Disraeli, at a time (1878) when yet another result of Balkan instability was being worked through at the Congress of Berlin, stood at the Dispatch Box in the British House of Commons, and said:
No language can describe adequately the condition of that large part of the Balkan peninsula—Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina—political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total absence of all public spirit…hatred of all races, animosities of rival religions, and absence of any controlling power…nothing short of an army of 50,000 of the best troops would produce anything like order in these parts.4
History has a way of repeating itself. The message makes a sober but telling conclusion.
The most important physical feature of Bosnia as a scene of military operations is its wild terrain. The brushy mountain country, craggy peaks, and roadless forest areas offer troops numerous places to hide, opportunity to shift forces unseen even from the air, and locations for ambush. Deep gorges make transverse movement difficult, and there are few secondary roads and rail lines until the central uplands east of the mountains are reached. Here the fertile land supports large population centers and industry, farming, and lines of communication are better. The major transportation routes are by road, rail, and inland waterways.
With the exception of its coastal areas, the Balkan Peninsula has a central European climate, characterized by warm and rainy summers and cold winters. The coastal areas enjoy variations of the Mediterranean type of climate, with warm, dry summers and mild, rainy winter seasons.
Bosnia-Herzegovina covers a land mass of roughly 51,197 sq km (see figure 2-1). It is slightly larger than the state of Tennessee. The CIA estimated the demographic distribution of Bosnia's pre-war population as consisting of 44 percent Muslim, 33 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croat. Four years later, the CIA statistics indicated a Serb plurality of 40 percent, followed by 38 percent Muslims and 22 percent Croats.5
A large part of the in-country infrastructure, such as power, water, and telecommunications, was destroyed by the war. Consequently, IFOR forces had to bring with them most, if not all, of what they needed to execute the peace operation. In addition, minefields were numerous and added a certain risk factor to all deployed personnel.
There are a number of players involved in the Bosnian tragedy. First, there are the ethnic groups, which consist of the Serbs (Orthodox Christians), the Muslims (of similar Slavic origin to the Serbs and Croats), and the Croats (of the Roman Catholic faith). The Serbs want to create a "Greater Serbia," establishing territorial ties with Serbia and Croatian Serb areas. The Muslims tend to favor an ethnically mixed state for Bosnia and the Croats hope to stake out their own areas of Bosnia.
Figure 2-1
Second, there are the factions, which consist of the Bosnian Army (primarily Muslim forces), the Bosnian Croats (united in a federation with Bosnian government forces), the Croatian government, the Bosnian Serbs (rebels supported by Yugoslavia), and the Croatian Serbs.
Bosnia's most crucial deficiency is not incapacity for self-governance. The fundamental source of dysfunction is the absence of a formula for governance acceptable to each of its ethnic constituencies. Until this core issue is resolved, no amount of international largesse, infrastructure repair, or specialized training will suffice to put Bosnia back together again. Thus political will, not governmental capacity, is the key ingredient missing from the recipe for peace.
If a workable political formula ultimately emerges, there are numerous secondary factors relevant to governing capacity (e.g., economic resources; reintegration of refugees, displaced persons, and former combatants into productive society; and linkages between governing elite and organized crime) that will also play a vital role in shaping Bosnia's ultimate destiny.
Bosnia's economic challenges would have been daunting even without the convulsions of civil war. The shock of exposing their centrally planned economy to the discipline of global competition would have been harsh enough, owing to Bosnia's relatively primitive level of development, even by East European standards. By 1989, when the framework of state-centric economics collapsed along with the Berlin Wall, the Bosnian economy was in a deplorable condition. Inflation stood at almost 2,000 percent, and per capita debt for all Yugoslavia was the highest in Europe. Compounding the task of economic adjustment, nearly half of the 1990 federal budget for Yugoslavia was consumed by the military establishment. Lacking the means to continue propping up uncompetitive state-run enterprises, the government slashed subsidies and unemployment skyrocketed.
A further consequence of this war, which was waged largely against civilian targets, was massive emigration. Over a million Bosnians, 20 to 25 percent of the pre-war population, fled the country. These refugees came disproportionately from the ranks of professionals and skilled laborers, causing a "brain drain," but also creating a potential source of remittances useful for recovery after the conclusion of the conflict. In addition, in excess of a million inhabitants were dislodged from their homes and remain internally displaced within the country.
Throughout most of its recent history, including the Tito regime, the public security apparatus (i.e., the judiciary, police force, and penal system) served as a fundamental instrument of state control. Yugoslavia's disintegration into ethnically defined entities during the first half of the 1990s had the further effect of converting many local police organizations into agents of intimidation and brutality against those of different ethnic origins. Without a fundamental reorientation in the functions performed by police and other institutions of public security, especially regarding minority rights, a multiethnic political community cannot be expected to endure. Police and judicial training programs alone will not suffice because the critical deficiency is not one of capabilities, but rather how political authorities employ those capabilities. As long as nationalistic political leaders continue to dominate the political process, the public security apparatus will be exploitable as an instrument of persecution of ethnic minorities.
The relationship between the constabulary and the armed forces in Bosnia was quite fluid during the war, in large part because of the nature of the conflict. Indeed, much "ethnic cleansing" was actually perpetrated by police elements. Shifting from the police to a military unit was no more complicated than a change of uniform. As military demobilization took place pursuant to the Dayton accord, the process was reversed, and many ex-soldiers were absorbed into police units. As a result, police strength, in proportion to the civilian population, was several times higher than the European standard of one for every 330 citizens. Apparently this also flooded police ranks with individuals possessing little or no background in law enforcement. One recent study indicated that over 80 percent of current Federation police officers have less than 6 years experience, and in many cases this experience is of a paramilitary nature. In sum, there is no shortage of police manpower, but the pool from which the various Bosnian police forces have been drawn was not confined to personnel with bona fide expertise in law enforcement.
After the death of Marshal Tito and the disintegration of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s, the forces that had held Yugoslavia's fractious peoples together were no longer present. When Serbian leaders sought to unify their nation into a greater Serbia, the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia began moving toward independence. The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) reacted by putting pressure on both Croatia and Slovenia to disarm their "illegal paramilitary groups."
In June 1991, the crisis in Yugoslavia deteriorated into open conflict when Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally declared their independence from the Republic of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian (Serbian-dominated) government promptly started a military campaign to seize the Serb-populated area of Croatia, the Krajina region. About 30 percent of Croatian territory was seized by the JNA. The JNA, after losing a series of sharp skirmishes with Slovenia, elected not to become heavily involved in a conflict with them and negotiated a withdrawal of forces.11
Efforts to stop the fighting and resolve the conflict led to the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713 in September 1991, which called for a complete and general arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. This was followed by UNSCR 749 in April 1992, which authorized the deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). This was the beginning of more than 4 years of military activities by the UN in the former Yugoslavia to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to assist in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the beleaguered population. These activities included the UNPROFOR, Operation Provide Promise (airlift of humanitarian aid), the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) force in Macedonia, the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), and the UN Confidence Restoration Organization (UNCRO) in Croatia.
The initial UNPROFOR deployed to Croatia in 1992 to monitor the cease-fire arrangements between the Croatian and Yugoslavian (Serb) forces. Authorized for a period of 1 year (via UNSCRs 743 and 749), the UNPROFOR was subsequently extended several times over the next few years until it eventually transferred its peacekeeping authority to NATO on 20 December 1995. During this time, it grew in size and area of responsibility. The UNPROFOR deployed into Bosnia after that state declared its independence and degenerated into civil war. The UNPROFOR also expanded into Macedonia in December 1992 to prevent that state from being drawn into the conflict. When the conflict spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the headquarters of the UNPROFOR, initially located in Sarajevo, was relocated to Zagreb.
The UNPROFOR developed into the largest, most expensive, and most complex peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN. By March 1994, it had expanded to more than 38,000 troops from 37 countries, the largest contributions coming from the United Kingdom, France, and Pakistan. No U.S. ground forces were committed to the operation; the U.S. role in the UNPROFOR was limited to logistical and other support, including a medical hospital provided by the Joint Task Force (JTF) Provide Promise. Some 15,000 UNPROFOR troops were deployed to Croatia and another 1,000 to Macedonia. The rest were stationed in Bosnia to monitor the fragile peace and to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid to beleaguered populations. The annual cost of the UNPROFOR was estimated at approximately $1.6 billion.
In addition to its military forces, the UNPROFOR had a civil department that dealt with political, legal, and humanitarian issues. Chief among these were economic issues, arranging for prisoner care and transfer, securing passage of supply convoys, and most importantly, mediating between the warring parties. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative was designated as the Secretary General's Special Representative for operations in the former Yugoslavia and remained in this capacity after the termination of the UNPROFOR.
Pursuant to the UNSCR 725 passed in June 1992 and under the auspices of the UNHCR, the U.S.-led coalition airlift operation, called Operation Provide Promise, commenced deliveries in July of critical humanitarian aid to cities in Bosnia, principally Sarajevo. The policies governing the multinational airlift operation were coordinated by a high-level working group (HLWG) of one-star generals from the participating nations: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Germany. The HLWG also provided a single point of contact for dealing with the UNHCR, specifically the Airlift Operations Coordination Group (AOCG) at the UNHCR in Geneva, which coordinated all airlift and airdrop missions going into Bosnia and Croatia.
The U.S. Joint Task Force-Provide Promise (JTF-PP) was subsequently formed on 1 February 1993 to consolidate oversight of all of the U.S. activities in support of the UN mission in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. These activities included the conduct of U.S. airlift operations, including airdrops, force extraction, and peace operations. The JTF-PP, commanded by CINCUSNAVEUR, had its headquarters at Kelley Barracks, Germany. There was also a small headquarters nucleus in Naples, Italy, as well as a JTF-PP Forward situated in Zagreb. Eventually, the JTF-PP comprised more than 1,200 people, mostly on temporary duty. Reserves were used extensively.
More than 176,000 STONs of food, medicine, and supplies were delivered by Provide Promise from February 1993 to January 1996, the longest lasting humanitarian airlift in history. The operation involved 14,660 equivalent C-130 leads or about 13.8 (equivalent) C-130 sorties per day. The U.S. portion of this airlift consisted of two C-130s operating from the Italian air base at Falconara, Italy, and an indeterminate number of C-141s from Rhein Main Air Base in Germany. Other nations contributing airlifters included Germany (two C-160s) and Canada, France, and the United Kingdom (two C-130s each). The U.S. Air Force flew approximately 45 percent of the airlift sorties.
Operation Provide Promise also conducted emergency airdrops of food and medicine to regions isolated by the Bosnian Serbs. More than 19,800 STONs were dropped, primarily by U.S. C-130s, in the 19-month period starting in February 1993 (equivalent to 2.8 C-130 sorties per day).
Other activities performed by JTF Provide Promise included the operation of a U.S. 60-bed emergency medical treatment center at Camp Pleso in Zagreb, Croatia, for a UN military population of more than 47,000. In December 1995, this center was replaced with a smaller Czech medical battalion facility. JTF Provide Promise also supplied imagery to the UN and NATO from July 1995 to early November during the period of Operation Deliberate Force.
On 1 January 1996, nearly 3 years after its formation, the JTF Provide Promise began deactivation. It turned over its residual missions and organizations to the U.S. Army, the largest one being Task Force Able Sentry in Skopje, Macedonia. The U.S. Army TF Able Sentry monitors and reports troop movements along the Serbia/Macedonia border as part of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).
In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali recommended an expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate into Macedonia to deter the spread of conflict into that region. Subsequently, the Security Council authorized the establishment of a UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) via Resolution 795 of 11 December 1992. In February 1993, the UN deployed the first troops (the Nordic battalion) into Macedonia. In June 1993, the first American troops, Task Force Able Sentry, were sent into the country. The UNPREDEP was established as a distinct operating entity in the FYROM by UNSCR 983 of 31 March 1995.
In June 1996, the UNPREDEP military troop component consisted of two mechanized infantry battalions: a Nordic composite battalion and a U.S. Army task force, supported by a heavy engineering platoon from Indonesia. The total strength of the military component was 1,000 troops, including approximately 500 U.S. troops. In addition, there were 35 UN military observers operating in country under the operational control of the UN commander and 26 UN civilian police monitors were deployed under the control of the Chief of Mission. The authorized strength of the civilian component was 168.
The UNPREDEP operated 24 permanent observation posts along the 420 kilometers of the Macedonian side of the border with Serbia and Albania. It also operated 33 temporary observation posts. Nearly 40 border and community patrols were conducted daily. An Interim Accord was signed between Greece and the FYROM on 13 September 1995 that paved the way for the admission of the FYROM to a number of European organizations.
After the termination of the UNPROFOR, the Secretary General recommended that the UNPREDEP be continued and that it become an independent mission, reporting directly to the UN HQ.
The Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities signed the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium on 12 November 1995. Under the agreement, the Security Council was requested to establish a Transitional Administration for an initial period of 12 months. Not later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period, elections for all government bodies would be organized by the Transitional Administration.
On 15 January 1996, the Security Council passed a resolution (UNSCR 1037) to set up a UN presence in Eastern Slavonia to oversee its eventual transfer back to Croatia. It thus established the UNTAES with a military component of up to 5,000 troops. On 31 January 1996, the Security Council authorized the deployment of 100 military observers.
NATO responsibilities to the UNTAES operation were twofold. First, NATO agreed to provide air support to the forces of UNTAES in case of attack by either the Croatians or the Serbs. Second, NATO agreed to extract the UNTAES forces should the situation warrant such an action.
In March 1995, Croatia ended the presence of the UNPROFOR in Croatia. At the same time, it approved a UN troop presence under a revised arrangement, called the UN Confidence Restoration Organization (UNCRO), as established by the UNSCR 981 of 31 March 1995. Upon termination of UNCRO on 15 January 1996, most of the UN forces in Croatia were transferred to the Commander, Implementation Force (COMIFOR).
The political basis for NATO's role in the former Yugoslavia was established in June 1992 when the NATO Foreign Ministers announced their readiness to support peacekeeping activities under the aegis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—subsequently renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In December 1992, the NATO foreign ministers stated their readiness to support the UNPROFOR peacekeeping operations under the authority of the United Nations. This marked the start of several NATO operations conducted in support of the UN over the next 4 years. The Alliance initiated maritime operations by NATO naval forces, in conjunction with the Western European Union (WEU), to monitor and subsequently enforce the UN embargo in the Adriatic (Operation Sharp Guard). NATO air forces were deployed to monitor and, subsequently, to enforce the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (Operation Deny Flight). NATO also provided close air support to the UNPROFOR during its deployment to Croatia and Bosnia, and in response to Serb mortar attacks in Sarajevo, NATO launched a series of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs (Operation Deliberate Force).
In July 1992, NATO ships of the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), began monitoring operations in the Adriatic (Operation Maritime Guard), joining the WEU ships also monitoring Adriatic ship traffic under Operation Sharp Guard. In November 1992, NATO and WEU forces in the Adriatic began enforcement operation in support of UN economic sanctions and the arms embargo of the countries of former Yugoslavia. Subsequently, at a joint session of the North Atlantic Council and the Council of WEU on 8 June 1993, the combined NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard was approved. Operational control of the NATO/WEU Task Force, designated Combined Task Force 440 (CTF 440), was delegated through SACEUR to the Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) to carry out the functions of CTF 440. The COMNAVSOUTH staff has been augmented by a WEU staff element. The commander and deputy commander of CTF 440 were both from the Italian navy.
In the 2-year period between January 1993 and December 1994, Operation Sharp Guard amassed 12,500 ship-days of operations (an average of 17 ships at sea at any given time) and flew 3,800 MPA sorties (averaging 5 per day). The operation challenged 31,400 ships, boarding a total of 2,575 ships (3.5 per day) and diverting 643 ships to Italian ports for additional inspection.
There were three Operational Task Groups (OTGs) under CTF 400, made up of ships from many nations. The OTGs were supported by land- and carrier-based fighter aircraft operating in the area and by MPA assets from eight nations. The NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF), which employed eight E-3As and two E-3Ds, also supported Operation Sharp Guard.
Following the Dayton Accord in November 1995, Operation Sharp Guard stopped enforcing the economic sanctions imposed by the UN. The arms embargo was lifted gradually, beginning on 14 March 1996 (90 days after signature of the Peace Agreement) when the import of all but heavy arms was permitted. Operation Sharp Guard ceased operations on 18 June 1996.
In October 1992, the UN established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO AWACS aircraft began monitoring operations of this no-fly zone in October 1992. On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council authorized enforcement of the no-fly zone via UNSCR 816. The resulting NATO enforcement operation, called Operation Deny Flight, began on 12 April 1993 under the Allied Forces Southern Command (AFSOUTH) OPLAN 40101. Deny Flight was a joint/combined airborne reconnaissance (RECCE) and combat air patrol (CAP) operation designed both to enforce the no-fly zone and to conduct strike operations in support of the UN peacekeeping forces.
In June 1993, the NATO foreign ministers offered protective airpower for the UNPROFOR, and in January 1994, the Alliance leaders reaffirmed their readiness to carry out air strikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs. This commitment was underscored when, on 28 February 1994, the first military engagement ever undertaken by NATO occurred: four Bosnian Serb warplanes, originating out of Banja Luka, violated the no-fly zone and were shot down by NATO aircraft.
Subsequently, limited NATO air strikes were conducted in support of UNPROFOR in August, September, and November 1994.
In May 1995, additional NATO air strikes were carried out on Bosnian Serb positions, after which hostages were taken by the Serbs but subsequently released on 18 June. On 11 July additional air strikes were conducted to defend the UN Protected Zone in the Srebrenica area.
During the 33-month duration of Operation Deny Flight, almost 80,000 sorties were flown (30 percent CAP, 28 percent strike, 25 percent surveillance and RECCE, and 17 percent "other"). About 47 percent of the sorties were flown by the U.S. military, 30 percent by the USAF alone. Fighter and bomber sorties originated from bases in Italy and from carriers operating in the Adriatic. The tanker and surveillance sorties originated from bases in France and Germany.
These flights, along with those of Operations Provide Promise, Sharp Guard, and Deliberate Force, were coordinated by the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) of COMAIRSOUTH located in Vicenza, Italy. Run by the U.S. Air Force, the CAOC coordinated the air operation over Bosnia of the other NATO countries as well. The CAOC began operations in the spring of 1993 on a temporary basis with about 78 people assigned. By December 1995, it had become a permanent facility with more than 400 personnel assigned.
Following the conclusion of Operation Deliberate Force, NATO conducted two additional air operations under Operation Deny Flight on 4 October and 9 October. The Deny Flight mandate was terminated on 20 December 1995 with the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to NATO IFOR.
On 30 August 1995, in response to a Bosnian Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo, NATO commenced a series of air attacks on Bosnian Serb military targets in an operation known as Operation Deliberate Force. These attacks continued until 20 September 1995 when CINCAFSOUTH and the UNPROFOR commander concluded that the Bosnian Serbs had complied with the conditions set down by the UNPROFOR commander. During Operation Deliberate Force, there were 3,515 sorties flown by 8 countries and NATO. The United States conducted two-thirds of the sorties (2,318) with the United Kingdom (326), France (284), Netherlands (198), and Spain (121) making up the bulk of the rest. Again, Italian air bases and carriers in the Adriatic were used to launch these strikes. This NATO air campaign has been given much of the credit for bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995. In support of Operation Deliberate Force, NATO conducted suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) operations against the Bosnian Serb integrated air defense system from 9 September to 14 September 1995. This operation was called Dead Eye.
In addition to its participation in Operation Sharp Guard, the Western European Union (WEU) conducted two additional operations in the former Yugoslavia, one on the Danube and the second in Mostar Bosnia.
The WEU operation on the Danube provided logistic support of the UN embargo against the former Yugoslavia. Overall, more than 300 police and customs officers and 11 patrol boats were active in embargo activities on the Danube. Close coordination was maintained with the riparian states of Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary (associate partners of the WEU). The Coordination and Support Center was situated in Calafat, Romania.
Since July 23, 1994, the WEU also assisted the European Union in administering the City of Mostar through the establishment of a Unified Police Force. This Unified Police Force was manned jointly by the Croats and Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by police officers deployed by the WEU countries.
Deployment of NATO-led forces into the former Yugoslavia was the culmination of years of international activity and negotiations to bring the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia to the negotiating table and to start the rebuilding process in the region. Following the signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris on 14 December 1995, NATO was given a mandate by the UN, on the basis of UNSCR 1031, to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. The NATO-led multinational force was called the Implementation Force—or "IFOR"—and the operation, code-named Joint Endeavor, began on 16 December.
The role of the IFOR was to help the parties implement a peace accord to which they had freely agreed in an even-handed way. IFOR was not in Bosnia to fight a war or to impose a settlement on any of the parties. In addition to its principal task, it was also helping to create a secure environment for civil and economic reconstruction. Its mission was limited to 12 months. However, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement on 10 December 1996 that announced that NATO was prepared to extend its participation and on 12 December 1996, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1088 authorizing continued participation by NATO. On 20 December 1996, IFOR was replaced by a NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), code-named operation Joint Guard, whose mission was to continue to secure the environment for an additional 18 months.
The NATO-led IFOR was the largest military operation ever undertaken by the Alliance. It demonstrated that the Alliance could successfully adapt its forces and policies to the requirements of the post-Cold War world, while continuing to provide collective security and defense for all Allies. It was tangible proof that, in addition to carrying out the core functions of defense of the Alliance, its military forces had the flexibility to be used outside the NATO area, for operations under the authority of the UN Security Council and with clear political objectives defining the military tasks. NATO's own military capabilities and its adaptability to include forces of non-NATO countries were decisive factors in the Alliance's role in implementing the Peace Agreement.
Under the authority of UNSCR 1031 of 15 December 1995, NATO was responsible for the implementation of the military aspects of the Bosnian Peace Agreement, signed by all parties to the conflict. There were also civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, which were the responsibilities of other international and non-governmental organizations. One of the goals of the military mission, however, was to create secure conditions for others to carry out non-military tasks associated with the Peace Agreement.
In accordance with the Peace Agreement, IFOR had the following primary military tasks:
The IFOR had a unified command and was NATO-led, under the political direction and control of the Alliance's North Atlantic Council, as stipulated by the Peace Agreement (annex 1A). Overall military authority was in the hands of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General George Joulwan. General Joulwan designated Admiral Leighton Smith (NATO's Commander in Chief Southern Command (CINCSOUTH)) as the first commander in theater of IFOR (COMIFOR). With the retirement of Admiral Smith in July 1996, Admiral Joseph Lopez was appointed as CINCSOUTH and also replaced Admiral Smith as COMIFOR. For the duration of the IFOR operation, the COMIFOR headquarters was split-based between Sarajevo and Naples.
The IFOR operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement). Its rules of engagement provided for the robust use of force, if necessary, to accomplish its mission and to protect itself. If force needed to be used to ensure compliance with the terms of the Peace Agreement, IFOR would observe the international legal principles of proportionality, minimum use of force, and the requirement to minimize the potential for collateral damage.
The IFOR consisted of elements sent to the theater by participating nations and of elements of UN peace forces already in place and transferred to NATO command and control. Every NATO nation with armed forces committed troops to the operation. Iceland, the only NATO country without armed forces, provided medical support. But IFOR was more than just a NATO operation. In addition to troop contributions from NATO nations, a significant number of other nations were participating in the IFOR. As of September 1996, non-NATO participating nations included Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine—all of which are Partners for Peace countries—plus Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco.
The non-NATO forces were incorporated into the operation on the same basis as forces from NATO member countries. They took their orders from the IFOR commander through the multinational divisional commanders, and had liaison officers at SHAPE and the IFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo. In addition, arrangements were in place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels for political consultations with non-NATO IFOR troop-contributing nations. Participation by non-NATO Partnership for Peace nations in IFOR not only contributed to the accomplishment of IFOR's mission but also provided all the participating forces with practical experience of operating with each other.
The participation of Russia was very important for the success of IFOR's mission. It was also a crucial step in the evolving NATO-Russia cooperative relationship. Russian forces joined the IFOR in January 1996. Russia's participation was subject to special arrangements between NATO and Russia. The Russian contingent was directly subordinate to Colonel General Leontiy Shevtsov, as General Joulwan's Russian deputy. In theater, the Russian brigade was under the tactical control of the U.S.-led MND(N).
An advanced Enabling Force of 2,600 troops began deploying to Bosnia and Croatia on 2 December 1995. Their task was to facilitate the smooth flow of the deployment by establishing the headquarters, communications, and logistics necessary to receive the main body of 60,000 IFOR troops to be deployed into the area. Elements of the Enabling Force were from Allied Forces Southern Europe Headquarters in Naples, Italy, and the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Moenchengladbach, Germany. The rest were provided by other NATO commands as well as by NATO nations. The deployment of the main body of troops was activated on 16 December, after final approval by the North Atlantic Council of the Operational Plan (OPLAN 10405), and the UNSCR 1031 of 15 December, authorizing the IFOR's mission.
The transfer of authority from the commander of UN Peace Forces to the commander of IFOR took place on 20 December 1995, 96 hours after the NATO Council's approval of the main deployment. On that day, all NATO and non-NATO forces participating in the operation came under the command and/or control of the IFOR commander. IFOR secured conditions for the safe, orderly, and timely withdrawal of the remaining UN forces not coming under NATO command and control.
By 19 January 1996, 30 days after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR (D+30), the parties to the Agreement had withdrawn their forces from the zone of separation on either side of the agreed cease-fire line. As of 3 February 1996 (D+45), all forces had been withdrawn from the areas to be transferred. The transfer of territory between Bosnian entities was completed by 19 March 1996 (D+90), and a new zone of separation was established along the inter-entity boundary line (IEBL).
In assessing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 months after the beginning of the IFOR deployment, the North Atlantic Council concluded that the IFOR had been successful in bringing about a more secure environment. The parties continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and had generally complied with the major milestones in the Peace Agreement.
All heavy weapons and forces were to be in cantonments or demobilized by 18 April 1996 (D+120), which represented the last milestone in the military annex to the Peace Agreement. Due to technical problems, the parties to the Peace Agreement were not able to complete the withdrawal and demobilization or cantonment of heavy weapons and forces by the deadline, although the revised deadline set by SACEUR of 27 June 1996 (D+180) for the cantonment of heavy weapons was met.
In some areas, compliance had fallen short of requirements under the Peace Agreement. The parties had released most prisoners of war but not all. Minefield clearance from the zones of separation and areas being transferred fell behind schedule. However, IFOR continued its efforts to monitor de-mining operations and to lend assistance to the parties in other areas. IFOR also continued its efforts to remove impediments to freedom of movement and to project a sense of security throughout the country. It played a key role in creating the conditions for peace, but ultimately peace depended on the parties themselves.
The international community responded to the positive achievements in the implementation of the Peace Agreement by suspending sanctions against the parties. After the Agreement was initialed, the UN Security Council suspended economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and began phasing out the arms embargo. The UN terminated the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia on 18 June 1996, but indicated that sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Bosnian Serb authorities could be reimposed if they fail significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement.
NATO and NATO member nations assumed primary funding responsibility for IFOR. In accordance with NATO practice, this was based on a mix of common and national funding. Common-funded costs were borne by the NATO Military Budget and the NATO Security Investment Program (formerly, Infrastructure funding). Non-NATO countries were responsible for their own national contributions to IFOR, with the exception of the common-funded costs that were met by NATO.
For lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, full implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement was crucial as well. By implementing the military aspects of the Agreement, NATO helped to ensure a secure environment conducive to civil and political reconstruction. A timely conclusion of an arms control regime and of confidence- and security-building measures were also of fundamental importance to the peace process. The civilian aspects of the Agreement were carried out by appropriate international and non-governmental organizations. The London Peace Implementation Conference of 8-9 December 1995 set up the framework for these efforts. The High Representative named at the London Conference, Carl Bildt, was charged with monitoring the implementation of the Peace Agreement and coordinating the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in civilian implementation.
In view of the importance of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, IFOR provided increased support for civilian tasks within the limits of its existing mandate and available resources. IFOR worked closely with the Office of the High Representative (OHR), IPTF, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the UNHCR. The OSCE, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and many others, including more than 400 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), were also worked with closely. IFOR offered a range of support facilities to these organizations, such as emergency accommodation, medical treatment and evacuation, vehicle repair and recovery, transport assistance, security information and advice, and other logistical support.
IFOR continued to assist the efforts of these organizations in tasks that were essential to the long-term consolidation of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR units worked with the OSCE on election preparations and human rights monitoring in OSCE field offices. Logistic and other support were provided to the ICTY in the investigation of war crimes and assistance was provided to the UNHCR in the return of refugees and displaced persons. Help in the maintenance of law and order was provided to the IPTF and air and ground transport assistance was made available to the OHR and others. IFOR units provided mine awareness training and education to local schools and community groups. Substantial support was also provided to all agencies by the IFOR Information Campaign, in the form of both printed material and electronic media.
IFOR military engineers repaired and opened more than 50 percent of the roads in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and rebuilt or repaired over 60 bridges including those linking the country with Croatia. They were also involved in de-mining and repairing railroads; opening up airports to civilian traffic; restoring gas, water, and electricity supplies; rebuilding schools and hospitals; and restoring key telecommunication assets.
Finally, IFOR included a specialized group of about 350 personnel such as lawyers, educators, public transportation specialists, engineers, agricultural experts, economists, public health officials, veterinarians, communications experts, and many others. These were part of a civil-military team, referred to as CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation), which provided technical advice and assistance to various commissions and working groups, civilian organizations, NGOs, and IFOR units, as well as to the parties to the Agreement and to local authorities.
The mandate for the NATO-led IFOR expired on 20 December 1996. On 10 December 1996, the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Ministerial Session, issued a statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The statement announced that NATO was prepared to organize and lead a Stabilization Force (SFOR) to take the place of IFOR, authorized by a UNSCR under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. On 12 December 1996, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1088 authorizing the establishment of SFOR as the legal successor to IFOR. SFOR was activated on 20 December 1996.
The role of IFOR (Operation Joint Endeavor) was to implement the peace. The role of SFOR (Operation Joint Guard) was to stabilize the peace. The difference between the tasks of IFOR and SFOR is reflected in the names of their missions. SFOR had the same rules of engagement as IFOR for the robust use of force, if it should be necessary to accomplish its mission and to protect itself. Its specific tasks were to—
SFOR also stood ready to provide emergency support to UN forces in Eastern Slavonia.
SFOR's size, with around 31,000 troops in Bosnia, was about half that of IFOR. Building on the general compliance with the terms of the Dayton Agreement ensured during the IFOR mission allowed the smaller-sized SFOR to concentrate on the implementation of all the provisions of annex 1A of the Peace Agreement, i.e., to stabilize the secure environment in which local and national authorities and other international organizations could work; and provide support to other agencies (on a selective and targeted basis, in view of the reduced size of the forces available).
NATO envisaged an 18-month mission for SFOR. The North Atlantic Council planned to review SFOR's force levels after 6 and 12 months with a view to shifting the focus from stabilization to deterrence and completing the mission by June 1998.
The SFOR was also a NATO-led unified command under the political direction and control of the Alliance's North Atlantic Council, as stipulated by the Peace Agreement (annex 1A). Overall military authority was again in the hands of NATO's SACEUR, General George Joulwan, who designated General William Crouch (NATO's Commander of Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT)) as the commander of SFOR (COMSFOR). COMSFOR's headquarters was in Ilidza.
The NATO and 18 non-NATO nations that participated in IFOR also participated in SFOR. In addition, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco participated in the Alliance's Mediterranean dialogue. Slovenia and Ireland also joined SFOR, bringing the total of non-NATO participating nations to 20.
In view of the importance of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, SFOR planned to continue to provide support for civilian tasks. However, with fewer forces at its disposal, SFOR would need to prioritize its efforts and carefully select where they could be applied. To be effective, SFOR and the other organizations would also need to continue to plan together and identify mutual objectives to ensure that the limited SFOR support could be applied where and when needed.
| Bosnia Index | Foreword | Acknowledgments | Preface | I. Introduction | II. Bosnia—Setting the Stage | III. Command and Control Structure | IV. Intelligence Operations | V. Civil-Military Cooperation | VI. The International Police Task Force | VII. Information Activities | VIII. Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle | IX. Counterintelligence and HUMINT | X. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Soldier's Perspective | XI. C4ISR Systems and Services | XII. NDU/CCRP Bosnia Study | XIII. Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned | XIV. Summary | End Notes | Appendix A: The Dayton Peace Agreement Summary | Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events | Appendix C: References | Appendix D: Acronyms | About the Contributing Editor | About the Authors