When it comes to peace operations, many officers are convinced that victory is determined not on the ground but in media reporting. This concept has led to the development of information programs designed to influence public attitudes both at home and in the local population. This has also made information a critical element in the command and control of peace operations. As U.S. doctrine correctly states, "Public affairs is a fundamental tool of competent leadership, a critical element of effective battle command and an essential part of successful mission accomplishment."70 This chapter examines the role of information in peace operations through the prism of IFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (December 1995-December 1996).Information activities contribute in different ways to mission accomplishment. A successful public information campaign contributes to building and preserving public support for a military operation as it affects the prism (media reporting) through which the world and the local communities assess the events of peace operations. Indeed, media reporting provides the basis for the world's-including many in the political elite-judgment as to the success or failure of a peace operation.
Information activities also help commanders communicate to the parties their intentions and might, and get the local population to act friendly. With UNPROFOR and IFOR, major military operations were rare.71 On the other hand, IFOR abundantly used information activities to deter the FWF from violating the military annex of the Dayton agreement and from attacking NATO's troops. IFOR also used information to convince the local population that a brighter future awaits them if the parties comply fully with the Dayton agreement.
During Joint Endeavor, IFOR Public Information (PI) ran an information campaign designed to "seize and maintain the initiative by imparting timely and effective information within the commander's intent."72 The term information campaign refers to the coordinated and synchronized use of public information and psychological operations. The campaign was thus composed of two elements: a PI campaign designed to establish IFOR's credibility with the international media to gain international support of the operation; and a psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign designed to shape the local population's perception in favor of IFOR troops and activities. IFOR PI undertook the public information aspects of the policy, while the Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force (CJIICTF) undertook the PSYOP aspects.73
Traditionally PI and PSYOP are separated. The strict separation stems from the different missions and philosophies.
The nature of Operation Joint Endeavor, a peace-enforcement operation, made it possible to closely associate public information and psychological operations. IFOR PSYOP campaign consisted of convincing the local population and FWF of the benefits of the Dayton agreement by relying on truthful and honest arguments. It thus did not resort to deception or disinformation campaigns (two other facets of psychological operations). Under these circumstances, PI and PSYOP were open and transparent. Both operations relied on similar guidance, themes, and messages. Each of them was entrusted with reaching a specific audience. Public information dealt with journalists, while PSYOP carried IFOR's message to the local population without the mediation of journalists, through IFOR-owned media: a TV production section, 6 organic and 56 affiliated radio stations, a national weekly newspaper The Herald Of Peace, a youth magazine Mircko, posters and handbills.
This chapter examines the place of PI and PSYOP in peace operations through the prism of IFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It presents a brief background on Operation Joint Endeavor the planning process and defines the key concepts for information activities throughout the operation. The following section shows how IFOR implemented these key concepts and how they affected command and control and mission accomplishment. The next section tackles some of the obstacles and problems that appeared during the implementation phase. The final section draws implications from the IFOR experience for future peace operations.
When SHAPE and AFSOUTH began planning for Operation Joint Endeavor, they did so with little up-to-date guidance. In fall 1995, the NAC was revising its public information strategy document to adjust it to the upcoming operation. The document was not completed in time to aid planning. At that time, SHAPE was also revising its policies on public information and psychological operations.74 SHAPE, however, circulated its draft revisions to PI and PSYOP planners. Planning was thus based on newly drafted doctrines, and on previous planning for contingencies in former-Yugoslavia.75
NATO commanders expected information to play a critical role in the success of IFOR's mission, by helping gain international support and by shaping local attitudes in favor of IFOR troops and operations. Following Admiral Smith's intent, planners established the need for a proactive, fully coordinated campaign which was synchronized with the major staff components. The key concepts of IFOR's information policies during Joint Endeavor were-
The public information campaign key concepts had consequences for the command and control structure. Indeed, plans sought to establish and promote cooperation and liaison, both internally (within the command staff components) and externally (with the civilian organizations). Plans authorized a functional information chain, allowing PIOs across the country to exchange information, thus speeding the information flow. Plans also called for a close integration of PI with operational staffs (mostly G/J3), and mentioned the possibility to closely integrate PI and PSYOP elements in a coordinated and synchronized campaign.76
Providing IFOR's target audiences (the international and local media, the local population, and the local factions) with complete, accurate, and timely information was the key element of a policy designed to gain and maintain credibility with the international media. According to Capt. Van Dyke, USN, IFOR chief PIO, Admiral Smith felt that in an open and transparent operation such as IFOR, "if we [IFOR] know, they [the media] know."77 Under these circumstances, disseminating relevant information-including bad news and mistakes-as quickly as possible was an absolute requirement. Achieving this goal had major command and control implications. To provide complete and accurate information to its audiences, PI needed to be tied into operations. To ensure timely information, PI needed to have knowledge of operations/incidents as they unfolded and to be allowed to quickly release information to the press. To achieve these requirements, IFOR closely integrated PI and PSYOP with other operational elements (mostly G/J2 and G/J3), established a functional chain of information, and delegated release authority to the lowest responsible level.
To provide the media with complete and accurate information and to disseminate important facts and messages to the local population, PI and PSYOP personnel were closely integrated with operations staffs and enjoyed a close relationship with the IFOR commanders, especially at headquarters level.
At headquarters level, commanders organized a very close relationship with their public information officers. For example, Admiral Lopez, USN, COMIFOR in summer and fall 1996, held his first and last meeting every day with Capt. Van Dyke, USN, the IFOR chief PIO. COMARRC, LtGen Walker, UKA, usually chaired a daily ARRC information coordination group. Both ARRC and IFOR PIOs enjoyed an open-door policy with their commanders. They had regular one-on-one informal meetings when they needed. This close relationship allowed the PIOs to gain insights into the commanders' thinking and wishes. It also ensured that the commander knew what was developing in the news media.
In addition, throughout the operation most commanders made sure that PI had complete and timely knowledge of current and future operations, even if classified. The following mechanisms helped maintain the flow of information between PI and operations. IFOR PI had a liaison officer to the Joint Operations Center (JOC). At ARRC, MND(N) and MND(SW), PIOs had free access to the operations room throughout the operation. IFOR and ARRC PIOs attended COMIFOR and COMARRC staff meetings as well as the morning and evening conference calls. At headquarters level and at MND(N) and (SW), PIOs attended the morning staff meetings and the daily conference calls. These arrangements enabled IFOR PI to anticipate and prepare for incidents (through knowledge of plans) and difficult issues (through a clear understanding of HQ policy and thinking). The rapid link between PI and Ops, minimized the likelihood that a reporter would break a story about IFOR operations that PIOs were not aware of.
To provide timely information to its audiences, PI needs to be aware of operations and incidents as they unfolded. This constitutes a tough challenge because reporting through a chain of command is time-consuming, as each authority level processes the information before passing it up. It is an even more time-consuming process in a multinational operation where each layer might speak a different language. This process does not adequately support PIO needs for timely delivery of accurate information. The stop-gap measure lay in a functional information chain linking public information officers throughout theater.
The challenge stems from the inherent imbalance between a journalist's ability to report on the spot and the military's need to verify and process information before it passes it up the chain of command. A journalist can provide viewers with personal impressions and judgments, while military reporting typically relies on verifying information. For the journalist, immediacy can override accuracy. For the military, accuracy usually overrides immediacy. The problem is compounded by the fact that journalists can relate any piece of news much faster than the military. While witnessing an incident, a journalist just needs to set up a satellite phone to break the news to his central offices. In a matter of minutes, the news may reach wide international audiences. By comparison, the military flow of information is much slower. The danger of this inherent imbalance is that higher headquarters learn about an operation/incident from the news rather than from its subordinate headquarters. The likely results are potentially important. Higher headquarters will often (angrily) turn to subordinate elements for confirmation. On occasions, it may affect decision making, either by providing a lasting impression or by forcing the commander to react in the heat of the moment.
IFOR's solution to this dilemma consisted of a vertical functional information chain linking all PIOs throughout theater. According to Colonel Serveille, annex P to OPLAN 40105 explicitly authorized a direct liaison between public information organizations at all levels of IFOR operations.78 The chain of information worked in coordination with the chain of command. It allowed PIOs to communicate and exchange information without having to pass through all the layers of the chain of command, thus speeding up the information flow.
In case of a serious incident, the process was further decentralized. Division or headquarters dispatched a PIO to collect firsthand information and (eventually) deal with the press on-the-scene. This provision greatly reduced the amount of time necessary for PI to obtain operational information of potential media interest.
The purpose of these arrangements would be defeated if, in the end, PIOs were not allowed to release the information to the media. Therefore, under IFOR, information release authority was delegated to the lowest possible level. As a result, COMIFOR had authority to release (or to delegate release authority to appropriate levels) all theater-operational information. In addition, IFOR PI was authorized to confirm news already obvious to the media without having to refer to higher headquarters. This provision greatly enhanced the PI's ability to react quickly to fast-breaking news.
Appropriate delegation of release authority ensured that PIOs throughout theater could react in a timely fashion to fast-breaking news without interference from higher echelons. The higher the release authority is, the longer it takes to confirm and release relevant information. In some cases, such delays can create tensions with the press and damage the military's credibility among journalists.
Coordination was ensured through a variety of meetings where information policy and activities were discussed and IFOR's information strategy was established. Coordination occurred at several levels: internally (between various staff components), externally (between IFOR and the main civilian organizations operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as the OHR, the UNHCR, the UNMIBH, the OSCE), and nationally (within national contingents).
Internal coordination was designed to enhance information flow between staff components, avoid duplication of efforts, and synchronize efforts so they mutually reinforced each other. Thorough internal coordination made it less likely that different staff components would develop diverging plans. Although IFOR and ARRC plans called for coordination between staff components involved in information activities, they did not set up specific mechanisms. Consequently, early in the deployment, IFOR and ARRC staffs created such mechanisms as necessities arose. As the enumeration below shows, the ARRC initiated most of the internal coordination mechanisms.
Though not as systematic as at headquarters level, coordination mechanisms were established at two of the three multinational divisions: MND(N) and MND(SW). The U.S.-led MND(N) held an Information Operations Council designed to bring together the key players relevant for information dissemination (PIO, G3, PSYOP, civil affairs). In the UK-led MND(SW), the chief PIO attended operational and civil affairs meetings, but did not organize a specific coordination forum. Coordination was mostly informal, through walk-ins and phone calls with relevant staffs. It is unclear whether the MND(SW) informal approach would have been more effective associated with formal coordination mechanisms.79
Coordination also took place with the major civilian organizations in charge of facilitating the implementation the civilian annexes of the DPA. In particular, IFOR established common activities and coordination mechanisms with the OHR, the UNHCR, the UNMIBH, and the OSCE.
IFOR quickly learned that coordinating with the civilian agencies was necessary. Early in the operation (by end of February 1996), IFOR PI realized that media interest was shifting to the civilian implementation of the DPA. However, at that stage civilian organizations attended, but did not take part in, the daily briefing. IFOR PI felt it was left in a position to talk about civilian issues outside its realm of responsibility. IFOR PI feared this situation could damage its credibility.
However, establishing coordination mechanisms with the civilian agencies was a challenging task. First, civilian agencies were slow to respond to IFOR's offers for cooperation as many arrived in theater well after IFOR. For a while, they were consumed by problems in setting up their own operations. Cooperation with IFOR was not their main concern. In addition, it seemed that some of the civilian organizations were reluctant to cooperate closely with IFOR out of fear they would lose their freedom of speech and be tainted by their association with a military force. As a result, widespread cooperation was only fully in place by mid-May 1996.80 The coordination and cooperation mechanisms included the following:
IFOR was a 36-nation coalition placed under SACEUR's operational control. As a result, each contingent was expected to report daily to the NATO chain of command. But aside from the NATO chain of command, each nation expected its contingent to report to national authorities. Contingents fulfilled this dual requirement by sending Situation Reports (SITREPs) to IFOR and to their respective MODs. In a specific case, U.S. public information officers throughout theater were required to participate in a daily teleconference with representatives of the State Department, Department of Defense, and National Security Council.84 Conversely, nations also expected their public officers in theater to follow national guidelines and directives.
In some cases, national requirements sparked difficulties with IFOR. For example during fall 1996, MND(N) heavily advertised the redeployment of U.S. units out of Bosnia. That line supported the U.S. official position that U.S. troops would come home after a 12-month deployment, but it contradicted IFOR's effort to keep the redeployment issue in low profile. In some cases, information was formally released to the international press, both by contingents in theater and by home nations, without IFOR prior knowledge. In a few instances regarding casualties incidents, nations even released information when NATO was the formal release authority.85
In peace support operations, where the outside force does not conduct traditional combat operations, the commander has to place a greater reliance on non-lethal weapons. PI and PSYOP are two critical non-lethal weapons. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, these two groups worked hand-in-glove to make each other's activities more effective in support of the commanders' objectives. PI and PSYOP are tools for the commander to communicate with adversaries, neutral parties, various factions, and the local population. The PI will do so through providing material to journalists while PSYOP will do so through controlled dissemination means (such as force-controlled radio stations or poster campaigns).
To be able to use these tools effectively, the commander had to have PI and PSYOP tied into the command and control structure. This occurred, in the obvious vein, through inclusion of both the IFOR PIO and the CJIICTF commander at the morning and other critical staff meetings. Both the PI organization and the CJIICTF had liaisons in the IFOR CJ-3 staff through officers assigned to the JOC. The coordination meetings discussed above were also crucial to ensuring effectiveness.
This tying of the PI and IIC (PSYOP) into the command and control structure made it possible for COMIFOR and other commanders to use these tools in support of objectives and operations. At headquarters level and in some divisions, information was systematically used to reinforce the appropriateness of IFOR's activities. Information was always on the commander's mind as one of his major tools for action. G3 was constantly aware of the possibility to use the media and PI was always aware of ongoing and future operations. For example, the MND(SW) commander often relied on press statements to lay blame publicly on the factions who violated provisions of the DPA to pressure them into compliance.86 In a number of high-profile incidents, IFOR relied on its information campaign to influence the behavior of the local factions without having to resort to the use of force. In summer 1996, a Serb policeman fired a warning shot at an IFOR soldier and ordered his policemen to surround him. In response, COMIFOR approved an information plan (resorting to press statements and IIC products) to apply gradual public pressure on RS leaders to oust the chief of police. In another example, RS leaders refused to let IFOR troops inspect an ammunition depot in Han Pisejak. COMIFOR instructed IFOR spokesman to recommend that all NGOs pull out of RS since IFOR was about to use lethal force to inspect the depot. After a few days, RS leadership authorized IFOR to carry out its inspection mission.87
The PI and PSYOP organizations played another role as non-lethal weapons-they were sources of information for the operation at the same time that they released information. Journalists can provide, knowingly or unknowingly, a great deal of information to PIOs that is potentially critical to operations. The coordination and communication meant to give PIOs information also served as a means to transmit information back to the operation (specifically, the J-2 or J-3 elements). The IIC personnel, as well, had extensive contacts with the local populace and interpreters. These contacts always have the potential for providing HUMINT that will help the force commander understand the situation better and could provide critical operational information. In non-traditional missions such as Joint Endeavor, commands have to expand their concepts of intelligence and important information to capture the complex types of problems that exist in these operations. PI and PSYOP, like Civil Affairs, are far more important information sources in a peace support operation than in a wartime environment. With this in mind, the command and control structure/concept must have a means to feed their information back into the command as well as to feed them information for dissemination into the broader community.
Close coordination with operations enabled PI to play an expanded role in the operation. First, it enabled PI to provide the media with accurate and timely information. It also allowed for better timing of public information campaigns. Finally, it facilitated use of information as an operational tool. It allowed commanders to communicate directly with their 'adversaries' and with the local populations.
In a 36-partner coalition such as IFOR, room existed for different concepts of PI/PSYOP and how best to use them in a combined campaign. Even between the three major contributors (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France), there were significant differences in their approaches to information operations. The following outlines some of the most significant issues.
One major bone of contention was the nature and amount of information to be released to the media. For example, it seemed that IFOR and ARRC perspectives on this issue often conflicted. IFOR's policy, based on U.S. public affairs principles, was clear: all information likely to interest the media is to be released unless precluded by troop safety and/or operational security. Information already obvious to the media should be confirmed. For IFOR HQ, the question should always be: "Why should I not release the information?" The ARRC, especially at the beginning of the operation, seemed to strictly follow the British doctrine, according to which one does not talk about ongoing or upcoming operations. For the ARRC, the basic question seemed to be: "Why should I release this information?" The two doctrines regularly generated conflict between the two headquarters.
There also were frictions between IFOR and subordinate headquarters about the level and type of information that should be reported up the chain of command/chain of information. Differences of opinion in that domain also caused tensions. In some cases, contingents did not report as much information as IFOR felt it needed to effectively handle information operations. In some instances, contingents failed to report information that would reflect negatively on their attitudes/operations. In other cases, contingents failed to report details viewed as unimportant operationally. These details, however, could have helped IFOR spokesmen with the media.88
Some contingents failed to closely associate their PI with their operational staffs. For example, at the French-led MND(SE), commanders seemed to consider the PI as a support operation. During the first months of the operation, PI did not have easy access to the operations room, did not attend the conference calls, and was not associated with G2 or G3 activities. Things only improved slowly. Several months into operations, PIOs were tasked with presenting a daily press summary at the evening division conference call. By fall 1996, they gained unlimited access to the operations room. They then became more closely associated with operations as an organizational reform placed the PIO under G3 supervision. It seemed, however, that these reforms were too slow and incomplete to fully satisfy IFOR HQ PI.
Various contingents also shared different concepts of PSYOP. For example, the Spaniard and Italian contingents did not cooperate closely with the CJIICTF, although both contingents used information policies in support of their G5 (civil affairs) activities. The major difference of opinion occurred between the United States (who ran the CJIICTF) and the British. The U.S. has a rigid top-down approach to PSYOP with centralized planning and product development (at headquarters level) and decentralized execution by subordinate units. Bosnia fit this approach. During Joint Endeavor, the CJIICTF headquarters developed products and COMIFOR (then COMARRC) approved all products before release. Finally, subordinate units in the three MNDs disseminated the products throughout theater. The MNDs were able to provide inputs for future products, but they were not allowed to run their own campaigns. The top-down approach allowed IFOR to run a unified campaign across theater. According to LtCol Furlong, DCOMCJIICTF, unity of effort was especially important in regard to Bosnian Serb audiences, who were more hostile to the international community's effort than any other Bosnian group. This approach, however, conflicted with the British developing doctrine. In MND(SW), the British wanted a decentralized, grassroots product development on the grounds that local commanders knew better the local situation and could therefore develop products better to fit local circumstances. The British also thought the approval process (at COMIFOR's level) was too slow and cumbersome. They favored delegating approval authority to the lowest practical level. While some fixes occurred through IFOR to improve problems stemming from these different approaches, the basic tension remained.89
Some of the nations participating in the coalition, among them the French (who led the multinational division in MND(SE), were reluctant to use PSYOP forces. For historical and political reasons, the French were very sensitive about the concept of psychological operations.90 As a result, the French only allowed a six-man U.S. PSYOP team under a bilateral liaison agreement. The team manned an IFOR radio in Mostar and occasionally disseminated The Herald Of Peace and other CJIICTF products. For the most part of the operation, the division's staffs only had limited interactions with the U.S. PSYOP forces.91
Political sensitivities also led to PSYOP personnel remaining under national command and control. Based on a 1984 Executive Directive, the United States refused to place PSYOP forces under NATO command and control.92 U.S. PSYOP forces (the bulk of the CJIICTF) thus operated under USEUCOM operational control. Refusal to place PSYOP forces under SACEUR's operational control generated several problems. The arrangement created a de facto dual chain of command, which contradicts basic military principles, as CJIICTF products had to be approved at IFOR and EUCOM levels. In practice, this requirement did not appear to slow down the approval process significantly, mainly because EUCOM quickly agreed to a silent approval procedure.93 Second, this arrangement created coordination problems because the CJIICTF, as a theater-level (mainly U.S.) command, did not always feel compelled to coordinate activities with the MND HQs. For example, a U.S. tactical PSYOP team showed up in MND(SE) unannounced for a dissemination mission and stumbled onto an anti-sniper operation led by the French division. Third, this arrangement also inhibited a flexible use of PSYOP elements at tactical level as the ARRC and the divisions had limited authority to instruct the PSYOP personnel to conduct specific activities. Finally, as each nation retained control over its PSYOP elements, Joint Endeavor set a bad example for future operations. As more nations strengthen their PSYOP assets, the multiplication of national chains of command constitutes a dangerous trend. In the long run, it may damage NATO's ability to achieve unity of effort. This issue needs to be readdressed in the near future.
Though the coordination mechanisms established at IFOR headquarters levels proved to be beneficial (most notably by enhancing the information flow), they were not necessarily reproduced at division levels.
The French-led MND(SE) did not mirror the internal coordination mechanisms and forums set up at headquarters. The division had neither formal nor informal coordination processes. The division commanders seemed to consider information as a support activity. Throughout the operation, PI neither chaired nor participated in coordination meetings with other staff elements. Within months of the operation's start, the PI officers had established informal links with the American PSYOP unit, the G5 (civil affairs), and the G3. However, the coordination remained loose throughout the year.
All three divisions failed to reap the benefits that a close coordination with the civilian agencies might have given them. Apart from MND(SW), which tried to establish limited common activities with the civilian organizations (mostly regular briefings with the UNHCR), the other divisions did not seek to coordinate their activities with the local representatives of the civilian organizations operating in their AOR. In MND(N), the force protection rules seriously handicapped the PIO's ability to coordinate with outside organizations. CIMIC was the only interface with the local communities. In MND(SE), the PIOs did not hold regular coordination meetings or common activities with the civilian agencies in its AOR. In that case, it seems that strong suspicions about ultimate and ulterior motives remained on both parts.94 Overall, at division level common activities and coordination forums between PI and the civilian agencies were rare.
Operation Joint Endeavor revealed the critical nature of information activities in peace operations. In a peace operation, media reporting plays a critical role in determining success or failure. A commander's information activities (mostly PI and PSYOP) are the best tools to gain support for an operation and to influence perceptions. The Bosnia experience provides several important lessons on how best to achieve a proper information flow and real coordination.
The information campaign was based upon principles that served well the commanders' and the public's needs. By providing complete, timely, and accurate information, IFOR established its credibility with the international media and the local public. Throughout the operation, reporters have publicly expressed their satisfaction with the arrangements made.95 The requirement for dissemination of complete, timely, and accurate information was adequately supported by several internal arrangements:
The widespread coordination taking place within operational staffs (especially G/J2 and G/J3) and with civilian agencies made it possible to develop a common information strategy, most notably by timing release of similar messages and themes. It also made it easier to react promptly and comprehensively to significant events and the commander's needs. Common activities and coordination mechanisms with civilian agencies were particularly beneficial to the operation. By accounts of civilian and military participants alike, and in comparison with earlier missions, this was perhaps the most extensive and effective civilian-military cooperation process for PI in a multinational operation. Most notably, the coordination mechanisms with civilian agencies enabled IFOR and the primary organizations to appear as united in a common effort on the behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It provided a forum to exchange information, reduce inaccuracies, and de-conflict sensitive issues.
Adequate information flow and close coordination allowed the commander to use PI and PSYOP as a non-lethal weapon. It was one of the commander's major tools to communicate intentions, might, and resolve to the local populations and the FWF. Throughout the operation, commanders made extensive use of public information and PSYOP to help achieve operational goals. Those lessons should not be forgotten for the next time around.
| Bosnia Index | Foreword | Acknowledgments | Preface | I. Introduction | II. Bosnia—Setting the Stage | III. Command and Control Structure | IV. Intelligence Operations | V. Civil-Military Cooperation | VI. The International Police Task Force | VII. Information Activities | VIII. Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle | IX. Counterintelligence and HUMINT | X. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Soldier's Perspective | XI. C4ISR Systems and Services | XII. NDU/CCRP Bosnia Study | XIII. Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned | XIV. Summary | End Notes | Appendix A: The Dayton Peace Agreement Summary | Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events | Appendix C: References | Appendix D: Acronyms | About the Contributing Editor | About the Authors