[Presidential Decision Directives - PDD]
Union Calendar No. 235
104th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - House Report 104-486
NATIONAL DRUG POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE DRUG WAR
SEVENTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
March 19, 1996
3. June 27, 1995, Hearing
In the first of two back-to-back interdiction hearings held
on June 27, 1995 and June 28, 1995, entitled ``Illicit Drug
Availability: Are Interdiction Efforts Hampered by a Lack of
Agency Resources?,''
.............
During this hearing, the Subcommittee examined the current
drug interdiction efforts of the major Federal agencies engaged
in the national drug control strategy, namely DEA, the U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, and the Departments of Defense and
State.
Collectively, the expert witnesses confirmed that on
November 3, 1993, President Clinton signed a Presidential
Decision Directive for Counternarcotics (PDD-14), which
instructed Federal agencies to shift the emphasis in U.S.
international antidrug programs from the transit zones such as
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean to the source
countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. PDD-14 provided
that the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) should appoint a Coordinator for Drug Interdiction ``to
ensure that assets dedicated by the Federal drug program
agencies for interdiction are sufficient and that their use is
properly integrated and optimized.'' [PDD-14, November 3,
1993.]
The aim of this hearing was to offer the Administration's
principals on interdiction, those whose mission was affected by
PDD-14, an opportunity broadly assess their own efforts and
explain the impact on their agencies of PDD-14 and its
concomitant ``controlled shift'' of resources.
.............
5. Joint Interagency Task Force--East
At JIATF East, briefers included Rear Admiral Andrew A.
Granuzo, who bluntly admitted that the central obstacle to
waging a more effective drug war, particularly in interdiction,
is that ``there is no one in charge.'' This assessment mirrored
the views of Admiral Yost, Bill Bennett, John Walters, Robert
Bonner, and a host of others inside and outside the
Administration.
JIATF East was created by Presidential Decision Directive
14 (PDD 14), which ordered a review of the Nation's
counternarcotics command and control intelligence centers.
Creation of three joint interagency task forces and a domestic
air interdiction center was authorized by the White House Drug
Czar in April 1994. Accordingly, JIATF East is joined in its
interdiction mission by JIATF West in Almeda, California; JIATF
South in Panama; the DAICC at March Air Force Base, California;
and JTF-6 in El Paso, Texas.
JIATF East is dedicated to ``deconfliction of all non-
detection and monitoring counter drug activities in the transit
zone.'' The command integrates intelligence with operations,
and ``coordinates the employment of the U.S. Navy and U.S.
Coast Guard ships and aircraft, U.S. Air Force aircraft, and
aircraft and ships from allied nations, such as Great Britain
and the Netherlands.'' The command's mission boils down to
``maximiz[ing] the disruption of drug transhipment,''
collecting, integrating and disseminating intelligence, and
guiding detection and monitoring forces for tactical action.
Just as importantly, JIATF East integrates law enforcement
personnel, primarily from Customs, into the international
interdiction effort. For that reason, the command includes FBI,
DEA, DIA and State Department, in addition to the Department of
Defense.
...............
1. The ``Controlled Shift''
The President's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy not
only refocused demand reduction resources on drug treatment,
but theoretically refocused supply reduction resources on
source country programs. This refocusing was termed a
``controlled shift.''
The 1995 Strategy states the National Security Council
(NSC) conducted a ``lengthy review'' of drug trafficking in
1993 and concluded that ``a stronger focus on source countries
was necessary.'' Accordingly, the NSC (note: no mention is made
of any other agencies' input or ONDCP in reaching this
decision) ``determined that a controlled shift in emphasis was
required--a shift away from past efforts that focused primarily
on interdiction in the transit zones to new efforts that focus
on interdiction in and around source countries.'' \100\
Making this 1993 NSC recommendation national policy,
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 14
(PDD-14),\101\ which called for (1) ``providing assistance to
those nations that show the political will to combat narco-
trafficking through institution building,'' (2) ``conducting
efforts to destroy narco-trafficking organizations,'' and (3)
``interdicting narcotics trafficking in both source countries
and transit zones,'' through the controlled shift of resources
from the transit zones.\102\
Ironically, in view of the deep transit zone interdiction
cuts proposed and effectuated by President Clinton in 1993,
1994 and 1995 (and proposed for 1996), and the 1995 testimony
of ONDCP Director Brown that interdiction efforts are ``less
than effective,'' the 1995 Strategy states that, ``without
effective transit zone programs in place, the smooth
implementation of the new source country program will be
severely inhibited.'' \103\ The ``essential component'' of the
source country programs is ``economic development,'' or ``job
creation'' in fields other than illegal narcotics.\104\
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\100\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 44.
\101\ A Presidential Decision Directive is a written policy
declaration, signed by the President, which directs Executive branch
departments and agencies to follow a particular policy course. It is
usually issued in concert with implementing instructions.
\102\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 44.
\103\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 44.
\104\ Id.
..................
4. Invitations Rejected By the President's National Security Advisor
and By the President
Since the NSC was responsible for PDD-14 which initiated
the shift of interdiction resources to the source countries,
the Subcommittee Chairman wrote to National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake in the Fall of 1995 and invited him to come before
Congress, privately if necessary, to discuss the status of the
drug war. The Subcommittee Chairman never received a response
to that invitation, suggesting disinterest on the part of the
National Security Advisor in discussing this issue with Members
of Congress concerned about the strategy shift.
Similarly, the Subcommittee Chairman has offered,
repeatedly and in writing, to discuss with the President a
bipartisan approach to restoring the drug war's effectiveness
and re-elevating the drug war as a national security issue. The
Subcommittee Chairman has further offered to coordinate a
meeting with the full National Security, International Affairs,
and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, with selected congressional
leaders, with the bipartisan drug policy group co-chaired by
Congressman Zeliff and Congressman Rangel (D-NY), or with the
newly constituted Senate-House Drug Policy Task Force.
The Subcommittee Chairman's invitations to the President to
meet with Members of Congress concerned about this issue began
in the March 9, 1995 Subcommittee hearing and continued
throughout 1995. In December 1995, after an invitation to meet
with a bipartisan group of congressional leaders on the drug
issue was physically handed to the President by one of the
Chairman's Subcommittee staffers following remarks of the
President at the national CADCA Conference, the Subcommittee
Chairman received a letter signed by a White House scheduler
indicating the President's appreciation for the Subcommittee
Chairman's ``support,'' and no interest in a meeting with
congressional leaders.