From the Reagan Administration's first suggestion in June 1985 that the United States should transfer arms to Iran through the final decision in December 1986 that arms shipments would cease, Department of State officials opposed these dealings for reasons of policy and status. Department officials argued that trading arms for hostages would only increase the value and therefore the number of hostages. They also believed that the Department, not the National Security Council staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, should establish counterterrorism policy, including dealings with Iran and efforts to free hostages in Lebanon.
During 1985 and 1986, senior State Department officials monitored the U.S. contacts with Iranians quite closely, with increasing consternation. At several points, department officials attempted to stop the arms-for-hostages initiative. At least twice, they attempted to circumvent it by opening other channels to Iran. After the arms-for-hostages story broke in November 1986, the department and Secretary of State George P. Shultz eventually used the revelations to regain control over counterterrorism policy. Following a strenuous bureaucratic struggle, Shultz persuaded President Reagan to prohibit further arms transfers to Iran and to announce that the Department of State would take the lead on such counterterrorism and diplomatic matters in the future.
During the congressional investigations in December 1986 and throughout 1987, Shultz testified -- to great effect -- about State Department efforts to oppose arms shipments to Iran and State's limited contemporaneous knowledge of the activities in this regard of the NSC staff. In contrast to other agencies, State Department officials appeared open and cooperative; they were the emerging heroes of the Iran/contra story and seemed to have nothing to hide.
In 1990 and 1991, however, Independent Counsel received new evidence, in the form of handwritten notes that had not been provided in response to previous document requests, suggesting for the first time that central aspects of Shultz's testimony were incorrect. Based on the notes, it appeared that Shultz and other senior Department of State officials had known significantly more about arms shipments to Iran than Shultz's testimony reflected. As a result of this new evidence, Independent Counsel conducted an investigation into whether Shultz or other department officials deliberately misled or withheld information from Iran/contra investigators.
Independent Counsel concluded that Shultz's testimony was incorrect, if not false, in significant respects and misleading, if literally true, in others, and that information had been withheld from investigators by Shultz's executive assistant, M. Charles Hill. Nevertheless, for reasons explained in this chapter, the investigation did not result in criminal charges.
Department of State Organization and Arms Shipments to Iran
During 1985 and 1986, Shultz was the secretary of state, John C. Whitehead was deputy secretary of state and Michael H. Armacost was under secretary of state for political affairs. These senior ranking officials met daily to keep each other informed of the department's activities and relevant domestic and international events.1
1 Armacost, Grand Jury, 3/13/92, p. 6.
Shultz and Whitehead were political appointees. Armacost was a career foreign service officer. During 1985 and 1986, two other senior foreign service officers occupied posts of importance in the department: Executive Secretary Nicholas Platt, and Shultz's executive assistant, M. Charles Hill.
Formally, the executive secretary was responsible for making sure that the secretary of state was adequately supported by the department bureaucracy: that matters were appropriately staffed, that deadlines were met and that appropriate guidance was given up and down the bureaucratic chain of command.2 To fulfill that role, Platt attended and made a detailed handwritten record during most of Shultz's meetings within the department.3 One of Platt's two deputies accompanied Shultz on all trips outside Washington, D.C., and reported back to Platt, who made notes of those reports. In addition, Platt had a close working relationship with Hill, who regularly reported to Platt what had occurred in Shultz's meetings outside the department; Platt also made notes of these reports. Platt also took notes in other meetings he attended and of significant information he acquired throughout the day. Platt created over 4,500 pages of daily handwritten notes from January 2, 1985, through February 12, 1987.4
2 Ibid.; Platt, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony, 7/24/87, p. 35 (hearing on nomination to be United States Ambassador to the Philippines); Platt, FBI 302, 4/5/91, pp. 1-2.
3 E.g. Platt, FBI 302, 7/14/87, p. 1; Ibid., 4/5/91, p. 2; Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 65.
4 Platt Notes, 1/2/85-2/12/87, ALW 0034815-9618.
Hill had served as the department's executive secretary prior to Platt. Thereafter, as Shultz's executive assistant from summer 1984 until the end of the Reagan Administration in January 1989, Hill's formal role was to write speeches and keep a record of Shultz's activities. In practice, Hill was one of Shultz's closest advisers and his principal gatekeeper. Hill regularly traveled with Shultz and, with few exceptions, attended and kept a handwritten record of Shultz's meetings in the department. In addition, Shultz regularly reported to Hill significant information he received and meetings he attended outside of Hill's presence, both to get Hill's reaction to the information and to permit Hill to record it in his notebooks.5 Shultz, who characterized Hill's notes as a ``remorselessly precise record and a vivid picture'' after using them to write his recent memoirs,6 consistently stated that Hill's notes were accurate.7 During the period January 1984 through December 1987, Hill filled more than 50 stenographer's notebooks with detailed, often verbatim, daily notes of Shultz's meetings, statements and activities.
5 Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, pp. 4-5, 142-45.
6 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (Chas. Scribers Sons 1993), p. xiii.
7 E.g., Shultz, OIC Interview, 12/11/90, p. 6 (describing Hill's notebooks as ``a useful managerial tool'' to Shultz as Secretary of State).
The two State Department components with primary responsibility for the Middle East and counterterrorism were the Bureau of Near Eastern and Asian Affairs (NEA) and the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning (S/CT). Throughout 1985 and 1986, Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy headed NEA and Arnold L. Raphel served as his principal deputy. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley headed the counterterrorism office during 1985 through September 1986; his principal deputy was Parker Borg.
These nine senior officials -- Shultz, Whitehead, Armacost, Platt, Hill, Murphy, Raphel, Oakley and Borg -- together with a very few assistants, appear to have been the only State Department officials with significant contemporaneous knowledge of U.S. and Israeli contacts with Iranians and arms shipments to Iran during 1985 and 1986. Among that group, Armacost, Raphel and Oakley constituted what one participant called a ``floating directorate'' that monitored this activity, principally through contacts outside the department, and reported any significant developments to Shultz, often through Platt and Hill.8
8 Ross, FBI 302, 3/11/92, p. 4.
Department of State Evidence of Iran Arms Shipments: The Notes
The best evidence of Department of State knowledge of U.S. dealings with Iran comes from Hill and Platt's notes. It was their job to bring important information to the attention of Shultz and to communicate to others his guidance and questions. Both Hill and Platt took minute-by-minute notes that document this exchange of information in remarkably detailed fashion.
Notes taken by three other department officials supplement Platt and Hill's notes. Platt's deputy Kenneth M. Quinn took detailed notes of information he received from or passed on to Platt. Christopher W.S. Ross, the principal deputy to Armacost, took detailed notes of information he received from or passed to Armacost. Arnold Raphel took less detailed, but still valuable, notes of significant information he received.
The notes of these five officials -- Hill, Platt, Quinn, Ross and Raphel -- were particularly important to Independent Counsel's investigation because State Department officials committed so little about the Iran arms transfers to formal documents.9 With the exception of a few cables and memoranda, almost everything significant that Independent Counsel was able to learn about the Department of State's role in the Iran initiative came from these handwritten notes.
9 Although Ross was a prolific notetaker and produced a typed transcript of his relevant handwritten notes to Iran/contra investigators during 1987, he was unable to locate notes dated earlier than November 18, 1985. (Ross, FBI 302, 3/11/92, p. 1; DAMASCUS 02366, 3/30/92, ALW 0054999.) During 1992, the OIC reviewed Ross's collection of handwritten notes and confirmed the completeness of his December 1986 production of transcribed relevant entries.
The Department of State's Production of Evidence During 1986 and 1987
On November 28, 1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese III wrote a letter to Shultz requesting that department information ``be segregated and held for review by and transmission to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) upon its request.'' 10 Meese's request applied to
10 Letter from Meese to Shultz, 11/28/86, ALV 004590-91.
[a]ny and all material of any kind, type, or description, including, but not limited to, all memoranda, briefing materials, minutes, handwritten notes, diaries, telephone logs, . . . files and other documents of the . . . State Department, . . . from 1 January 1985 to the present, concerning the following:
1. All arms activities involving Iran;
2. All hostage negotiations or similar communications involving arms as an inducement;
3. All financial aid activities involving the Nicaraguan resistance movement which are related to Iran or Israel; [and]
4. All activities of Robert C. McFarlane, . . . Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter . . . relating to 1-3 above.11
11 Ibid.
In response to the Meese request, the Department of State's Legal Adviser Abraham D. Sofaer, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Donald J. Bouchard sent a memorandum the next day to the senior official in each department component that potentially would possess relevant information, including Hill and Platt.12 The Sofaer/Bouchard memorandum, which the Department of Justice had reviewed and approved before it was issued at State,13 distributed a copy of Meese's letter to each of these persons, reported that the President had ordered the Department of Justice investigation and stated that ``[t]he Secretary has pledged full Department cooperation. . . .'' The memorandum stated that, with regard to the phrase ``All arms activities involving Iran'' in the Meese letter, the department was interpreting this request,
12 Memorandum from Sofaer and Bouchard to Platt (S/S), Grossman (D), Ross (P), Boyce (T), Abrams (ARA), Murphy (NEA), Holmes (PM), Abramowitz (INR), Bremer (S/CT) and Lamb (DS), cc: Hill (S), Subject: Search for Documents, 11/29/86, ALV 004587-89.
13 Sofaer, OIC Interview, 4/6/92, pp. 4, 16-17.
[b]ased upon consultation with the FBI, . . . to encompass any materials concerning allegations or evidence of U.S. or U.S.-authorized arms shipments to Iran, requests by Iran for arms or alleged offers by the U.S., Israel, or other parties allegedly acting on behalf of the U.S. to supply arms.14
14 Memorandum from Sofaer and Bouchard to Platt (S/S), et al., Subject: Search for Documents, 11/29/86, ALV 004587.
The memorandum also instructed that, with regard to named individuals such as McFarlane, North and Poindexter, ``[y]ou should . . . provide information of any alleged activities [by them]. . . .'' 15 The memorandum, which stated twice that the Meese request covered handwritten notes,16 directed those addressed to transmit copies of responsive documents to the department's information coordinator by December 3, 1986, and to hold the original documents in their offices pending the conclusion of the investigation.17
15 Ibid., ALV 004588 (emphasis added).
16 Ibid. (``Please note that the request defines documents which are subject to production most broadly to include handwritten notes, diaries, and telephone logs of Department officials. . . . It is not necessary to retrieve documents that were directed to the central information system. . . . However, any . . . personal notes . . . must be produced'').
17 Ibid., ALV 004588-89. The memorandum also directed that, ``[i]f you have any question as to whether a particular document is responsive, you should forward it. L [Office of the Legal Adviser] will make the final determination of responsiveness.'' (Ibid., ALV 004589.)
On December 3, Shultz took note of the document request in a letter to Meese:
Dear Ed:
Your letter of November 28 requested that this Department segregate and hold for review by and transmission to the FBI various documents of potential relevance to your ongoing investigation. I wish to assure you personally of this Department's full cooperation as you pursue this highly important task.
In response to your request, we immediately ordered production of all documents requested. . . . Our goal is to have the requested materials in the hands of the FBI by the end of this week.
The Legal Adviser and his staff have been in close touch with the FBI investigators and will continue to provide them full cooperation and assistance as the investigation proceeds.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ George 18
18 Letter from Shultz to Meese, 12/3/86, ALV 011058.
Hill -- who had reviewed his notebooks after the revelations of early November 1986 and located numerous notes regarding Iran, hostages, McFarlane, North and possible arms shipments 19 -- began to review his notebooks again after receiving the Meese request and the Sofaer/Bouchard memorandum.20 On December 2, 1986, Hill noted, in red pen, that ``CH [Charles Hill] wkg [working] full-time on notebooks for FBI re Polecat,'' 21 a term used by Hill to describe arms-for-hostages deals with Iran.22 Hill also received a report that afternoon from Sofaer, who had met with the FBI to discuss the sensitivity of Hill's notes and how their production could be avoided:
19 E.g. Hill, OIC Interview, 2/21/92, pp. 18-19, 21; accord Hill Note, 11/8/86, ANS 0001743-44 (``g008CH bfs (S) [Charles Hill briefs Shultz] on all details of g008Polecat. . . . Arf [Raphel] knows more than this chronology[.] CH -- . . . does chronology of what g008we told since May '85'') (emphasis in original); Hill Note, 11/9/86, ANS0001748. (``g008(S) = CH [Shultz meeting with Charles Hill] 0915 at [Shultz's] house (upstairs study)[.] CH -- (hands over 3 papers -- Chron [Chronology] of what we knew since May '85, . . .'') (emphasis in original); Hill Note, 11/10/86, ANS 0001756 (``g008from CH [Charles Hill] notebooks'').
20 On December 1, 1986, Hill made a note, and told Shultz, that the topic of Brunei's $10 million contribution to the contras was ``g008not w/I [within] the purview of what they asked for in this investigation.'' (Hill Note, 12/1/86, ANS 0001941, emphasis in original). Hill made another note to the same effect the next day, and again passed the information to Shultz. (Hill Note, 12/2/86, ANS 001946.) Hill's notes suggest that he read the Sofaer/Bouchard memorandum closely.
21 Hill Note, 12/2/86, ANS 0001946.
22 Both Platt and Hill were evasive about the origin and meaning of the term ``Polecat,'' which appears throughout their notes as a reference to arms-for-hostages proposals and developments. (See Hill, Grand Jury, 7/10/92 pp. 39-41, ``That is what Platt and I began to call this whole thing because we associated it with Oliver North. I believe Platt made this name up. North equaled Pole . . . and Polecat was something that kind of smelled. . . . It was whatever Oliver North and McFarlane were up to.''); cf. Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 46 (``That [Polecat] was Charlie Hill's characterization, I think.''). Platt's principal deputies from 1985 each confirmed that ``Polecat'' was a derogatory term for Oliver North personally (North -- North Pole -- Polecat) and referred to the arms-for-hostages aspects of North's counterterrorism activities. (Quinn, FBI 302, 12/4/91, pp. 2-3; Brunson McKinley, FBI 302, 12/13/91, p. 3.) For a time in late 1985, Hill replaced ``Polecat'' in his notes with the less pejorative term ``Night Owl.''
R/O [Readout] g008Abe [Sofaer] g008= [meeting with] g008CH [Charles Hill] . . . Abe mtg w [meeting with] FBI.
* * *
On g008Polecat notes, I [Sofaer] sd [said] parts sensitive, + probl [problem] of coherence in context. (S) [Shultz] wd [would] prefer to meet w [with] Dir. Webs [FBI Director William Webster] + go thru story w him orally. They accepted that + will let us know tomorrow what Dir. [Director Webster] says.23
23 Hill Note, 12/2/86, ANS 001946. Hill's note indicates that he passed this information to Shultz. Ibid. (symbol of arrow pointing to the right with a star at the end of the arrow and a vertical line through the shaft of the arrow); accord Hill, OIC Interview, 7/9/92, pp. 8-9 (explaining meaning of the symbol).
Later that afternoon, Hill wrote, underlined and circled: ``g008CH [Charles Hill] Reemerges from Notebook research on Polecat.'' 24
24 Hill Note, 12/2/86, ANS 0001947.
Hill continued his notebook review the next day. At the top of his first page of December 3 notes, Hill wrote and circled, ``CH [Charles Hill] works on Notebook Research.'' 25 Hill also received Sofaer's report that the FBI had determined that one agent would need to see Hill's notes:
25 Ibid., 12/3/86, ANS 0001953.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** BOX HEAD *** *** BOX HEAD *** *** BOX HEAD *** *** BOX HEAD *** --------------------------------------------------------------------
..........g008CH Notes
.....g008Abe = CH1220.....Dir Webst [FBI Director Webster] doesnt want to get personally involved. One guy wd [would] go over docs [documents] w CH [Charles Hill]. Tell you what he needs + leave the rest.26 --------------------------------------------------------------------
Hill immediately reported this proposed arrangement to Shultz, who replied, ``ok, good.'' 27
26 Ibid., ANS 0001955.
27 Ibid.
On Thursday, December 4, 1986, Hill provided the notes he had selected from his review to three FBI special agents who met at State with him and Michael G. Kozak, the principal deputy legal adviser.28 Hill told the agents that he had searched his handwritten notes and other records that were available to him in the secretary's office and located a set of documents pertinent to the Iran/contra arms controversy.29 Hill provided the agents a chronological set of 65 photocopied pages.30 The documents Hill provided consisted of excerpted entries (some of which also were partially redacted) from 32 pages of his own notebooks; three excerpted notes by Platt dated November 19, 1985; and cables and other Department of State documents.31 Hill did not state to the FBI agents that he had more relevant material, that he had not had time to review all of his notebooks, or that this production was the result of a partial review of the notebooks. FBI Special Agent Danny O. Coulson understood that Hill was providing everything he had that was relevant to Iran/contra within the parameters of Attorney General Meese's November 28, 1986, letter to Shultz.32
28 Hill, FBI 302 (Special Agent Beane), 12/4/86.
29 Ibid., p. 1.
30 See Ibid. (attached photocopies). Hill wrote the date of each incompletely dated or undated document on the upper right-hand corner of each photocopied page.
31 Ibid., pp. 1-5 (itemizing the documents produced).
32 Memorandum from FBI Special Agent Michael S. Foster re: Coulson/OIC Meeting, 3/5/92, pp. 1-2, 027774.
Pursuant to Sofaer's discussion with FBI Director William H. Webster, Hill also met privately on December 4, 1986, with Coulson, who was the senior FBI agent assigned to the Iran/contra investigation.33 During this interview, Hill said that he possessed notes he had taken of his conversations with Shultz regarding arms sales to Iran. Hill stressed that these notes, which represented confidential conversations between Cabinet officers and the President, were extremely sensitive and asked Coulson to disseminate the notes only to individuals with an absolute ``need to know.'' Hill then disclosed that these notes related in part to the December 7, 1985, meeting of President Reagan, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, Shultz, White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter and CIA Deputy Director John N. McMahon regarding selling arms to Iran.34 After walking Coulson through the documents, which contained explosive statements attributed to President Reagan,35 Hill provided copies of five photocopied pages to the FBI: one page of typed talking points that had been prepared for Shultz's use at the December 7, 1985, meeting; excerpted entries from three pages of Hill's December 7 notes; and one page with two excerpted notes by Platt dated December 7.36 In his own notes, Hill subsequently made this account of the interview:
33 Hill, FBI 302 (Special Agent Coulson), 12/4/86.
34 Ibid., p. 1.
35 Coulson's interview report states that,
[a]t the December 7, 1985 meeting, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Secretary of State Shultz and Donald Regan opposed sale of arms to Iran as being illegal. . . . During this meeting President Reagan indicated that the American people would not understand if four hostages died because ``I wouldn't break the law.''
***
During the course of this meeting the President indicated that ``they can impeach me if they want, visiting days are Wednesday.'' Weinberger indicated ``you will not be alone.''
(Ibid., pp. 1-2.)
36 Ibid. (attachments); ALW 0059585-88 (``original'' photocopied handwritten Hill and Platt notes provided by Hill to FBI on December 4, 1986; each page is dated by Hill in red pen in upper right hand corner).
g008CH [Charles Hill] g008= [meeting with] g008FBI
1030-1300Reads g008Polecat Record
-- Parts on P [Presidential] conversations (Dec 6, 7, 1985) read to sr. [senior] agent only, who will discuss w the Director.
-- Asked for nothing to take away.
-- astounded at the detail of fact. Much that was new to them.
-- said, personally, ``g008if only the WH [White House] had taken the (S) [Secretary's] advice.'' 37
37 Hill Note, 12/4/86, ANS 0001966.
Hill later received a report of the reactions that the FBI agents had expressed to Kozak after their meeting with Hill:
y [you] impressed the hell out of them . . . one FBI sd [said] to Kozak[:] ``I deal w [with] murderers, rapists, terrorists + the scum of the earth and I'm a pretty thick skinned guy -- but when I hear what those guys in the WH [White House] did to the Sec of State -- as a citizen -- I'm furious.''
(Ibid., 12/4/86, ANS 0001968.)
Two weeks later, the senior FBI agent met again with Hill to discuss these documents. Hill clarified that his notes resulting from the December 7, 1985, White House meeting were based on a general conversation and then a more detailed meeting with Shultz; Hill identified Platt as the author of the other notes Hill had produced on December 4; and Hill stated that Platt's note marked ``from Rich'' reflects information that Weinberger gave to Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, who in turn reported Weinberger's comments to Platt. (Hill, FBI 302, 12/18/86; accord, Hill Note, 12/18/87, ANS 0002073: ``1415 -- g008Colson [sic] = [meeting with] CH [Charles Hill] (Just to ask CH to explain relationship betw [between] the various R/O's [read outs] of the Dec 7 '85 mtg + the tp [talking points] prepared for it.[)]''.)
Later on the afternoon of December 4, 1986, Sofaer told Hill that the FBI wanted to take possession of his original notes regarding the Brunei solicitation,38 but added that Kozak would try to make alternative arrangements:
38 At this time, there was substantial concern among Department of State officials such as Abrams, Sofaer and Hill (who knew that Brunei had contributed $10 million to the contras but that North had claimed it never arrived) that North had absconded with the Brunei money.
-- Webster wants orig [original] notes + wd [would] lock up for indep. counsel. Kozak will work for giving copies + CH [Charles Hill] showing originals on request.39
39 Hill Note, 12/4/86, ANS 0001968. Hill later told Shultz that ``Webster wants orig [original] pages of notebooks. -- but that wd [would] destroy `best evidence' on g008other issues (2 sided pages) in order to get `best evidence' for g008this [Brunei] issue.'' (Hill Note, 12/4/86, ANS 001970, emphasis in original.) Hill, who graduated from law school but never practiced, recalled the ``best evidence rule'' from ``a case in [his law school] Evidence course.'' (Ibid.)
Hill also wrote some reflections that day on the process of reviewing his notebooks in response to the Meese request and the Sofaer/Bouchard memorandum:
-- g008Polecat
Reviewing the notebooks for the 4th time
Like rereading g008Paradise Lost; each time something new seems to appear -- not new evidence, but new interpretations impress themselves on you. The impression now shining through is that the key figures were . . . [Michael Ledeen and North].
So 2 activists -- one policy driven, one operationally driven [ -- ] play on the flaws of 2 leaders: -- McF's [McFarlane's] megalomania -- P's [President Reagan's] humanitarian spirit 40
40 Hill Note, 12/4/86, ANS 0001970-71.
In April 1987, the OIC transmitted its omnibus document request to the Department of State. This request, which covered the period January 1, 1983, to the present, specifically called for the production of all ``notes'' prepared or maintained by Hill and Platt on subjects including the sale, shipment or transfer of military arms to Iran.41 On May 28, 1987, the Office of the Legal Adviser produced various photocopied documents in response to the OIC request. One set of documents, which includes a number of excerpted Hill notebook entries, was a slightly expanded version of the chronological set of document copies that Hill had provided to the FBI special agents on December 4, 1986: It included copies of excerpts from 34 pages of his own notebooks and five excerpted notes by Platt.42 A second set of documents consists of excerpted Platt notes, including 18 photocopied pages of excerpted notes regarding Iran that Platt had provided to Sofaer's office in December 1986.43
41 Letter from Geoffrey S. Stewart to Michael Kozak, Deputy Legal Adviser, 4/23/87.
42 ALV 001577-1680.
43 ALV 002710-40.
In early 1988, the Department of State also provided to the OIC a copy of the set of Hill's November and December 1986 ``post-revelation'' notes, which had been provided to the Senate Select Iran/contra Committee in 1987.44
44 Hill Notes, 11/3/86-12/31/86, ALW 021109-430 (set of photocopied, redacted pages selected from Hill's notebooks that was provided to the Senate Select Committee by the Department of State in 1987; produced by State to the OIC on January 20, 1988).
OIC Acquires Additional Department of State Evidence During 1990 and 1991
In 1990, the OIC requested and received Hill's permission to review his original notebooks covering the period 1983 through the end of the Reagan Administration in January 1989, and to photocopy all entries relevant to the continuing Iran/contra investigation.45 At the time, Independent Counsel's investigation was focused on support for the Nicaraguan contras and the activities and statements of sub-Cabinet officials such as Elliott Abrams, Duane R. Clarridge, Alan D. Fiers, Jr. and Donald P. Gregg. Neither Shultz nor Hill was a subject of the OIC's investigation.
The 1990 review of Hill's notebooks resulted in the OIC keeping copies of a much greater volume of relevant notes than the Department of State had produced in response to OIC and congressional requests in 1986 and 1987.46 The OIC continued to assume the accuracy of Shultz's well-known testimony regarding his exclusion from information regarding arms shipments to Iran and his (and Hill's) seeming cooperation with each Iran/contra investigation. When Shultz and Hill were reinterviewed at the end of 1990, the OIC remained focused upon the subjects of its investigation at that time: Abrams, Clarridge and Gregg.
45 Hill made his notebooks available to the OIC for its review off-site, first during June 1990 in a secure facility at the Hoover Institution library in Stanford, California, and then during July and August 1990 in a secure section of the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C. The OIC reviewed these documents anew, identifying and copying all relevant items. It was not until much later that the OIC compared its selection to Hill's original production of relevant notes.
46 Most of the ``new'' Hill notes that the OIC identified and photocopied in 1990 fell into two categories. Some notes address the plethora of specific topics concerning the Nicaraguan contras (including strategy for obtaining contra aid from Congress, regional diplomatic activity and contra financial analyses) that the OIC had agreed to exclude from its request for relevant Hill notes in 1987. Other notes were created during the period April 24, 1987, through January 20, 1989, which was outside the scope of the OIC's previous requests for relevant Hill notes. The OIC accordingly was not troubled to find these notes when it reviewed Hill's notebooks in July 1990.
On April 5, 1991, the OIC also interviewed Nicholas Platt as part of its continuing investigations of Clarridge, Abrams and Gregg.47 Platt described his notetaking practices as executive secretary and said that, although he already had reviewed his notes for any relevant Iran/contra material and turned the relevant notes over to both Congress and the OIC, his complete notes were in a safe deposit box at a local bank, and the OIC was welcome to review them and duplicate them as necessary.48 The following Monday, an FBI special agent took custody of Platt's original notes for the period January 1985 through February 1987.49 In May 1991, after a brief review of Platt's original handwritten notes revealed that they were highly relevant to the continuing Iran/contra investigation, the OIC requested and obtained Platt's permission to copy his entire collection of notes.50 The OIC returned Platt's original notes later in 1991.51
47 Platt, FBI 302, 4/5/91, pp. 4-9. This interview, which the OIC had requested months earlier, had been deferred until Platt, who was serving as United States ambassador to the Philippines at the time, was in Washington for regular consultations.
48 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
49 Ibid., 4/8/91, p. 1.
50 Letter from John Q. Barrett to Ambassador Platt, 5/28/91, 016491; Letter from Ambassador Platt to Barrett, 6/5/91, 016596.
51 Platt, FBI 302, 9/24/91, p. 1.
It was not until the summer and fall of 1991, in connection with the accelerating investigations of Abrams and several CIA officials, that the OIC realized that Hill's notes were inconsistent with Shultz's testimony. Further investigation revealed that Hill had not produced these notes in 1986 or 1987, and that Platt had not produced corresponding notes of many of the same events. The OIC later obtained notes from other Department of State officials that also had not been produced to Iran/contra investigators.52
52 For example, in 1991 and 1992, the OIC located for the first time handwritten meeting and reminder notes that had been created contemporaneously by three junior foreign service officers (Glyn Davies, Keith Eddins and Debi Graze) who served as special assistants to Shultz during 1986-87. Although these notes were largely cumulative, repeating much information that Hill, Platt, Ross, Quinn and/or Raphel had recorded in their notes, they occasionally contained substantive information that was not recorded in any other document. These notes were not produced earlier because the Department of State failed to advise the special assistants that they had been requested. (Eddins, FBI 302, 1/28/91, p. 6; Graze, FBI 302, 8/27/92, p. 3.) When contacted directly by the OIC in 1991-92, each special assistant promptly and voluntarily provided the requested material.
Shultz's ``Three Phases'' of Department of State Knowledge Regarding Arms Shipments to Iran
Starting with his earliest closed-session testimony before Congress on December 16, 1986, Shultz characterized his knowledge of the Iran arms shipments in three phases: from June to November 1985, when he said he knew arms sales were debated but was not informed that any took place; from December 1985 to May 1986, when he said he knew the United States was attempting to open a dialogue with Iran but was unwilling to sell arms; and from May 4 to November 3, 1986, when he received no information of arms transfers. In essence, Shultz's testimony centered more on what he did not know than on what he did; it laid the groundwork for the widely held misperception that he and other Department of State officials were largely ignorant of the Iran arms shipments. Shultz's testimony -- which was prepared by Hill and Sofaer, and reviewed by Platt -- specifically characterized the development of the Iran initiative, and his knowledge of the initiative, as follows:
The following chronology would fail to give the full picture as I saw it if I did not note at the outset that this year-and-a-half-long episode involving contacts with Iran seems to me in retrospect to have taken place in three phases: an initial period from June until November 1985 when arms transfers were periodically debated as part of an effort to improve relations with Iran and secure the release of our hostages -- during this period I learned of two proposed arms transfers, but was not informed that either was consummated; a middle period, from December '85 to May '86, during which I had strong evidence that we were trying to open a dialogue with Iran but were unwilling to sell arms; and a third phase, from May 4, 1986, when I heard of a discussion in London about arms transfers and protested to the White House, until the revelations in the media beginning November 3, 1986 -- during this period I received no information indicating that an arms transfer to Iran had occurred.53
53 Shultz, SSCI Testimony, 12/16/86, pp. 6-7 (emphasis added); accord, Shultz, House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Testimony, 1/21/87, pp. 13-14; Shultz, Tower Commission Testimony, 1/22/87, pp. 8-9. In 1992, Shultz explained that it had been his thinking that the ``three phases'' construct
just made the account more understandable and easier to describe. The phases were characterized, I believe, by if a phase came to an end and I concluded for one reason or another that the effort to sell arms to Iran had stopped, so that ended the phase.
(Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 37.) Although Shultz had abandoned the ``three phases'' organizational scheme by the time he gave public testimony before the Select Committees in July 1987, the substance of his testimony was largely unchanged and he did, on one occasion, resurrect ``three time periods'' in response to a specific question. (Shultz, Select Committees Testimony, 7/24/87, pp. 87-93.) He also told the Select Committees at the beginning of his testimony that he would make no opening statement because Congress had his prior Iran/contra testimony and what he had to say was ``basically the same testimony. So I don't choose to read it out again.'' (Ibid., 7/23/87, p. 2.)
The evidence contained in contemporaneous notes supports the thesis that Shultz and others in the department opposed the initiative. But it does not support the commonly accepted corollary: that they were prevented from monitoring the initiative. In fact, Shultz and his senior officials did monitor the initiative. As a result, Shultz and other top department officials had a far better understanding of the initiative than their testimony suggests. Moreover, significant aspects of Shultz's testimony were incorrect: Shultz learned in ``phase one'' that arms had been shipped; Shultz repeatedly complained during ``phase two'' that arms were still on the table; and there is strong evidence that, during ``phase three,'' Shultz learned in both late May and late July that arms had been shipped to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages. The evidence shows that Shultz's characterization of each of the three phases set out in his testimony was incorrect: Shultz and others in the department were substantially better informed during each of the three phases than he stated.
Phase One: ``from June until November 1985 . . . I learned of two proposed arms transfers, but was not informed that either was consummated''
As Shultz told Congress, he learned during 1985 of two proposed transfers of U.S. arms to Iran: the Israeli TOW missile shipments planned for August and September, and the Israeli HAWK missile shipment planned for November. He did not admit knowledge that either was consummated.
Contemporaneous notes taken by both Platt and Hill show that Shultz and other senior Department officials received information indicating that the transfers had taken place. These notes corroborate McFarlane's contention that he had kept Shultz and others informed about the Iran initiative.
Hill's notes reflect that McFarlane informed Shultz (who was traveling in Australia) by a ``back channel'' cable transmitted on July 14, 1985, that he (McFarlane) had been advised by an Israeli emissary of contacts with Iranians who
were confident that they cld [could] achieve the release of the 7 hostg [hostages]. They sought some gain in return: 100 TOWS from Israel -- but the larger purpose wld [would] be the opening of the private dialogue w [with] a high level American official and a sustained discussion of US-Iranian relations[.] 54
54 Hill Note, 7/14/85, ANS 0001109 (emphasis deleted); Back Channel Cable from McFarlane to Shultz (unnumbered), 7/14/85, ALV 005092-95.
Shultz directed Hill to ``do a cautiously positive reply to say ok.'' 55 Shultz, by cable transmitted later that day, told McFarlane that he (Shultz) agreed
55 Hill Note, 7/14/85, ANS 0001109. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
that we should make a tentative show of interest without commitment. . . .
That being said, I further agree with you that this situation is loaded with ``imponderables'' that call for great caution on our part. . . . I would only underscore a couple of them: the fraud that seems to accompany so many deals involving arms and Iran. . . .
I suggest . . . that we give the emissary a positive but passive reply. That is tell him that he may convey to his Iranian contacts that the U.S. has been informed of the Iranian proposal and is receptive to the idea of a private dialogue involving a sustained discussion of U.S.-Iranian relations. In other words, we are willing to listen and seriously consider any statement on this topic they may wish to initiate. . . .56
56 SECTO 13108, 7/14/85, ALW 001132-34.
Shultz followed up after he returned to Washington on July 19, 1985.57 Hill made a note that Shultz should ``check w[ith] Bud'' McFarlane about
57 Shultz Record of Schedule, 7/19/85, ALW 0048791.
* ``Emissary'' from Israel re Israel-Iran contact to help w[ith] A. 7 hostages B. moderates in post-Khomeini Iran (Gorbanefar) [sic] 58
58 Hill Note, 7/23/85, ANS 0001140. Shultz also discussed this topic at a ``wrap up'' meeting with his senior aides late the next day. (Hill Note, 7/24/85, ANS 0001141.) Hill made another note two days later that Shultz should ``check out'' this matter with McFarlane. (Hill Note, 7/26/85, ANS 0001143.) On August 5, 1985, Hill made a note indicating that he told Shultz to ask McFarlane ``tonight at 6 pm'' about ``Peres + Isr [Israel]/Iran intel [intelligence] link[.]'' (Hill Note, 8/5/85, ANS 0001152.) None of these notes was produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
On August 6, Hill took detailed notes of Shultz's ``read out,'' or recounting, of his conversation with McFarlane regarding the ``Israel-Iran link:''
3 mtgs [meetings] betw [between] Israelis + 2 or 3 from Iran (Hamburg + Tel Aviv) Bud's contact is [Israeli official David] Kimche. Was in DC on weekend. Irans [Iranians] sees IR [Iran] in shambles. See new govt as inevitable. Mil [military] + people still pro-American. Want a dialogue w [with] Amers [Americans]. Want arms from us. Want 100 TOWS from Israel. All totally deniable. Say they can produce 4 or more of hostg [hostages]. Want a meeting somewhere. So Bud is pursuing it. Shamir told Kimche he wanted to know explicitly whether I informed. Kimche sd [said] Murf [Murphy] mtg [with Syria] scares them.59
59 Hill Note, 8/6/85, ANS 0001154.
Hill also noted his own response to Shultz's report, and Shultz's ultimate response to McFarlane:
g008CH [Charles Hill] to (S) [Shultz]
We are being had. Isr [Israel] desperate for a big arms trade rel [relationship] w [with] Iran that US permits. They have finally hit on the way to do it.
(S): its a mistake. I sd [said] it had to be stopped 60
60 Ibid.
On September 4, 1985, Platt noted information -- which he labeled as a matter that had lots of ``juice'' 61 -- about Shultz-McFarlane discussions and ``equipment'' shipments to Iran in exchange for hostages:
61 Platt Note, 9/4/85, ALW 0036258. Platt's deputy said Platt used the term ``juice'' to refer to anything that was ``especially interesting.'' (Quinn, FBI 302, 12/4/91, p. 3.)
-- Juice -- O [Oliver North] -- Bud [McFarlane] -- Ledeen -- Back channels Israel-Iran -- would produce 7 hostages[.] Kimche. g722Israel Israelis g722produce said they could produce -- Because Iranians wanted equipment.
Past 2 days -- sidebar conversations w Bud + S [Shultz] -- How to move them -- numbers, etc. . . .
-- This AM Bud said to S -- Deal is -- They'll move seven hostages to beach . . .
-- Ollie North will go out + arrange. He needs a fake passport -- g722will get We have one.62
62 Platt Note, 9/4/85, ALW 0036258-59.
On September 11, 1985, Hill noted his awareness that these exchanges would leave the United States with an obligation to replenish ``arms'' to Israel:
Bud [McFarlane] wkg [working] on 7 hstgs [hostages]. Don't stir it up. Its independent from Syrian effort. Iran-Israel. Shd [Should] be worked thru by end of week.
(Scam on us) They [Iran] giving us what wld [would] anyway [hostages] (for Atlit [prisoners in Israel]) + then give us a bill for arms for IR [Iran] from Israel.63
63 Hill Note, 9/11/85, ANS 0001117. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
On the evening of September 14, 1985, the balance of the Israeli TOW shipment went to Iran and Reverend Benjamin Weir was released. The next day, Platt made a note, based on a call from Oakley (who had just spoken with North) that ``Polecat [is] beginning to Pay off -- Weir has been released. . . . Other things could happen.'' 64 On September 16, Hill's first note of the day recorded his understanding of events:
64 Platt Note, 9/15/85, ALW 0036343.
Weir released + taken to CIA [facility] in Va. Secret because op. [operation] still going on. Oakley working w Ollie [North].
McF [McFarlane] + Ollie are getting us into deal where we will have to pay off Isr [Israel], IR [Iran] and Syr [Syria] for what we wd [would] get from Syria for nothing following Atlit release.65
65 Hill Note, 9/16/85, ANS 0001123. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
On September 17, 1985, Weir's release became public and both Platt and Hill's notes reflect numerous discussions about the release. They both noted an early morning telephone call between Hill and Reginald Bartholomew, the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon.66 Bartholomew, who had not been informed of any of the arms-for-hostages proposals leading up to Weir's release,67 told Hill that ``all signs are we g008didn't get Weir from Syria. As for others (IR [Iran], Isr [Israel] etc) I have no info.'' 68 Bartholomew, from his position outside the circle of knowledge in Washington, said it was his feeling that ``Weir was let out to g722put bring letters + put pressure on us to release the Dawa prisoners [in Kuwait].'' 69 Since then, Shultz has used Bartholomew's uninformed speculation that Weir was released to deliver a message regarding the Dawa prisoners as proof that it was the reason for Weir's release and that Shultz, himself, was unaware of the arms transfers that preceded Weir's release.70 Contrary to Shultz's pretenses, Hill's notes from later in the day on September 17, 1985, show that Shultz did receive indications that arms were involved.
66 Hill Note, 9/17/85, ANS 0001125; Platt Note, 9/17/85, ALW 0036354.
67 Bartholomew, FBI 302, 1/2/92, pp. 3-6; Hill Note, 9/17/85, ANS 0001125 (``I [Bartholomew] know precious little about origins of this or who is involved. Bud [McFarlane] has told me nothing of who else [is] involved.'').
68 Hill Note, 9/17/85, ANS 0001125.
69 Platt Note, 9/17/85, ALW 0036354. The Dawa prisoners held in Kuwait reportedly included a close relative of a key member of the Hezbollah faction that was holding the hostages in Lebanon. (See generally Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, pp. 72, 93, 95, 159; Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/13/92, pp. 300-1.)
70 E.g. Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, pp. 60-61, 70-73, 77, 79, 90, 113, 115, 172-73. The suggested explanations are not mutually exclusive: The terrorists could have decided to free Weir after Iran received TOW missiles from the West, and they could have told Weir that the remaining hostages would suffer unless he communicated the terrorists' demand that Kuwait free the Dawa prisoners.
On the day that Weir's release was announced, NBC News had a story about an airplane that had run into trouble on its flight back to Israel after delivering arms to Iran. Hill noted on September 17, 1985:
NBC -- Isr. [Israeli] arms to g722arms Iran.
DC-8 flew from Iran to Isr [Israel]. Isr sd yes, but elec. + commo [electrical and communications] failure. Story is Iran Jews on board. Plane picking up spare parts. Kimche met in London in last month w [with] NSC official. + arrangements made. US interested in leverage w Iran mil. (ingratiating) over what comes after Khomeini.
(false) Kashoggi [sic] + Nimrodi.71
71 Hill Note, 9/17/85, ANS 0001126. Hill marked this note with stars and the symbol ``H),'' which indicated that he regarded the information as ``interesting.'' This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
The Department of State apparently learned of NBC's information through a telephone call from NBC reporter Chris Wallace to Raphel on September 17, 1985. (See Raphel Note, 9/17/85, ALW 0062116-17; same information as Hill's 9/17/85 note; Raphel Chronology, 1987, p. 1, ALW 0056726.) A series of State Department cables during this period also referred to the reports of the plane returning to Israel running into trouble over Turkey after delivering weapons to Iran. (See Department of State cable to Beirut, Damascus and London, 9/17/85, ALW 025278-79; MANAMA 02805, 9/19/85, ALW 025287; Department of State cable to all Near East diplomatic posts, Ankara, Paris, London, Rome and Nicosia, 9/19/85, ALW 025282-83; see also ``Rara avis,'' The Economist, 9/21/85, p. 42, ALW 025280; cf. RIYADH 08507, 9/23/85, ALW 025281, reporting front page Al Riyadh story of previous day claiming President Reagan sent U.S. official to Tehran to discuss release of hostages in Lebanon.)
Hill noted Shultz's reply: ``Well, sometimes you have to try things.'' Hill's note indicates that he told Shultz The Washington Post had a story that Weir had been released. Hill observed that reporters ``[h]ave not yet put the two [stories] together.'' In the margin of his notebook, he wrote: ``Bud's folly is out.'' 72
72 That same day, Platt made notes of McFarlane's report that the effort to obtain hostages other than Weir ``appears not going anywhere'' and wrote that this activity had turned into a ``[r]ace between Syria to round up hostages so [Classified Country Name Withheld] can pay or Israelis can pay iranians with weapons sales.'' (Platt Note, 9/17/85, ALW 0036360.)
On September 20, 1985, after it was clear that no additional hostages would be freed, Shultz stated that he was ``uncomfortable with polecat operations.'' 73 The next day, Shultz, Armacost and Whitehead discussed their concern for the U.S. Government position -- bargaining for hostage release while publicly denying a deal. Hill recorded their discussion in his notebook:
73 Platt Note, 9/20/85, ALW 0036387. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
g008Weir + 6 Hostg [Hostages]
Arma [Armacost]: I have anxiety about
strange bargaining going on. Iran plane in Israel.
(S): I'm not comfortable, don't know what to do about it.
When Weir released, lot of people wanted
to take credit for it. But looks like they let him go just to propagandize their cause.
Arma -- They are being cute w [with] me.
Pdx [Poindexter] just says its v [very] confused.
I wd be concerned about bargaining w Iran while we say we not doing a deal.
(S): WH [White House] has taken control. When they want us to do something they will tell us.
JW [Whitehead]: do you tk [think] they tell the P [President]?
(S): Yes, But he doesn't appreciate the problems w [with] arms sales to Iran.74
74 Hill Note, 9/21/85, ANS 0001132-33 (original emphasis). This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
In 1993, Armacost acknowledged that during the period surrounding Weir's release, arrangements involving ``giving something for hostages'' were ``going on,'' and Armacost understood that one major component was arms going to Iran.75 Armacost, although not recalling specific discussions, testified that the connection between Israel's dealings with Iran and Weir's release ``surely'' was something that he and Shultz discussed.76 Oakley, who was informed by North that an arms shipment produced Weir's release,77 generally kept Shultz informed by briefing Armacost and Platt.78 Oakley believed that Shultz knew everything that he knew about the Weir release because he had reported his information.79 McFarlane and Poindexter also testified that they informed Shultz about the Israeli shipments preceding the release.80
75 Armacost, Grand Jury, 3/13/92, p. 30.
76 Ibid., p. 43.
77 Oakley, FBI 302, 8/19/87, p. 2; Ibid., 11/13/91, pp. 3, 5; Ibid., 11/14/91, p. 2; accord, Oakley, Tower Commission Interview Notes, 12/17/86, p. 2, ALS 002391.
78 E.g. Ibid.
79 Oakley, FBI 302, 11/14/91, p. 4.
80 E.g. McFarlane, FBI 302, 3/20/92; Poindexter, Select Committees Testimony, 7/15/87, pp. 180-81.
Notes from November and December 1985 corroborate this testimony and reflect the working understanding within the Department of State that the Weir release had, in fact, involved arms transfers to Iran. A note taken by Raphel during a meeting with Armacost, Oakley, Borg and Ross on November 12, 1985, states that ``Iranian/Israeli connection got Weir released.'' 81
81 Raphel Note, 11/12/85, ALW 0062333. Raphel, who died in 1988, was not interviewed regarding this note.
An early morning Hill note from November 18 reflects the same understanding. It indicates that Hill and Shultz discussed:
McF [McFarlane] + Isr/IR [Israel/Iran] hostg [hostages]. That was attempt to see (S) [Shultz] last night. He thinks something's coming down in next week or so (not for the first time)
-- Nothing cld [could] be more
(S): its appropriate than a meeting
a bad betw [between] [a non-Iranian
deal intermediary] + Ollie North.
Looney Tunes.82
82 Hill Note, 11/18/85, ANS 0001194. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
The next day, Hill made another note regarding ``Ollie North's hostg [hostage] caper. Ollie telling story (skewed) to Parker Borg. Using [non-Iranian intermediary] (witting) as cover.'' 83 Hill later received a secure telephone call from Platt in Washington, D.C. Platt reported that North told Borg he (North) had stumbled on the Israelis sending arms to Iran as a result of his contra activities. North claimed he ``went to Isr [Israel] + sd [said] we know yr [you're] doing this + we want something for it -- use yr [your] channel to IR [Iran] to get hstg [hostages] out. They thot [thought] all wd [would] come out w [with] Weir. Didn't. Now will try again.'' 84 Hill responded to this account of North's story by stating, ``I think Ollie is lying to try to make the arrangement sound more acceptable. We (he) didn't just stumble on this.'' 85
83 Hill Note, 11/19/85, ANS 0001198. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
84 Hill Note, 11/19/85, ALW 0058650 (misdated as 11/18/85). This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
85 Ibid.
A memorandum from Oakley sent electronically to Shultz in Geneva on November 18, 1985, states that,
[t]hrough other sources and connections, those used for the release of Reverend Weir, there is an expectation of a possible break through on the hostages on November 20 or 21. [Non-Iranian intermediary] was informed of the possibility and urged to be present so he could take credit.86
86 Memorandum from Oakley to Shultz, 11/18/85, ALW 0047963-65.
As Shultz has testified, McFarlane informed him in Geneva the next day (November 19, 1985) that the remaining hostages were about to be released following a shipment of 120 HAWKs from Israel to Iran. Oakley's memo and McFarlane's report together told Shultz that the Weir release had involved the same kind of arms-for-hostages deal. Oakley's memorandum stated the ``sources and connections'' who were developing the November 1985 activity were those used for the release of the Reverend Weir. McFarlane's report disclosed these ``sources and connections'' included the Israelis and their arms dealers. The inference from Oakley's memorandum and McFarlane's report, then, is that the Israelis were following the same pattern in November 1985 to obtain the release of the remaining hostages, as they had in obtaining the release of Weir.
Notes from discussions leading up to the December 7, 1985, White House meeting of the President with his national security advisers confirm Shultz's and other senior department officials' awareness of the Israeli arms transfers prior to the Weir release. Shultz spoke with Poindexter on December 5, 1985, first by unsecured telephone, then on secure. Shultz reported to Hill that during the first call he (Shultz) told Poindexter,
I think we shd [should] say g008stop[.] Syria has indicated to Murf [Assistant Secretary Richard W. Murphy] that Iran [is] playing a big role + they can't influence it much. We are signalling to Iran that they g008can kidnap people for profit.87
87 Hill Note, 12/5/85, ANS 0001227 (emphasis in original).
Later, during the secure call, Shultz said, ``This is paying for hostgs [hostages] -- so we have broken our principles.'' 88 The only hostage who had been paid for at that point was Weir, and the only currency that had been discussed was arms.
88 Ibid., ANS 0001229.
Hill's notes of Shultz's report of the December 7, 1985, meeting state:
They [McFarlane and Poindexter] say Isr [Israel] sent 60 I-hawks [missiles] for release of Weir. Maybe thats why he released + maybe not. [Non-Iranian intermediary] sent back to Beirut so he can get credit for it.89
89 Hill Note, 12/7/85, ANS 0001242; accord generally Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 45 (``I'm not a military person so I always have trouble with TOWs and HAWKs and things like that.'').
Hill's note shows that Shultz was informed that arms transfers in fact had been consummated in connection with the release of Weir. Thus, although Shultz stated as recently as February 1992 that he still believed that Weir was released to bring pressure on Kuwait to release the Dawa prisoners, and not because of the Israeli arms shipments, he could not maintain that he was never informed that Israel made arms shipments at or before the time of the Weir release.
Before the Select Committees in 1987, Shultz testified that McFarlane had informed Shultz and President Reagan on August 6, 1985, of an Israeli proposal to sell 100 U.S.-supplied TOWs to Iran in return for the release of four Americans held hostage in Beirut.90 Shultz testified that he objected and heard nothing indicating that the transfer had taken place.91
90 Shultz, Select Committees Testimony, 7/23/87, pp. 67-68. Hill's notes do not reflect such a meeting with McFarlane and the President on August 6, 1985.
91 Ibid.
Regarding the November 1985 HAWK shipment, numerous notes reflect that Shultz and other senior department officials were informed contemporaneously of many of its details, including discussions prior to the Geneva summit of President Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the flight plan, the need for overflight clearances, the delay in the shipment and the reasons the Iranians eventually returned the missiles.
With regard to the November 1985 shipment of HAWKs, Shultz testified to Congress that he knew the shipment was planned, but that he believed that it was never consummated. At first, he believed no arms were actually sent. Later, he understood the shipment had been unsatisfactory and therefore returned. He said:
I learned about the -- I learned about the proposed shipment in connection with the hostages, as I described it, in the telephone call in Geneva. But since no hostages were released, I assumed that no arms were sent. I later learned, as I testified, that a shipment went from Israel to Iran but was rejected by Iran and presumably sent back; so as of that time, as far as I knew, no arms had been shipped.92
92 Shultz, HFAC Testimony, 1/21/87, p. 64.
The shipment was not in fact sent back to Israel until February 1986. No contemporaneous State Department records indicate a belief that the shipment was immediately ``sent back.'' 93
93 Congress never asked Shultz whether he was informed that the President had approved the shipment, and he never volunteered that information. Hill's notes reflect that McFarlane told Shultz, before the shipment, that the President had approved what Shultz called at the time ``A 30M [$30 million] wpns [weapons] payoff.'' (Hill Note, 11/22/85, ALW 0058654.)
Phase Two: ``from December '85 to May '86, during which I had strong evidence that we were trying to open a dialogue with Iran but were unwilling to sell arms''
Shultz's position on phase two was that during this period he ``had strong evidence that we were trying to open a dialogue with Iran but were unwilling to sell arms.'' 94 The notes of Hill, Platt and others, however, reflect Shultz's awareness of ongoing arms-for-hostages negotiations during nearly this entire period.
94 Shultz, SSCI Testimony, 12/16/86, p. 6. In 1992, Shultz stated that his December 1986 testimony had incorrectly drawn the line between phases two and three in early May 1986. Shultz said that he should have started phase three some time in or after early June 1986, after McFarlane's trip to Tehran with a planeload of HAWK missile battery parts. Shultz said that he had meant to draw the line between phases two and three at the point that Poindexter and Casey told him ``that the whole operation was going to stand down or some phrase like that.'' (Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 229.)
Both Platt and Hill took notes of a meeting between Shultz and Armacost on January 4, 1986, in which they discussed the Iran initiative. Shultz told Armacost that Israeli counterterrorism adviser Amiram Nir had met with Poindexter ``to revive hostg [hostage] idea.'' The new deal would involve trading ``3300 TOWS for hostg [hostages].'' Shultz reported that he told Poindexter that the new proposal raised ``all [the] same probls [problems] as before. A payment. Blows our policy.'' Shultz complained to Armacost, ``[s]o its not dead. [Israeli Prime Minister Shimon] Peres comes to me on some things + to the NSC [staff] on others.'' 95
95 Hill Note, 1/4/86, ANS 0001255. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Following a January 7, 1986, meeting at the White House, Shultz made a brief report to Hill. Hill's note of the report, under the caption ``Iran Polecat,'' states: ``P [President Reagan] decided to go ahead. Only Cap [Weinberger] + I opposed. I won't debf [debrief] anybody about it. (TOWS for hostages).'' 96 Then, on January 14, Hill noted that Armacost reported to Shultz that ``g008Hostg [hostage] dealing still going on.'' Shultz's response was ``WH [White House] is running this. No comment[.]'' 97
96 Ibid., 1/7/86, ANS 0001264 (emphasis deleted). This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
97 Ibid., 1/14/86, ANS 0001270. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Three days later, on January 17, 1986, there was another meeting at the White House to discuss the initiative. Platt noted Shultz's report of that meeting as follows: ``[l]ong discussion of Polecat at lunch. He [Shultz] half shut his eyes -- Want it to be recorded as[:] A[.] unwise [and] B[.] illegal.'' 98
98 Platt Note, 1/17/86, ALW 0037151.
News of the new arms transactions circulated through Shultz's inner circle. Armacost's deputy Ross on January 23 noted that Quinn reported that Raphel had heard that the arms-for-hostages effort had been reactivated, that this might indicate the Iranians had come back to us, that a reported hostage-relief initiative involving New York Cardinal John O'Connor might simply be a cover,99 and that Shultz had said the department should stay out of the activity but attempt to keep itself informed:
99 In January 1986, Department of State officials learned of a complicated initiative to free Shi'ite detainees held by Israel in South Lebanon as a means of obtaining the freedom of the hostages in Lebanon. This supposed initiative involved such religious figures O'Connor, Terry Waite, Pope John Paul II and the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Damascus, Syria, along with General Antoine Lahad in South Lebanon. See, e.g., Memorandum from P -- Christopher Ross to the Files, Subject: Transcription of Personal Notes in Response to Request for Search for Documents, Ref: L [Sofaer] and A [Bouchard] Memorandum Dated November 29, 1986, 12/8/86, p. 5, ALV 002745-46 (Ross' translation and narrative explanation of his 1/14/86 handwritten note).
1/23 g0081100 KQ [Quinn]
* * *
(2) AR [Raphel] info of Sat meeting
reactivating Arms for hostages.
Iranians came back?
GPS [Shultz]: let's stay out, just keep
informed. No control or
involvement.100
100 Ross Note, 1/23/86 ALW 0047076; accord Memorandum from P -- Christopher Ross to the Files, Subject: Transcription of Personal Notes in Response to Request for Search for Documents, Ref: L [Sofaer] and A [Bouchard] Memorandum Dated November 29, 1986, 12/8/86, p. 6, ALV 002746 (Ross' translation and narrative explanation of his 1/23/86 handwritten note).
On January 24, 1986, Platt noted: ``Polecat lives.'' 101
101 Platt Note, 1/24/86, ALW 0037163. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
On February 6, the U.S. Embassy in Paris sent a ``No Distribution'' (NODIS) cable to Shultz reporting that the ``Embassy has been approached by a French, Swiss-based arms dealer . . . with a written prospectus alleging ongoing negotiations between the government of Iran and U.S. middlemen toward exchange of 10,000 TOW missiles for release of six U.S. hostages in Lebanon.'' 102 Hill noted the cable in his notebook as follows: ``g008Polecat? NODIS from g008Paris. Its spreading around[.]'' 103
102 PARIS 05480, 2/6/86, ALV 004154-60.
103 Hill Note, 2/7/86, ANS 0001317. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987. The Department of State replied, in a cable drafted by Oakley, to the Paris cable on February 23: ``As Embassy [Paris] has surmised, the proposal described Reftel [in the Paris cable] is a scam. There is no rpt [repeat] no USG [U.S. Government] official involvement in or knowledge of the purported arrangement to transfer TOW missiles to Iran, nor is there any evidence of which USG is aware that such a transfer would produce the release of American citizens held hostage in Lebanon.'' (STATE 054752, 2/22/86, ALV 004161-64.) The reply appears to have been literally true, because the proposal described in the Paris cable was not the proposal the White House had approved. But, as Hill's note reflects, the cable was a foretaste of leaks to come.
On February 11, Shultz attended a ``family group'' lunch with Poindexter, Weinberger and Casey.104 Weinberger took extensive notes of the discussion, which revolved around the arms-for-hostages arrangements.105 Weinberger's notes record a timeline for the anticipated hostage release that included 1,000 TOW missiles being transferred from Kelly Air Force Base in Texas to Israel on February 15.106 According to the timeline, 500 of the TOW missiles were to be delivered to Bandar Abbas in Iran on February 16, and the second 500 TOWs would be delivered on February 19, with the U.S. hostages to be released on February 23.107 Appearing after the timeline in Weinberger's notes is a statement attributed to Shultz: ``Try to find pattern of various connections between a number of countries -- ours with Iran, French with Iraq, South Africa, etc. etc.'' 108 The latter note indicates that Shultz was present for the entire lunch, including the recitation of the timeline.
104 Shultz Record of Schedule, 2/11/86, ALW 0049130. Shultz explained that he arranged for these periodic, principals-only gatherings, which began during McFarlane's tenure as national security adviser and continued during Poindexter's, ``to create more amity among the people who tended to be fighting with each other a lot.'' (Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, p. 89.) These lunches, which would not occur unless all four ``family'' members could be in attendance, typically occurred in the White House Family Dining Room. (Ibid., pp. 89, 203.)
105 Weinberger Meeting Note, 2/11/86, ALZ 0040652A-52E.
106 Ibid., ALZ 0040652D.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., ALZ 0040652E.
The next family group lunch took place February 21, 1986. Afterward, Shultz reported to Hill and Platt that the ``hostg [hostage] deal getting screwed up. [syndicated columnist] Jack Anderson is on to it.'' Shultz also reported that the hostage ``[t]urnover supposed to be g008this g008weekend [as would be expected based on the timeline laid out at the February 11 Family Group lunch]. I pleaded w [with] Pdx [Poindexter] that if not pls [please] shut it down. Fr [French] got stung. Spaniards too.'' Shultz added, ``I think we have already turned over some wpns [weapons]'' -- again, as would be expected based on the timeline. In fact, 1,000 TOW missiles had been delivered to Iran between February 15 and 17, 1986. Shultz concluded by stating that ``at F4 [family group] we agreed no comment on any Qs [questions]. But we will get crucified.'' 109
109 Hill Note, 2/21/86, ANS 0001321. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Platt's corresponding notes are similar:
Hostage deal. Have not wanted to know much. Getting g722fuc screwed up to a fare the [sic] well
-- Israelis have screwed up
-- Jack Anderson has wind
-- g008turnover to take place this weekend
-- French have paid penalty -- have not gotten people out. Spaniards got a deal.
-- Asked PDX [Poindexter] to shut it down if it doesn't work.
-- Agreed that in respect to Qs [questions] CT [State's Office of Counterterrorism] et al stonewall, but we will get g722crucifiee crucified.
(Platt Note, 2/21/86, ALW 0037404-05.) This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Platt reported this conversation to Quinn, who noted ``[t]urnover of people this weekend. If it doesn't work -- please shut it off. Some weapons already Exchanged.'' (Quinn Note, 2/21/86, ALV 002336.)
The next development came in March, when Department officials learned that one of the Iranian negotiators was going to come to Washington, D.C., in April. Raphel reported to Quinn that a DoD component wanted to tap the Iranian's phone while he was in Washington and that the visit indicated that the initiative ``was back on.'' 110
110 Quinn Note, 3/31/86, ALV 002337.
Iranian arms broker Manucher Ghorbanifar did visit Washington in April 1986. On April 3, Shultz reported to Hill and Platt that he had talked to Poindexter about the visit, and about a possible meeting between McFarlane and high-level Iranians. Hill's notes state:
g008Polecat VI[ 111] Money man in town w
111 Hill sarcastically began to add numerals to some of his Polecat notes during 1986.
[with] $ [money] to pay
for TOWS. If he pays, They'll
set the McF [McFarlane] mtg [meeting].
During that mtg our hostg [hostages] supposed to be released. I [Shultz] sd [said] this all has me horrified. Region petrified that Iran will win + we are helping them. He [Poindexter] said TOWS are defensive wpns [weapons]. I sd [said] ``so's yr [your] old man.'' 112
112 Hill Note, 4/3/86, ANS 0001399. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Platt's notes are to the same effect.
Hill's notes from April 15 indicate he told Shultz that the ``plans are for Bud [McFarlane] to go to Tehran 4/25 w [with] Ollie [North] to work on hostages for arms. To see Rafsanjani[.]'' 113 On April 21, Armacost reported to Shultz, as reflected in Hill's notes, that ``Bud [McFarlane] may show up in Tehran on Wednesday [April 23, 1986].'' The danger in this planned mission was apparent: Hill asked, ``How much will we pay to get McF [McFarlane] back?'' and called it ``all disastrous.'' 114 The next day, Shultz told Hill (who labeled his note ``g008Polecat 15'') that ``Ir [Iran] keeps haggling. P [President Reagan] g722says has said here's the deal + that's it, Pdx [Poindexter] says. -- McF [McFarlane] [is] in town today, so wont be in Tehran tomorrow.'' 115
113 Ibid., 4/15/86, ANS 0001412. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
114 Ibid., 4/21/86, ALW 0053811. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
115 Ibid., 4/22/86, ANS 0001426. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Later that day, April 22, Armacost and Shultz discussed a Customs Department sting operation in Bermuda that had resulted in the arrest of six Israelis, charged with selling arms to Iran in violation of U.S. law. According to Hill's notes (which, in a pun on ``Polecat,'' he labeled ``Poledog''), Armacost worried aloud to Shultz that, ``[i]f it breaks, Isr [Israel] may blow whistle on g008Polecat.'' 116 On April 24, Hill noted that, as a result of the ``g008Isr [Israel] + arms to Iran sting,'' Poindexter had ``put Bud's [McFarlane's] trip [to Iran] on ice.'' 117
116 Ibid., ANS 0001427. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
117 Ibid., 4/24/86, ANS 0001432. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
It was in May 1986 that McFarlane's trip to Tehran finally took place. State Department notes reflect discussions about the trip in advance, knowledge that weapons parts were transferred to Iran during the trip, and, subsequently, the mission's failure to obtain the release of the hostages.
The month of May began with a leak similar to that reported in the February 1986 Paris cable, but this time word of U.S. arms sales to Iran surfaced in London. U.S. Ambassador Charles Price called home and demanded to know what was going on. Price's call prompted Shultz, who was at a presidential economic summit in Tokyo, to confront White House Chief of Staff Regan and Poindexter and demand that the operation be stopped.
Shultz later testified that, following this confrontation, Poindexter assured him in late May that the initiative was over.118 No contemporaneous notes record such assurances. Platt and Hill's notes suggest that, in early May at least, Poindexter gave Shultz a more equivocal response. Hill's May 4 notes state that Shultz said,
118 E.g. Shultz, Select Committees Testimony, 7/23/87, pp. 26-28.
Pdx [Poindexter] sd [said] he told Price [that there was] no more than smidgn [smidgeon] of reality to it. I [Shultz] went thru my feelings. He [Poindexter] doesnt share it. Says we g008not dealing w these people. g008He has great decision-making g008equanimity. But I sd to him he has the P [President] very exposed.119
119 Hill Note, 5/4/86, ANS 0001439.
Platt's subsequent note regarding a Shultz-Poindexter exchange reads as follows:
S [Shultz] made strong personal effort to turn off Polecat tues [Tuesday] AM [May 6, 1986]. Saw Regan + Pdx [Poindexter]. unloaded. D R [Regan] said he'd raise it w Pres [President Reagan]. PDX then muddied waters. . . . S did it again. g7220 No insulation between this operation + Pres. This is wrong + illegal + Pres is way overexposed. Nothing will happen CH [Hill] thinks.120
120 Platt Note, 5/8/86, ALW 0037956.
On May 13, Weinberger called Shultz about a specific intelligence report he had just received. The report described an ``arrangement to pay for items being provided to Iran by U.S.'' 121 That afternoon, Weinberger brought the report to a White House meeting and showed it to Shultz. Weinberger's notes state that Shultz was ``appalled'' at the report that, among other things, a U.S. delegation was going to Iran and that ``240 types of spare parts'' Iran wanted ``would be available when the delegation arrives.'' 122 A Hill note of May 19 appears to refer to this discussion between Shultz and Weinberger. The note indicates that Hill discussed the following information with Shultz:
121 AMW 0002161-62 (intelligence report).
122 Weinberger Diary, 5/13/86, ALZ 0040148; AMW 0002161 (intelligence report).
Iran at F4 [family group] last Friday [May 16, 1986]? Wbgr [Weinberger] told S [Shultz] about [intelligence report] that Bud [McFarlane] wd [would] get arms there + g008then they see about hostg [hostages]. More + more elusive. Parts for [HAWK] anti-missile system. But we believe sys [system -- Iran's HAWK missile batteries] wont work.123
123 Hill Note, 5/19/86, ANS 0001453. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
The question of Department of State access to these intelligence reports became an issue during the Select Committees investigation. Shultz consistently testified that he was denied access to the intelligence reports. (E.g. Shultz, Select Committees Testimony, 7/23/87, pp. 75-77.) Although there is no evidence that Shultz generally saw the intelligence reports that were distributed to Executive branch officials, Shultz was at least intermittently given the gist of significant developments contained in them. He had several sources of this information. The director of the Defense Department component that produced these reports, Armacost and his deputy Ross all stated, and Hill's notes reflect, that the defense official regularly called Armacost to report significant developments from the intelligence reports. (Armacost, FBI 302, 1/22/87; Armacost, Grand Jury, 3/13/92, p. 95; Ross, FBI 302, 3/11/92, pp. 3-4.) In addition, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, who was shown some of these reports by Weinberger and Powell, testified that he spoke to Raphel on a daily basis and informed him of significant developments from the intelligence reports; Raphel's handwritten notes reflect these discussions. (Armitage, Grand Jury, 4/29/92, p. 42.) Finally, as Weinberger's diary and meeting notes reflect, Shultz had opportunities during 1985 and 1986 to learn about the intelligence from the people who were receiving hard copies, including Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter.
In the May 13, 1986, instance discussed in the text, Weinberger called Shultz and told him about an intelligence report.
On May 22, Hill reported to Shultz that North was bringing a non-Iranian intermediary to Cyprus, and that Catholic Relief Services was donating $10 million to poor Shias in Lebanon. Shultz responded, ``This is to be [the] cover story for our shipment of TOWs to Iranians.'' 124 Two days later, May 24, Raphel recorded in his notes that Quinn had told him about a ``transfer today -- arms to Iran today.'' 125 Hill's notes from May 27 indicate that he told Shultz that Poindexter had told Weinberger ``[d]eliveries g008are being made of our mil [military] equip [equipment] -- may see action today on release.'' Hill also told Shultz that ``[the non-Iranian intermediary] is in Beirut with 10m [$10 million]. We have commo [communications] to him from ships (the cover).'' 126
124 Hill Note, 5/22/86, ANS 0001459 (note headed ``g008Polecat''). This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
125 Raphel Note, 5/24/86, ALW 0062905.
126 Hill Note, 5/22/86, ANS 0001462 (emphasis in original).
As Hill understood at the time, of course, this information corresponded to real, ongoing activities. On May 28, 1986, Hill accurately reported to Shultz and Platt the unsuccessful conclusion of McFarlane's trip to Iran with a cargo of HAWK missile battery parts:
g008Polecat died. M.O. [McFarlane 127] to Tehran. Talks broke down + on way back. [Non-Iranian intermediary] has left Lebanon.128
127 Platt, who devised numerous nicknames for people and operations during his tenure as executive secretary, began to refer privately to McFarlane as ``the morose one'' and, for that reason, Platt and Hill each occasionally used the abbreviation ``M.O.'' in their notes to connote McFarlane.
128 Hill Note, 5/28/86, ANS 0001463. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Phase Three: ``from May 4, 1986, . . . until the revelations in the media beginning November 3, 1986 -- during this period I received no information indicating that an arms transfer to Iran had occurred''
Shultz's testimony that ``during this period I received no information indicating that an arms transfer to Iran had taken place'' is most clearly incorrect with respect to the information about arms transfers he received in May. Shultz was warned by Armacost, Oakley and Raphel that the arms-for-hostages initiative had not been abandoned after McFarlane's failed trip to Tehran. There also is strong evidence that Shultz received information indicating arms transfers had taken place in connection with the release of Father Lawrence Jenco in July 1986.
On or about May 28, British counterterrorism counterparts confronted Oakley with the accusation that the United States was violating its ``no concessions [to terrorists] policy.'' 129 Following this confrontation, Oakley wrote to Platt what appears to be the first official State Department document complaining about the ongoing Iran initiative. Oakley's June 2, 1986, memorandum, which followed up on Armacost's May 30 report to Shultz,130 states that ``there is no doubt as to what was going on during the last ten days in May'' and complains that it ``was in direct blatant violation of basic hostage policy approved, reapproved, stated and restated by the President and the Secretary of State.'' Oakley warned that the negotiations were continuing, they would eventually leak, the Administration would be damaged and he, therefore, urged the department had to stop the initiative.131 Oakley expected that Platt, a good friend, would deliver the memorandum to Shultz,132 but no contemporaneous record confirms that this occurred.133 Oakley recalled that he received no feedback regarding his memorandum and said that, in sending it, he effectively resigned from the Department of State.134
129 Quinn Note, 5/28/86, ALV 002338; accord, Oakley, ``Agenda'' Calendar, 5/28/86, ALW 0043138.
130 Hill's notes of Shultz's ``g008Welcome Home'' meeting with Whitehead and Armacost include the following exchange:
Arma [Armacost] -- g008Polecat petered out. No Deal. But it won't go away.
(S) [Shultz] -- What does it take to get this to stop? Pdx [Poindexter] sd [said] Bud [McFarlane] was out there.
Hill Note, 5/30/86, ALW 0053818. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
131 Memorandum from Oakley to Platt, 6/2/86, ALV 004620-21.
132 Oakley, FBI 302, 1/6/92, p. 2.
133 The Department of State was not able to locate any record indicating Platt's distribution of Oakley's memorandum. (Letter from James E. Baker to John Q. Barrett, 2/11/92, p. 2 (018147), ``The document appears to have been handled `outside the system' in accord with the designation `eyes only.' Such memoranda are typically not recorded or tracked. They are kept or destroyed at the recipient's discretion and do not become part of the official files of the Department unless the recipient specifically brings them `within the system.' ''.) During early June 1986, the only substantive Hill and Platt notes regarding Oakley concern the possibility of nominating him to serve as United States Ambassador in Honduras. (Hill Note, 6/3/86, ANS0001478; Platt Note, 6/2/86, ALW 0038142.) Hill made an unexplained note regarding ``Iran -- arms sales,'' however, on the same day that Oakley sent his memorandum to Platt. (Hill Note, 6/2/86, ANS 0001472.)
134 Oakley, FBI 302, 1/6/92, p. 3.
Raphel next warned Shultz. On June 12, he asked Quinn to report up the chain to Shultz three significant new pieces of information: First, Armitage told Raphel about an intelligence report showing that the negotiations were continuing; second, Poindexter had just told Weinberger to ``implement the tilt (toward Iran),'' which would mean even more weapons sales would follow; third, Assistant Secretary Richard W. Murphy had been given a cryptic message via his counterpart in a third country from Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, that indicated that the initiative was continuing. Raphel was convinced that the operation would become public and embarrass the President. Quinn's notes state that Raphel requested his views be passed on. He said: ``Put [it] all together. Secretary of State must go back to President.'' 135 Quinn passed Raphel's report to Platt.136 Hill's notes show that Platt reported it to Hill, who reported it to Shultz.137
135 Quinn Note, 6/12/86, ALV 002339.
136 Platt Note, 6/12/86, ALW 0038225.
137 Hill Note, 6/13/86, ANS 0001494. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Armacost formally warned Shultz about the continuing arms-for-hostages negotiations in an ``eyes only'' memorandum dated July 2, 1986. Armacost's memorandum, transmitted through Platt, told Shultz that the National Security Council was engaged in ``sub rosa provision of arms'' to Iran, that ``a usually detached (and heretofore skeptical[)] source'' was ``upbeat'' about the prospects for a hostage release in Lebanon the next day, and that word of this deal was getting out, through Israeli official Amiram Nir, to arms dealers who were involved as middlemen, to officials of another government and to newspaper columnist Jack Anderson.138 Like Oakley and Raphel, Armacost warned Shultz about both the wrongness of the policy and the inevitability of public disclosure.
138 Memorandum from Armacost to Shultz, 7/2/86, ALV 005024.
Clearly, as of early July 1986, Shultz was on notice that the initiative was not over, regardless of what Poindexter may have told him, and that future arms transfers to Iran were likely. Hill's notes of July 2, 1986 -- the same day as Armacost's memorandum -- show that Hill and Shultz discussed a report of an impending hostage release:
g008Polecat moves again?
1800 EDT delivery of hostg [hostage] in Beirut set for Thursday
(119th such prediction) 139
139 Hill Note, 7/2/86, ANS 0001524. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Shultz later told Hill that the
Iran business [is] very uncomfortable. No one mentions it to me -- my own fault. I sd [said] if I didnt need to know dont tell me. Casey said it was dead. Its not.140
140 Ibid., circa 7/3/86, ANS 0001528. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Shortly after Shultz received these warnings, Jenco was released on July 25. Notes from Hill, Platt, Raphel, Quinn and Ross all reflect an understanding that the release was part of an arms deal. The notes show that North told Oakley as much, and that the director of a Defense Department intelligence component called Armacost and told him about intelligence reports that indicated Jenco was released in return for arms. On July 26, the day they received this news, Platt and Armacost each had several conversations with Shultz, some by secure phone.141 And Platt reported the news to Hill on Monday, July 28, 1986.142
141 Platt Note, 7/26/86, ALW 0038556-58, ALW 0038560; Armacost, Grand Jury, 3/13/92, pp. 117-20. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
142 Hill Note, 7/28/86, ANS 0001568. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
Yet no Department of State official would say that he told Shultz about the arms deal for Jenco's release. Platt and Armacost testified in 1992 that, although it is certainly likely that they told Shultz, neither could recall whether in fact they had done so. Hill, on the other hand, stated that he did not tell Shultz because he did not believe that the reports were true.143 Hill's notes indicate that Hill regarded the reports as an interesting item; they do not in any way indicate that Hill doubted their accuracy.144 But Hill's notes are replete with rumors that he reported to Shultz. Armacost, Platt, Quinn and Oakley each testified that any rumor or other indication that Jenco was released in return for arms would have been, and in fact was, very significant at the time, particularly given the warnings these officials had given Shultz in June and early July. On the eve of Shultz's congressional testimony in December 1986, they discussed Jenco as one the ``[a]reas of greatest vulnerability.'' 145 Yet, Platt and Hill did not provide their notes concerning the Jenco release to the Department's legal adviser or investigators.
143 E.g. Hill, OIC Interview, 2/24/92, p. 414.
144 Hill Note, 7/28/86, ANS 0001568. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
145 Platt Note, 12/15/86, ALW 0039344. This note was not produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987.
The Aftermath: State Responds to the November 1986 Exposure of Arms Sales to Iran
Shortly after the news of the Iran initiative broke in early November 1986, senior State Department officials began a two-part response. The first, led by Shultz and Hill, was a reexamination of what the department had known and done about the arms sales. The second, led by Shultz and L. Paul Bremer, the new ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism, was an effort to stop any further sales to Iran and to take control of counterterrorism policy from the NSC staff.
According to Hill, Shultz and others at the State Department were surprised to learn in November 1986 that the White House intended to continue its arms-for-hostages efforts even after the 1985 and 1986 sales had been reported in the press.146 Shultz was determined to try to persuade President Reagan to order an end to further sales.147
146 Hill, OIC Interview, 2/21/92, p. 22.
147 Ibid.
But from early November onward, it became clear that few if any other senior Administration officials shared Shultz's views on how to respond to the growing criticism of the Iran arms sales. While Shultz called for a full public disclosure of the facts, Weinberger and Poindexter advocated saying as little as possible.148
148 Weinberger Diary, 11/5/86, ALZ 0040517 (``Called John Poindexter -- Shultz has suggested `telling all' on attempts to deal with Iran to get their help -- strongly objected[.] I sd [said] we should simply say nothing -- John agrees.'').
At a meeting on November 10, 1986, attended by Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Regan, Poindexter, Casey and Poindexter's deputy Alton Keel, the rift between Shultz and the others widened. Shultz pressed for assurances that no more arms would be sent to Iran; Reagan in response insisted that all present support his Iran policy and refrain from making public statements.149 Shultz replied that he supported the President, but could not support the policy.150 In light of Shultz's position, a press release issued by the White House that day described only ``unanimous support for the President.'' 151
149 Regan Meeting Notes, 11/10/86, ALU 024685; Keel Meeting Notes, 11/10/86, AKW 047253-55; Hill Note, 11/10/86, ANS 0001764-65.
150 Keel Note, 11/10/86, AKW 047255; Hill Note, 11/10/86, ANS 0001768.
151 ''Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the American Hostages in Lebanon,'' 11/10/86, Public Papers of President Reagan, Vol. II (1986), p. 1539.
Shultz's opposition to additional arms sales continued throughout November 1986. Hill prepared a set of talking points for Shultz to use in an attempt to persuade President Reagan to discontinue the sales.152 Though Shultz could not remember precisely when he used these talking points with President Reagan, he remembers that talking points of this sort were his ``preoccupation'' in his efforts to convince Reagan that the shipments were a bad idea.153
152 Talking Points, ALW 50420-25.
153 Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/13/92, p. 318. Shultz met twice weekly with President Reagan, on Wednesdays and Fridays. (Ibid., pp. 327-28.) Shultz could not remember whether he went over these talking points with Reagan on Wednesday, November 12, 1986, or at another of these regular meetings. (Ibid., pp. 317, 326-27.)
Shultz appeared on CBS-TV's ``Face the Nation'' on Sunday, November 16, 1986. When questioned about the Iran arms sales, Shultz voiced his opposition to any further transactions. Asked whether he could speak for the entire Administration on this point, Shultz replied that he could not.154
154 Shultz, Face the Nation Transcript, 11/16/86, p. 12, ALW 0050352.
On November 20, 1986, Shultz met with President Reagan to go over a list of erroneous assertions Reagan had made during a nationally televised press conference the previous evening. With Regan present, Shultz tried to convince the President that the public saw the Iran arms sales as arms-for-hostages exchanges. Shultz specifically mentioned the November 1985 HAWK shipment, which McFarlane had described to Shultz as arms-for-hostages at the time the shipment took place. Reagan replied that he knew about the November 1985 transaction, but that it was not an arms-for-hostages deal.155
155 E.g. Hill Note, 11/22/86, ANS 0001881. Hill's notes also indicate that Shultz and President Reagan discussed this same subject the previous day, at their regular Wednesday meeting: ``Bud [McFarlane] once told me [Shultz] about a plane of arms that wd [would] go if hostg [hostages] released -- not if not. P [President Reagan] knew of this -- but it didn't come off.'' (Hill Note, 11/19/86, ANS 0001852.)
That same day, Sofaer took action to remove what he believed to be a false statement regarding the November 1985 HAWK shipment from the testimony that Casey was to give to the intelligence committees on Friday, November 21, 1986. By late afternoon on November 20, the draft testimony stated that no one in the U.S. Government knew until early 1986 that the November 1985 flight carried missiles instead of oil-drilling equipment.156 Sofaer knew this was false based on Hill's note of McFarlane's November 19, 1985, call to Shultz in Geneva, during which McFarlane outlined the upcoming shipment of HAWK missiles.157 Through a series of phone calls to senior Justice Department officials, Sofaer alerted the attorney general to Hill's November 19, 1985, note, which was written proof that Casey's draft testimony contained a false statement about the November 1985 HAWK shipment.158 Late in the evening on November 20, 1986, Sofaer received confirmation from Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper that the false statement in Casey's testimony regarding November 1985 had been corrected.159
156 Sofaer, Select Committees Deposition, 6/18/87, p. 43.
157 Hill Note, 11/19/85, ANS 001200. Hill mistakenly wrote ``Tuesday, November 18'' on the preceding page of notes. Earlier notebook pages confirm, however, that Hill made the notes on pages ANS 001199-1200 on Tuesday, November 19, 1985.
158 Sofaer, Select Committees Deposition, 6/18/87, pp. 38-50.
159 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
On Friday, November 21, 1986, the day of Casey's testimony, President Reagan asked Meese to conduct an inquiry into the Iran arms sales and to report his findings at a senior advisers' meeting scheduled for Monday, November 24, 1986.160 As part of this inquiry, Meese and Cooper interviewed Shultz on Saturday morning, November 22, with Hill present. Hill and Cooper took extensive notes of the interview.161 The November 1985 shipment was high on the list of items discussed. Shultz told Meese that President Reagan had recently acknowledged to Shultz that he (Reagan) knew about the November 1985 shipment.162 Meese asserted later in the same interview that President Reagan had not known about the November 1985 HAWKs shipment, and that if Reagan had known and had not told Congress, it would be a violation of law.163
160 Meese, Select Committees Testimony, 7/28/87, pp. 224-25.
161 Cooper Notes, 11/22/86, ALV 71839-42; Hill Notes, 11/22/86, ANS 001882-89.
162 Hill Note, 11/22/86, ANS 001883.
163 Hill Note, 11/22/86, ANS 001888.
Shultz's effort to get control of the Iran initiative seemingly failed in a senior advisers' meeting on November 24, attended by President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Regan, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Poindexter and Meese. At this meeting, Meese denied Reagan's knowledge of the 1985 HAWK shipment. According to Weinberger's notes of the meeting, Meese advised the group that the November 1985 HAWK shipment was ``[n]ot legal because no finding,'' but ``President g008not informed.'' 164
164 Weinberger Meeting Notes, 11/24/86, ALZ 0040669MM (emphasis in original).
Events and revelations overtook the internal Administration debate on continuing the arms sales. On Tuesday, November 25, 1986, Meese announced during a nationally televised press conference that proceeds from the Iran arms sales had been siphoned off to supply weapons for the contras. The furor over this diversion of funds became the focus of congressional investigators. In the aftermath of the disclosure of the diversion, President Reagan handed over to Shultz and the State Department the responsibility for future dealings with Iran.165
165 E.g. Shultz, SSCI Testimony, 12/16/86, p. 31.
Other matters required Shultz's attention during this period. He learned on December 6, 1986, that U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon John Kelly had circumvented the State Department chain of authority by having multiple unreported contacts with McFarlane and North during the second half of 1986. In August 1986, Kelly had met with McFarlane, who briefed him on the Iran arms sales. Then, between October 30 and November 4, 1986, Kelly had numerous conversations with North and retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord on hostage-related arrangements with Iran. During the same period, Kelly sent and received several ``back channel'' messages to and from Poindexter at the White House. After discussing the matter with President Reagan, Shultz summoned Kelly back to Washington and ordered him to follow the chain of authority at all times in the future.166
166 Ibid., pp. 29-31.
Despite the public uproar over secret U.S. dealings with Iran, contacts with representatives of Iran continued on December 13, 1986, with Shultz's knowledge. CIA operative, George Cave, accompanied by Charles Dunbar of the State Department, met with Iranian representatives in Frankfurt, West Germany. Shultz allowed the meeting to proceed with the understanding that the Iranians would be told that American hostages must be released unconditionally and that no more weapons could be sold until it negotiated an end to its war with Iraq and stopped supporting terrorism.167
167 Ibid., p. 31.
Dunbar called Shultz after the meeting, however, to report that the Iranians -- with Cave's apparent agreement -- were insisting on adhering to a formal but unsigned nine-point plan worked out earlier by North, Secord and Albert Hakim.168 In return for the eventual release of all American hostages in Lebanon, the plan envisioned more arms shipments to Iran, as well as U.S. efforts to cause the release of the Dawa prisoners held by Kuwait.169 Shultz alerted President Reagan to the still-extant nine-point plan. Reagan authorized Shultz to ignore ``any unauthorized understandings that may have been reached,'' and to proceed according to Shultz's understanding outlined in the preceding paragraph.170
168 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
169 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
170 Ibid., p. 33. On the morning of his December 16, 1986, SSCI testimony, Shultz learned that Cave had an additional meeting with one of the Iranians after Dunbar left Frankfurt. Shultz was angry, and told SSCI he would work to remove Cave and the CIA from further contacts with Iran. (Ibid., pp. 35-36.) Cave portrayed the additional meeting as Iranian-initiated, brief and inconsequential -- and stated that he relayed to State the information he received at the second meeting. (Cave, Select Committees Deposition, 9/29/87, pp. 181-82.)
How Shultz's Incorrect Testimony Was Prepared
The admirable role that Shultz and others in the department (particularly Bremer and Sofaer) played in November 1986, both in stopping the initiative and in urging disclosure of the events of 1985 and 1986, makes the misstatements in Shultz's testimony difficult to understand. Unlike the false testimony of Poindexter, Casey and Weinberger, the misstatements in Shultz's testimony do not fit neatly into the framework of protecting the President. To the contrary, on perhaps the most significant subject on which the others gave false testimony to protect the President -- the November 1985 HAWK shipment -- Shultz openly admitted being informed in advance and suffered the wrath of Administration loyalists as a result.
Shultz's December 1986 Testimony
Shultz gave his first comprehensive testimony about his role in the Iran initiative to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in closed session on December 16, 1986. Hill prepared the first draft of an opening statement to be used in the testimony, based on a chronology binder he had assembled. Hill then gave the draft statement and the binder to Sofaer for review. Shultz read the prepared statement.171
171 In his initial Iran/contra testimony, which occurred in public session, Shultz told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that he was ready to tell ``everything I knew at the time about our sales of arms to Iran'' but would only be able to provide the ``classified details of my knowledge and activities . . . based on documents that I have, cable traffic and notes that were taken at the time,'' in a closed session of the Committee. (Shultz, HFAC Testimony, 12/8/86, pp. 58-59, 66.) Although Shultz's testimony in the December 8 public session concentrated ``on looking forward,'' (Ibid., p. 59), he provided a brief summary concerning his knowledge of arms transfers to Iran during 1985 and 1986, (Ibid., pp. 66-67.) Shultz also told the committee that he had ``already made all the information at my disposal available to the FBI.'' (Ibid., p. 58.)
Shortly before this testimony by Shultz, Hill had given a copy of the documents in the binder to the FBI. Both Sofaer and the FBI agent who received the copy understood that the binder included all of the entries in Hill's notebooks that related to the Iran initiative.
They were wrong. In putting the chronological binder together, Hill omitted more Iran-related notes than he included. Among the omitted notes are nearly every one of his notes referred to in this chapter, as itemized above. Hill's omissions were consistent with Shultz's incorrect testimony in December 1986 and thereafter.
There is strong evidence that Hill intended to mislead. First, Sofaer and the senior FBI agent independently understood that the documents they received from Hill included all of his notebook entries regarding the Iran initiative.172
172 Sofaer was not present when Hill gave the agent the documents on December 4, 1986, and the agent and Sofaer never discussed the documents or Hill's statements about the documents. It is unlikely that the agent and Sofaer would independently make such a significant mistake, unless Hill gave them the wrong impression that the notes were complete.
Second, the FBI agent who interviewed Hill and received his documents, pursuant to the attorney general's request on December 4, 1986, was, by arrangement of the director of the FBI, the senior agent on the Iran/contra investigation. The agent was working on a criminal investigation of the highest levels of Government that potentially implicated the survival of the Reagan presidency. The agent met with Hill to receive his documents, because Hill insisted on dealing with the senior FBI agent involved. Hill made no statement suggesting that he had more relevant material than he was producing, or that for any reason his production was incomplete. If Hill had indicated in any way that he had not produced all of his relevant material, the agent would have demanded compliance and, if necessary, deployed assisting agents to review Hill's notes in their entirety.173
173 See generally, Memorandum from FBI Special Agent Michael S. Foster re: Coulson/OIC Meeting, 3/5/92, 027774.
Third, Sofaer and other State Department attorneys spent a significant amount of time preparing Shultz to testify to Congress in 1986 and again in 1987. Frequently they worked with Shultz in Hill's presence. If they had received any indication that there might be additional relevant notes in Hill notebooks, they would have done whatever work it took to find them.
Fourth, the Department of State attorneys who worked most closely with Shultz, Sofaer and Hill in preparing Shultz to testify stated that, throughout their preparation process, they all -- including Hill -- treated the binder as ``the Bible'' of Shultz's knowledge about the Iran initiative.174 Thus, Hill well knew and perpetuated their misperception that the binder was comprehensive.
174 Sofaer, OIC Interview, 4/6/92, p. 42; Kozak, FBI 302, 3/4/92, pp. 5, 7.
Fifth, when Shultz was first interviewed in February 1992 after being advised of his status as a ``subject'' of the OIC investigation, and before he was confronted with the evidence that his testimony was wrong, Shultz defended that testimony by asserting that he was confident that it was correct because Hill had gone over and over the notebooks, pulled out everything about the Iran initiative, and given it to Sofaer and the FBI.175
175 Shultz, OIC Interview, 2/12/92, pp. 6-13; cf. Hill Note, 12/15/86, ANS 0002046 (``(S) [Shultz] -- . . . CH [Charles Hill] [was] Quick off the mark to go over the papers for hours.'').
Finally, there is significant evidence, discussed separately below, that Platt and Hill colluded to withhold information from investigators and Sofaer. This evidence indicates a deceptive intent by Hill in his dealings with the FBI and Sofaer.
Both Hill and Shultz attempted to blame Sofaer and the Office of the Legal Adviser for Shultz's erroneous testimony. This attempt to lay the blame elsewhere is unworthy. Shultz and Hill, not Sofaer, had reason to know what Hill's notes would contain. They formulated the ``three phases'' characterization of Shultz's arms sales knowledge in the chronology that became his prepared statement.176 On December 7, 1986, it was Hill who objected that Sofaer had, upon reviewing Hill's draft of the opening statement that Shultz was to make the next day before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, ``expanded your [Shultz's] record to include [what Sofaer believed to be] virtually all the facts.'' Hill's own notes document his argument with Sofaer that Shultz's testimony should contain ``characterizations and statements on behalf of Shultz:''
176 E.g. Hill Note, 12/7/86, ANS 0001992 (``(S) [Shultz] -- One method of summary is 3 periods.''); ibid., ANS 0001993-94 (``(S) -- . . . . I need a structure in the testimony that enables me to handle Q [questions]. -- First phase. . . . -- 2 Phase starts w [with] Jan [January 7, 1986] mtg [meeting]. . . . -- Then 3d period up to Jacobsen release where my record essentially bg008lank.'') (emphasis in original).
(CH -- Abe [Sofaer] is depriving (S) [Shultz] of the ability to make a stmt [statement] saying how he saw the scene that in any way defends his own interest.
i.e[.] Abe -- and (S) -- both saying that anythg [anything] explanatory is exculpatory + so shdnt [shouldn't] be used.
-- Abe is playing to g008(S)'s weakness like ON [Oliver North] played to g722Reag P [President Reagan's] weakness and Ledeen played to McF's [McFarlane's]
-- So (S) can be induced to make g008no stmt [statement] in his own behalf.
* * *
CH [Charles Hill] yells -- gets
characterizations +
stmts in g722behaf
behalf of g722self (S) 177
177 Ibid., 12/7/86, ANS 0001995 (emphasis in original).
Shultz's July 1987 Testimony to the Select Committees
Sofaer and his staff prepared Shultz's July 1987 testimony before the Select Committees with an eye toward the ``whole picture'' of Iran/contra -- not to a more narrow view such as Shultz's role or what Shultz knew.178 An attorney on Sofaer's staff, Elizabeth Keefer, collected and organized documents from other agencies relating to both the Iran arms sales and the contras.179 Keefer created back-up briefing books containing chronologies relating to both the arms sales and the contras.180
178 Keefer, FBI 302, 3/10/92, p. 2.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
Keefer was certain she spoke with Hill about these chronologies, which she recalled were cleared by Shultz's office prior to being released.181 Keefer viewed the chronologies as important: They were a list of events that were stipulated to by Congress and the State Department, and were designed both to facilitate and limit the questioning of Shultz by committee members.182
181 Ibid., p. 3.
182 Ibid.
Keefer and others met with Shultz on several occasions to go over his upcoming testimony. These meetings were attended by Shultz, Hill, Sofaer, Kozak and Keefer. Hill's notes were relied upon as Shultz's memory of events.183 They were ``the Bible.'' 184
183 Ibid.
184 Kozak, FBI 302, 3/4/92, pp. 5, 7.
Sofaer confirmed Keefer's recollection that the preparation of Shultz's July 1987 testimony was intended to be thorough and definitive. Sofaer stated:
[T]he most comprehensive collection of information that we engaged in was the last one for the joint committee. . . . That was the last and I think most authoritative. . . . [I]n those answers there would be reflected every bit of information that was brought to our attention.185
185 Sofaer, OIC Interview, 2/20/92, p. 74.
Sofaer's staff took a team approach to preparing sample answers for Shultz:
It wouldn't be just one person. Everybody -- this was like institutional testimony. [Keefer] worked on it, [Kozak] worked on it, everybody went over every answer and compared it to the documents so that the answer would be accurate.186
186 Ibid., p. 92.
Sofaer confirmed Hill's significant participation.187
187 Sofaer, OIC Interview, 4/6/92, pp. 65-66.
Possible Collusion by Platt and Hill
Several of the most obviously significant notebook entries that Hill did not produce correspond directly to particular entries Platt also failed to include in the set of relevant notes he compiled in early December 1986 at the request of the legal adviser's office. It is unlikely that Platt and Hill each, acting independently, would have omitted notes containing the same significant information.
The parallel omissions of Hill and Platt are the best evidence that the two acted together. Foremost among the joint omissions are Platt and Hill's July 1986 notes stating that the Jenco release ``was [a] result of Polecat.'' 188
188 Hill Note, 7/28/86, ANS 0001568; Platt Note, 7/26/86, ALW 0038555.
First, on the same page of notes about Jenco that Platt did provide to the legal adviser, he redacted (that is, photocopied his full note and then cut off before recopying) the following passage: ``release of Hostages Jenco. Result of Polecat negotiations.'' 189 He did not provide any part of the next page in his notes, which contains the following statement:
189 Ibid.
-- Price: ITOW, side winders, 155 mm ammo. Weir was earnest money. . . .
-- Armacost calls [Head of Defense Department component] -- real negotiation had been whether it was 1 or 2. 24 million -- 4 mil [million] laundered through Israel -- rest is equipment, for which, he implied, they are paying.190
190 Ibid., ALW 0038556.
Second, by the time Hill on November 8, 1986, began reviewing his 1985 and 1986 notebooks for information, he was aware of press reports alleging that Jenco had been released as part of a U.S. arms deal with Iran.191
191 On November 6, 1986, Hill, who was in Europe with Shultz, made a notebook entry regarding that morning's Washington Post story:
Nov 6 g008Wash Post Pincus: 3 American Hostages Released During
14 Months of Negos [Negotiations] + shipments to Iran.
-- channel opened at Israeli initiative
g008The Story -- McF [McFarlane] met in London w [with] Kimche
g008is -- McF then met Iranians in Eur [Europe] + Iran
H) g008out -- 1st US/Israeli shipment of arms was Sept 85 --
+ g008Weir Released
-- 2d was July 86 + g008Jenco released
-- 3d was this month, + Jacobsen released.
(Hill Note, 11/6/86, ALW 0056323, emphasis in original.) The next day, on a flight from Paris to Vienna, Charles Redman, the assistant secretary of state for public affairs, told Shultz, Hill and others that ``most [media] stories say 3 shipments, each related to 1 hostg [hostage]. And in meantime 3 more hostg taken.'' Shultz replied that, if these stories were true, ``Iran has made chimps out of us.'' (Hill Note, 11/7/86, ANS 0001732.)
Third, on a notebook page dated November 10, 1986, Hill referred back to his July 1986 note about Jenco's release:
g008from CH [Charles Hill] notebooks
7/28 g008Jenco release (July) was Polecat $24 m[illion] in wpns [weapons] next will be [Terry] Anderson
8/11 Jack Anderson on it.
9/16 Ledeen = CH [Charles Hill] -- wants to tell (S) [Shultz] what's going on at Casey's request
9/17 Casey = (S) Nephew of Rafsj [Rafsanjani] will be brought in. Has infor [information] on Iran. Only P [President Reagan] knows 192
192 Ibid., 11/10/86, ANS 0001756.
Hill, after the public revelations had begun, located the note he had made several months earlier, and then withheld the note and the summary.193 The note showed that he had been told at the time of the Jenco release in July 1986 that it had been part of a large weapons deal, and that he regarded this entry as particularly noteworthy. Hill's November 10 note suggests that he made an affirmative decision not to include the July 28, 1986, Jenco note in the chronological binder of relevant documents that he was compiling.
193 Hill's November 10 note also refers back to three other entries relating to arms shipments to Iran that Hill had located in his earlier notebooks: his August 11, 1986, note (labeled ``Polecat'') quoting Jack Anderson's column in that morning's Washington Post, (Hill Note, 8/11/86, ANS 0001591); Hill's September 16, 1986, notes of a telephone call from Michael Ledeen, an NSC consultant who said he wanted to brief Shultz at Casey's request about what the United States and Israel ``have been doing'' with Iran, (Hill note, 9/16/86, ANS 0001610); and Hill's September 17, 1986, note of Shultz's secure telephone call to Casey, who told Shultz that United States representatives would be meeting with Rafsanjani's nephew, (Hill Note, 9/17/86, ANS 0001613.) Of these three notes, only the top half of Hill's September 16, 1986, note regarding Ledeen was produced to the FBI, Independent Counsel, the Tower Commission or the Select Committees during 1986 or 1987; the second half of Hill's Ledeen note, which he did not produce, states:
-- Involved at outset with the Israeli (Kimche) approach on getting us into rel. [relationship] w[ith] Iran. -- for intel [intelligence], then for hostg [hostages]. McF [McFarlane] picked up on it.
-- (S) [Shultz] opposed Polecat op [operation] + told P [President Reagan] -- so didnt want to be part of it or informed about it. This all at the very start.
The awareness of Anderson's column, the full substance of Ledeen's call to Hill and Casey's report to Shultz regarding the so-called second channel also were not addressed by Shultz in his December 16, 1986, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, or in the ``Iran Chronology I'' that he presented to the Select Committees in July 1987.
There is more to this Hill note. In 1987, Iran/contra investigators asked the department for a complete set of Hill's November-December 1986 ``post-revelation'' notes. Hill supposedly complied with this request by giving the Office of the Legal Adviser a set of photocopies that Hill described as his complete notes for November 3-December 31, 1986, and the legal adviser provided the copies to Independent Counsel and the Select Committees. Although this set of Hill's unnumbered notebook pages included 24 pages of notes that he had created on November 10, 1986, the set did not include the above-quoted single page, which referred back to Hill's July 28, 1986, note regarding an arms-for-Jenco deal. In other words, Hill failed to produce the page that might have revealed that his chronology binder was not the comprehensive set of notes that the FBI and the legal adviser believed it to be.
On December 15, 1986, the eve of Shultz's testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, there is a Platt note that shows that he and Hill discussed their concerns about the Jenco issue.194 By then, Platt and Hill had gone back through their notes to identify relevant material. The note shows that they discussed the July 1986 Jenco release as one of the ``[a]reas of greatest vulnerability.'' 195 They knew Shultz was going to -- and did -- testify that, from May to November 1986, he had no indications that any arms were shipped to Iran, yet both Platt and Hill's notes showed that they and Armacost, who spoke with Shultz on a daily basis, had been told about a weapons deal that produced the Jenco release.
194 Platt Note, 12/15/86, ALW 0039344.
195 Ibid.
The Platt notebook entry appears at the end of the day on December 15, 1986. Hill's notebook shows that, at 7:00 p.m. that evening, he and Platt were discussing Iran/contra events.196 Both sets of notes show that they discussed Congress's request for testimony from Kelly, the ambassador to Lebanon.197 Platt's notes then continue as follows:
196 Hill Note, 12/15/86, ANS 0002048.
197 Ibid. (``g008Kelly + g008Congress. Standing invitation for him to go up. We g722are (NP [Platt]) are saying he can't go until issue resolved. They say ok, but don't let him go back w/o [without] seeing us. This will blow up. -- leak that P [President Reagan] says admonish, but (S) [Shultz] wants to fire. -- Evans + Novak will do a column. -- WH [White House] will realize JK [Kelly] a hostage to release/clnc [clearance] of the instructions.'') (original emphasis); Platt Note, 12/15/86, ALW 0039344 (`` -- Kelly + the Congress -- '').
Areas of greatest vulnerability.
-- Jenco -- released well before Jacobsen. How did he think that had occurred.
What did you think.
-- Why did you avert your gaze.198
198 Ibid.
The notes appear to reflect concerns about possible questions Shultz might confront in the next day's testimony before SSCI. But Hill and Platt each professed not to remember this conversation when they were shown Platt's contemporaneous note.199 Neither attempted to offer an innocent explanation. Hill, who was the first to be confronted about the conversation and had never seen the Platt note, was visibly shaken. Platt, who had spoken to Hill and reviewed the note privately before he was questioned about it by the OIC,200 simply stated, ``I have no explanation for this.'' 201
199 Hill, OIC Interview, 2/24/92, pp. 386-88; Platt, Grand Jury, 3/27/92, pp. 138-40.
200 Platt, Grand Jury, 3/27/92, pp. 23-24.
201 Ibid., p. 130.
Platt and Hill made other significant parallel omissions in their note productions to investigators. Contrary to Shultz's repeated testimony that he was not told about a proposed trade of HAWK missiles for hostages until McFarlane told him in Geneva on November 18 or 19, 1985, when it was too late to stop it,202 Platt and Hill's notes show that Shultz was informed on November 14, 1985, before he left from Washington. Platt's note recorded the basic information:
202 E.g. Shultz, SSCI Testimony, 12/16/86, p. 17; accord, generally, Shultz, HFAC Testimony, 12/8/86, p. 66.
-- Small mtg [meeting] -- P [Armacost],
D [Whitehead], CH [Hill], S [Shultz]
-- 600 hawks 200 phoenix missiles for
Iran -- Bud [McFarlane] asks Cap
[Weinberger].203
203 Platt Note, 11/14/85, ALW 0036734.
Hill's note, which he marked with a star and his symbol for ``interesting'' information, recorded:
g008after
g008Arma [Armacost] = [meeting with] (S) [Shultz] in last few days Bud [McFarlane] asked Cap [Weinberger] how to get 600 Hawks + 200 Phoenix to Iran. Its highly illegal. Cap wont do it Im sure. Purpose not clear. Another sign of funny stuff on Iran issue. PDX [Poindexter] not levelling w [with] me. Framed in term of long-term rel. [relations] w mod. [moderate] els [elements] in Iran.204
204 Hill Note, 11/14/85, ANS 0001187.
Second, Platt and Hill also failed to produce their respective notes of January 4, 1986, which show that Poindexter briefed Shultz on a January 2, 1986, meeting with Israeli counterterrorism adviser Amiram Nir and the latest proposal to trade arms for hostages. Platt's note reads:
Mtg [Meeting] II w [with] S [Shultz] 1140.
Another issue. Israeli -- Iranians -- issue not dead. Peres has 2 track approach -- comes to me on some issues -- goes to NSC for others.205
205 Platt Note, 1/4/86, ALW 0037024.
Hill's note recorded the detailed discussion that occurred:
g008(S) [Shultz] = Arma [Armacost] POLECAT
Pdx [Poindexter] sd [said] NiR came to see him to revive hostg [hostage] idea. Wd [Would] id [identify] Hizbollah prisoners held by Lahad who not bloody + offer to release -- and 3000 TOWS for hostg [hostages].
I sd [said] all same probls [problems] as before. A payment. Blows our policy. Isr [Israel] has an interest in leaking such a deal.
So its not dead. Peres [Shimon Peres, Israeli Prime Minister] comes to me on some things + to NSC on others.
g722Neww Newsweek had the McF [McFarlane]-Kimche meetings but didnt run it. Kimche seems to have leaked it deliberately.
I think Pdx [Poindexter] was negative twd [toward] Nir.206
206 Hill Note, 1/4/86, ANS 0001255-56.
Platt and Hill also did not produce their respective notes of Fe