The approach adopted under the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) differed fundamentally from UNPROFOR. The mandate for UNPROFOR was largely humanitarian, facilitating delivery of relief supplies and shielding Moslem enclaves in territories occupied by Serb forces. In discharging their numerous mandates, UNPROFOR commanders had to consult political authorities in both NATO and the UN before force could be used. This unwieldy "dual key" command and control arrangement rendered UNPROFOR powerless to respond to tactical developments. The Contact Group countries (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia), especially the United States, insisted that IFOR would not suffer these debilitating vulnerabilities. To discharge its responsibilities under annex 1A of the DPA (i.e., to ensure the separation of forces, their confinement to cantons, and downsizing), therefore, IFOR would be endowed with a single chain of command (NATO), executive powers, robust rules of engagement, and overwhelming force.
UNSCR 1035 articulates the mandate for both IFOR and the IPTF (21 Dec 1995). As was the case with IFOR, however, the raison d'ˆtre for the IPTF originates in the DPA. Annex 11 of Dayton explicitly states that responsibility for maintaining a "safe and secure environment for all persons" rests with the signatories themselves;26 however, to assist in discharging their public security obligations, the parties requested that the IPTF be created and that it perform the following functions:
The IPTF was not armed and was not empowered to enforce local laws. Since its purpose was to help already established law enforcement agencies maintain public order and assist them in adopting methods of policing consistent with international standards, the IPTF could only function effectively with the consent of the parties. In the absence of such collaboration, the IPTF possessed neither the mandate nor the resources to preserve public order independently. The dilemmas this would generate for IPTF officials do not appear to have been anticipated or well understood by drafters of this annex. The IPTF's first Deputy Commissioner, Robert Wasserman, offers the following insights into this situation:
- It appears the framers of Dayton perceived that the IPTF would somehow simply monitor local police to see they didn't get out of hand and then advise willing parties on how to professionalize the police with modern practices. There was no thought given to the fact that the ethnic rivalries meant there was no functioning police to protect minorities after Dayton. And Annex 11 used the term 'internationally accepted standards of policing,' which are non-existent. There are internationally accepted human rights standards, but policing reform required something far more descriptive.27
In circumstances where implementation of Dayton ran counter to interests of one of the parties (e.g., the transfer of Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo to the Federation or the resettlement of Moslems to strategic locations in the ZOS), local police either withdrew or became active protagonists. In such instances, IFOR was compelled to become involved. While IFOR could provide "area security" or reinforced patrolling to deter lawlessness, its forces were not trained or equipped for riot control or law enforcement tasks. Nor was it considered prudent to engage in activity that smacked of policing. Thus, when the police force of one of the parties refused to cooperate with the IPTF-because doing so would have damaged their vital interests-an "enforcement gap" arose. There were no effective sanctions available to the IPTF to punish noncompliance, and this gap was never satisfactorily bridged during the life of the IFOR mission.
By establishing IFOR under NATO auspices, the "dual key" problem suffered by UNPROFOR was resolved for purposes of implementing the military provisions of Dayton, but the consequence was to fragment implementation of civilian aspects. The two international actors concerned with maintaining a safe and secure environment, IFOR and the IPTF, were divided from each other organizationally with the IPTF falling under the UNMIBH. Yet a fourth actor, the OHR, was delegated a coordinating role by the GFAP, but without authority over either organization. The IPTF commissioner was simply directed to consult with the HR. Responsibility for organizing the pivotal national elections, moreover, was assigned to the OSCE, which itself regularly spoke with contradictory voices.28 In addition, the UNHCR, the World Bank, numerous other international organizations, and several hundred NGOs had vital independent contributions to make to various aspects of the peace-building process.
During the first crucial months, the HR made no effort to promote coordination among the various civilian entities by convening regular meetings of the "principals" or heads of the other key international organizations operating in Bosnia. Only after the mission was well underway was the HR ultimately prodded into conducting weekly "Principal Meetings" to bring a measure of coherence to the peace operation.29 Obtaining strategic unity of effort out of this fragmented structure, therefore, could only be achieved through considerable exertion and continuous attention. At the operational level, the national and municipal elections compelled the key institutional actors (IFOR/SFOR, OSCE, IPTF, OHR) to establish a Joint Elections Operations Center for more timely exchange of information and coordination of responses.
In the wake of SCR 1026 (30 November 1995), a UN assessment team visited Bosnia in December 1995 to establish the requirements for this anticipated Civ-Pol mission. The principal factor used to determine the number of IPTF personnel was the combined strength of the Bosnian police forces. As the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 13 December 1995, the total was 44,750 (32,750 in the Federation and 12,000 in the Serb Republic).30 Using a ratio of one monitor for every 30 local policemen, the IPTF was authorized 1,721 monitors.31
On December 24, 1995, the UN Secretary General issued a note verbale inviting UN member states to contribute to the newly established monitoring mission. Over 40 countries responded, and the first contingent of monitors began to deploy a month later. The original plan called for the IPTF to establish more than 100 field offices. When the UN deployed, it initially established a headquarters in Sarajevo; regional headquarters in Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Sarajevo; 14 district offices; and 54 field stations. The IPTF did not approach full strength until August 1996.
The only skills required to qualify for the IPTF were fluency in English, the ability to drive, and 8 years of experience in policing (as policing was defined in the donor country). During the initial stages of deployment, it was not uncommon for IPTF members to fall short of even these minimal standards. Of the three requirements, the most vital was competence in English. Without the ability to communicate, personnel were incapable of making any contribution to the mission. Another serious constraint was lack of credibility for those monitors who were not proficient as police officers. Local Bosnian police cadres tended to regard themselves as technically superior to IPTF personnel, particularly those from developing states. In addition, the long-range objective was to reorient Bosnia's various police agencies to function in accordance with principles of democratic policing. Police monitors from autocratic regimes could not be expected to grasp the nuances of democratic policing themselves, let alone imbue these ideals in their Bosnian counterparts.
The need to conduct screening in the donor country before deployment to Bosnia became apparent at an early stage, and an effort was made as early as March 1996 to do this in a few donor nations. Prior to recruiting the second rotation for duty after December 1996 (a normal tour in Bosnia being 1 year), the UN began routinely examining volunteers in source countries before deployment. To improve the English competence of incoming personnel, the IPTF Training Unit developed an English aptitude test (speaking, reading, and writing). To avoid compromise of the exam, the IPTF insisted that a member of their training staff accompany the teams administering the qualifying exams. This has significantly enhanced the quality of incoming IPTF personnel. The quality of the force was also greatly enhanced during recruitment of the second rotation by specifying to donors the spectrum of seniority and skills required to staff the organization (e.g., supervisors, forensics specialists, trainer/mentor, etc.). Once the UN demonstrated it was serious about getting qualified people, most countries responded positively and began producing personnel with appropriate capabilities.
Prior to deployment in the field, newly assigned police monitors underwent a 1-week screening and orientation course at the IPTF training facility outside Zagreb, Croatia. Personnel were tested for English language skills and driving ability. The primary function was to provide specific information and training required for the mission in Bosnia. Among the topics covered were the mandate, IPTF reporting forms, computer literacy, attributes of the mission area, mine awareness, and an orientation to IFOR/SFOR.
When UNPROFOR transferred authority for the Bosnia operation to IFOR in December 1995, it also transferred the existing UN logistical and communication infrastructure to the NATO-led operation. NATO contingents already deployed in Bosnia and the more combat-capable non-NATO units also came under IFOR command. This made it possible for IFOR to begin operations immediately and to reach its full complement of over 60,000 troops expeditiously. No consideration was given to the needs of the IPTF, however, even though it was to be a UN-supported activity just like UNPROFOR had been.
The consequence of this for the IPTF was that it had to build its entire operation essentially from the ground up. Although UNPROFOR had included a Civ-Pol mission, the Dayton accord left them in limbo. The UNSCR authorizing the formation of the IPTF, and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIH) to manage it, was approved in late December 1995. Organizers then had to confront the ponderous task of procuring essential resources via the UN's logistic support system and recruiting some 1,700 qualified police monitors from around the world. Even the United States was delayed in fielding its contingent. The result was a considerable lag in bringing the IPTF up to operational status, and a serious gap in readiness when the Sarajevo suburbs were transferred to Moslem authority in February-March 1996.32
Since the IPTF was under UNMIBH auspices-as opposed to being part of an integrated mission with combined military and Civ-Pol components-logistical limitations became a chronic operational concern. In addition to the UN's inherent bureaucratic lethargy, the IPTF faced an uphill battle for resources because of its unfortunate parentage. Many in the United States had heaped condemnation on the UN for the demise of UNPROFOR. Yet when it came to finding a sponsor to sustain this creature of the U.S.-brokered Dayton Accord, the UN was the most attractive alternative. It took time for the IPTF to recover from the animus that had developed between the United States and the UN. While improvements were made with the passage of time, shortcomings in transportation, communications, and interpreters continued to plague the mission well into the SFOR phase.
Chronic deficiencies in UNMIBH logistics support were enumerated in a 10-page memorandum to the IPTF Commissioner from his Deputy Chief Logistician in late July 1996. The impact on operations was summarized as follows:
- Based upon the IPTF subordinate relationship to the UNMIBH, the IPTF has no organic assets. All logistical support is to be provided by UNMIBH. The general level of support by UNMIBH has been inadequate. As of 29 July, the required communications, vehicles, reasonable fuel supply, EDP [Electronic Data Processing], and medical support has [sic] not been completed...The current IPTF logistical status to support the mandate is unacceptable, and unless rectified prior to 15 August 1996, may cause the IPTF to fail in all or part of the critical mission requirements.33
Shortages of mission-essential items such as communications equipment, vehicles, and medical care plagued the IPTF from the earliest days of its deployment.34 Many items that were ultimately transferred to the IPTF from UNPROFOR stocks (e.g., vehicles and office furniture) routinely arrived in damaged or unserviceable condition and had often been stripped of associated items such as jacks or tool kits.35 The problem was exacerbated by the Chief Administrative Officer of UNMIBH, who refused to process IPTF requests for support prior to the arrival of each influx of personnel. Since deployments extended over a 6-month period (March-August), a persistent delay was built into the process of achieving operational status.36 Summarizing the situation, a senior IPTF logistician asserted that, "During formal and informal discussions with IPTF Monitors, from the IPTF Stations, Districts, and Regions, almost without exception all have indicated that UNMIBH logistical support has been unresponsive, or totally inadequate."37
Aggregate data compiled by the IPTF headquarters staff substantiate these impressions. Communications equipment was chronically in short supply, with deficiencies of 25 percent for hand-held radios, 29 percent for vehicle radios, and 65 percent for satellite links (at the end of July 1996).38 Transportation was another major limitation. The IPTF had been issued 516 vehicles as of 30 July, yet only 454 were operational. This constituted a 21 percent shortfall from the 574 required to carry out mandated responsibilities.39 UNMIBH made no provision to replace total losses in spite of regular attrition, a problem that was accentuated by the recurring failure of donor countries to ensure all their monitors could drive.40 Even simple items, such as snow tires and chains, began to loom large in late September after the UNMIBH Administrative Officer refused repeated IPTF requisition requests. This was in spite of the fact that 75 percent of IPTF vehicles had bald tires, and November was one of the snowiest months in Bosnia.41 This had serious operational implications since the municipal elections were slated at the time for 22 November, and this electoral process was likely to be contentious, involving efforts by tens of thousands of prospective voters to cross the IEBL.
It was perhaps inevitable that the IPTF would turn to IFOR to ameliorate certain shortcomings in mission support. As the operation was being established, the IPTF sought assistance with medical care, fuel, maps, security for its vehicle maintenance facility, and access for its personnel to military stores (e.g., PXs). With the exception of maps (which were readily available) and PXs (which were not), the support that IFOR sought was decentralized and available only by negotiating directly with one or more of IFOR's contributing countries.42
This scattershot approach proved to be particularly inappropriate for purposes of medical care. The UN's medical staff assumed that IPTF personnel would be able to "depend on the medical support system provided by IFOR medical facilities."43 Consequently, in January 1996, they directed UNPROFOR's Medical Coordination Center (MEDCOC) in Zagreb to make the necessary arrangements before it had to terminate operations on 1 April 1996.44 IFOR did agree to provide emergency medical evacuation. For other medical support, MEDCOC was directed to approach each national contingent possessing medical units to make arrangements. Given that the willingness and capacity of these national contingents to take on such additional burdens varied widely, this did not result in reliable and comprehensive medical coverage. As late as 30 July 1996, UNMIBH had not made any formal arrangements for medical support other than emergency evacuation. Even though nations such as Norway allowed IPTF personnel to use their medical services on an informal, space available basis, this still left many gaps. In the view of a senior IPTF official, this situation "jeopardizes the IPTF operationally, and more seriously, from a personal safety aspect."45
IFOR also provided other forms of support to the IPTF, including co-location of radio transmitters (for security) and fuel on a cash reimbursable basis. In the latter case, however, British forces later refused to refuel IPTF vehicles because UNMIBH had failed to provide reimbursement. In mid-July, IFOR agreed to formalize a "Logistics Support Package" involving co-location of communications antennas and diesel fuel storage sites, and, in emergency cases only, to provide fuel, medical care, water, rations, shower facilities, and maps.46 This alleviated the most extreme potential implications of the IPTF's logistical shortcomings, but the chronic problems remained well into the SFOR phase of operations.
As the IPTF entered its second year, logistic support had improved considerably. Arrangements with SFOR were in place, UNMIBH itself became more responsive, and logistics pipelines began operating predictably with the simple passage of time. Nevertheless, its operational capacity continued to be impeded, in particular by inadequate transportation. The IPTF's aging vehicle fleet required excessive maintenance and had never been large enough to accommodate fully its multiple tasks in the first place.
The Dayton Peace Accord established the authority and purpose for both the IPTF (annex 11) and IFOR (annex 1A). The only reference to duration pertains to IFOR, stating that the parties "...welcome the willingness of the international community to send to the region, for a period of approximately 1 year, a force to assist in the implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement as described herein."47 Although annex 1A had largely been fulfilled after a year, the most crucial civilian aspects of the DPA (e.g., refugee returns, municipal elections, status of Brcko, war criminals) remained outstanding. Accordingly, a subsequent military force, SFOR, was authorized by NATO and the United Nations. SFOR's expected duration was 18 months, until June 1998. The IPTF mandate was also extended, but only for a year, until December 1997.
Owing to the crucial role performed by Amb. Richard Holbrooke in forging the Dayton agreement, the State Department was the lead agency for orchestrating the U.S. role in implementation. No pol-mil plan was developed to guide this effort.
During the IFOR phase of the operation, the IPTF focused on monitoring local police and judicial authorities for compliance with internationally accepted standards in their daily operations and treatment of minorities, and on facilitating the September 1996 national elections. During the SFOR phase greater attention was given to training and restructuring local police forces so their future conduct would conform to norms of democratic policing (See Guiding Philosophy of the IPTF Mission, below).
The first real test for the IPTF came when neighborhoods surrounding Sarajevo were transferred from the Serbs to the Federation in early 1996. The Dayton Agreement directed that control of certain high ground and buffer zones around Sarajevo that had been fiercely contested during the war be transferred to the Federation so the city would not be as vulnerable to Serb artillery fire in the future. These suburbs were populated by over 100,000 ethnic Serbs. Many were not permanent residents but had themselves been displaced from other locations in Sarajevo by the fighting. The transfer of these seven municipalities (Vogosca, Centar, Novi Grad, Ilijas, Hadzici, Ilidza, and Grbavica) was scheduled to take place simultaneously on 4 February 1996, 45 days after implementation of the DPA had begun.
As the date approached, the IPTF was not yet functional. None of the senior leadership had yet arrived, fewer than 400 monitors were on hand, and very few field stations had yet been opened. Other crucial deficiencies were described by two IFOR public safety specialists assigned to assist the IPTF during this early period:
- In addition to manpower difficulties and almost no command and control structure, IPTF faced other critical deficiencies. Habitable office space was at a premium. Also scarce were phone links, for example, between IPTF headquarters and IFOR, the support base in Zagreb, and field stations. In addition, radios, base stations, vehicles, and petroleum products were in short supply.48
In addition to the unpreparedness of the IPTF, the OHR had not done any detailed planning for the transition. Consequently, on 4 February the High Representative and the IFOR commander announced that the transfer would be delayed. The concept would also be changed to a phased process occurring over a 6-week period ending in mid-March. This adjustment provided an opportunity for the IPTF to become partially operational and for IFOR to render crucial assistance with planning, logistics, and communications. Serb authorities in Pale took advantage of the delay, however, to prepare for a sweeping evacuation of the suburbs and to more thoroughly ransack fixed property so that incoming Federation citizens would inherit little more than a wasteland.
In mid-February, as the OHR, IPTF, and IFOR began to conduct the first transfer, Serb authorities implemented their own plan to relocate ethnic Serbs into the Serb Republic. They employed local Serb police and marshaled recently demobilized military vehicles and the VRS logistical infrastructure to facilitate movement of inhabitants and their belongings. From late January through mid-March 1996 some 100,000 Serbs fled Sarajevo for RS territory. At least some of the dwellings being evacuated belonged to their Serb occupants, who were clearly entitled to the electrical wiring, plumbing fixtures, and window frames they carted off. In the absence of an authoritative mechanism to establish ownership, the international presence was powerless to prevent homes and apartments from being gutted. In addition, various buildings and industrial facilities were either set ablaze or booby-trapped. This turmoil created an impression of lawlessness, especially when these images were captured, and to a certain extent magnified, by international news coverage.
The transfer of Sarajevo suburbs was a defining moment for the entire peace mission. Although the limited assets available to the IPTF were skillfully employed, the organization would clearly have been much better equipped to handle the exigencies of this crucial event if it had been fully operational. Indeed, experience made a significant difference, as each successive transfer was handled more smoothly than the previous ones, even though planners had specifically reserved the more troublesome locations until the end. In general, the IPTF was more successful at managing the behavior of local uniformed police forces than they were at controlling the conduct of vandals and provocateurs from both sides of the ethnic divide.
An evaluation of whether the peace mission met this defining moment successfully depends on the yardstick used. If measured against the number of persons killed (one) in this volatile operation, then the transfer must be considered a remarkable accomplishment. Much more was at stake, however, as this event set the tone for the entire operation. If Dayton was to work, Serbs and Moslems had to have confidence that they could live together in relative safety. The message derived from this experience was that even under the cognizance and apparent protection of international military and police forces, it was not safe for Serbs to remain in Moslem neighborhoods. The international community could not dissuade the Serbs from fleeing en masse. Nor could they prevent significant destruction of property and intimidation aimed at compelling others to flee when they otherwise might have remained. This event also revealed a serious enforcement gap that would persist throughout the operation. IFOR would not engage in law enforcement and the disruptions did not constitute an imminent threat to life, and, therefore, did not trigger an IFOR response. The IPTF, on the other hand, had neither the authority nor the resources to act.
As each suburb was transferred, Federation authorities (Muslims and Croats) took political and administrative control. This was an accomplishment for the Dayton Accords. Since IFOR had just established its presence in Bosnia, however, all parties were anxious to gauge what this would signify. While the outcome could clearly have been much worse, it was not reassuring either, and IFOR would not have another window of opportunity to create a stronger impression on the Bosnian Serb leadership.
Annex 11 of DPA describes functions that the IPTF is to perform, which essentially amount to monitoring, restructuring, and mentoring the law enforcement and judicial apparatus in Bosnia.49 Although the parties theoretically requested such assistance, the Serb Republic did not participate in negotiating the Dayton Accords and did not freely consent to such intrusions. Thus, from the very start, the relationship between the IPTF and police forces of the Federation was generally more constructive than it was with the RS.
As of August 1997, the RS had persistently refused to submit to IPTF restructuring, and when not subject to IPTF monitoring, RS police continued to engage in conduct contrary to the DPA. Thus, the relationship with the RS was not one of collaboration, and at times, it became somewhat confrontational (e.g., when the IPTF encountered RS roadblocks, erected in violation of the principle of freedom of movement). In contrast, within most of the Federation IPTF monitors were normally able to establish a professional working relationship, and they served as a catalyst for combining Bosniac and Bosnian Croat police forces into amalgamated entities at the municipal, cantonal, and Federation level.
In performing its monitoring function, the IPTF suffered from an enforcement gap that plagued the entire peace operation. Abuse of ethnic minorities by police officers continued to take place in all three ethnic communities. Certain municipal police chiefs, moreover, were notoriously corrupt and enmeshed in networks of illicit activity along with their political mentors.50 When circumstances allowed, the IPTF could call upon IFOR/SFOR to back them up to compel compliance with the DPA. This was a suitable mechanism for dealing with ongoing activities such as roadblocks, weapons caches, or illegal detention of ethnic minorities. After the fact, however, the IPTF was reduced to conducting investigations and imploring appropriate authorities to act in accordance with their own laws.51 As the authors of a study of Bosnian jurisprudence have concluded, these entreaties have tended to have only superficial effect:
- IPTF monitors often become aware of human rights abuses or other misconduct by police officers of the Entities. Reports of these activities are usually generated and passed up the chain of command...Generally, in the Entities, such conduct is condoned or overlooked and the officer is transferred, not dismissed.52
It remains to be seen whether efforts to restructure and reform the police will have a profound and lasting impact on police accountability and on their treatment of minorities.53
The initial challenge for the IPTF, in this regard, was to establish the actual size of police establishments in the Bosnian Federation and the Republic of Srpska (RS). These units had burgeoned during the war, and the distinction between the police and army (already blurry in the Yugoslav police state) was further clouded by use of certain police elements as paramilitary forces. Indeed, the origins of the Moslem army were in its police force. As a result of wartime expansion, both the Federation and the RS had a ratio of one policeman for every 60-100 citizens, as opposed to the European standard of 1:380. After establishing their size, the next task was to obtain an agreement from the two entities about the extent to which their mutual police forces would be reduced.
The agreement on restructuring Federation police forces is contained in the Petersberg Declaration on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed on 25 April 1996 in Bonn. This agreement obligated the Federation to reduce their police establishments to 11,500. Even though this left a ratio of one policeman for every 200 inhabitants (almost double the European standard), it nevertheless reduced their constabulary to a third of its previous size. This was agreeable because government expenses could be reduced, it would bring the parties a step closer to conformity with the European model of community policing, and would afford their public security forces access to international assistance. The RS refused to submit to a restructuring program for its police forces until September 1997 when the Plavsic-Karadzic schism made it possible to begin a partial effort.
The IPTF was a central player in the Federation's "downsizing" program.54 They helped craft a 40-question, multiple choice exam designed to test comprehension of the new Bosnian Constitution, the new Code of Conduct, and the role of policing in a democratic society. In addition, each aspirant had to take a written psychological test to identify those requiring further evaluation. The latter was conducted by an IFOR psychologist seconded to the IPTF for this purpose. The multiple choice exam was printed by IFOR (to avoid compromising the exam) and administered by IPTF members, with assistance from members of the Ministry of Interior.
Screening was conducted by canton, with the first exams administered in August 1996. Instead of allowing all serving police officers to compete for positions in the reduced force, Federation authorities sent for testing only the number of applicants needed to fill the billets available. Thus instead of "vetting," which implies a process whereby those guilty of incompetence, corruption, or abuse (to include war crimes) are expunged, the process served to "downsize" these forces.55 Out of the first batch of 1,350 taking the exam, only 29 failed the multiple choice portion, and only 10 were identified for further psychiatric evaluation (only 1 was ultimately found to be mentally imbalanced). After the exams were administered in the first several cantons, the entire process was suspended because the multiple choice test had been compromised.
The restructuring process regained momentum with the arrival of the second IPTF contingent in late 1996 and the designation of a Deputy IPTF Commissioner for Restructuring. Building on the testing that had already been completed, the IPTF set about to certify that all personnel allowed to remain in the Federation's police forces met the following requirements:
In late 1996 the IPTF recognized that the focus of its mission needed to evolve, with more emphasis given to training and the restructuring process and less to monitoring. Accordingly, they created a second Deputy Commissioner's position with specific responsibility for restructuring. In recruiting the second contingent of monitors, moreover, the IPTF sought personnel with skills relevant to the task of restructuring.
To train police officials at all levels in the Federation in the principles of democratic policing and human rights, the IPTF collaborated with bilateral programs from the United States (i.e., ICITAP), Germany, and Austria. This entailed leadership training seminars in these countries to familiarize Federation police officials with law enforcement principles such as community policing and to expose them to investigative and enforcement techniques for dealing with transnational challenges such as drug trafficking, organized crime, and smuggling. In addition, the United States and other interested countries collaborated with the United Nations to provide basic police equipment.
Until September 1997 the RS had only received training that served the broader purposes of the peace mission, such as election security and VIP protection. Other programs were confined to the Federation until Biljana Plavsic agreed to permit restructuring to begin among those RS police units that were loyal to her (about a quarter of the force).
The certification process for all Bosniac personnel in the Sarajevo Canton was completed in February 1997, and all 10 cantons comprising the Federation, along with the 1,000-member police force of the Federation itself, were scheduled to be completed by September 1997. Initially only Bosniac personnel could be certified because there were no Croat volunteers. As of August 1997, however, this barrier had been overcome in three cantons (Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Mostar), and joint Moslem-Croat police forces had been formed in almost all the municipalities of these three cantons. An Embassy assessment noted as of 5 August that "Since the integration of police in Sarajevo and Gorazde Cantons and in Mostar, we note that there have been few problems among the police themselves, and joint patrols are becoming the norm."56 All 11,500 Federation police officers were slated to complete the 4 weeks of induction training by August 1998.57 Assuming this process continues to progress as planned, the IPTF anticipates there could be a viable, integrated Federation police force in a couple of years.
To monitor the 14 September 1996 national elections effectively while preserving the capacity to respond to potential disturbances, the IPTF developed a plan calling for a more flexible posture. Only 600 of its roughly 1,700 personnel were left to man static positions (i.e., at IPTF headquarters, the 3 Regional and 14 District headquarters, and 51 stations). This allowed for the creation of 400 2-person Mobile Patrol Teams (providing coverage of 19 voter routes and 4,000 polling places), with a reserve comprised of a dozen strategically located "Hot-Spot" teams, each having 25 personnel.58 The IPTF collaborated with IFOR to identify the most likely trouble spots and then established coordinated patrolling patterns for these areas. A number of OSCE officials were also incorporated into IPTF patrols on 14 September.
The IPTF gave particular attention to IEBL-crossing points along voter routes. Their function was to monitor local police as they searched vehicles and occupants for weapons and contraband. During this electoral period, only wanted criminals could be detained by indigenous police forces. After the search was completed, drivers were given a certificate, signed by both the local police and IPTF, that exempted them from further searches that day. Prior to the elections, IFOR assigned communications personnel to IPTF headquarters, and on election day, senior IPTF officials were incorporated into IFOR's command post. The intent was to ensure connectivity with IFOR should IPTF patrols encounter a hostile situation requiring a response.59
In contrast to the controversy swirling around other aspects of the elections (e.g., intimidation of opposition candidates and restrictions on their access to the media, manipulation of the voter registry for municipal elections by the RS, and suspiciously high turnout of Moslem voters), the actual conduct of the elections on 14 September was remarkably placid. Several factors contributed to the absence of serious disruptions, but the sine qua non was the cooperation of governing elites in all three entities. Postponement of the municipal elections removed contention from the process, because elections were then reduced largely to a contest over who would govern within each of the ethnic communities. In all three cases, nationalist leaders, exploiting the advantage of incumbency to the fullest, expected to be victorious. Thus, elections conferred a mantle of legitimacy on them that was useful for furthering their aims. This prospect motivated interior ministers from each of the entities to instruct local police to cooperate, which they did. As one experienced observer noted: "The IEBL crossing plan developed by the interior ministers is an excellent example of strategic instructions issued to local police for the accomplishment of a sensitive mission and the local police executing the instructions in a calm and competent manner."60 Without this, even the most detailed planning and harmonious cooperation by the international community would have served merely to limit damage caused by inevitable confrontations and protests.
Nevertheless, the tranquil atmosphere on election day was enhanced by the extensive planning and coordination undertaken by the IPTF and its counterparts, especially IFOR and the OSCE. The IPTF's advanced preparations were touted by a veteran U.S. military peacekeeper, as follows:
The IPTF has a superb plan to assist the local police as it prepared for the 14 September elections. The IPTF prepared a comprehensive duties and responsibilities handbook for the local police as well as established a national election planning cell to facilitate planning and coordination in support of the elections.61
It was also vitally important that members of the international community with electoral responsibilities (i.e., the OSCE, IFOR, and the IPTF) had made extensive efforts to coordinate their actions. IFOR, in particular, provided crucial support in the form of Civil Affairs planning specialists for the OSCE and the IPTF, as well as logistic support for distribution and post-election collection of ballots.
Perhaps the most enduring contribution the IPTF mission made to the conduct of future Civ-Pol operations was the articulation and operationalization of the concept of "democratic policing." A step beyond the "community policing" approach adopted in Haiti, this model explicitly links reform of the police with transformation of the political process. The essence of this innovative approach to policing is captured in the IPTF "Commissioner's Guidance Notes for the Implementation of Democratic Policing Standards":
- For Bosnia-Herzegovina, the police must realign their missions from the protection of the state to the protection of citizen's rights. Service to the public must become the police's calling...A democratic police force is not concerned with people's beliefs or associates, their movements or conformity to state ideology...Instead, the police force of a democracy is concerned strictly with the preservation of safe communities and the application of criminal law equally to all people, without fear or favor.62
The "democratic transition of the Federation" thus became more than a by-product of IPTF activities.63 In the words of Commissioner Paul FitzGerald, "It is a mandate."64 To execute this mandate, the Commissioner directed that action be taken in three essential areas:
While the detailed articulation of this concept in a 40-page document was a major advance, devising an effective scheme for implementation was an even more vital and challenging matter. As of the publication of this work, this remains a work in progress, but demonstrable progress has been made within the Federation.
International responsibility for security matters is divided, in the Dayton Peace Accords, between the IPTF and IFOR. Annex 11 relegates the tasks of monitoring, inspecting, training, and assisting Bosnia's law enforcement and judicial systems to the IPTF. Military aspects of DPA are treated separately in annex 1A.
Within the confines of their respective mandates, both IFOR/SFOR and the IPTF performed well. When called upon to support implementation of "civilian" aspects of Dayton, however, acute difficulties periodically arose. Some of the key provisions of Dayton (e.g., freedom of movement, refugee return, apprehension of war criminals, municipal governance, and the status of Brcko) regularly revealed an "enforcement gap" that remained largely unresolved well into the second year of the peace mission.
Military assistance, principally in the form of Civil Affairs police specialists, was invaluable in establishing an operational capability for the IPTF and reducing the initial deployment gap. Their role was especially crucial in planning for the pivotal transfer to Moslem control of half a dozen Sarajevo suburbs and in marshaling the IPTF's limited resources to address each successive transfer. Once the IPTF had become fully operational, Civil Affairs personnel provided liaison between the two organizations, ensuring that operational information was exchanged between the two entities on a daily basis. IFOR also provided certain forms of logistic assistance (See Logistic Support, above).
Given that the IPTF mandate had only been approved by the UN in late December 1995, and the transfer of Sarajevo suburbs took place scarcely 3 months later, the capacity of the mission to meet this critical initial challenge hinged on getting the IPTF functioning in a timely manner. Indeed, according to the Dayton Accords, the original transfer date was to be late February, at which point none of the senior IPTF leaders was even on station. To help the IPTF begin functioning as expeditiously as possible, IFOR detailed a half dozen Civil Affairs officers with backgrounds in planning, operations, training, and logistics. Among their vital contributions were the following:
Once the IPTF had become operational, the focus shifted to long-term tasks, such as the downsizing and restructuring of local police forces. IFOR Civil Affairs advisors contributed significantly to this phase of the operation. This included drafting the Agreement for Restructuring the Police and the Principles of Policing in a Democratic State, which were signed by the Federation at Bonn in April 1996, and serving as the staff for the Commission on Police Restructuring. Another crucial IFOR responsibility was to be prepared to evacuate IPTF personnel, if necessary. Evacuation procedures were drawn up by Civil Affairs liaison personnel. In addition to their daily function of exchanging operational information between the two organizations, they also provided the interface between IFOR and the IPTF in preparing for and supporting national and municipal elections and in dealing with the organized crime threat.
The police restructuring program that has been developed to imbue a new ethos of public service is still in its early stages. To have any lasting impact, many more years of consistent effort will be necessary. The status as of mid-1997 was as follows:
Police restructuring and training programs, however, will not prevent a resumption of conflict in Bosnia. The critical deficiency is not one of police capabilities but rather how those capabilities are employed. As long as xenophobic political leaders command the allegiance of police forces, the public security apparatus will continue to be exploitable as an instrument of repression and genocidal policies.
Without consensus among the parties on the core issue of Bosnia's identity, many matters integral to the Dayton process, such as refugee returns, municipal governance, the status of Brcko, or the disposition of war criminals, will continue to be regarded as matters of national survival. The outcome of each will heavily influence Bosnia's ultimate destiny. The various police forces in Bosnia will be crucial players in the process that determines the outcome of each of these critical disputes. Only the most optimistic assessments would maintain that the central issue in dispute-integration vs. partition-will have been resolved by Jun 1998. The peace that prevailed under IFOR and SFOR has been deceptive, therefore, because it was a product of external intervention. There can be no confidence that peace will be self-sustaining because numerous core issues capable of precipitating conflict remain unresolved.
This issue is at the core of the quandary in Bosnia. Ethnic populations were the targets of violence during the war, more so than opposing armies. The outcome was "ethnic cleansing." The carnage was stopped just short of its ultimate goal of homogeneity. If Bosnia's three nations are now to live together in a single state, respect for minority rights must become integral to the political and judicial processes. Abuse of minorities has continued to be a chronic concern, however, and no ethnic group has an unblemished record in this regard.66
If Bosnians are to coexist peacefully, then impunity for actions against ethnic minorities must end, and institutions that dispense justice equitably must begin to flourish. The IPTF's pathbreaking initiative to transform Bosnia's police forces into agents of democratic policing is the linchpin for this transformation. It will not be sufficient, however, since judicial and penal systems are also subject to abuse. One aspect of the system that appears to merit particular scrutiny is pre-trial detention. This is a major concern given the preference of police for suspect interrogation, as opposed to the tedium of gathering physical evidence. There are numerous areas where safeguards are weak, disregarded, or totally lacking. These include manipulation and abuse of the supposed 3-day limit on police detention, the regular failure to notify detainees of their rights, and the lack of prohibitions against use of illegally obtained evidence.67 These serious flaws in Bosnian jurisprudence were not resolved by the DPA, as authors of a major study of the Bosnian legal system conclude:
- Although GFAP (the General Framework Agreement for Peace or DPA) contained provisions related to the Constitution, Human Rights and Policing, insufficient attention was, in our view, given to the administration of justice and the development of a system of laws which not only comply with Human Rights but also and more importantly ensure that they are protected. In this respect GFAP and the Constitutions of both entities seem to have created an unwieldy structure of Human Rights Courts and subsidiary organizations which sit on top of a system which is almost certainly fundamentally flawed. While breaches of Human Rights will almost certainly be identified by this system, they will be difficult to rectify unless a properly functioning, independent system of justice, at all levels is developed to protect them.68
The court system lacks autonomy because it has been subordinated, de facto, to the police. Municipal police chiefs and ministers of interior, in turn, have operated as agents of control for the leadership of the ruling party. As vestiges of a communist-era police state, minus the veneer of ideology to lend a whiff of legitimacy, the Federation and the RS currently are political regimes in transition. The only outcome compatible with a multiethnic state is a bona fide democracy that practices majority rule while guaranteeing minority rights.
Human rights monitoring organizations, such as the Commission on Human Rights created by annex 6 of the DPA (including the Ombudsman and Human Rights chamber), must be nurtured so they can perform a watchdog function over formal institutions of government. Bosnian human rights organizations, in turn, must develop robust linkages with counterparts internationally. All of this will require an arduous process of institutional development that will take many years to complete. This represents the peace-building phase of a peace operation. It is not yet certain, however, that Bosnia is solidly headed down this path.
Some actions that could serve to improve the effectiveness of the IPTF are-
Objective Standards for Democratic Policing: Perhaps the most significant contribution the IPTF will make to the conduct of future peace operations is the articulation of specific, observable standards for democratic policing. A major stride forward will have been taken if these become recognized as "the international standards of policing."
Pre-Mission Assessments: In December 1995, the UN assessment team focused essentially on numerical factors such as the total number of personnel and police stations in the forces of each ethnic community. This was sufficient only to determine the numbers of monitors required, neglecting the other missions (e.g., training, advising, and restructuring Bosnian police forces). Future assessments should take into account the manning and resources needed to perform all CIVPOL missions, as well as the extent to which limited political consent among the disputants might affect the CIVPOL mission.
Mandate: The factor that determines whether the mandate can be executed successfully is the extent to which the parties actually consent to ends that CIVPOL seeks to serve. At the core of the "enforcement gap" was the fiction that all the parties consented to full implementation of the DPA. There were no effective sanctions to close the gaps in either law enforcement or compliance with the DPA, other than compellance by IFOR/SFOR, and this also had its constraints.
Clearly, the international community needs to develop instruments that can give it greater leverage in such circumstances. One interesting alternative would be to incorporate constabulary forces into the military force mix. Their mission would be to provide support to the IPTF so that it could more effectively carry out its tasks.
Recruitment of CIVPOL Monitors: The Bosnia experience highlights four deficiencies:
To remedy these deficiencies, the following actions would appear to be warranted:
| Bosnia Index | Foreword | Acknowledgments | Preface | I. Introduction | II. Bosnia—Setting the Stage | III. Command and Control Structure | IV. Intelligence Operations | V. Civil-Military Cooperation | VI. The International Police Task Force | VII. Information Activities | VIII. Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle | IX. Counterintelligence and HUMINT | X. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Soldier's Perspective | XI. C4ISR Systems and Services | XII. NDU/CCRP Bosnia Study | XIII. Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned | XIV. Summary | End Notes | Appendix A: The Dayton Peace Agreement Summary | Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events | Appendix C: References | Appendix D: Acronyms | About the Contributing Editor | About the Authors