The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader an overview of the command and control (C2) structure that was in place when the Implementation Force (IFOR) entered Bosnia in December 1995, and how that structure evolved throughout the course of the operation. Operation Joint Endeavor is a unique case in the history of peace operations. It is the first operation NATO has conducted out-of-area, or out of its normal area of protection. Also, a number of countries who have worked together for a long time in NATO and a large number of countries who had never been together formed Operation Joint Endeavor. Overall the operation was successful, in part because of the personal relationships of the commanders and staff involved. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the operation were not defined before the troops were deployed and therefore had to be pushed down from NATO Headquarters during and after the deployment of forces. Although the mission could have failed in the early stages due to the lack of a unified political direction by NATO and the weak interaction between the civil and military authorities in Bosnia, the "people on the ground" found ways to make the mission a success.
The three framework nations (the United States, United Kingdom, and France) formed the basis for the multinational divisions (North, South West, and South East, respectively). OPCON (operational control) and OPCOM (operational command) of the divisions were also assigned to the ARRC. HQs IFOR was split between Naples and Sarajevo and the HQs ARRC was located at Ilidza near Sarajevo. The U.S.-led MND(N), with its HQs in Tuzla, was the largest division and included brigades from Turkey, Russia, and a third non-U.S. brigade referred to as the NordPol brigade (made up of troops from Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Poland). The British-led MND(SW), with its HQs located in Banja Luka, was built around a British brigade along with troops from Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Finally, the French-led MND(SE), with its HQs in Mostar, was the smallest division and was comprised of troops from France, Italy, and Portugal. Both the British and French already had a large number of troops in Bosnia in support of UNPROFOR and the Rapid Reaction Force. Hence, the bulk of the deployment activities for IFOR were the NATO command unit forces, the U.S. forces, and the forces of the other participating nations.
The Allied Forces Southern Command (AFSOUTH) Headquarters served as the operational-level headquarters for this operation, due in part to the recent success of Operation Sharp Guard (maritime control) and the need to use air bases on Italy's territory. AFSOUTH, located in Naples, Italy, is a 45-year-old peacetime NATO headquarters, which had the mission to watch over naval deployments in the Mediterranean Sea. AFSOUTH was neither staffed nor equipped to lead a land force into combat. Had IFOR encountered more combat in this operation, the headquarters structure probably would have failed without much additional U.S./NATO staff support and equipment. There is a belief, in some minds, that Headquarters IFOR and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) constituted a Joint Task Force. This was not the case in Bosnia.
NATO's ability to influence events during early preparation for IFOR helped to avoid problems encountered by UNPROFOR and to ensure a clear definition of military tasks under a unified chain of command. This is largely attributable to close involvement of NATO military planners with Contact Group negotiators prior to and during Dayton to ensure that security tasks that could be accomplished realistically were incorporated into the agreement. Consequently, there is clear language hammered into the General Framework Agreement stating that IFOR "will operate under the authority of and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command." UNSCR 1031 provides NATO with the mandate and the necessary political authority to direct NATO and non-NATO forces under IFOR. However, NATO's robust military terms of reference highlight the paucity of authority for the civil activities of the High Representative—the weak link in the implementation of the Dayton Accord. In any future operation that depends on the success of both military and civil tasks, NATO will want to ensure that its civil counterpart also enjoys a commensurate amount of authority to fulfill its responsibilities.
The lack of unified political direction for the overall peace implementation process was a risk to the success of IFOR. The General Framework Agreement establishes three structures for implementation—an Implementation Force for the military aspects, a High Representative to coordinate civil tasks, and Donors Conferences to stimulate reconstruction. (Figure 3-1 illustrates the C2 structure for civil and military tasks.) NATO's robust terms of reference in the General Framework Agreement highlight the paucity of authority for the High Representative. The High Representative is not a UN Special Representative with UN authority and his political guidance comes from a Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, which is not a standing internationally recognized political organization. Given the UN's reluctance to play a lead role, there is no internationally recognized political organization providing overall political direction. Consequently, the three structures remain virtually autonomous, operating within a loose framework of cooperation and without a formal structure for developing unified policy. The absence of a standing political organization with which the NAC can coordinate policy exacerbates synchronization of civil/military implementation at the strategic level and NATO's role in implementing the Peace Agreement. In any future operation that depends on the success of both military and civil tasks, NATO will want to ensure that its civil counterpart will also enjoy a commensurate amount of authority to fulfill its responsibilities.
At SHAPE, the Partnership Coordination Cell, with resident liaison teams from PfP nations, provided secure facilities for IFOR Liaison Officers and for SHAPE's IFOR Coordination Center (ICC) (see figure 3-2). The ICC has been the key link in arranging initial contacts with non-NATO nations, coordinating plans, and resolving national issues with SHAPE. Plans to deploy National Liaison Teams to a National Coalition Cell (NCC) in theater did not materialize and an alternative location at Naples satisfied neither the desire of nations to be represented in theater nor to maintain contact with their contingents.
COMIFOR and COMARRC have been given OPCON over their main combat troops (see figure 3-3). Early impressions from IFOR operations suggest that this amount of command authority does not suffice, and that OPCOM should have been granted. OPCON does not permit (1) assignment of a separate employment to force components, (2) does not allow the redress of imbalances and shortfalls within the forces assigned, and (3) does not allow the reassignment of forces. The above three activities are important for the fulfillment of the mission, are in the interest of economy of effort, and would be authorized with delegation of OPCOM. A study conducted by a NATO's Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff Working Group addressed this very subject. The study results were published in September 1995. It was concluded that Conflict Prevention, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping would require OPCON. Peace Enforcement, however, being the most demanding non-Article V mission and entailing the possibility of combat, would require OPCOM. IFOR's mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is Peace Enforcement. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the current definitions of NATO command levels such as OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM (tactical command), and TACON (tactical control) may be part of the problem and will have to be investigated and discussed in this context.
Although COMIFOR exercised OPCON over assigned forces, it is estimated that there may have been as many as 10,000 other forces in theater area under national C2, including national support elements in Croatia and Hungary, naval forces operating in the Adriatic under national OPCON, UN Forces in Croatia and Macedonia, and forces pending TOA. Without TACON as a minimum, COMIFOR had no control over these forces and could only coordinate their activities. Although these conditions caused no serious incidents, an operational emergency could have created problems with ROE and force protection. In addition, COMIFOR needed at least TACON to manage any redeployment of forces until they are out of theater. It is also a fact that there was no operational reserve force available for the IFOR phase of the operation. U.S. Marines were stationed afloat and occasionally in the region, however if needed it would have taken days to have them in place to respond in an operational crisis.
There were also some shortfalls in the U.S.-related command arrangements. Most significant was that the command relationships between NATO authorities, USCINCEUR, and USAREUR were not well defined, which led to inefficiencies and confusion. At the center of this issue was how the Army (Component) fulfills its Title 10 responsibilities. The root cause of the problem was the absence of a U.S. JTF command equivalent that had the authority, expertise, and staffing to properly provide U.S. C2 and coordinated logistics for out-of-sector U.S. service members. In accordance with National Security Decision Directive 130, the U.S. PSYOP forces were not placed under IFOR C2. These forces remained under USEUCOM control. This caused some problems in the product coordination and approval process and inhibited flexible use of PSYOP elements at the tactical level. Another significant C2 shortfall was inadequate early coordination with humanitarian organizations, particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Because of the unique nature of this operation, some of the IFOR C2 relationships required special arrangements. For example, a special agreement was established between the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and the Russian Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev, for the employment of Russian forces in IFOR. Coordination that began in October 1995 between SACEUR and General Grachev produced an agreed option for the employment of Russian forces in IFOR, whereby SACEUR has overall control of the Russian brigade through the Deputy Commander for Russian forces, Colonel General Shevtsov. COMARRC exercised TACON of the brigade through the Commander MND(N), in whose area the brigade operates. OPCON remained with the Russian chain of command, with MG Nash having tactical control over the forces. Figure 3-4 depicts the current command arrangement between the SACEUR and Russian forces assigned to MND(N). As with the other politically dominated C2 structures, this one would be problematic under stress, particularly if new missions were required. Operationally, U.S. and Russian forces had to go through an interpretive process to get orders from the MND(N) to the Russian brigade and the same coming back to MND(N). The arrangements did, however, initiate military cooperation between Russian and NATO forces.
The integration of 14 PfP nations and 4 other non-NATO nations under NATO C2 has been a major success due to experience from the PfP Program and innovative C2 arrangements at several levels (see figure 3-5). For example, national offices were brought into multinational HQs and senior national officers were "dual hatted" as deputy commanders as practiced in the Nordic-Polish brigade. At the political level, non-NATO nations have been acquainted with NATO's consultation process in NAC(+), expanding NATO process, and the Senior Political Committee (Reinforced) meetings. The Ad Hoc Planning and Coordination Group at NATO HQ has facilitated military planning and coordination, especially during force planning.
IFOR established a Joint Military Commission (JMC) as the central body for commanders of military factions to coordinate and resolve problems. Two or more FWF military representatives (usually commanders) attended meetings under IFOR supervision to coordinate joint activities, disseminate intent and instructions, and resolve differences. COMIFOR delegated routine JMC chairmanship to COMARRC who issued instructions to ensure the parties' compliance with the military aspects of the GFAP. Below the COMARRC level, the MNDs, their subordinate brigades, and battalions established subordinate military commissions. At these lower levels, the JMC activities included disseminating policy, issuing instructions to factions on policies and procedures, coordinating GFAP-required actions, resolving military complaints or questions, coordinating civil-military actions where appropriate, and developing confidence-building measures between the parties.
The command arrangements at the outset of IFOR operations for the Public Information Office (PIO), PSYOPS and CIMIC operations, and some aspects of the Intelligence operations (e.g., counter intelligence) also required innovative adjustments to effectively integrate them into the overall IFOR command structure and operation. OPLAN 40105 called for PIO and coalition press and information centers with each of the major IFOR headquarters. In Sarajevo, IFOR and the ARRC decided to share a single press center located in the Holiday Inn, but this caused confusion in the chain of command—dual command relationship and sometimes conflicting guidance. At the multinational divisions, the commanders preferred to bring their own national PI assets to run the PI program and this too introduced some confusion into the IFOR PI operation—conflicting IFOR and national doctrine, procedures, and guidance on the nature and amount of information to be released to the media.
The CIMIC and PSYOPS operations also suffered command and control problems. The activities of the units deployed to the multinational divisions were managed and controlled from the headquarters operations in Sarajevo, which caused operational problems for the local tactical commanders to which the units were attached. Finally, it was important that the activities of the PIO, CIMIC, and PSYOPS be carefully coordinated, while at the same time preserving the objectivity of the PI and CIMIC activities. A number of different coordinating mechanisms were used by IFOR, the ARRC, and the MNDs to accomplish this both internally and externally.
The ARRC's basic structure of MNDs, brigades, battalions, and corps troops has proved effective for the integration of national forces into multinational formations. While these structures are basic in the UK and U.S. framework divisions, the French Division (MND(SE)) normally operates with regiments. In recognition of its integration requirements, the French re-organized into brigades and battalions to facilitate the incorporation of battalions and brigades from other nations. To date this has been effective.
The U.S. SOF established a Special Forces operating base in San Vito, Italy, and a forward operating base in Sarajevo under IFOR. Liaison control elements were assigned to coalition and NATO units to integrate intelligence, operations, communications, close air support, and medical evacuation. SOF also helped survey and monitor the zone of separation, supported civil-military activities, and provided liaisons with the FWF. Commander, Special Operations Command Europe (also Commander, Special Operations Forces, IFOR) assumed OPCON of all SOF elements in support of Operation Joint Endeavor except for SOF afloat, PSYOP, and CA forces. U.S. PSYOP forces remained under USEUCOM command and control and CA forces under USAREUR command. As noted earlier, the command relationships of the U.S. PSYOP and CA forces were not clearly defined at the outset of the operation and this caused problems for the deployed forces. There was a Combined Joint Special Forces Operations Task Force located in Sarajevo which the U.S., UK, and France SOF elements supported. The United Kingdom and France also had their own national SOF units supporting MND(SW) and MND(SE) respectively.
The maritime and air operations were run through COMNAVSOUTH, COMSTRIKFORSOUTH, and COMAIRSOUTH (see figures 3-6 and 3-7). Maritime forces operating in the Adriatic are subject to political constraints that were in conflict with the principle of unity of command. The peacetime command structure of AFSOUTH with two maritime PSCs provides flexibility in accomplishing a wide range of maritime tasks in a large maritime region. However, under IFOR conditions and limited to the Adriatic only, it was assessed by AFSOUTH that current maritime tasks could be accomplished by a single NATO Task Force/NATO Expanded Task Force in accordance with NATO's concept of Multinational Maritime Forces (MNMFs). Despite the limited degree of integration, however, effective coordination between the parties involved as provided unity of effort in this low-threat maritime environment and has supported IFOR operations well. Naval forces currently operating in the Adriatic under NATO and national OPCON have achieved interoperability through common NATO tactical and procedural standards.
Command of air operations has been achieved by designating the IFOR Air Component Commander as the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). A single layer C2 structure was established at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vicenza, and was responsible for the entire air effort, simplifying the C2 for air operations. The air tasking process draws together all the different tasking requirements and unifies them in a single order, the Air Tasking Message. The IFOR Air Component Commander and JFACC, with comprehensive authority from COMIFOR, exercises command, control, and coordination authority for airspace, air operations, and air forces operating throughout the Air Tactical Area of Operations.
An IFOR Commander for Support (C-SPT) was established in Zagreb, Croatia. His responsibilities included coordinating the sustainment, movements, medical, engineering, and contracting operations of the national logistic elements; and commanding selected IFOR units in support of the deployment, execution of peace implementation, and redeployment of IFOR. C-SPT was also designated as the single point of contact for all IFOR matters pertaining to relations with the Croatian government. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) established a field office in Split, Croatia. They were responsible for all NATO common-funded contracting and contracting for all scarce resources in theater. They provided liaisons with C-SPT and the framework division headquarters. NAMSA headquarters in Luxembourg held all contracts for the theater. The ARRC COSCOM commander was designated the COMMZ Forward Commander and was located in Split, Croatia, as well. He was responsible for reporting movement into theater to C-SPT. Finally, three National Support Elements were established to support the framework nations' movement activities: the United States in Kaposvar, Hungary, the British in Split, Croatia, and the French in Ploce, Croatia.
All troop-contributing nations used the national logistics stove-pipes to support their forces in Bosnia. The lead nations, also known as framework divisions, were assigned the responsibility for coordinating support for the various multinational brigades and battalions assigned to work in their sector. C-SPT was also assigned the responsibility to serve as CINCIFOR's logistics commander. C-SPT set up the roles of the Engineer Coordination Center (ENGCC), the Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC), the Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC), the Medical Coordination Center (MEDCC), and the Theater Contracting Coordination Center (KCC). C-SPT is a positive way in which to address multinational logistics.
There are some lessons to be learned from the deployment to Bosnia from a command and control structure viewpoint:
| Bosnia Index | Foreword | Acknowledgments | Preface | I. Introduction | II. Bosnia—Setting the Stage | III. Command and Control Structure | IV. Intelligence Operations | V. Civil-Military Cooperation | VI. The International Police Task Force | VII. Information Activities | VIII. Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle | IX. Counterintelligence and HUMINT | X. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Soldier's Perspective | XI. C4ISR Systems and Services | XII. NDU/CCRP Bosnia Study | XIII. Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned | XIV. Summary | End Notes | Appendix A: The Dayton Peace Agreement Summary | Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events | Appendix C: References | Appendix D: Acronyms | About the Contributing Editor | About the Authors