to offer more precise typology and analysis).

Whereas until a decade ago the center of gravity of opinionmakers was in the left and the LDP government was to the right of (a vaguely defined) center, today the government and its supporters among opinionmakers (say, the Yomiuri Shimbun) seem to be part of a bloated center, taking criticism from the left and the right. On the left you have the traditional left--the communists and the socialists--and the liberals (Asahi Shimbun). The left has a sense of crisis that there is a general societal drift toward the right, that the political center is moving toward the right (as exemplified by passage of laws on the national anthem, on eavesdropping, on the new US-Japan guidelines). Major Leftist fears are that the recent rewriting of the security treaty--particularly provisions on Japan's response to regional contingencies--will drag Japan into America's wars in the region, and that rewriting of the constitution by the Japanese in the near future would put the country on a warlike path once again.

While the left is fighting a rear-guard action, the right is on the offensive. The right is made up of not only the Sankei Shimbun and its commentators, but of all sorts of other groups--the Bungei Shunju group, particularly the opinion journal Shokun, and Sapio of Shogakukan. There are also individual writers who would be classified under the right. In terms of substance, the right ranges from pro-American/proalliance elements to anti-American/proindependence elements. Proindependence does not necessarily mean anti-American, although in fact it often does. Generally, resentment at American hubris is not limited to the right or, for that matter, to Japan. Resentment also stems from persistent Asian reminders of past Japanese wrongdoing, and a desire to determine Japan's own course. In doing so, there is at least a desire to be rational, not emotional--a sense that Japan should pursue its own national interests, that may (or may not) coincide with US interests but are at any rate defined by the Japanese themselves. "Japan is in search of a capitalism with Japanese characteristics," as one writer put it. The younger generation generally has little sense of debt to the United States, which translated into the acquiescence of older generations to American demands and whims because "we owed them" even when the United States was seen as making unreasonable demands. One commentator captured these trends when he pointed out that the Japanese today were more interested in kokueki (national interests) than in giri (obligation).

I could not read enough pieces by opinionmakers to attempt a genuine survey of the vast collection of opinions (a la Ken Pyle or Mike Mochizuki). What follows are my impressions of a small sampling of current opinion. I have taken some samples from Nihon no Ronten 2000 (Japanese Debates 2000) published by the Bungei Shunju group. The perceptions of opinion makers about and attitudes to economic, political, security, and other issues are listed below.

Economy
On the strength of American economy, there is a whole spectrum of opinion; there is little unique in the Japanese analysis, but the Japanese tend to focus on the US current account deficit and the "illusion of the dollar," predicting an end to the robust GDP growth and the stockmarket boom based on the wealth effect. Another popular theme is the tension between globalization (which to many is really Americanization) and national institutions and practices in Japan and Asia generally. While some champion global standards, many demand room for national variances. Some even hope and predict that nativist reaction would defeat hegemonic dominance of global (that is, American) standards.

Politics
"Neo-nationalists" on the right such as Kanji Nishio are busy revising history, "removing distortions." From the little I have read/heard, the alleged distortions are found in the more negative accounts of facts and Japanese intentions and positive accounts of the intentions of others in mainstream history books. Denying that the Nanking massacre happened is part of removing distortions. Another theme of neo-nationalists is Japan's continuing subservience to the United States for which the domestic political establishment (more than the United States) is lambasted. General constitutional revision--not just of Article 9 but of the entire basic law--is seen as a necessary step toward independence. China is a popular theme. US-Japan and US-China relations make a zero-sum game, so China's gain is Japan's loss and vice versa.

Security
The taboo on criticizing China or North Korea has been lifted (basically the left's pacifist argument has been blown away by China and North Korea's actions) so the debate has shifted to the right. The defense debate now centers on whether the new guidelines of US-Japan security ties are useful for Japan or only increases the danger of Japan being embroiled in America's wars; whether or not Japanese participation in the development of TMD is a good idea; whether or not the concept of participating in regional contingencies is constitutional; and whether or not the constitution should be revised for national security (and other) reasons.

There is little direct anti-Americanism in the security debate. The left no longer argues that US imperialism is trying to dominate the world on behalf of monopoly capital. I'm not sure whether there is raw anti-Americanism on the right such as we had from Jun Eto-- who died recently. Perhaps, Susumu Nishibe demonstrates his anti-Americanism when he mocks the United States for thinking foolishly that "American justice is universal justice." Nishibe finds the single-minded American pursuit of deregulation and competition undescribably vulgar.

Other
A major debate on "the private" and "the public" was touched off by a comic book On Wars by cartoonist Yoshinori Kobayashi, which I have not had time to study. Kobayashi argued that the private has become dominant in the postwar period; people now reject the notion of the public, particularly the notion that the public IS the State. He affirms the public impulse--which is associated with patriotism--that he says exists in each individual along with the private impulse. Kobayashi's book provoked virulent reactions from the left as well as others who saw it as rationalization/justification of the Second World War. Some new material here may affect Japanese attitudes toward the United States and Asia.

Mikie Kiyoi of the Foreign Ministry became a celebrity through her attacks on foreign journalists who don't bother to study the Japanese language and misreport Japan with impunity, taking advantage of the fact that "indulgence, swallowing insults and bearing pain are virtues, while complaining and blaming others is juvenile" in Japan. She strikes a chord with Japanese opinion leaders as well as the public who think that Japan is misunderstood, or misrepresented deliberately. The neo-nationalist slogan iubeki kotowaiu (saying to the world what needs to be said) from a while back is still strongly supported in some quarters. Kiyoi is in solidarity with a group of private Japanese citizens living in New York who compiled a volume criticizing Japan coverage by the New York Times's Nick Kristoff and Sheryl WuDunn.

Policymakers
By policymakers I mean politicians and bureaucrats. Further, I have in mind policymakers who have some dealings with the United States. So, our policymakers are constrained by the realities of the US-Japan relationship while at the same time having a degree of direct input into Japanese policy toward the United States. At one level, the policymakers may have abstract ideas about American power, traits, or culture, but on another level, they are dealing with practical issues that involve the United States. The latter makes policymakers more pragmatic/realistic as a group than the opinionmakers. (I have not done enough work to distinguish politicians from bureaucrats. Clearly, power to formulate and implement policies is shifting from bureaucrats to politicians--albeit slowly--and questions arise: how do the two groups differ in their views of America and the world, and how does the power shift influence the policy outcome? I'm afraid I do not have enough data to answer these questions at this point.)

To understand the trends in Japanese policymakers' attitudes, I have tried to engage those I was interviewing for another purpose (that is, discussing the state of the Japanese economy as well as fiscal and monetary policies for Medley Global Advisers) on questions concerning US-Japan relations. My interviews were mostly with economic officials (from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Bank of Japan) and LDP officials who have an interest in economic issues. I saw some Foreign Ministry officials but no one from the Japan Defense Agency.

Following these meetings, I conclude tentatively that, for now, policymakers are more or less satisfied with the bilateral relationship, and no major changes in policy are likely in the near term. In the microeconomic sphere, Japanese trade negotiators have become tougher, refusing to give in to "unreasonable" US demands, while in macroeconomics, there is the nagging suspicion that US demands on Japan or the positions the United States takes in international negotiations are a lot more self-serving than they purport to be. Yet, the Japanese admire (often grudgingly) the US economic performance and lament their own. The strong sense Japanese policymakers had some years ago that they had discovered/invented an alternative model of economic development and of capitalism has taken a beating through domestic and Asian economic difficulties. But some say it will be back, particularly now that the Asian crisis economies are recovering quickly.

Policymakers' attitudes in political and security areas have perhaps changed less than in the economic areas. My assumption (without having interviewed extensively) is that those dealing with North America and security are still at the mainstream of the Foreign Ministry (though the "Asia school" of the ministry is apparently rising) and that this mainstream remains close and favorably disposed to Washington, despite a feeling that the Clinton administration has treated Japan shabbily. In this connection, news that Rust Demming at State and Kurt Campbell at Defense--Japan's best friends in the current administration and a good combo--are leaving the US Government is received with great concern in some policy circles.

Policymakers' perceptions about and attitudes toward economic, political, security, and other issues are presented below.

Economy
In microeconomic (or sectoral trade) negotiations, there was a clear shift between Prime Ministers Kiichi Miyazawa and Morihiro Hosokawa. The Miyazawa-Clinton summit in July 1993 followed the traditional pattern: the Japanese gave in at the end although they thought US demands were unreasonable; the summit was the culmination of a cycle of talks; there were ambiguities in the agreement language so that each side could interpret it in its own way, up to a point. The Hosokawa-Clinton summit in February 1994 was in stark contrast with the earlier summit: the talks broke down because the two sides agreed to disagree (for Japan it was a major departure from the past pattern in that it did not bend and was willing accept failure of highest level talks); Japan took the moral high ground, accusing the US side of pushing "managed trade." The auto talks that ended in June 1995, led by then MITI chief Hashimoto (under Prime Minister Murayama), was another landmark. The Japanese appealed successfully to world opinion (notably the WTO and Asian countries afraid that if Japan caved, the United States would attack them next) that the United States was forcing "managed trade" and "quantitative targets" in the talks and refused to bend. Japanese agencies that feel the brunt of micro pressures are of course resentful. A recent complaint is that the US Government, and in particular USTR and Commerce, has become an agent of specific US companies, extracting concession for these companies.

In addition, many Japanese officials acknowledge their deliberate use of US gaiatsu in mircoeconomic areas in removing domestic microeconomic barriers. In particular, MOF and EPA, which are more concerned about macro policies, tend to use US pressure to overcome domestic resistance (to, say, the big stores law or equalization of tax on farm and residential land) which they cannot handle by themselves. There is a cost to using foreign pressure, however, in the form of strained bilateral relations. The Foreign Ministry tends to worry about such costs. Some at the ministry even feel that Japanese economic officials are resisting US pressure/advice only because it comes from the Americans and that there will be a backlash against Japanese trade negotiators' rude treatment of their US counterparts.

While welcoming US pressures on macroeconomic issues, MOF and EPA tend to resent macroeconomic pressures by the United States, perhaps because they are at the receiving end of such pressure but also because officials honestly think that the US pressure is misplaced. Many officials argue that macro pressures are sometimes really for US interests and not good for Japan. The Plaza accord is often mentioned as an example of how the United States made Japan reflate (to counteract the deflationary effects of a higher yen), while it neglected to do its own homework of reducing the budget deficit and raising the saving rate. The bubble was thus created, many say. The recent pressure from Treasury Secretary Summers to boost Japan's GDP growth from the current 1 percent or less to 3 percent is seen in similar light: Summers wants Japan to do the heavy lifting while the United States seeks to pull off a triple soft landing of the economy, the stockmarket, and the dollar, and avert a crisis.

As the Asian crisis economies recover--some of them quickly--some Japanese officials are feeling that the crisis governments had been wrongly blamed for "crony capitalism" (because the crisis was precipitated more by the uncontrolled flow of global speculative capital than by "corruption" and "relationship-based finance"), and that the Asian Monetary Fund idea--of demonstrating a determination to protect currencies under assault with a huge reserve of funds (as the United States had indeed done for Mexico in the mid-1990s)--was essentially correct. According to one American scholar, Japanese are asking: "Why can't we have a capitalism which is not the same as American capitalism? Why can't we do it our way? Japanese--and other Asians--want to pursue the legitimate alternative way." This sentiment is amplified when the United States fails (or appears to fail) to lead and acts in parochial and self-serving ways--a la Seattle WTO, or as in the case of the CTBT.

Politics
My sense is that the United States has its best friends in the Foreign Ministry, friends who are convinced that the two countries share goals and even values in dealing with bilateral as well as regional/global issues. But just as it is not enough for foreign governments to convince the US State Department alone, ignoring other departments and the Congress, the United States will need to send messages not just to the Foreign Ministry but increasingly to nonfriendly Kasumiga-seki mandarins and Japanese politicians. Although the United States may welcome the powershift from bureaucrats to politicians, in specific instances the pragmatism of bureaucrats that support US interests may come to be missed if politicians act in a different way.

On China and "Japan passing," Japanese officials closest to the State and Defense departments (that is, the Foreign Ministry and the JDA) have heard the US administration's repeated assurances but that is not the same thing as convincing the Japanese opinionmakers or the public, or Japanese politicians. Fear of a US-China condominium has existed and was unnecessarily intensified by President Clinton's refusal to stop in Tokyo at the time of his China visit. On whether Japan would take the lead in establishing/fortifying Asian organizations excluding the United States such as ASEAN+3, and the Asian Monetary Fund and its variants, I think it is possible particularly after the Seattle WTO. But internal constraints on such organizations are so great that the United States should not overreact. The coming constitutional debate should be watched, especially because it is not just about Article 9 but about the very origin of the basic law; the Japanese are coming to a consensus (although the left is resisting) that Japanese did not write the constitution, and that they need a document written by themselves. The taboo on constitutional revision has been lifted decisively by Democrat leader Hatoyama's advocacy of this cause.

Security
In a general sense, policymakers are moving toward Japan as a normal nation, but there are nuances even within the conservative establishment (for example, between Ichiro Ozawa and Koichi Kato).

As earlier suggested, North Korea's Taepo Dong missile launch increased the Japanese sense of insecurity and their support for the alliance (more specifically, for the guidelines legislation and TMD participation). But at the same time, many Japanese felt that the United States was not sufficiently concerned about the threat from North Korea, which raised the further question of whether the United States was a reliable ally and would come to Japan's aid if it were attacked. But the contradictory attitude that the Yomiuri lamented in 1996 is still prevalent: Japan wants-- expects--US protection but wants the US presence to decline and is threatening to cut Host-Nation Support, which they deliberately call omoiyari yosan (compassion budget). Against this background, Okinawa and the bases will remain an issue--real and potentially explosive--in coming years. In case Democrats prevail in the coming election (which appears less and less likely in early 2000 as Hatoyama stumbles along), there could be a major shift in Japanese attitude toward "alliance without bases," a more autonomous, inward-looking Japanese defense posture.

Other
"Will America continue to lead?" many officials asked. If America is too blatantly parochial and/or self-serving as in Seattle (the Japanese have heard the view that President Clinton was willing to sacrifice multilateral negotiations to help Vice President Al Gore in his bid to succeed him), it will lose credibility as a hegemon. "You can command confidence and respect only when you are seen as transcending your own interests to act in the general interest," one economic official said.

Is attitudinal change related to a generational shift in Japan? One economic official commented: "The cabinet-level people are in their 60s and above--they're the ones that experienced defeat and would follow the US lead even when they think Americans are unreasonable and selfish. Our generation, in the 50s or late 40s, are similar, but slightly more assertive, wanting to make Americans understand in cases differences develop. Many of the elite had a good experience studying/working in the United States and have positive feelings about the United States. We sense that younger people are much cooler towards the United States and are more assertive of Japan's own national interests, etc. They don't have a sense of debt."

Conclusion
Conditions surrounding the bilateral relationship are favorable, as compared to several years ago, and Japanese perceptions of and attitude toward the United States are generally benign.

The sense is that in the next year or two, there won't be major changes in Japanese attitudes or major surprises in Japanese policy. Major domestic events coming up in the next year or two include:

External events that may impact on US-Japan relations include:

Domestic events are not likely to have a major influence on the bilateral relationship with the possible exception of the constitutional debate. External events may be more significant and although some of these events may in fact work to strengthen US-Japan ties, they also could alienate the allies from each other. And because they are external, the United States and Japan will have less control over these events.

Although the bilateral relationship looks stable--implying that no surprising improvement or deterioration from the US point of view is likely--the United States may wish to listen carefully to the opinionmakers to see if there are important messages amidst the cacophony. The United States also may want to ponder whether it is necessary to talk to Japanese politicians more as they gain influence in policy formulation and implementation (although US diplomats have done a much better job of touching all the bases than have Japanese diplomats). Another topic of study is how generational shift changes Japanese perceptions and attitudes. The "postwar" period is ending in that those of a generation which does not remember the war or the impact of the war are coming into positions of responsibility.

Finally, the US side should ponder the fact that Japanese perceptions and attitudes are related to US perceptions, attitudes, and actions. The Japanese policymakers have not developed a fondness for the Clinton administration and particularly on the political-security side, demonstrate a great nostalgia for American individuals who dealt with Japan and Asia during earlier Republican administrations. This is an American as well as a Japanese problem.

 

Trends in Chinese Assessments of the United States, 2000-2005

by Bonnie S. Glaser

No country presents such vexing contradictions for China as the United States. The maintenance of good Sino-American relations is indispensable for China's continued economic growth. Without sustained high levels of US direct investment and an open US market for Chinese goods, China's aspiration to become a middle-level developed country by 2050 will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize. The preservation of a favorable security environment for China and the achievement of reunification with Taiwan also are, in part, contingent on the state of Chinese ties with the United States.

Yet, at the opening of the 21st century, Beijing is uncertain about the feasibility of securing a stable Sino-US relationship. Chinese leaders harbor strong suspicions about US intentions globally as well as toward China. The Chinese fear that Washington is determined to prevent the rise of a strong China that could pose a challenge to American supremacy in the new century. They also worry about US resolve to spread American values and transform China and other remaining socialist and authoritarian governments into Western-style democracies. Beijing is especially uneasy about the advent of an extremely imbalanced global pattern of power in which America's might vastly outstrips other nations and provides the United States with the unilateral means to advance its interests as it sees fit. Chinese complaints are targeted at fundamental American foreign and defense policies such as post-Cold War NATO strategy, the deepening of security ties to Japan and plans to develop and deploy missile defense systems on the continental United States as well as around China's periphery to protect American forward-deployed forces and possibly American friends and allies in Asia from ballistic missile threats.

Although debates in China are ongoing about US foreign policy and intentions toward China, the parameters of those debates have narrowed substantially over the past year. There is now greater agreement among Chinese America specialists than previously existed in their analysis of the overall international situation as well as specific elements such as US strategy and objectives toward China. Minority positions are still held, but they seem to carry little weight in the policymaking process. Thus, this paper presents primarily mainstream perspectives on the United States, which currently dominate the formulation of Chinese policy.

The task of predicting how Chinese attitudes toward the US policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific region will change over the next five years is a challenging one. This situation is in part because Chinese assessments of the United States and its intentions toward China are primarily reactive, and US policies as well as other external events influencing Beijing's estimates in the next five years cannot be predicted with certainty. We can forecast with a degree of confidence, however, that Chinese ambivalence about American power will endure. Moreover, Chinese suspicions about US intentions toward China probably will not be significantly assuaged and may even intensify during this period. This paper attempts to present current circumstances and trends in Chinese evaluations of US policy and identify key variables that may influence Chinese attitudes and approaches toward the United States between 2000 and 2005. The conclusion draws implications for Chinese foreign policy and US interests.

Current Trends in Chinese Attitudes Toward the United States

Chinese assessments of US policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific region flow from Beijing's estimates of US comprehensive national power relative to other major states, US global strategy and economic role, and American intentions toward China. Therefore, analysis of Chinese estimates of these broad, yet fundamental issues must precede consideration of their evaluation of US regionally based policies. Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance, US policy toward Taiwan, the regional security architecture, and the Korean Peninsula are presented in turn.

US Reign as Sole Superpower
After the events of 1999, China reached the conclusion that the United States will continue to occupy the position of sole superpower in a global pattern of one superpower and several major powers for at least the next two decades.(1) Beijing had hoped that this power structure, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would be short-lived and be supplanted by a multipolar pattern of power in which a core group of countries that are relatively equal in comprehensive national strength would engage in bounded competition and cooperation, effectively checking the ambitions of any single power. The prevailing imbalance of power is objectionable to China because it provides the US with an opportunity to advance a global security and ideological agenda that benefits American and broader Western interests. In Chinese parlance, the US can pursue "power politics and hegemony." At the same time, China's room to maneuver and its ability to defend its own interests are severely constrained in a unipolar international system. A multipolar global pattern that the Chinese hope will provide greater opportunities to promote and defend Chinese interests is expected to take shape gradually, but little progress is expected before 2005.

During the next five years, and even for several decades, as the world transitions from a bipolar to a multipolar power structure, the Chinese forecast that China will lag significantly behind the United States in key indexes of power, including economic, technological, scientific and military might. Chinese analyses of the bases of US strength stress the critical importance of America's lead in the development and application of high technology and predict that the US technological edge will enable a further consolidation of the US advantage over other powers. Two specialists on the American economy at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, which writes annual assessments of the international situation and the global balance of power for the Chinese leadership, forecast "the US will take the lead to enter the information world and keep its absolute superiority in developing the knowledge economy."(2) They and other Chinese experts emphasize the links between technological prowess, economic strength, and military power. Comparative assessments of the technological and economic level of potential competitors have convinced most Chinese analysts that no power is likely to rival the US position in the early part of the 21st century.

US Global Strategy and Intentions
The main strategic objective of the United States, from China's perspective, is to exploit the opportunity presented by its unprecedented favorable global position to further consolidate American supremacy and shape the world according to US interests and values. The United States is frequently described by Chinese analysts as in pursuit of a strategy of global "hegemony" and absolute superiority over potential rival states. US plans to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system are viewed as an integral part of this strategy, aimed at preventing other powers from having a reliable retaliatory capability against a US first strike. PLA officers reject the US contention that concern about a missile launch by North Korea is the driving force behind consideration of the C-3 system, the more ambitious of two NMD configurations under deliberation, which envisions the emplacement of 200-250 interceptors in Alaska and North Dakota. They insist that Washington's true goal is to degrade or nullify China's nuclear deterrent.

The NATO military operation in Kosovo in 1999 alarmed Beijing--even before the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade--because it demonstrated US willingness to circumvent the United Nations and employ military force to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations to advance American strategic aims. The military intervention also represented a test of NATO's "new strategic concept," which the Chinese view as intended to globalize NATO's role. The purported Clinton doctrine of "new interventionism" has been widely criticized by China for putting issues of human rights above state sovereignty.

During the Kosovo war and in its immediate aftermath, many Chinese feared that the United States might use similar means to interfere in states on China's periphery or even on the Chinese mainland. The possibility of US military intervention in North Korea, the South China Sea, and in the Taiwan Strait was judged to be greater than in the past. Active American interference in Tibet and Xinjiang also was considered more likely, although most Chinese researchers expected that the US would rely on political means to stir up ethnic unrest, for example, rather than use military force to meddle in Chinese minority areas. Subsequent US decisions to limit its involvement in East Timor and refrain from intervention in Chechnya, along with US reassurances that Kosovo was not a model for future US intervention abroad, alleviated the urgency of Chinese concerns, but did not eliminate them completely. The Chinese remain wary of what they see as an increased proclivity of the US to rely on military means to advance American interests.

More fundamentally, however, the Kosovo war served as a catalyst for a reassessment in China of US global strategy and intentions. The United States could no longer be depicted as a relatively benign world policeman whose policies in many areas served to promote regional and international stability--a view that was not universally accepted, but was actively promoted by an influential group of Chinese think tank experts and officials as the rationale for building a constructive strategic partnership with the United States. Instead, the US came to be seen by the majority as a destabilizing and unpredictable hegemon determined to use all possible means to pursue its interests and spread Western values with impunity.

US Economic Role and Power
Beijing recognizes that the global economy is a major factor that increasingly influences China's security. The Chinese are acutely aware that the United States is the primary engine propelling the world economy forward. Sustained strength in the US economy is essential for China's economic growth as well as for the continuing recovery of Asian states from the financial crisis. Chinese economists worry that a major correction in US financial markets or a broader US economic downturn could have a devastating impact on China's economic modernization strategy.(3) Despite rhetorical statements declaring a need to diversify Chinese markets and expand domestic demand, Beijing remains exceedingly dependent on US markets to absorb its exports. The decision to make far reaching concessions to Washington in the bilateral negotiations on China's accession to the World Trade Organization signifies the judgment by Chinese leaders that economic globalization is inevitable and that although the process carries inherent risks, China will benefit from joining the globalization trend.(4)

Chinese attitudes toward US economic power are obviously ambivalent, however. Chinese analysts of international affairs (in contrast to Chinese economists) especially emphasize that US economic strength has provided the foundation for stepped-up American political and military intervention. They worry that sustained US economic growth and its dominant position in scientific and technological development will encourage the United States to rely on unilateral means to achieve its global ambitions.(5) Military researchers point out that the expanding US economy has provided ample funds to support a continued increase in the US military budget. Some predict that the United States will take advantage of the weakening of the economic strength of many Asian countries to enhance American economic influence over the region.(6)

US Intentions Toward China
Since the Clinton administration set out its strategy of comprehensive engagement toward China in 1993, American strategy and intentions toward Beijing have been hotly debated topics among Chinese experts and officials. The events of 1999, most notably the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, have resulted in a narrowing of previously wide differences on this issue and produced a virtual consensus that the United States is striving to contain, constrain or otherwise check China. A leading analyst of American affairs noted privately in October 1999 that there is widespread acceptance in China that "the containment factor" is a prominent component in US policy toward China.

In accordance with America's global strategic ambitions, the United States is viewed as being determined to prevent China from challenging its preeminent position regionally and globally. Many in China contend that the United States seeks to slow the growth of China's economic power as well as its development of science and technology to ensure that Chinese military weapons and capabilities continue to lag far behind those of the United States. Another US objective identified by Chinese is to promote democracy and the rule of law in China, which many believe extends to a desire to undermine Communist Party rule. Perpetuating the separation of Taiwan from the mainland is also considered to be an important goal of US strategy. The official characterization of US intentions by senior Chinese leaders and in official documents as aimed at "Westernizing," "splitting" and "weakening" China apparently now are widely accepted.

US efforts to improve relations with states on China's periphery are interpreted by many in Beijing as intended to better position Washington for strategic competition with China in the future. The strengthening of the US-Japan military alliance, including the new Defense Guidelines, recently fortified US military arrangements with several Southeast Asian states as well as with Central Asian states bordering China, and US plans to deploy theater missile defense (TMD) systems in the region are cited by Chinese experts as evidence of a US strategic design to encircle China. Discussion of possible inclusion of Taiwan in a "regionwide" US defense missile system on China's periphery also has intensified Chinese suspicions that the United States views China as likely to emerge as a strategic adversary in the next century.

A small number of liberal-minded, Western-educated Chinese experts view Washington's objectives in pursuing relations with Beijing as relatively benign and even in China's long-term national interests. For example, US goals of opening up the Chinese economy, promoting democracy and the rule of law in China, and encouraging Chinese adherence to global norms on everything from nuclear nonproliferation to military transparency to human rights are considered by these individuals as prodding Beijing to make policy choices that are difficult but essential for China's attainment of its aim of enhancing Chinese comprehensive national power in the new century. Even these experts are worried, however, that unprecedented US global power and its impatience for change in Chinese internal and external policies could result in increased US pressure on China that could have destabilizing consequences for Sino-American relations as well as regional and global stability. Many also are anxious about the dangerous mix of a continued trend toward independence in Taiwan, growing nationalistic fervor in China in support of the use of military force to prevent permanent separation of the island from the mainland, and increasingly resolute US determination to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military attack.

US-Japan Alliance
Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance are undergoing a sea change.(7) In the past, Beijing judged that, on balance, the presence of American forces in Japan and the US nuclear umbrella over Japan benefited China by: effectively checking Japan's ambitions for regional hegemony; restraining the buildup of an independent Japanese military capability and limiting Japan's ability to project military power; and providing reassurance to other Asian states that worried about China's growing economic, political, and military power. In the early 1990s, China even feared that economic friction between Washington and Tokyo could spill over into the security realm and cause a rupture of the alliance, triggering Japanese rearmament.

The signing of the Joint Declaration on the Alliance for the 21st Century by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April 1996 and the subsequent process of revising the Defense Guidelines governing wartime US-Japan cooperation prompted a heated debate in China about the US-Japan alliance and its impact on Chinese security interests. The Chinese suspect that the primary motive behind efforts by Tokyo and Washington to reinvigorate the security treaty and expand its area of coverage is a desire to counter the rise of Chinese power. In addition, the provision in the new guidelines that allows for US and Japanese forces to jointly respond to undefined emergencies in the Far East has heightened Chinese concern that the US and Japanese militaries will buttress their capabilities to respond with force in the event that Beijing seeks to militarily intimidate or take over Taiwan.

China is increasingly skeptical about the role of the alliance in restricting Japan's acquisition of power projection forces. Chinese military and civilian analysts contend that the security treaty provides Japan with a cover to develop a broad range of military capabilities, and many forecast that Japan will eventually sever itself from the United States and pursue its security interests on its own. Instead of serving as a check on Japanese regional ambitions, the alliance is now viewed as accelerating Japan's development into a "normal" country that shoulders greater responsibility for regional security, a trend that China finds worrisome. The Chinese also maintain that modification of the Defense Guidelines to allow for regional wartime cooperation between American and Japanese forces has stimulated support in Japan for revising the Peace Constitution to include the right of "collective self-defense." Revision of Japan's constitution would mark a major watershed in Japanese post-World War II history and probably would have extremely negative consequences for Sino-Japanese relations.

US Policy Toward Taiwan
From Beijing's perspective, a positive consequence of China's 1995 and 1996 missile firings across the Taiwan Strait following Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University was the recognition at high levels of the US Government that China's threats to use force to thwart Taiwan independence had to be taken seriously. Some, although not all, subsequent American policies toward Taipei have been seen as mindful of the dangerous potential that new steps toward independence could have for cross-strait stability. The Clinton administration's swift response to Lee Teng-hui's 9 July 1999 call for cross-strait relations to be conducted on a "special state-to-state" basis was widely praised by Chinese officials and institute analysts. The Chinese especially appreciated President Clinton's private assurances to Jiang Zemin regarding US policy, both in his phone call to the Chinese president and in the September meeting of the leaders in Auckland, New Zealand. Chinese officials were pleased by Clinton's statement that Lee Teng-hui had created difficulties for both the United States and China, which suggested that Washington shared Beijing's assessment of Lee as a "troublemaker." Public affirmations by American officials that US policy is based on the three Sino-US communiques, the three no's (no support for Taiwan independence, no two-China policy, or no Taiwan membership in international organizations that require sovereignty as a condition for joining) and the acknowledgment that there exists only one China were welcomed by Beijing as signals of Washington's dissatisfaction with Lee's action. The subsequent unprecedented decision by the United States to oppose Taipei's bid to enter the UN was also widely applauded as signaling Taiwan that the US would not countenance actions by either side that had a destabilizing influence on cross-strait security.

Although the Chinese found these US policy steps reassuring, resentment in China is nevertheless growing over US policy toward Taiwan, especially sales of advanced weaponry and assistance to the Taiwan military to enhance its fighting capability, which the Chinese view as boosting the confidence of Taiwan independence advocates and inhibiting progress toward reunification. The announcement of the approval of a $550 million arms sale package to Taipei soon after Lee Teng-hui's July 9th statement was sharply criticized by Chinese officials and institute researchers who cited the sale as evidence of Washington's duplicitous policy. US Congressional backing for the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which, if it becomes law, would further strengthen ties between the US and Taiwan militaries, is also worrisome to Beijing because of its potential to embolden independence supporters in Taiwan.(8)

Most Chinese analysts and officials are convinced that the US near-term objective is to preserve the cross-Strait status quo and its long-term aim is to prevent reunification of the Mainland and Taiwan. Return of the island to Chinese control, Chinese researchers maintain, would provide economic and strategic advantages to Beijing while weakening the American position and thus, they claim, is strongly opposed by the United States.(9) Most Chinese contend that the sole reason that the United States does not support de jure independence for the island is that it would trigger a PRC military response and likely lead to a Sino-US military clash that could quickly escalate.

Chinese officials and institute analysts complain that while Beijing has curtailed its sales of missiles and nuclear-related technology to satisfy US security concerns in the Persian Gulf, Washington has failed to even engage in a meaningful dialogue about how to address Chinese concerns about American arms sales to Taiwan. To pressure Washington to impose limits on its weapons transfers to Taiwan, Chinese officials are attempting to establish linkage between their demands and China's future cooperation with Washington on countering proliferation. Some PLA researchers privately have hinted that Beijing may renege on its bilateral arms control commitments with the United States if Washington sells specific weapons systems to Taiwan, especially theater missile defense systems.(10)

Underlying Chinese concerns about US transfers of theater missile defense systems to Taiwan, including lower-tier systems such as advanced the Patriot or PAC-3, is their conviction that such systems will require early warning surveillance for cueing purposes from US satellites or even a US force presence on Taiwan.(11) To China, therefore, transfer of missile defense to Taipei signals closer C3I cooperation between the American and Taiwan militaries. Chinese officials say that such sales will be perceived in Beijing as a restoration of the US-Taiwan Defense Treaty and thus a violation of the terms of diplomatic normalization between the US and China.(12) American intention behind enhancing Taipei's ability to defend against Chinese ballistic missiles is suspect because such actions run counter to the Clinton administration position that the United States does not support Taiwan independence. From Beijing's perspective, the deployment of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) against Taiwan is necessary to deter Taipei from taking the separatist path. US provision of missile defense systems to Taiwan is considered likely to further embolden proindependence advocates on the island by giving them hope that they can defend the island against an attack by Chinese missiles. Sales of new missile defense systems to Taiwan will also increase the confidence of separatists that the United States will come to Taiwan's aid even if Taipei is the provocateur, the Chinese claim.

Regional Security Architecture
China is increasingly dissatisfied with the prevailing security structure in the Asia-Pacific region that is founded on a system of bilateral US alliances and military relationships with states in the region. With the end of the Soviet threat and rising suspicion in the United States as well as in Japan and elsewhere about Chinese intentions, US-led security arrangements are seen by many in Beijing as oriented toward restraining the exercise of Chinese power. China opposes military alliances as "Cold War relics" and claims that US initiatives over the past few years to reinvigorate its bilateral alliances have added to regional instability.

In place of the existing security architecture, China has proposed a new security concept for the region.(13) This vision of a post-Cold War Asian security order was authoritatively outlined in China's July 1998 Defense White Paper. The key features of China's new security concept are the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, open and nondiscriminatory trade practices, and multilateral dialogue to promote mutual trust and understanding. On the latter point, China favors multilateral discussions that enable all sides to air their views, but absent consensus, does not obligate the participants to a specific course of action. In building bilateral relationships, Beijing is also promoting a new model of "strategic partnerships" that it is forging with key regional and global nations as well as important political-economic organizations, such as ASEAN as an alternative to US alliance relationships, which the Chinese insist are aimed at third parties.

In addition to setting out its new security concept in selected official documents and leadership speeches, Beijing is promoting its new model of security through bilateral discussions with scholars and officials in the region as well as in multilateral security forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Beyond these low-key efforts, however, so far there appears to be no comprehensive strategy for realizing China's vision. This situation is partly because there is no sympathetic audience in Asia for policies directed at weakening US alliances. Even more important is that Chinese leaders have decided not to adopt a directly confrontational stance toward the United States on this issue. They are satisfied at present to have put the United States and other regional states on notice that China is dissatisfied with current security arrangements, while promoting a discussion of alternatives that could better provide for regional peace and stability in the future. Nevertheless, China's new security concept is a clear sign that Beijing is increasingly uncomfortable with the United States as the preeminent power in its own neighborhood.

Korean Peninsula
Chinese perspectives on US policy toward the Korean Peninsula also are in flux.(14) Beijing shares broad US policy objectives on the Korean Peninsula of averting military conflict, maintaining a nuclear-weapons-free peninsula and promoting a process of stable change. China does not always support US measures to achieve these objectives, however, and, until recently, has been quite critical of US policy toward North Korea. The adoption by the Clinton administration of the recommendations put forward by former Defense Secretary William Perry in 1999 are viewed by China as a welcome shift from an approach that relied heavily on sticks while offering few carrots to a policy that emphasizes dialogue and provides P'yongyang with more positive incentives. The partial lifting of the half-century-old economic sanctions on North Korea by President Clinton was roundly praised by Beijing.(15)

China is nevertheless ambivalent about the prospect of normalization of relations between Washington and P'yongyang. On the one hand, Beijing has long hoped for the completion of "cross recognition" on the Korean Peninsula that began with China's establishment of diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1992 as an important step in the process of easing North-South tensions. On the other hand, however, Beijing is increasingly wary of the possible negative impact on Chinese security interests of a robust US influence on the Korean Peninsula that may soon include P'yong yang. This concern, along with a desire to advance its strategic interests, probably underlies China's increasingly active posture toward the Korean Peninsula--including a mid-January 2000 visit to Seoul by Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian.

The NATO military operation in Kosovo has heightened Chinese fears of US military strikes on North Korea to eliminate any potential nuclear weapons program and set back P'yongyang's plans to develop and deploy long-range ballistic missiles. China's opposition to nuclear weapons on the peninsula may not extend to the North's development of a conventional missile capability that may effectively deter the United States from launching an attack similar to that which was carried out against the former Yugoslavia. This may be the first clear signal that Beijing views its interests as potentially diverging from American interests on the peninsula. As the situation evolves on the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese expect greater Sino-American competition for influence and will likely continue to seek to maximize their position by strengthening relations with both the North and the South.

China has in principle opposed the deployment of any country's troops outside its own territory, but in practice has tacitly accepted the presence of American forces on the Korea Peninsula. As a process of change takes shape on the peninsula, however, Beijing is putting the United States and regional states on notice that it hopes US ground forces will not remain indefinitely. The Chinese Ambassador to Seoul, Wu Dawei, stated in an interview last December that China wants "involved parties to settle the issue of US military presence in Northeast Asia at an appropriate time."(16) Beijing increasingly views the presence of US forces on the peninsula as contrary to Chinese interests and is already probably seeking to persuade the South Koreans that future security on the peninsula can be ensured without the deployment of American ground troops in Korea. A minority view in China holds that the presence of US troops would serve as a buffer against possible escalating tension between a reunified Korea and Japan, but this view is not likely to hold sway amidst deepening Chinese suspicions of US intentions to check the growth of Beijing's power and influence on the peninsula and elsewhere in the region.

Variables Affecting China's Views of the United States, 2000-2005

Numerous variables will shape Chinese attitudes toward the United States in the coming five years. To narrow the field to a few key variables, some assumptions have been made. First, there are not likely to be any major changes in the global balance of power in this period. The United States will remain the sole superpower and will preserve its advantages in economic, technological, political, and military measures of strength. China will continue to lag far behind the United States in all major indexes of power.

Second, the probability that China will experience social upheaval and systemic political change in the next five years is extremely low.(17) Thus, domestic variables and their potential impact on China's posture toward the United States will not be considered in great detail. The trigger of domestic change in China, however, the manner in which it unfolds, and the outcome all would affect Beijing's perspectives on the United States. Suspicion among Chinese leaders that the United States is behind social unrest or separatist activities in China would undoubtedly increase Chinese paranoia about US intent to undermine the regime and supplant communism with democracy in China. This situation consequently would lead to a hardening of Chinese attitudes toward American policies in the region. A systemic political change that produced a more liberal regime could have either a positive or a negative effect on Chinese views of the United States and its regional policies. A more democratic government could be in conflict with the United States over China's continued determination to bring Taiwan under national sovereignty, enhance Chinese military capabilities, and eliminate US force presence in the region even as it pledged greater transparency militarily and promised to uphold higher standards of human rights.

Taiwan's Uncertain Future
To the Chinese leadership, US policy toward Taiwan has a more immediate and critical impact on Chinese interests than US global strategy or other policies in the region. How the United States handles the Taiwan issue is judged by Beijing to be a litmus test of Washington's intentions toward China. If the United States is seen as willing to put Sino-American relations at risk by crossing redlines set by Beijing--including sales of specific weapons and support for further steps by Taiwan toward independence--this assessment will guide future Chinese policy toward the United States and may lead to the judgment that a Sino-US military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait is inevitable. Despite the growing realization in Beijing that the United States does not control decision making in Taipei, the Chinese maintain that US policy--especially through its arms sales to Taiwan and its commitments to defend the island from Chinese attack--encourages Taiwan to resist entering into a serious dialogue with the mainland to work out arrangements for reunification.

There are many uncertainties regarding Taiwan and the likely evolution of Chinese attitudes toward US handling of the Taiwan issue. In March of this year, Taiwan will elect a new president who, over time, will chart a new course for the island that has continuities as well as discontinuities with the policies pursued by Taiwan's current president Lee Teng-hui. If this transition of power is followed by a commitment by the new government to preserving the status quo, easing cross-strait tensions, including a slowing of the arms buildup across the strait and a resumption of dialogue between Taipei and Beijing, then Chinese concerns about US backing for Taiwan independence may diminish. An agreement on terminating hostilities in the strait and the opening of political talks between Beijing and Taipei could remove the Taiwan issue as an obstacle to further progress in Sino-American relations under the condition that Beijing judges that Washington is not seeking to block a cross-strait solution.

Alternatively, Taipei's new government could prove to be resolutely determined to pursue independence. The holding of a national referendum on Taiwan's future status or a revision of the constitution to legalize the island's separateness from the mainland and existence as a sovereign, independent state are examples of steps that Taipei could take that would be viewed as extremely provocative in Beijing. Washington's response to such steps by Taipei would be critical in China's deliberations over an appropriate policy response. In a dangerous variant of this scenario, China could conclude that Taiwan is moving toward independence with tacit or even overt US backing. Should this occur, Beijing may opt to use force against the island sooner rather than later, and a Sino-US military confrontation could ensue that holds the potential to quickly escalate to a major war beyond the Taiwan Strait.

Between these extremes is a scenario that differs little from the situation that has prevailed in the past five years. The new Taiwan Government may well follow a path similar to that set by Lee Teng-hui. This would include efforts to enhance Taiwan's participation in international organizations and other steps to raise its international status. Dialogue with the PRC may be resumed, but Taipei may resist discussing the terms of political reunification with the mainland. The new Taiwan president could rhetorically renounce the goal of separation, while taking incremental measures that appear to the PRC to be aimed at the eventual objective of independence. In this case, China's approach toward Taiwan probably would harden, and Beijing would step up pressure on Washington to set limits on its arms sales to the island. At the same time, China might reduce or even halt its cooperation with the United States on curbing global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Beijing would remain suspicious of the US role and American intentions, but probably would refrain from using force against Taiwan. Sino-American relations would continue the current pattern of cooperation and competition amid mutual suspicion. China could also take a more proactive stance against the presence of US forces in the region and seek to more assertively persuade other states in the region of the need to create new security arrangements for the Asia-Pacific.

US Global and Regional Policies
The way the US exercises its power over the next five years will have a pivotal impact on Chinese attitudes and policies toward the United States. Recurring intervention abroad with military force to advance American objectives, especially without UN approval, will be viewed with alarm by Beijing. In the aftermath of NATO's military operation in Kosovo, Chinese institute experts remain divided over whether Kosovo will be used as a model for future US policy in Europe and especially in Asia. A pattern of US armed intervention in geographical regions that are not critical to Chinese interests probably would result in rhetorical condemnation and greater unwillingness to cooperate with the United States on issues of low priority for Beijing. US military intervention on China's periphery could provoke a stronger Chinese response, including alignment with Russia and other willing powers to constrain US behavior.

The outcome of the 2000 presidential elections in the United States may result in tactical shifts in US foreign policy and particularly in Washington's approach to dealing with Beijing that will influence Chinese attitudes and policy toward the United States. For example, foreign policy advisers to Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush advocate placing greater emphasis on building and sustaining coalitions and alliances with those who share core American values.(18) In Asia, Robert Zoellick calls for Japan, the United States, Korea, and Australia to forge closer defense ties and for Japan's forces to be "more closely integrated to support the US military in Asia."(19) The incumbent Democratic administration also has indicated a desire to expand security access arrangements with Singapore and with other ASEAN states.(20) Depending on other American regional and global policies, Beijing may well perceive such efforts as part of a US strategy of encirclement aimed at checking the growth of Chinese power.

A Republican administration decision to abandon the objective of building a constructive strategic partnership between the US and China that was agreed upon by Presidents Clinton and Jiang Zemin in 1997--as suggested by some presidential candidates and their advisers--would further reduce Beijing's confidence that a stable relationship with the United States is attainable. Even more alarming to Chinese leaders would be a retraction of the Clinton administration's "three no's" commitment.(21)

Deployment Decision on National Missile Defense System
In June 2000, the Clinton administration is planning to make a decision on deployment of an NMD system to protect the continental United States. Barring technological difficulties or an economic downturn that forces choices in resource allocation, the United States is likely to proceed with NMD deployment. Two configurations are under consideration. The C-1 system would consist of a single NMD site, most probably Alaska, with approximately 100 interceptors that would have the potential to intercept China's current arsenal of about 20 ICBMs. This system could be deployed as early as 2005. The C-3 system envisions the deployment of 200 to 250 interceptors in two sites, Alaska and North Dakota. This system could be effective against a larger number of ICBMs and could be deployed by 2011. In either case, to preserve roughly the same nuclear balance that exists between China and the US today, the Chinese would have to substantially increase the number of their ICBMs by the planned deployment date.

Whichever system the Clinton administration chooses, the decision to go forward with deployment of an NMD system will have profound implications for China's attitudes toward the United States. Although China's strategic forces have long been vulnerable to a US first strike, Beijing now is concerned more about the US threat than in the past and judges a Sino-American military confrontation to be possible in the future. Any NMD system probably will feed Chinese paranoia about US intentions and lead Beijing to conclude that the United States seeks to deprive China of a survivable second-strike capability. Even a determination to deploy fewer than 100 interceptors in the C-1 system will not convince the Chinese that the priority US concern is a missile attack from North Korea or Iran because they will assume that the system would ultimately expand to greater numbers of interceptors designed to negate their strategic deterrent. The Chinese will consider NMD deployment as representing a dangerous shift in US defense strategy away from a doctrine based on mutually assured destruction to one based on pursuit of US strategic superiority.

The US decision to field a national missile defense system will coincide with ongoing Chinese plans to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, but will no doubt affect the trajectory of those plans. China is likely to build and deploy a mobile, solid-fueled, strategic missile force with penetration aids and other countermeasures that is large enough to deny the United States a certain first-strike capability against Chinese strategic forces. In sizing its new force, a debate is likely to ensue over whether to deploy MIRVed warheads and, more fundamentally, over whether a nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence is still sufficient to meet China's security needs in the new security environment.

If the United States fails to reach agreement with Russia on amending the ABM Treaty to allow for deployment of NMD systems and opts to unilaterally abrogate the treaty, Chinese concern about US unilateralism also will increase. This condition will spur Beijing to cooperate more closely with Moscow against American interests.

Evolving Plans on Theater Missile Defense Systems
A decision on deployment of theater missile defense systems is not expected until 2007. Once the United States proceeds with NMD deployment, however, the Chinese will assume, probably correctly, that deployment of upper-tier TMD systems will proceed on schedule. Over the next five years, prior to a final determination on deployment, discussion in the United States and in the region of the pros and cons of transferring upper-tier TMD systems to Taiwan is likely to heat up and may significantly influence Chinese assessments of US intentions as well as American policies and presence in the Asia-Pacific. Sales to Taiwan in this period of weapon systems that degrade the ability of China to threaten Taiwan with ballistic missiles will no doubt elicit sharp rhetorical and policy responses from Beijing. Chinese officials are currently warning the US against the transfer to Taiwan of upgraded Patriot missile batteries known as PAC-3s, destroyers equipped with the Aegis battle management system, and long-range early warning radar.

Ultimately, the impact of TMD deployment on Chinese attitudes will depend on the deployment sites chosen and on Beijing's assessment of the strategic purpose of the TMD systems deployed. A decision to deploy upper-tier TMD systems on Taiwan soil or on ships owned and operated by the Taiwan military is likely to have a deep impact on Chinese assessments of US intentions on the Taiwan issue and provoke a series of negative responses from Beijing, toward both Washington and Taipei. Retaliatory measures by China could range from suspension of some or all Sino-US military exchanges and a halt to cooperation in arms control and nonproliferation efforts to breaking diplomatic relations with the United States. The likelihood of Chinese use of force against Taiwan would be high.

A decision by Washington not to substantially upgrade Taiwan's ability to defend against Chinese ballistic missiles, including a determination to forgo the transfer of upper-tier TMDs to Taiwan, probably would have a favorable impact on Chinese attitudes toward the United States. Beijing is not likely to strongly object to the deployment of upper-tier TMD systems, both land based and sea based, that remain under US operational control as long as the defense of Taiwan is not an explicitly enunciated goal.(22) The possibility that such systems could be used to defend Taiwan in the event of a military confrontation with the mainland is perceived by China to be in conformity with the long-standing US policy of "strategic ambiguity." China's sole urgent concern regarding the deployment of upper-tier TMD systems under Japanese control is the prospect that they could be used to shield Taiwan from a missile attack. A decision by Tokyo to procure such systems will intensify Chinese concerns about the US-Japan alliance, especially if the threat from North Korean missiles has been effectively eliminated.

An Indian Nuclear Deterrent With Tacit US Backing
If securing Indian membership in the CTBT and NPT become US policy priorities, China will be concerned that Washington may be willing to agree to Indian deployment of nuclear weapons in exchange for New Delhi's signing on to those arms control treaties. Since India conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998, Beijing has worried that the United States tacitly supports an Indian nuclear deterrent against China. Flight testing of the Agni II medium-range ballistic missile in April 1999 further heightened Chinese fears. US acquiescence to India's desire to deploy a nuclear deterrent would inflame Chinese suspicions that the US is concerned about a future threat from China and is pursuing a strategy of encirclement and containment.

Change on the Korean Peninsula and US Force Presence
Any analysis of changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment over the next five years must consider the possibility of a radical change in the standoff between North and South Korea. Scenarios of change include economic collapse or political disintegration in the North, reconciliation between P'yongyang and Seoul, and military conflict initiated by the North out of desperation. However change occurs, the emergence of a verifiable peace on the Korean Peninsula probably will be a catalyst for the restructuring of US forces in the region. In the United States, a debate probably would ensue over the threats to American interests in East Asia and the purpose of US forward-deployed forces. The explicit question will be raised regarding whether American forces should be forward deployed in East Asia to counter a potential threat from China. The outcome of this debate and the resulting decisions made on the restructuring of US forces in the region will have a decisive impact on Chinese estimates of US intentions and the prospects for achieving a stable and cooperative relationship with the United States.

Assuming that Beijing's concerns about US strategy and intentions have not been assuaged, the Chinese probably would respond to the new situation in Korea by pressing Seoul to insist on the removal of American ground forces from the peninsula. If Beijing became convinced that the United States was pursuing a strategy of military containment of China, the Chinese leadership could opt to take an assertive stance against the presence of US military forces in Japan as well and could press for an end to US alliances with both South Korea and Japan. Moreover, China might seize upon this opportunity to promote a regionwide reassessment of the prevailing security architecture and its suitability to the new strategic environment.

The stance that Beijing adopts toward American regional force deployments over the next five years will be influenced somewhat by the views of other states in the region. If Asian states continue to value the US presence as a regional balancer and a guarantor of open maritime lines of communication through the South China Sea, then Beijing will be reluctant to assertively contest the continued presence of US forces. Another factor is the attitude of regional states, including China, toward the possible remilitarization of Japan and the US role in thwarting that outcome. If current trends continue, concerns about a greater Japanese security role among regional states may diminish, and support may increase for a reduction of American forces provided that Japan remains anchored in the security alliance with the United States.

Chinese Leaders' Confidence in China's Future

Another key variable that will shape Chinese attitudes toward the United States in the coming five years is the confidence that Chinese leaders have about China itself--the Chinese economy, political and social stability, and China's evolving position relative to other powers. To the degree that Chinese leaders feel secure about their continued rule, are not worried about threats from within, and are optimistic about China's future ability to narrow the gap in comprehensive national power between their country and the other leading powers, they will very likely be less paranoid about US intentions toward China and the dangers of a sole superpower world.

US Economic Recession
A downturn in the US economy, especially if coincident with weakness in the Japanese and European economies, could have a devastating impact on China's economic growth plans. Reductions in US capital investment in China, as well as purchases from China, could slow Chinese growth. Many economists forecast that within the next five years, there will be a major correction in US financial markets that could reverberate globally and there could possibly be a broader US economic recession. The subsequent increase in unemployment rates in the United States and rising trade deficits probably would lead to new trade tensions with China.

An economic recession in the United States could affect Chinese attitudes toward the United States in several ways. First, Chinese leaders would be concerned primarily about the concrete negative effects of a slowdown in US economic growth on the Chinese economy, and their worries about potential uses of American power in ways that could be harmful to Chinese interests probably would recede. Second, China probably would revise downward its estimates of American power and US ability to achieve its purported global "hegemonic" ambitions. If the West European and Japanese economies experienced a simultaneous upward turn, the Chinese would judge that the pace of development of a multipolar world was accelerating, and their apprehension about the United States remaining the sole superpower for many decades would further diminish.

Conclusion

Implications for Chinese Policy and US Interests
The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the NATO military operation in Kosovo crystallized in the minds of Chinese leaders the potential dangers of a unipolar world in which the United States has a commanding lead over other major states in all crucial indexes of comprehensive national power. In the wake of the Kosovo operation, Beijing's wariness of US global strategic aims and American intentions toward China has increased considerably. China's estimate that the US will continue to occupy the position of sole superpower for at least the next two decades strengthens the imperative for Beijing of maintaining normal and stable Sino-US relations. At the same time, however, the Chinese expect that unprecedented US strength and Washington's perceived determination to check China's emergence as a great power that could challenge America's leading position will make achieving a steadier Sino-US relationship more difficult. In addition, the possibility of a Sino-US military confrontation over Taiwan is looming larger in the estimation of many Chinese institute experts and probably in the minds of Chinese leaders.

Chinese attitudes and policies toward the United States will be influenced considerably by the variables outlined in this paper. Barring fundamental changes in American global and regional strategy or the global balance of power, China's suspicions of the United States probably will grow, not diminish, over the next five years. US policy toward Taiwan will be a litmus test for Beijing of broader American intentions toward China, especially US policy responses to any steps by Taipei to legalize the island's existence as a sovereign, independent state; US decisions regarding the transfer to Taiwan of more capable theater missile defense systems; and the development of C3I ties between the American and Taiwan military that would increase the likelihood of rapid American involvement in combat across the Taiwan Strait.

Continued high levels of distrust of the United States and worries about a potentially hostile security environment for China are certain to have significant implications for Chinese foreign policy and, in turn, for American interests. Beijing may conclude that it is necessary to devote greater resources toward defending Chinese security interests against newly emerging post-Cold War threats and enhancing Chinese leverage to cope with them. Accelerated military modernization, closer alignment with Russia against the US, active opposition to US forward-deployed forces in East Asia, renewed proliferation activity, stepped-up obstructionism in the UN, and increased cultivation of Third World clients are just some of the policy choices that Beijing could make.

Unless and until Chinese leaders conclude that US policy poses an urgent threat to core Chinese national interests, however, they are unlikely to alter their policy of seeking to peacefully manage differences between the two countries and develop a stable relationship with the United States. Beijing will be disinclined to adopt a confrontational international posture toward the United States over the next five years because doing so would put in jeopardy China's economic development, political stability, and in turn, the survival of the Communist regime. We should nevertheless expect that China will be less accommodating than in the past to American concerns about Chinese policies domestically as well as internationally. Moreover, Beijing is likely to be more reluctant to cooperate with Washington on issues where Chinese vital interests are not at stake and the prospect for a divergence of American and Chinese interests exists. For example, in areas like the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Middle East, where the Chinese have worked together with the United States for the primary purpose of promoting better Sino-American ties, Beijing may no longer be willing to moderate its behavior to please the United States. Chinese cooperation on halting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction probably will be slowed, and Beijing is likely to seek points of leverage to press the United States to address its concerns about American policy toward Taiwan.

Additional tactical adjustments in Chinese foreign policy are probable and, in fact, have already begun to be implemented. To shore up Chinese security in its own neighborhood as a hedge against the possibility of intensified competition with the United States in the future, Beijing is seeking to reinforce relations with states on its periphery, including Russia, India, Vietnam, North Korea, and the bordering Central Asian nations. This policy will continue as Beijing attempts to increase its influence in the region and position itself to defend its interests more effectively in the future.

In an effort to curb American power and promote the trend of a multipolar world, China is likely to strengthen its relations with the other major global poles: Russia, Japan, and Western Europe. On issues where the Chinese perceive their core national security interests to be endangered, such as the deployment of theater and national missile defenses, Beijing is likely to cooperate more actively with other nations than in the past to constrain the actions of the United States. China, however, is unlikely to lead any such effort or seek to forge an anti-American alliance with other countries. In the United Nations, we also can expect that Beijing will selectively work bilaterally and multilaterally in response to global events with the larger goal of limiting US ability to act unilaterally.

 

US-ROK Relations: Trends at
the Opening of the 21st Century

by Scott Snyder

Introduction

With the dawn of a new millennium, the burdens of history that have weighed so heavily on South Korean aspirations during the past century have at least momentarily been set aside in favor of hope for the future and new resolution to set aright those past difficulties that have led to failure or disappointment. Downtown Seoul at least has been scrubbed down and stands shiny and bright with hopeful determination. Mammoth exhortations for a new millennium in which dreams will be fulfilled hang from corporate buildings of businesses rising from an economic crisis that only two years ago were darkened and sobered by fear and failure. Such hope and determination to meet the future were likewise hyperbolically expressed in the first American State of the Union address of the millennium. The tone of heady optimism extends to the US-ROK relationship, at least if one accepts UC-Berkeley Professor Emeritus Robert A. Scalapino's firsthand assessment over more than half a century of observation and analysis that "the US-ROK relationship is more promising than it has been at any time in the recent past."

Despite deserved positive reflection on the achievements of common purpose and shared interests reflected in the current US-ROK relationship, there are also many harbingers of change that may either sustain or dramatically weaken the relationship at a time of uncertainty and transition in the Northeast Asian security environment. Likewise, economic globalization poses new challenges that will provide simultaneous opportunities for both common purpose and potential conflict in the relationship. Perhaps most interesting and complex of all, a variety of demographic, social, and cultural trends are influencing public attitudes and introducing new factors that will affect how South Koreans and Americans see each other. The increasing complexity and apparent contradictions inherent in managing such a relationship between the United States and South Korea will introduce new, unpredictable elements into what has in the past been a relationship with a remarkably consistent and durable foundation of shared purpose, despite occasionally dramatic episodes of apparent disagreement and frustration. Perhaps more importantly, it remains unclear whether the social perspectives of the younger generation will sustain a positive US-Korea relationship or whether the final outcome of the transition-in-process to a post-Cold War structure for managing Northeast Asian political and security relationships will challenge the relative consistency, stability, and strength that has characterized the US-ROK relationship in past decades.

Trends in US-ROK Political and Security Relations

For five decades since the outbreak of the Korean war, the common security threat from North Korea has remained the dominant focus of US-ROK relations. The US-ROK alliance itself came about as a result of North Korean aggression and remains fixed on deterrence against any renewed threat. With the end of the Cold War, South Korea's economic transformation, and North Korea's economic decline, the balance of power internal to the Korean Peninsula clearly has shifted, and the status quo on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely to be sustainable in the long term. One result is that unlike the past in which a weak Korea was the object of great power rivalry and competition, South Korea has emerged as an influential actor in regional security relations. In partial response to these developments, the relative proportion of US and South Korean capacity and contribution to the military relationship have gradually transformed the nature of the US-ROK security relationship from a patron-client state relationship to one that more closely approximates partnership. Most notably, the United States and South Korea in the early 1990s agreed that the ROK would regain peacetime control of its ground forces, and US deployments on the Korean Peninsula were adjusted to give the US a supporting rather than a leading role in deterrence against the North, but further planned adjustments were suspended in 1992 with renewed concern about North Korea's nuclear weapons development efforts.

Some South Koreans, however, view the joint command structure and South Korea's continued military dependence on the United States in key military areas (including current restrictions on ROK missile deployment) as institutional reflections of a dependence relationship rather than a structure of shared responsibility for security commensurate with the perceived level of development South Korean society has achieved as a new member of the OECD on the threshold of joining the industrialized world. As the security situation in Northeast Asia continues to evolve, some South Koreans desire to achieve a level of autonomy in the security arena commensurate with the rapid progress they have made in the economic and political realm. These sentiments constitute the primary backdrop for potentially emerging tensions in US-ROK security relations over military issues such as South Korea's weapons procurement decisions and indigenous weapons development programs (for instance, current negotiations over allowable missile development ranges), Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) issues, the ROK's political role as part of a joint strategy for dealing with North Korea, and the emerging ROK debate over the future of relations with the PRC (including whether South Korea should participate in development of theater missile defense--[TMD]).

US-ROK Military/Alliance Management

A number of emerging potential conflicts in the US-ROK military-to-military relationship essentially have arisen as a result of the mismatch between ROK self-perceptions as a maturing economy with a more pluralistic political system and perceptions that the US-ROK security relationship remains unequal or has lagged in its recognition of ROK social and political advances. South Korea's desire to expand its missile development and deployment capacity beyond the 180-kilometer-limit imposed under a 1979 US-ROK bilateral agreement to the international norm of 300 km as defined under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) are one symptom of South Korean desires for greater autonomy in the military sphere. Although a number of complex technical issues must be resolved in negotiations to revise the 1979 US-ROK bilateral agreement, that agreement itself is no longer politically viable while the United States simultaneously pursues MTCR compliance for North Korea (a less restrictive standard than for our ROK allies!) as a minimum objective in US-DPRK missile talks. According to one South Korean commentator, "We understand the US stance, since it pertains to its strategic goal of containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction [WMD]. Nevertheless, we cannot acquiesce to the US demand for 'the ROK to strip off all its clothes for the sake of developing missiles.'"

The United States is prepared to allow South Korea to develop and deploy missiles up to the MTCR-consistent 300-km-range limit, but a request by President Kim Dae Jung to develop missiles with a range of 500 km has held up a final resolution of this issue in bilateral US-ROK negotiations.

Another manifestation of South Korean desires for more independent scope of action in the military sphere is an increasingly active debate in South Korea over dependency on US-originated technology for weapons procurement (well over three-quarters of ROK foreign procurement has traditionally been from the United States) that on the one hand is desirable to ensure interoperability but on the other hand may become a symbol of ROK dependency on the United States in cases where US-originated technology is less competitive on quality or price grounds.

A similar desire to rectify perceived inequities in the US-ROK security relationship underlies ROK demands to renegotiate the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In particular, South Korean analysts have been particularly sensitive to differences in the SOFA agreements negotiated with Japan as compared to a