[Presidential Decision Directives - PDD]
                                                 Union Calendar No. 235
104th Congress, 2d Session -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  House Report 104-486
       NATIONAL DRUG POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE DRUG WAR
                             SEVENTH REPORT
                                 by the
               COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
March 19, 1996



3. June 27, 1995, Hearing
    In the first of two back-to-back interdiction hearings held 
on June 27, 1995 and June 28, 1995, entitled ``Illicit Drug 
Availability: Are Interdiction Efforts Hampered by a Lack of 
Agency Resources?,''

.............

    During this hearing, the Subcommittee examined the current 
drug interdiction efforts of the major Federal agencies engaged 
in the national drug control strategy, namely DEA, the U.S. 
Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, and the Departments of Defense and 
State.
    Collectively, the expert witnesses confirmed that on 
November 3, 1993, President Clinton signed a Presidential 
Decision Directive for Counternarcotics (PDD-14), which 
instructed Federal agencies to shift the emphasis in U.S. 
international antidrug programs from the transit zones such as 
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean to the source 
countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. PDD-14 provided 
that the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) should appoint a Coordinator for Drug Interdiction ``to 
ensure that assets dedicated by the Federal drug program 
agencies for interdiction are sufficient and that their use is 
properly integrated and optimized.'' [PDD-14, November 3, 
1993.]
    The aim of this hearing was to offer the Administration's 
principals on interdiction, those whose mission was affected by 
PDD-14, an opportunity broadly assess their own efforts and 
explain the impact on their agencies of PDD-14 and its 
concomitant ``controlled shift'' of resources.
 
.............



5. Joint Interagency Task Force--East
    At JIATF East, briefers included Rear Admiral Andrew A. 
Granuzo, who bluntly admitted that the central obstacle to 
waging a more effective drug war, particularly in interdiction, 
is that ``there is no one in charge.'' This assessment mirrored 
the views of Admiral Yost, Bill Bennett, John Walters, Robert 
Bonner, and a host of others inside and outside the 
Administration.
    JIATF East was created by Presidential Decision Directive 
14 (PDD 14), which ordered a review of the Nation's 
counternarcotics command and control intelligence centers. 
Creation of three joint interagency task forces and a domestic 
air interdiction center was authorized by the White House Drug 
Czar in April 1994. Accordingly, JIATF East is joined in its 
interdiction mission by JIATF West in Almeda, California; JIATF 
South in Panama; the DAICC at March Air Force Base, California; 
and JTF-6 in El Paso, Texas.
    JIATF East is dedicated to ``deconfliction of all non-
detection and monitoring counter drug activities in the transit 
zone.'' The command integrates intelligence with operations, 
and ``coordinates the employment of the U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Coast Guard ships and aircraft, U.S. Air Force aircraft, and 
aircraft and ships from allied nations, such as Great Britain 
and the Netherlands.'' The command's mission boils down to 
``maximiz[ing] the disruption of drug transhipment,'' 
collecting, integrating and disseminating intelligence, and 
guiding detection and monitoring forces for tactical action.
    Just as importantly, JIATF East integrates law enforcement 
personnel, primarily from Customs, into the international 
interdiction effort. For that reason, the command includes FBI, 
DEA, DIA and State Department, in addition to the Department of 
Defense.

...............


1. The ``Controlled Shift''
    The President's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy not 
only refocused demand reduction resources on drug treatment, 
but theoretically refocused supply reduction resources on 
source country programs. This refocusing was termed a 
``controlled shift.''
    The 1995 Strategy states the National Security Council 
(NSC) conducted a ``lengthy review'' of drug trafficking in 
1993 and concluded that ``a stronger focus on source countries 
was necessary.'' Accordingly, the NSC (note: no mention is made 
of any other agencies' input or ONDCP in reaching this 
decision) ``determined that a controlled shift in emphasis was 
required--a shift away from past efforts that focused primarily 
on interdiction in the transit zones to new efforts that focus 
on interdiction in and around source countries.'' \100\
    Making this 1993 NSC recommendation national policy, 
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 14 
(PDD-14),\101\ which called for (1) ``providing assistance to 
those nations that show the political will to combat narco-
trafficking through institution building,'' (2) ``conducting 
efforts to destroy narco-trafficking organizations,'' and (3) 
``interdicting narcotics trafficking in both source countries 
and transit zones,'' through the controlled shift of resources 
from the transit zones.\102\
    Ironically, in view of the deep transit zone interdiction 
cuts proposed and effectuated by President Clinton in 1993, 
1994 and 1995 (and proposed for 1996), and the 1995 testimony 
of ONDCP Director Brown that interdiction efforts are ``less 
than effective,'' the 1995 Strategy states that, ``without 
effective transit zone programs in place, the smooth 
implementation of the new source country program will be 
severely inhibited.'' \103\ The ``essential component'' of the 
source country programs is ``economic development,'' or ``job 
creation'' in fields other than illegal narcotics.\104\

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    \100\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 44.
    \101\ A Presidential Decision Directive is a written policy 
declaration, signed by the President, which directs Executive branch 
departments and agencies to follow a particular policy course. It is 
usually issued in concert with implementing instructions.
    \102\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 44.
    \103\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February 
1995, p. 44.
    \104\ Id.


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4. Invitations Rejected By the President's National Security Advisor 
        and By the President
    Since the NSC was responsible for PDD-14 which initiated 
the shift of interdiction resources to the source countries, 
the Subcommittee Chairman wrote to National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake in the Fall of 1995 and invited him to come before 
Congress, privately if necessary, to discuss the status of the 
drug war. The Subcommittee Chairman never received a response 
to that invitation, suggesting disinterest on the part of the 
National Security Advisor in discussing this issue with Members 
of Congress concerned about the strategy shift.
    Similarly, the Subcommittee Chairman has offered, 
repeatedly and in writing, to discuss with the President a 
bipartisan approach to restoring the drug war's effectiveness 
and re-elevating the drug war as a national security issue. The 
Subcommittee Chairman has further offered to coordinate a 
meeting with the full National Security, International Affairs, 
and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, with selected congressional 
leaders, with the bipartisan drug policy group co-chaired by 
Congressman Zeliff and Congressman Rangel (D-NY), or with the 
newly constituted Senate-House Drug Policy Task Force.
    The Subcommittee Chairman's invitations to the President to 
meet with Members of Congress concerned about this issue began 
in the March 9, 1995 Subcommittee hearing and continued 
throughout 1995. In December 1995, after an invitation to meet 
with a bipartisan group of congressional leaders on the drug 
issue was physically handed to the President by one of the 
Chairman's Subcommittee staffers following remarks of the 
President at the national CADCA Conference, the Subcommittee 
Chairman received a letter signed by a White House scheduler 
indicating the President's appreciation for the Subcommittee 
Chairman's ``support,'' and no interest in a meeting with 
congressional leaders.