In the past 48 months, DoD Counterintelligence (CI) personnel working with national and DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) personnel from strategic, operational, and tactical organizations have provided critical support to numerous contingency operations and overseas training exercises. Beyond the traditional missions of CI and HUMINT, ground force commanders have identified CI and HUMINT support as essential to accomplishing the force protection mission in operations from Provide Hope to Joint Endeavor and in locations as diverse as Somalia, Panama, Haiti, Macedonia, Rwanda, and Turkey. (See figure 9-1.)
The CI and HUMINT elements recently deployed in Bosnia were the largest such deployment since Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They experienced success and the full endorsement of their supported commanders. This was a result of the integration into current operational procedures of lessons learned from past operations and, most significantly, the ingenuity, tenacity, and adaptability of the soldiers and civilians sent to Bosnia to execute the CI and HUMINT mission. These soldiers and civilians used innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures to provide the necessary intelligence to conduct successful operations in the complex, unpredictable environment of Bosnia. The primary goal of CI and HUMINT activities in Bosnia, and during other recent deployments, has been to reduce risk to the force by providing the information and intelligence that the commander needed to effectively manage or avoid risk and still accomplish the mission. (See figure 9-2.)
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of CI and HUMINT activities conducted in support of the U.S.-led ground Task Force Eagle or MND(N). The perspective will be that of the CI and HUMINT mission manager (G2X)-that element of the Task Force intelligence staff (G2) responsible for coordinating, deconflicting, and synchronizing all CI and HUMINT activities in the sector of operations of this multinational task force. CI and HUMINT worked together in support of Task Force operations and therefore cannot be addressed independently. Likewise, the multinational or combined aspects of CI and HUMINT operations will also be addressed.
To appreciate the foundation upon which these activities were based, past operations and training must be briefly examined. The basic tactics, techniques, and procedures that worked in Bosnia were drawn from the past; developed, identified, or refined in other contingency operations; addressed in joint doctrine; practiced in local unit, non-doctrinal training courses; or developed, tested, and instituted on-the-fly by deployed personnel. Solutions came from many sources, but usually from the young soldier who understood both the requirement and the customer, the ground commander. The experienced soldier or civilian and the parts of the bureaucracy that would bypass red tape and provide the necessary equipment and expertise also proved to be essential to mission accomplishment.
This chapter will focus on the positive, constructive results of approximately 200 operators and a few leader-managers who, working as a team, accomplished an important mission.
Veterans of the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) deployed throughout Europe during WWII and the aftermath, along with CI and HUMINT veterans of the Vietnam conflict, could provide a convincing argument that the tactics, techniques, and procedures used today, although somewhat refined with some information technology-based tools, are very similar or identical to those used in their previous operations. Sometime in the development of CI and HUMINT disciplines the focus on supporting warfighters was lost or allowed to go dormant. As the DoD prepared for the Cold War to go hot, CI and HUMINT took a backseat, while the other intelligence disciplines, which relied on systems built with high technology and could provide almost instant results, came to the forefront. Recent contingency operations such as Operations Other Than War (OOTW) (now referred to as Stability and Sustainment Operations (SSO)), have brought CI and HUMINT to the table with other intelligence disciplines.
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia set the stage for the importance of CI and HUMINT in future operations. The lessons learned there were significant and set the course for CI and HUMINT in supporting the warfighter. The requirement for joint doctrine and a computer-based information system with connectivity to the overall intelligence communication architecture had been identified as a result of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Then, Somalia set in motion the first application of the draft joint doctrine. During this time frame, USAREUR began experimenting with the first version of the TRRIP. (See figure 9-3.)
The TRRIP was a prototype, notebook computer-based data acquisition, management, and communication system designed to CI requirements. The prototype TRRIP was deployed on an exercise called Dragon Hammer 92 and then in support of the U.S. Army Hospital that deployed to Zagreb, Croatia, in December 1992. (See figure 9-4.) By deploying the TRRIP in support of the hospital, USAREUR began to develop the communications architecture that would be required to support a TRRIP deployed with the tactical forces. United States European Command (USEUCOM) also understood the utility of such a capability and stated the requirement for such a system on the theater commander's (CINC's) Intelligence Priority List (IPL).
In July of 1993, the requirement to send a battalion combat team to Macedonia was identified. The mission was, and still is, to monitor the border between Serbia and Macedonia. Operation Able Sentry was underway and CI and tactical HUMINT assets were deployed early to support the mission. (See figure 9-5.) Based on this deployment, USAREUR, in conjunction with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), developed the CI and Tactical HUMINT Contingency Operations Course. This course taught soldiers the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to conduct operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia as well as in other OOTW operations.
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca developed the CI Force Protection Source Operations Course to meet these evolving requirements. The Air Force and the Navy also began to develop courses to train their personnel in these specific skills. Although the Marine Corps already had trained their personnel in many of these skills, they developed tactics, techniques, and procedures to incorporate the use of a system like the TRRIP. Unfortunately, the number of soldiers who had received this specialized training was minimal.
Deployment of a Task Force CI Coordinating Authority (TFCICA) and support staff to Naples, Italy, to augment the joint intelligence staff (J2) of JTF Provide Promise was another event from which commanders and the intelligence community could learn how to employ these assets. This led to the deployment of a six person, joint CI team referred to as the Force Protection Branch to Zagreb, Croatia, to support JTF Provide Promise (Forward). Commander, JTF Provide Promise (FWD), Col. Quist, U.S. Marine Corps, stated in a letter to the USEUCOM Chief of Staff:
- The capability of the Force Protection Branch (FPB) is an essential part of the battlefield operating system on which I rely. In Operations Other Than War, the skills and method of operation used by the FPB are essential for successful, acceptable-risk operations. Without the services of the FPB I would lose a valuable asset which allows me to determine risk to our operations.
The second generation prototype TRRIP was then deployed. (See figure 9-6). This gave the Joint CI Team a significant capability. This deployment also provided USAREUR and INSCOM TRRIP developers critical input to the system itself and to the communications architecture necessary to support multiple systems in different geographical locations. Specialized software, a digital camera, and a scanner had been added. CI and HUMINT discovered that information was being delivered to analysts and to the decision makers faster and more accurately than had ever been experienced. TRRIPs were deployed in Naples, Italy; Skopje, Macedonia; and Zagreb Croatia. CI- and HUMINT-trained soldiers were on the ground and answering the commander's questions. Teams are still deployed in Macedonia and Croatia.
Operation Support Hope (see figure 9-7) in Rwanda was flawlessly executed by the supporting CI and HUMINT soldiers. This short-fused operation required 36 operators with 6 TRRIPs to deploy rapidly to various locations in Africa to support the operation. The results were stunning, and the concept of using CI and HUMINT assets in OOTWs was cemented in USEUCOM. The investment in the capability continued and would pay off with the deployment to Bosnia.
CI and HUMINT operators provided critical intelligence during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. (See figure 9-8.) The communications architecture was not stressed; however, input for the development of the TRRIP was obtained from the operators. Further definition and refinement of user requirements was taking place. CI and HUMINT were using real-world deployments as their Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE).
The CI and HUMINT operators deployed to Bosnia faced some difficult challenges and very real threats. Three former warring factions, with significant combat power and robust intelligence collection capabilities, were waiting for the arrival of NATO forces. Local civilians hired as linguists, cooks, maids, handymen, electricians, and carpenters became an everyday concern of the CI and HUMINT operators. Terrorists, organized crime, and petty criminals were also part of the threat. Some of the toughest terrain in the world and formidable winter weather also posed significant challenges to everyday survival. Based on previous peace operation deployments, CI and HUMINT became the intelligence disciplines of choice for Bosnia, and for that reason CI and tactical HUMINT soldiers were deployed early with the advance elements of the Task Force.
The success of any operation depends on the plan. Operators are fast to explain that the plan is just that, a plan. In the execution phase any plan begins to lose coherence as branches to planned courses of action must be taken and sequels to operations must be conducted. Nevertheless, the existence of a plan ensures that everyone understands the objective and has a clear vision of the commander's intent. CI and HUMINT operations are no different. They require a detailed, flexible plan that would be understood at every echelon, especially the lowest echelon where it is said that "the rubber meets the road."
After arriving at Task Force Eagle headquarters in Tuzla, the operators were able to assess the situation and define in greater detail the CI and HUMINT mission. A detailed, all inclusive plan was written, including communication, report formats, annotation procedures, information flow, logistics, and command and control. This plan was to be the foundation of CI and HUMINT operations within the Task Force Eagle sector. Based on the corporate knowledge acquired from previous operations, joint doctrine, service doctrine, and capabilities, the plan for CI and HUMINT operations in Task Force Eagle sector was quickly approved and signed. The CI and HUMINT annex to the operations order (OPORD) was distributed to every battalion within the Task Force.
Having developed the plan as the foundation, there was more to come. The communications portion of the plan, which depicted the architecture used, took 3 months to build. (See figure 9-9.) The heroics of young soldiers, older warrant officers wanting to learn, and contractors working and teaching made this architecture come to life. The plan was working. A method for processing hand held digital imagery was developed. A Counterespionage Standard Operating Procedure was also written specifically for this operation. Requirements management, report numbering, quality control, database, and source management systems were just a few of the topics that had to be addressed. A method was established for tracking the operational readiness of the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software upon which the TRRIP was based. The plan was an 80-percent solution, which in a tactical operation will usually win.
At the height of IFOR operations, approximately 110 U.S. Army CI and tactical HUMINT soldiers were deployed in support of Task Force Eagle. Four-person teams, tactically tailored for a variety of missions, were deployed in direct support of battalions and in general support of the Task Force. Their ability to support force protection intelligence requirements effectively prompted the Task Force commander to request additional teams during the potentially disruptive elections in September 1996. Additionally, allied forces within Task Force Eagle quickly discovered the importance of the CI and tactical HUMINT capability and requested U.S. Army CI and tactical HUMINT support. As a result, teams were dedicated to support the Nordic brigade, the Polish battalion, and the Swedish battalion. This ensured timely exchange of force protection information throughout the Task Force Eagle sector. CI and HUMINT personnel provided the local commanders with information on threats to their units as well as their units' vulnerability to foreign intelligence collection and/or terrorist operations.
The G2X was critical to the success of CI and HUMINT operations. The requirement for such an element was derived from joint doctrine, which called for it to be located at the level of the JTF intelligence staff (J2). Thus, initially the G2X was considered the J2X. There was no JTF or J2 to augment, so the original concept underwent a significant metamorphosis. The end result was a small J2X element at the U.S. National Intelligence Center which augmented the ARRC in Sarajevo and a rather robust G2X in support of Task Force Eagle.
The G2X consisted of a Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) cell, a national agency liaison officer, an Army G2X, and an Army Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority, as well as Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel. (See figure 9-10). An essential change to the original plan was that the G2X had no operational elements assigned. The G2X was strictly a staff element responsible for coordinating, deconflicting, and synchronizing the activities of multinational CI and HUMINT assets, U.S. national-level HUMINT assets, and DoD strategic HUMINT assets in the Task Force Eagle Sector. The G2X would also be responsible for coordinating with the ARRC HUMINT Coordination Group (HCG), now called CJ2X.
The G2X also evolved into the G2's quasi-collection managers for CI and HUMINT. This was more of an enabling function for the overall collection manager. It was a critical step to ensure CI and HUMINT were working in concert with other intelligence disciplines. The G2 saw CI and HUMINT just as any other collection discipline-an asset to be managed, synchronized, used to tip other collection means, and used to verify information collected via other intelligence collection disciplines.
The DHS cell within the G2X provided a critical function in refining the commander's PIRs into requirements against which DHS assets could collect. This cell also played an essential role in ensuring time-sensitive HUMINT was quickly processed, edited, and disseminated-first to the commander, second to the theater consumers, and finally to the national intelligence community. This usually was accomplished simultaneously.
DHS also provided significant support to the operations. Working closely with the allies, with the tactical elements, and independently, DHS provided a critical collection capability to the Task Force G2 as well as the theater- and national-level consumers. DHS flexibility, responsiveness, and focus on the ground commander's requirements made them an instant success. Other national-level agencies also provided essential support, giving Task Force Eagle an unprecedented, multiechelon, dedicated, responsive CI and HUMINT capability. Task Force Eagle would need it!
In an effort to counter the non-traditional threats confronted in this multinational peacekeeping operation, CI and HUMINT elements were called upon to provide, coordinate, deconflict, synchronize, and integrate an unusually wide variety of intelligence support. That support included counterintelligence collection, threat and vulnerability assessments, liaison with local law enforcement and foreign military security and intelligence services, CI Force Protection Source Operations, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM), debriefing of U.S. and allied soldiers, debriefing and screening of displaced persons or refugees and detainees, investigations and analysis, exploitation of foreign documents and equipment, and timely dissemination of hand-held digital imagery. Accomplishing all of these efforts was a critical requirement with enormous ramifications, not only for the mission of enforcing the Dayton Accords but for protecting the soldiers assigned to the MNDs.
The operational tempo for the CI and HUMINT operators, both forward-deployed and in support, was extremely high. Initially, tactical teams were restricted in movement due to force protection concerns. Eventually the Task Force commander, understanding the importance of the CI and HUMINT team mission, authorized an exception to policy for CI and HUMINT Teams. He allowed them to travel in two-vehicle convoys, as opposed to the standard four-vehicle convoys, during daylight hours. Travel required a brigade or battalion commander's approval. Travel at night required general officer approval and four vehicles. This made liaison dinners a challenge, but they did get approved. CI and HUMINT operators at the division level and those teams assigned to the Nordic brigade were able to use this important exception to policy. U.S. brigade commanders, however, were not required to implement this policy and therefore continued to require their teams to travel in four-vehicle convoys. This did not deter the teams. They became experts at organizing a four-vehicle convoy of military police, civil affairs, or whatever kind of personnel they could find heading out of the base camp. This process might take 2 to 4 hours during the evening to organize for the next day.
Bosnia was, and still is, an environment where CI and HUMINT operators could show their value added. The threats were real and the PIRs were critical to the commander. This was not a so-called "sensor-to-shooter" environment. It was an environment of terrorists, criminals, and elements of the three FWFs, all of whom were hard to identify but were well-armed and had significant intelligence collection capabilities including HUMINT. To describe this as a complex and challenging environment is an understatement.
After the first 3 months of 18- to 20-hour workdays 7 days a week, the success stories began to be daily events. The quality of reporting significantly improved, the hand held digital imagery was superb-and the commander expected it. The analysts began to produce superior products, mostly based on CI and HUMINT reporting from the field. The responsiveness of the CI and HUMINT assets improved as the communications routing was used so much that it was considered "burned in" and soldiers became more familiar with the TRRIP. The CI and HUMINT community had reached a solid 80 percent solution.
The Usora bridge incident in early August 1996 is an example of timely, accurate, and high-quality reporting that was collected and processed faster by CI and HUMINT teams than the CNN. A smaller bridge built by the United Nations near the Usora bridge was badly damaged after a charge had been thrown from a moving vehicle onto it. A tactical CI and HUMINT team immediately responded to the incident and arrived at the scene, interviewed witnesses, took digital photographs of the damage and, within one hour, passed the brigade and the TF commander accurate information. The national intelligence community had the final Intelligence Information Report (IIR) with digital photographs within 4 hours, with most of that time having been taken for imagery annotation. Hence, the standard for CI and HUMINT teams was to beat CNN and tell the real story. (See figure 9-11). Source operations, counterespionage investigations, local hire screenings, vulnerability assessments, and TSCM services were activities the commanders understood and demanded.
Another element of the plan that would ensure that the best asset or combination of assets was used to answer the requirement was the collection management portion. The collection management process for CI and HUMINT assets became more refined as the analyst-to-collector dialogue was established. A tactical evaluation system was developed. Task Force Eagle analysts were taught how to write evaluations and how to integrate CI- and HUMINT-derived information into the common picture of the battlefield. Timely feedback to the collector provided instant results. After 6 months, the analysts understood the capabilities and limitations of CI and HUMINT assets. The CI and HUMINT operators understood what the analysts needed. This was not accomplished without some frustration on the part of operators and analysts. Collection management had also been formalized and refined with collection requirements linked directly to the commander's PIR. Reporting would indicate which PIR the collected information addressed.
Early in the deployment, both CI and HUMINT single-source analysis and reporting, as well as the incorporation of CI- and HUMINT-collected information or analysis products into the all-source analysis product, was happening by chance rather than by design. This occasional dual-reporting carried the potential for confusion and misinformation. The element responsible for this analysis and reporting function in a Division Analysis and Control Element (ACE) is normally four soldiers. With 24-hour operations, it was obvious that augmentation would be required. The amount of reporting quickly overwhelmed the analytical capability and this continued to be a challenge until the fifth month of the deployment. The soldiers selected to augment the CI/HUMINT analysis in the ACE were usually personnel coming into theater on temporary change of station (TCS) orders and may or may not have had analytical experience. A senior analyst from USEUCOM trained other analysts on how to analyze CI and HUMINT information. Some soldiers quickly understood the requirement or had previous experience; however, this was the exception.
Unfortunately, due mainly to physical space limitation at Tuzla, the analytical effort was fragmented between the Division Main in Tuzla and the Division Rear in Lukavac. The Division Rear did not have workstations connected to the sensitive compartmented information (SCI) circuit referred to as DSNET 3. This severely limited their capability. They eventually did establish connectivity to the SIPRNET. This helped the situation. However, the analytical world for CI and HUMINT significantly changed in May. This was because the Division Rear CI and HUMINT analytical element, called the HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC), moved to the Division Main. They were given SCI connectivity with the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) as well as the U.S. Army WARLORD system. Also, in August the DIA, Defense Intelligence Threat Data Base System (DITDS) Program Manager, working with USAREUR and INSCOM, deployed a computer network server forward, providing for the first time automated link analysis capability, local storage for digital photographs, and another workstation which was needed for the CI and HUMINT analysts, sometimes called Multi-Discipline Counterintelligence (MDCI) analysts.
When the HAC, which had been constituted primarily from 165th Military Intelligence (MI) battalion personnel and TCSers, moved to Tuzla, it gave the Division ACE the extra capability that would prove critical in preparing for the September elections in Bosnia. They also provided other mid- and long-term analytical products for the commander. These products were impressive and could match the quality of any national- or theater-level product. Another important product read by the Task Force commander everyday was the "Night Owl." This was an open-source product, based on the translation of daily newspapers, television, and radio broadcasts throughout Bosnia. It selected articles or broadcasts which would be of interest to the tactical decision makers. Dissemination was made via the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET).
The most challenging aspect of the total analytical effort was orchestrating who would produce what product and for whom. An all-encompassing distributive analysis plan was never written or executed. Some national analysts complained that the Task Force was not reporting all the information received from the field. They were correct. There was too much information and not enough time. Reporting from the field was sent up the chain and laterally to all echelons, faster and in greater quantity in the U.S. sector than during any other military operation in history. This included text reports, hand held digital imagery and frames from handheld video. Analysts deployed with Task Force Eagle were able to develop an understanding of the real situation in the field which could not be transformed into a text message or relayed via video teleconferencing or a digital photograph. This came from interacting with the CI and HUMINT operators, making visits to various locations throughout the area of operation, and being involved in numerous operational briefings.
The use of low-cost, COTS information technologies proved to be a critical tool for the CI and HUMINT operator. Technology had never been used on this scale to support CI and HUMINT activities. One of the most significant CI and tactical HUMINT innovations was the TRRIP, which has paid great dividends in Bosnia. The TRRIP hardware and software suite provided a robust automated/data acquisition package that ensured timely reporting and product dissemination to commanders at the battalion, brigade, and task force level, as well as to national and theater consumers. This prototype system consists of COTS software and hardware connected to mobile subscriber equipment (MSE). The TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT), commercial telephone, or International Maritime Satellite (IMARSAT) provided extensive connectivity, greatly increasing the relevancy of the reporting to the warfighter and leveraging national and theater analytic assets to deliver unprecedented support.
The Army, Air Force, and Navy deployed with TRRIP-like systems. The connectivity provided by the Augsburg Hub, or server, was the critical link that enabled the CI and tactical HUMINT architecture to work throughout the theater. Access to the SIPRNET revolutionized the method by which CI and HUMINT information was processed and disseminated as well as how CI and HUMINT assets were managed. Linking the MSE network with the SIPRNET via the TROJAN SPIRIT was the critical step in ensuring connectivity to battalion level. TRRIP and SIPRNET have significantly changed the CI and HUMINT disciplines. These communities are just beginning to understand the full impact of these tools designed for the operator, not the analyst. The young CI and HUMINT soldiers in Bosnia have shown that they understand what these tools can and will do.
The database capability built by the DIA DITDS Program Office was known as the BLACKBIRD database. This was an operator's database used to file every spot report. In Task Force Eagle, these reports were called FPIRs and all were databased, no matter how insignificant. Allied reporting was also fed into BLACKBIRD. Information that normally would go into the battalion, brigade, or maybe the Task Force INTSUM would retain its individuality in the BLACKBIRD database, thus making the information much more powerful. This would prove critical in conducting link and pattern analysis or building association matrixes. This would also provide historical knowledge for the follow-on CI/HUMINT soldier.
The first lesson learned was that you will learn 100 things a day in the first 3 to 6 months of most contingency operations. The second lesson learned is that you must try to write down at least 1 of those 100 things you learned every day. The observers or the visiting professionals sent into the area for a short time to capture the lessons learned for you will not understand the essence of what you learned. You will be frustrated by reading their lengthy reports about what you did right, what you could have done better, and even how to fix it. They will not be accurate and it will irritate you because they have not recorded what you told them when you took the valuable time from your busy day to explain something to them. The bottom line is, if you are there from the beginning, living in miserable conditions, sleeping in your vehicle night after night, eating Meals Ready-to-Eat (MREs), filling sandbags, pulling guard duty, wondering when you might get a hot shower; write down what you learned. That is part of your job as a soldier. The CI and HUMINT soldiers, with their computers, were able to capture numerous lessons learned. The following are some of those lessons learned.
Detailed planning is necessary. During the planning phase, the leadership must bring in the experienced operators who have been on the ground and understand the task at hand. One seasoned veteran referred to this team as "the dirty thirty." The composition of this team must be carefully crafted to include the conceptual thinker, the pragmatist, the writer, the coordinator, the marketeer, the visionary, and the leader. They are all needed. One of the team must understand the Joint Operations, Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The others must understand the capabilities and limitations of the assets being considered to accomplish the mission. The plan must be straightforward and understood at the lowest echelon. Those at the lowest level must know that they can influence the plan with their input once they are in the execution phase. The success of executing the branches and sequels will depend upon this critical input.
Actionable intelligence must be provided. CI and HUMINT operators must understand that their information must be delivered to the customer immediately. In the Information Age the decision cycle becomes compressed; no longer can CI and HUMINT operators agonize over punctuation, format, and grammatical correctness. There should be limited locations in the architecture for quality control, preferably at the lowest level. Editing and vetting can be accomplished later, prior to the incorporation of the information into a national-level centralized database. The warfighter cannot wait for that. Speed and accuracy must prevail over form.
The demand for handheld imagery will increase. Handheld digital imagery, as well as handheld video, took on an importance that was predicted well before soldiers deployed to Bosnia. Unfortunately, database storage and retrieval of this information is still an unfullfillable requirement. Combat camera crews, the Task Force historian, soldiers manning critical checkpoints, and soldiers inspecting cantonment areas all had digital cameras along with every CI and HUMINT team. The product was demanded by the commanders. In SSOs the digital photo or video clip that is delivered quickly can have more impact than satellite or UAV imagery.
The J2X or G2X function is a must. This element is essential to all JTFs now and in the future, no matter what the mission. CI and HUMINT assets are essential to support the force protection mission. Joint doctrine must continue to be developed to further refine the integration of CI and HUMINT into joint and combined operations.
Modern information systems and communications are critical to the success of CI and HUMINT. CI and HUMINT had never before used computers and communications as a tool on the scale that they were used during Operation Joint Endeavor. Furthermore, it was accomplished without a dedicated, funded program. CI and HUMINT soldiers in Bosnia initially had 3-year-old systems because the USAREUR and subordinate operational commands had acquired funds, designed a system based on COTS, and fielded the capability they knew they needed. DoD and the services should ensure that the CI and HUMINT community can benefit from state-of-the-art technology. The need for a program office which responds to CI- and HUMINT-user defined requirements from the strategic to the tactical levels is evident.
CI and HUMINT single-source analysis is essential but difficult. Collecting information is easy compared to the task of telling the warfighter what it means and doing so in time for action to be taken. Reporting yesterday's news has limited utility. Predictive analysis is an art form. In the area of force protection, identifying periods of increased risk based on analyzed information may be the best the intelligence community can do. The Task Force commander will act when presented with a conclusion that indicates a greater threat at a certain time and place. These must, however, not be whims but well thought out analytical conclusions. CI and HUMINT require knowledgeable analysts who understand the collector.
Analysis maximizes the use of collection resources. The more analysts-to-collector interface, the better the collection effort. Analyst and collector dialogue, either electronically or face-to-face, paid dividends. The collectors understood that someone was actually interested in what they were collecting and they soon developed a keen sense of the type of information that the analyst was actually looking for. The collection manager's job became easier. The main task was ensuring that the best assets were going against the right requirement at the right time, a synchronization effort that included both CI and HUMINT collection assets. This is often given lip service in the overall collection planning cycle.
Assets must be focused and responsive. This is difficult with as many as 200 individual professional, collection personnel on the ground and approximately 20,000 more soldiers with eyes and ears interacting with the population. UAV's, satellites, and other technical collection systems are much easier to control and synchronize. Keeping the 200 professional CI and HUMINT collectors focused and responsive was a learning process, but eventually met with success. They all eventually responded to the Task Force commander's requirements first.
Investment in the training base is needed. Soldiers were deployed who were not trained with the skills that would be necessary to operate in this complex environment. CI and tactical HUMINT soldiers were trained in basic soldier skills. However, the bread and butter skills of a CI or HUMINT collector on the ground had been neglected. This was no surprise. The Army trains for the scenario with the most risk, the high-intensity battle. If mistakes are made on the battlefield, more firepower with creative and decisive maneuver can turn the battle. However, in a Bosnia-like situation, more firepower will not always work. Skills, including use of technology, must be taught before deployment. Skills such as how to anticipate requirements or how to think and undertake creative problem solving are important. The answer to the challenge is not usually in the manual.
Investment in training warfigthers must become a top priority. Giving the Task Force commander and his G2 25 CI and tactical HUMINT teams, assets from the DHS, multinational CI and HUMINT soldiers, and national agency assets was like giving a mechanic a new tool for working on a car and saying, this is a great tool and will make the car run better, but we are not going to teach you how to use it. Training the warfighter in Bosnia on how to use the CI and HUMINT assets available was at times a challenge. The Task Force commander quickly understood the capability and began to set high expectations. He had never had these assets available during any training exercise. Luckily, that did not seem to make a difference. Commanders at lower echelons reacted differently to using CI and HUMINT assets. The intelligence community must not forget to teach the warfighter about CI and HUMINT.
A solid, realistic plan with built-in flexibility is the key to success. The CI and HUMINT annex to the OPORD must be completed during the planning cycle, not after the operation has begun. CI and HUMINT must ensure that they are closely involved in the planning cycle and not on the outside looking in.
Know your players. Leading and managing a pick-up team is a difficult proposition. You must learn your players' capabilities as quickly as possible. Hopefully, you will be sent some known quantities who will make life a little easier. Set soldiers up for success as often as possible.
Good support is critical. The backend support is as critical as what is happening in the sector. Soldiers who are forward-deployed will always need something from the rear-get it to them.
Know your equipment. Check it, check it again, and if time allows check it again. This seems simple, but with new technology or inserted technology, this is a must. Leaders must ensure that there is time to conduct the appropriate checks, and then ensure the checks are done.
Common sense lessons learned are sometimes forgotten.
The mission in Bosnia continues. The lessons learned continue. We cannot afford to make the same mistake twice in a highly volatile environment such as exists in Bosnia or in the next Bosnia. The CI and HUMINT soldiers deploying in as follow-on forces have benefited from the knowledge of those who have gone before.
As the DoD continues to do more with less in non-traditional, non-linear operational environments, the capability provided by CI and HUMINT soldiers must not be overlooked. Commanders at all levels will continue to call upon those resources to assist in developing the situational awareness necessary to ensure that U.S. soldiers embark upon operations with an acceptable level of risk. In Bosnia, the CI and tactical HUMINT soldiers adapted quickly to an unfamiliar operational environment not normally experienced at the National Training Center or during any other armored division training event. They proved their worth as they developed innovative and effective tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet the demands they faced. As a proven commodity, CI and HUMINT soldiers, as well as those responsible for managing both the CI and HUMINT programs, must be given the latitude to continue developing new doctrine, leveraging new technology, and refining current methods and procedures. They are a critical asset who must be protected and supported as they pursue positive change to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and into the 21st century.
| Bosnia Index | Foreword | Acknowledgments | Preface | I. Introduction | II. Bosnia—Setting the Stage | III. Command and Control Structure | IV. Intelligence Operations | V. Civil-Military Cooperation | VI. The International Police Task Force | VII. Information Activities | VIII. Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle | IX. Counterintelligence and HUMINT | X. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Soldier's Perspective | XI. C4ISR Systems and Services | XII. NDU/CCRP Bosnia Study | XIII. Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned | XIV. Summary | End Notes | Appendix A: The Dayton Peace Agreement Summary | Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events | Appendix C: References | Appendix D: Acronyms | About the Contributing Editor | About the Authors