The use of an Army-provided Reach-Back capability to the Central Region proved effective in providing access to a broader range of voice and information services available through gateways with the U.S. strategic network, the Defense Information Infrastructure. The capability provided good access to Army activities in the Landstuhl, Kaiserslautern, Mannheim, and Heidelberg areas where a lot of the deployed active duty forces came from. It also served the needs of a large number of the CONUS-based deployed forces, such as the Civil Affairs and PSYOPS units. There was also a single-node Air Force Reach-Back capability to Ramstein AB, Germany.
The Army Reach-Back nodes (figure 11-17) were set up in Germany several days prior to the deployment of the tactical equipment to Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary. Upon arrival in country, the first priority was to establish connectivity with the Reach-Back nodes. Tactical satellite assets were used for this purpose and enough assets were also deployed to ensure that dual and triple connectivity could be established to other TRI-TAC switches as well. The tactical networks were interconnected with the U.S. strategic network at three locations in Germany-Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Kaiserslautern. At the peak of the operation there were 228 trunks connecting the tactical voice network to the Defense Switched Network (DSN) alone.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) continued to be an important military capability and was used for marking of the IEBL and the ZOS, vehicle tracking, asset tracking, and precision navigation and position identification.
At the outset of Operation Joint Endeavor, almost every Air Mobility Command location reported inadequate communications capability to include the transmission of classified information. The operating units at both Rhein-Main and Ramstein ABs, Germany, were unable to communicate with the CAOC in Vicenza, Italy, on a required basis during the first several weeks of the operation. This resulted in frustration, as tasking was not received in a timely manner. Questions concerning missions and/or operations could not always be answered directly without extended delays. For example, at Vicenza it took weeks to get a STU-III in the Regional Air Movement and Coordination Center (RAMCC). The RAMCC also did not have a classified e-mail capability. The working environment needed to safeguard operationally sensitive information, especially when participating in combined operations.
The Air Force C2 systems, the Global Decision Support System (GDSS), and the C2 Information Processing System (C2IPS) were undergoing upgrades when the operation was initiated. The systems were neither reliable nor user friendly. There were problems with the old and the new GDSS passing information to the old and new C2IPS. Some of the basic flight information was passed between systems, but remarks and comments were not. As a result, information about mission success, diversions, and cargo delivery was not always passed. The deployed operators also lacked adequate training to update and use the C2 systems and there were not enough trained personnel present and designated for ensuring that data was entered correctly and updated regularly.
Additionally, AMC resources were diverted from mission-specific tasks when duplicate requests for information were received from numerous agencies. There was a perception that the information being requested was for general information briefings and not decision making. For example, a request for a certain piece of information concerning aircraft reliability may have been pursued by three different divisions within the same directorate at AMC headquarters, as well as the TACC, the Air Staff and Joint Staff, and a variety of other organizations from the theater and throughout the DoD. As a result, deployed and headquarters personnel spent a great deal of time gathering and disseminating data and information instead of running the operation. This was a problem that was not unique to the Air Force but was pervasive across all IFOR and national organizational elements. Information requests must be managed carefully because they have the potential to grow and become more than just a burden on a given staff or organization.
The Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS) was deployed to Rhein-Main AB. The AFMSS consisted of a deployable ground mission planning system and a portable system. The ground system was used for aircraft flight planning at the main operating base and the portable laptop system was used to plan missions at remote locations. The system deployed to Rhein-Main supported C-17 operations into Bosnia, including President Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Perry's visits to Bosnia. The C-17 crews planned and built their missions, downloaded the information, and then loaded it into the C-17's onboard computer. The aircrews cut the mission planning time to less than an hour. The use of high-resolution imagery and digital terrain elevation data allowed aircrews to fly their missions on the computer. The system also provided airfield orientation, high terrain, and threat awareness and tactics analysis. AMC's Tanker Airlift Control Center used charts and maps produced by the AFMSS system at AMC headquarters to plan the initial routes used in the Bosnia airlift operation. AMC aircrews used AFMSS in daily operations between Rhein-Main and Bosnia. Additional support was given in providing joint operations graphics and charts to the JSTARS operations.
The late and somewhat fragmented arrival of the Army Combat Service Support (CSS) elements, coupled with the arriving users being unprepared to set up their communications and automation equipment (the long-haul communications at the NSE were up and operating), put them at a disadvantage at the outset. March and April 1996 were spent establishing support areas and finally in May the logistics communications were established, supply support areas became operational, and supply backlogs were diminished. The Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS), such as SAMS, ILAP, SARSS, SIDPERS, SPBS-R, ULLS, TAMMIS, and SAAS, supported the operation. Logistics also became a proving ground for advanced technology and concepts for developing automated systems to support force projection. Systems such as Total Asset Visibility (TAV), Intransit Visibility (ITV), Automated Manifesting System (AMS), Objective Supply Capability (OSC), Exportable Logistics System (ELS), and others were deployed to help improve the operation. An interesting Internet aspect was the use of the World Wide Web by ITV to determine locations of parts shipped in containers marked with RF tags. The ITV Home Page allowed managers to use a requisition query process imbedded in the Website. This helped managers estimate when parts arrived, thus preventing duplicate requisitions and setting priorities for receipt processing on arrival. The downside of deploying the prototype information systems was that the advanced technology outpaced the ability of the O/M support force to maintain the systems. The systems were also subject to environmental and human vulnerabilities that influenced their ability to provide reliable service, e.g., RF tags and bar codes missing, unauthorized software loads, untrained personnel trying to fix problems, freezing temperatures, high humidity, dust, and dirt.
U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support was the best that could be provided anywhere in the world. The United States leveraged its SIGINT, CI, HUMINT, OSINT, IMINT, and MASINT disciplines and capabilities and brought both its operational and advanced technology prototype systems to bear to provide the commander with "Information Dominance." Also key to the operational success was the contribution of many different intelligence organization elements-EUCOM J2; the analysis centers such as the JAC, UCIRF, and FOSIF; support activities such as the NICs and the National Intelligence Support Teams; and the CI/HUMINT teams on the ground in country to name a few.
Historically, weather has had a significant impact on military operations and Operation Joint Endeavor was no exception. The Balkans lacked a modern meteorological system and indigenous weather data was sparse. The 7th Weather Squadron and USAREUR weather staff provided accurate, timely, and relevant weather intelligence. The SWO provided numerous briefings and products that included satellite weather imagery of the Central Region and the area of operation, 24- and 48-hour forecasts, and weather impacts on operations. Thanks to the use of a German satellite communications weather broadcast system, the amount of real-time useful weather data to the troops in the field was the best in the history of the U.S. military. Weather personnel were deployed to IFOR, the ARRC, USAREUR (FWD), MND(N), and several base camps, but lacked sufficient manning to provide observers to other key locations. Remote weather support required more reliable communications from both the Air Force and Army to ensure climatologic data was received by supported units.
The JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System), JMICS (Joint Military Intelligence Communications System), and Trojan Spirit systems were used to extend wide-band intelligence services into theater supporting SCI and collateral secure voice, data, facsimile, video, secondary imagery dissemination, and other intelligence-oriented information services. The Trojan Spirit extended 128kb/s service to the brigade level, 32 to 64kb/s for SIPRNET, and the remaining bandwidth for JWICS (DISNET-3) and for secure telephones. This in itself was a success story. It was not, however, envisioned that Trojan Spirit would be used to support a broader set of C3I needs. The capability was limited in the number of terminals and capacity per terminal and was really designed as an intelligence community asset. INTELINK and LOCE information networks were used to support intelligent dissemination of intelligence and other information. The U.S. INTELINK and INTELINK-S also provided Internet-like Web services and Netscape browser tools to facilitate collaboration, coordination, and search capabilities for improved information retrieval and dissemination.
The JDISS, DISE, TRRIP, and other intelligent workstations provided access to a core set of intelligence databases and applications. JDISS was the theater link to the rest of the intelligence world. TRAP, TIBS, and TRIXS broadcast and intelligence exchange services were provided. The ASAS-WARLORD workstations that supported all source data processing and manipulation formed the backbone of the division intelligence architecture and were used extensively. Access to ASAS-WARLORD was provided to the NORDIC and Russian brigades and the Turkish battalion supporting MND(N). UAVs, such as Predator and Pioneer, were used extensively for monitoring important areas of interest. NATO AWACS, JSTARS, U2, and other capabilities were employed to provide information that could be used to demonstrate to the FWF that they could be seen any time of the day or night and under all weather conditions. The message was clearly sent to the FWF that compliance would be closely monitored and enforced by IFOR.
There were innovative uses of deployed capabilities to meet operational needs. For example, the AH-64 gun camera tapes were processed through the MITT, which is normally a CORPS-level asset but was deployed to the division for this operation. Using the MITT frame-grabber capability and annotation software, it was possible to select an image or frame and exploit the still image. Hence, exploited unclassified images could be produced within 12 hours and given to the allies and the FWF. It was easy to convince the FWF to move tanks out of the ZOS when you could show them a clear picture with the AH-64 crosshairs on the side of the tank. Interestingly, in a 1992 Army after action report for Desert Storm it was noted that better use should be made of the helicopter gun cameras for intelligence purposes in support of the ground commander. It took a couple of innovative enlisted men several years later on the ground in Bosnia to recognize and use the new technology deployed for other purposes in a different way to bring it to a reality. The capability was also used with Combat Camera footage and amateur handheld video camera tapes.
Timely transmission of Combat Camera and CI/HUMINT digital camera products and the integration of these products into the information operations network were challenges faced early in the operation. Adjustments had to be made to accommodate these needs. One of these adjustments was the integration of the U.S. CI/HUMINT commercial notebook computer-based data acquisition, management, and communications system into the SIPRNET. The capability is referred to as TRRIP (Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package). Linking the U.S. MSE network with the SIPRNET via Trojan Spirit provided connectivity to the battalion level for TRRIP users and significantly enhanced the operational effectiveness of the CI/HUMINT teams-a real success story. MSE in MND(N) was also linked to SIPRNET via the reach-back locations and this offered an opportunity to access a much greater capacity than the Trojan Spirit linking.
Another innovation based on commercially developed and available technology occurred in February 1996, when the CI/HUMINT team in Tuzla realized that the TRRIP too could play a role in exploiting Apache gun camera and other video sources to obtain images for the brigade commanders. By using the SNAPPY commercial freeze-frame product plugged into the back of the TRRIP, they could view video and do frame grabbing. The TRRIP lash-up did not have the annotation capabilities of the MITT but it could give the commanders snapshots of violations or other insights that they could then use with the FWF or otherwise. In this case, several SNAPPYs (high 8 video cameras, small-screen viewers, batteries, a freeze-frame printer, and power packs) were purchased by OSD(C3I) Office of Special Technology and provided to CI/HUMINT teams within 1 week of identifying the requirement. This COTS solution significantly enhanced the CI/HUMINT team capability at the brigade and battalion levels.
There were numerous other strategic and tactical ISR and communications capabilities deployed to support intelligence operations. Many of the systems deployed were stand-alone, and it was not clear to personnel in theater whether adequate consideration had been given to the integration of these capabilities in the operational environment. Division personnel felt that the burden of integration was placed on the units rather than having been done in advance of deployment as part of an integrated intelligence architecture. As a result, there were duplications and inefficient use of scarce bandwidth. This situation also contributed to training, maintenance, and logistic support problems as well as system performance and responsiveness to user needs. Furthermore, there was no one computer system that effectively balanced power, flexibility, and user-friendliness. The units had to determine the best machine to build a particular database on and the best format to put it in.
In spite of the enhanced capabilities and broadband systems extended into theater, the warrior on the ground and on the move was still operating in the range of kb/s. Some were getting access to 64kb/s but most were still limited to something less than this and in many cases had to operate in the 2.4kb/s to 9.6kb/s range. The JSOTF2 was allocated 32kb/s access, which in their assessment was insufficient to meet the intelligence systems communications needs. The Task Force Eagle G2 After Action Review noted that the MSE was not powerful enough to handle the division intelligence dissemination needs and this impacted their production and dissemination operations. The Task Force's 26 WARLORD terminals were interconnected via the MSE packet switch network. The graphic presentations, maps, and images produced could not be easily disseminated to the brigades over this network because the interconnecting communications pipes were too small. Instead, the production method had to be tailored to meet dissemination needs. If products were to receive wide dissemination they would be produced in textual format to ease dissemination problems. If the products were to receive limited and specialized dissemination then graphics were the medium of choice. In either case, production and dissemination operations were being affected by the size of the communications pipes. DISA-Europe lessons learned also noted that the military tactical systems were unable to fully support the bandwidth demands (e.g., VTC, SIPRNET, NIPRNET, and telemedicine) and leased commercial service was the only way to provide the deployed commanders the same service they were used to in garrison. It was also necessary to use contractor personnel to fill the gap in trained military O&M personnel in country. The use of commercial products and contracted O&M personnel added training demands for both the military and the contractors.
The advanced technology community stood poised to offer enhanced C4ISR capabilities for U.S. national and selected IFOR use. A wide range of the U.S. military's advanced technologies were deployed to the Bosnia theater which, among other capabilities, allowed the troops in MND(N) to electronically reconnoiter the landscape with a thoroughness that essentially allowed them to see day or night, in all weather, and in real time. The surveillance capabilities ranged from satellites in orbit to remote sensing devices buried in the ground, with an array of air and ground systems in between. If within an "area of interest" a phone call was made, a radio message was sent, or something moved on a Bosnia highway, the odds were it was known to the commanders and tracked by the systems.
Some of the advanced technologies were used before the IFOR deployment. For example, the PowerScene, a 3-D terrain visualization simulator (designed by Cambridge Research Assoc.) using computer-enhanced composites of satellite imagery, maps, and photographs, provided access to a "virtual Bosnia" that could be used to "fly" over the entire country and see realistic details down to one-meter resolution. The system was used for preflight rehearsals during the 1995 NATO bombing attacks and it was also a critical component of the Dayton peace talks. Tactically, the 1st AD used it to plan troop movements through a potentially hostile Bosnia countryside.
The Bosnia C2 Augmentation System/Joint Broadcast System (figure 11-18) was deployed in spring 1996 to provide improved wide-band connectivity and broadcast information services. These services accommodated intelligent push and pull of critical C2 information and services, such as intelligence, weather, broadcast news, and GCCS services to IFOR, the ARRC, and the MND headquarters. JBS was also used for real-time Predator video distribution.
The Army fielded the most advanced telemedicine system in history to provide medical care to U.S. forces in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary. The high bandwidth system supported applications such as telesurgery, telemedicine, telepsychology, and teledentistry. The Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany, the Combat Support Hospital (CHS) in Tszar, Hungary, and the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) in Tuzla were linked to each other and to medical centers in the states. Internet access was also provided. It was reported by DISA that about 10 percent of the U.S.-provided bandwidth in the operational area was allocated to telemedicine activities. This focused attention on the need to reexamine the priorities for circuit preemption, since traditionally higher priority C2 and mission support users preempted telemedicine consultations either in progress or scheduled to temporarily restore failed circuits supporting their operations.
The Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV) system was another advanced capability deployed to Hungary and Bosnia to track assets on order from a supplier, in transit, or in storage. JTAV was not the only asset visibility system deployed. A system was developed by the Volpe Transportation Center that used RF tags and GPS, and the International Transportation Information Tracking (In-transit) system was also deployed. The Army also used a number of tiered logistics systems such as the Unit Level Logistic System, the Standard Army Retail-Level Supply System, and the Department of the Army Movement Management System.
Network and system management was the glue that held all of the U.S. C4ISR pieces together. There were a number of different players on the U.S. side. The Joint Staff (J6Z) managed UHF and SHF SATCOM allocations and coordinated Joint Staff responses to CINC requests for additional contingency asset support. USEUCOM (J6) established a Joint Communications Operations Center to monitor and coordinate theater CIS activities. DISA-EUR managed the European theater Defense Information Infrastructure and extension of its capabilities such as DSN, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and the IDNXs into Croatia and Bosnia. DISA and the Regional Space Support Center managed the DSCS satellite system. The DIA managed the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and its extension into the area of operation. USAFE established a network operations center in Ramstein, Germany, to manage Air Force assets supporting the operation. USAREUR/5th Signal Command managed the Reach-Back and the deployed voice, data, and VTC tactical networks from their Theater Network Operations Center (TNOC) in Mannheim, Germany. They were the principal provider of staff and expertise to the CJCCC and they also had network management capabilities and staff at USAREUR (FWD) in Hungary, Task Force Eagle in Bosnia, and other brigade and battalion network management operations. There were other organizations managing mission support systems for logistics, medical, personnel, and other activities. The intelligence community had a number of different organizations managing the numerous ISR systems and services supporting the operation, including the Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, England, and the USAREUR Combat Intelligence Readiness Facility in Augsburg, Germany. Finally, DISA established a Joint Information Management Center in the Pentagon to manage the BC2A/JBS.
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) reported that they processed more than 1,400 Telecommunications Service Order (TSO) requests for extension of Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) connectivity and services into the theater. Over 740 of these requests were urgent, with 400 of them being requested within the first month of the deployment.
The redeployment of the ARRC was accompanied by the redeployment of the UK Signal Regiment (the United Kingdom was the framework nation supporting the ARRC) with its PTARMIGAN and IARRCIS CIS systems, including some other C2 capabilities. The U.S. TRI-TAC/MSE network was expanded to replace PTARMIGAN at the corps level and to provide connectivity to the SFOR Multinational Forces. The IFOR CRONOS system replaced the IARRCIS as the C2 capability for SFOR. The EUROMUX system was deployed by the UK in MND(SW) to replace the PTARMIGAN system at the division level. The replacement of PTARMIGAN with the EUROMUX resulted in some interoperability problems between the EUROMUX and MSE and the TTC-39D that needed to be resolved. For example, at the conclusion of the IFOR operation, the EUROMUX interface to the U.S. systems was only working in one direction. Calls could be initiated from EUROMUX to the U.S. network intercept operator but calls could not be completed from the U.S. systems to EUROMUX. EUROMUX was a newer version of PTARMIGAN but with less functionality. EUROMUX had fewer switching capabilities than PTARMIGAN but was much more suitable for a smaller user base such as the new operation. The EUROMUX had an advantage over PTARMIGAN in that it was more modern and required much less manpower to operate. The SFOR configuration resulting from the redeployments is depicted in figure 11-19.
In addition to the withdrawal of the ARRC framework nation CIS systems (i.e., the UK PTARMIGAN and IARRCIS), the TOA to LANDCENT/SFOR also required some reconfiguration and redeployment of the IFOR-procured CIS infrastructure, some of which was destined for AFSOUTH's use. Part of the reconfiguration included accommodating the move of the headquarters SFOR from the annex at the Tito Residency to Ilidza and the modernization of the SFOR command center CIS support. Therefore, CIS equipment essential to the headquarters of the LANDCENT Component Commander and Commander SFOR had to be replaced in some cases and added to in other cases to meet SFOR requirements. In regard to the latter, the CRONOS local area network (LAN) established at the SFOR headquarters was extensive. Its LAN featured a 100mb/s backbone, 10mb/s links at the staff level, fiber optic links to the workstations, connections to 13 external wide area circuits, and a substantial population of workstations. Although most of the information distribution was by e-mail, automated data replication using the Public Folder tool and access via Web-based tools were also introduced. Expanded functionality for CRONOS applications such as PAIS and CRESP was included as well.
NATO HQ staff needed to be convinced that equipment already procured for IFOR could not be used in toto to meet LANDCENT/SFOR requirements. This raised the significant and ongoing challenge of equipment accountability. Despite the questions of eligibility, NATO common funding of CIS infrastructure was approved and procurement initiated to support the LANDCENT/SFOR requirements.
There were unintended consequences associated with the TOA to LANDCENT and the removal of the ARRC and the PTARMIGAN, IARRCIS, and other ARRC-provided CIS capabilities. EUROMUX and MSE did not entirely replace the functionality of PTARMIGAN. For example, there was no replacement for the PTARMIGAN secure voice conference capability and secure SCRA. The UK THISTLE system, which was used by the ARRC to build and distribute the ground order of battle, was pulled out. The ARRC's geographic support, which provided the map and boundary databases used by all IFOR command elements, was not removed but arrangements had to be made with the UK to lease the system to NATO. And finally, the CIS capabilities of the Allied Military Intelligence battalion were also impacted by the withdrawal of ARRC equipment. These capabilities either required replacement or enhancements to support the SFOR operation adequately. As a result, some confusion, difficulty, and expense caused a delay in providing minimum essential CIS to the new HQ SFOR in Sarajevo.
The TOA to LANDCENT/SFOR also had some unintended consequences for the U.S. military CIS providers. Since the commander LANDCENT/SFOR was also the commander USAREUR, it was necessary to provide additional CIS capabilities to support his national responsibilities. Some of the services that had to be extended to the new headquarters facility in Ilidza (outside of Sarajevo) were secure and nonsecure (including Internet) data network and e-mail services, extensions off the Red Switch in Stuttgart, U.S. Secret mobile radio communications, and numerous DSN secure telephones. TACSAT and line-of-site communications, secure facsimile, U.S. television, and video teleconferencing were other capabilities that had to be provided. Simultaneously, Task Force Eagle downsized and transitioned from the 1st Armored Division to the 1st Infantry Division. The tactical network changed from the 22nd Signal Brigade and 141st Signal Battalion to the 121st Signal Battalion. The NATO and associated MND(N) downsizing (60,000 to 30,000 troops) and leadership change resulted in a major reconfiguration of the U.S. tactical satellite and switched network support to NATO throughout the area of operation as well.
Commercialization came in several forms. First, commercial products and services were used to augment the military systems deployed, as was the case with the IDNX and VSAT. In some cases, such as the NATO CRONOS network and U.S. NIPRNET and SIPRNET, they provided the strategic- and theater-level information services required for command and control operations. Commercial products and services were also an integral part of advanced technology capabilities deployed to theater, e.g., the U.S. BC2A/JBS information services and broadcast network. Commercialization played a role in the exit strategy when used as a means to replace tactical telecommunications systems with commercial capabilities such as the IPN for the IFOR telecommunications network and the Sprint contract to replace U.S. tactical systems in Hungary and Bosnia.
Use of commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) desktop and laptop computers and use of Microsoft Office Professional and MS mail were crucial steps in achieving information standardization for the IFOR operation. Microsoft Mail was not a universal platform that lent itself well to a dynamic environment such as Joint Endeavor where different e-mail clients and operating systems were employed. The only operating system that could be used to access Microsoft Mail remotely was Windows 95. Some users had to purchase Windows 95 so that they could access the system.
Information was easily exchanged using MS Word, PowerPoint, and Excel. MS Word was used by MND(N) to write FRAGOs, which were sent using FTP through the MCS to the subordinate commands. No comprehensive software users training was provided and so many operators had to learn on the job. Advanced training would have made it easier and faster for all users to learn MS Office Professional.
Using non-ruggedized hardware required special consideration. Daily cleaning and use of protective covers and power surge protectors were a must in the Bosnia environment. Handling of 3.5-inch diskettes and other removable data sources had to be done carefully as well. Disks needed to be kept clean to avoid loss of data. Double sources of storage when practical and disk covers and protective cases were also measures used.
The commercialization of IFOR communication systems was one of the goals for the overall improvement of the CIS architecture. The timing for withdrawal of the tactical systems was very much related to the success of the commercialization process. Tactical communications systems provided the advantages of mobility, flexibility, and security. Mobility and flexibility for communication systems became less important considerations as the operation continued and the headquarters remained almost entirely static. Security for the commercialized network could be met by means such as STU-IIBs for the voice network and operation of the secure data networks CRONOS and LOCE and the secure VTC network SECRET system high. Hence, it was possible to withdraw tactical systems once the commercial network was capable of satisfying the IFOR operational needs.
The military commercialization strategy must, however, take into account the disposition of the entity one plans to lease from or have a contractor operate in-both the political disposition (willingness) and the technical disposition (enough infrastructure to provide the service). PTT commercialization worked well in Croatia, but they were really "in the rear." In the Federation, the PTT was fairly cooperative, but didn't have the infrastructure. Contractor-provided service in these two areas worked fairly well, but was slow to deliver, especially since the bandwidth requirements were raised during and after acquisition of services. In the RS, nothing worked-PTT or contractor. Contractor support outside of IFOR compounds in RS areas was not obtainable because of lack of cooperation.
The IFOR plan for the commercialization of their communications network was also aimed at reducing the costs to NATO and reducing the IFOR dependence on the UN VSAT network. The plan was to install ERICSSON MD-110 digital switches at the major headquarters, expand the commercial VSAT/IDNX network, and lease E1 connectivity including cross-IBEL connectivity from the BiH and Croatian PTTs. The evolution of the commercial network, the IFOR Private (Peace) Network (IPN), was slower than IFOR would have liked. The main difficulties centered on the slow reconstruction of the BiH PTT infrastructure and the continued unwillingness of the FWF PTTs to provide cross-IEBL connectivity.
The United States also had major commercialization efforts in Taszar and Kaposvar, Hungary, and Tuzla, Bosnia. A 5th Signal Command contract with Sprint (supported by Lucent and MATAV) was used for this purpose. The voice part of the Taszar/Kaposvar effort was completed in two parts, approximately 50 percent in December 1996 allowing a return of 163 signal soldiers and the rest in February 1997 allowing the return of the remaining soldiers. The data part was finished in April 1997. The reduction in CIS personnel in MND(N) was a result of downsizing and to a lesser degree commercialization. The commercialization of seven base camps in Bosnia (completion scheduled for the spring of 1997) and the NATO force downsizing (about a 50-percent reduction) under Operation Joint Guard would contribute to a further reduction in the U.S. military CIS personnel in theater. It was estimated that the U.S. CIS military support personnel in country would be reduced from a high of more than 2,200 at the peak of the operation to just over 300 personnel upon completion of these actions.
There were some important lessons learned in the Army's commercialization efforts. First, the vendors could not respond quickly. One needs to plan on 120 days to contract and 5 to 6 months after that for the vendor to become fully operational. The problem is that vendors are not prepositioned or prepared to send mobile systems to operate in a field environment with an inadequate support structure. Second, the vendors are unable to hire technical personnel who are willing and able to match military personnel or DoD civilians in the field in technical expertise, dedication, and sense of urgency. This observation may run counter to conventional wisdom, but technical skills are in short supply in the workforce and commercial vendor personnel are not accustomed to the demands of the military in the field.
NATO and national acquisition of products and services for use in the IFOR operation was not strictly centrally controlled, so there were inconsistencies in costs, spares, support arrangements, training, and documentation. For example, USAREUR did not coordinate its contracting with NAMSA (NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency), the NATO contracting authority in country; they used their own contracting officer. This required USAREUR contracting personnel to come from Germany and Hungary to accomplish the contracts mission when in-country NATO contracting officers could have accomplished the mission if an agreement with NATO had existed. There were few standing contracts to support contingency acquisitions. For example, at the outset DISA had a contract in place for use of the commercial space segment (the CSCI contract for transponder leasing). However, there was no DISA or other contract vehicle in place for providing earth terminals and for the installation of other equipment such as IDNXs, routers, and the O&M of installed equipment. The CSCI concept placed the responsibility for user access on the end users' CIS support organization. They were to provide the access arrangements such as a SATCOM terminal and access equipment to extend the service to the end user location.
Control of PTT costs was also a serious problem. There was no mechanism for logging commercial calls or recording usage of PTT access. Extensive operational use was made of available commercial PTT access. This was extremely expensive, but an essential way to do business, especially during the early phases of the operation. It is difficult to control the use of commercial PTT and prevent abuse, but some form of call logging and usage tracking would help.
Competitive bidding did not always realize the best product for price and in some cases did not work for IFOR. A lowest cost bid for a computer mouse bulk purchase resulted in the delivery of poor-quality equipment that failed after several weeks of use. A similar problem was experienced with the acquisition of tape for marking the minefield areas. It was also felt that the competitive bid for the NATO UHF TACSAT terminals led to different quality products (purchased 106 Harris PRC-117D and 106 Motorola LST-5E). The LST-5E narrow band performance was much better than the PRC-117D. In addition, the warranty repair cycle was much more responsive for the LST-5E (the theater experienced a period of 2 months of no spares for the PRC-117D before repaired sets were received through the warranty program, but did not have any spares problems for the LST-5E). Competitive bidding also did not necessarily work when dealing with the Serbs, since frequently there was only one source and price.
Vendor quality was also important, especially considering the environment in which IFOR operated. Vendor services and products did not always meet expectations. For some vendors, such as IEC, this was a new experience for them as well as NATO, so both were on a learning curve. NATO and national acquisition processes had to be streamlined in order to meet the time-sensitive needs of the deployment. Use of the U.S. FMS process was attempted to acquire IDNX equipment for NATO, but the process in the end proved to be too slow and cumbersome to achieve rapid acquisition. A contract between NATO and N.E.T. was used instead.
Providing spares was also an issue. Inadequate spares were purchased for equipment procured under emergency acquisitions. There were no Radio Shacks or Tandys in Bosnia to buy spare parts or other emergency off-the-shelf products. Vendor maintenance personnel of the right ethnic group did not always exist in the region of operation and special measures were necessary to get access to such personnel. Such a case was reported in MND(N) where a repairman was a Croatian and the U.S. military had to be used to get him through Serb territory to fix the equipment. In Bosnia, and the Sarajevo area in particular, all transactions were in cash and German DMs were preferred. Most vendors wanted hard cash up front and many preferred not to have formal contract arrangements.
Repair of commercial and military CIS equipment that failed in country presented some interesting challenges. Identification and evaluation of failed equipment was a problem, sometimes due to a lack of experience with the commercial equipment and in other cases due to inadequate training, documentation, and test equipment. There were warranty issues; for example, who does what repairs where? Most ADP equipment was under warranty and therefore no maintenance could be performed on it. Specific examples were computer hard drives and memory chips. Those used on SECRET LANs, for example, could not be sent back to the manufacturers for repair. For the LST-5E UHF TACSAT equipment, the antennas and handsets were not under warranty and could be repaired using operational spares; otherwise, the equipment had to be returned to Motorola for repair. There were issues related to getting the failed equipment out of theater to repair facilities and then back in country to the user, including tracking of the status of the repair process; shipping delays; repair turnaround time; and slow and often unreliable Customs processing. The repair turnaround times for assets under warranty were in many cases excessive and impacted mission capabilities.
Although USAREUR had done some thinking in advance of deployment, contractors as well as the military still found themselves on a steep learning curve once they deployed. There were issues related to where repair facilities should be located, e.g., at vendor repair facilities, at government repair facilities in Germany, at the Intermediate Staging Base in Hungary, or at facilities in Bosnia. The NATO supply system did not support NABS and TSSR equipment and special arrangements had to be made with the CJCCC to establish logistic support procedures. In this case, the equipment was sent to the 1st Combat Communications Squadron deployed in Tuzla, which then forwarded it to the Air Force repair facility at Ramstein AB, Germany. The U.S Army experienced problems with some 6,000 pieces of CIS equipment during the first 6 months of the deployment. These problems included software glitches, hardware failures, integration problems, crushed computers, dirty line printers, and computer mouse problems. Many of the issues were pervasive and difficult to solve in an operational environment.
Historically, interoperability has been one of the most difficult areas to deal with and this operation was no exception. Integration and interoperability of commercial and military systems were not always straightforward either. The IDNXs and VTCs required special interfaces with the military, PTT, and UN VSAT networks.
The analog-based STANAG 5040 was still the norm for interfacing strategic, theater, and tactical voice systems. The interface was slow, inefficient, and lacked functionality to effectively integrate the strategic and tactical voice networks to accomplish a true "system of systems." No digital interface existed for interfacing strategic and tactical digital networks. The TTC-39D experienced interface problems with the ERICSSON MD-110 switch used by the UN and IFOR. The Interim Digital Interface PTARMIGAN (IDIP) was designed by the United Kingdom specifically for this operation and was used to provide a more effective digital interface between the UK PTARMIGAN and the U.S. TRI-TAC/MSE tactical systems. Marc Space, a U.S. company, designed a special interface box to allow the PTARMIGAN store and forward to interface with the U.S TYC-39 tactical message switch-the interface was demonstrated at INTEROP 95. The EUROMMUX that replaced PTARMIGAN in the MND(SW) was not capable of accommodating a STANAG 5040 interface. Therefore, there were problems interfacing it with the TRI-TAC TTC-39D which replaced PTARMIGAN at the CORPS headquarters level (i.e., SFOR headquarters and its interfaces with the three MNDs) and the interface between MND(N) and MND(SW).
The IDNX deployment required the certification of some 50 different interface arrangements. There were no automated interfaces between the IFOR data networks (CRONOS, IARRCIS, and LOCE) and national data networks, such as the U.S. NIPRNET and SIPRNET. The CRONOS was not interfaced with LOCE or the ADAMS networks even though information was manually transferred between the systems. Network applications were not interoperable. The ADAMS movement control system and JOPES required a manual interface for exchanging information. The NATO and national intelligence systems were not directly connected and had to use manual exchanges to share information from one system to the other. For example, a correlation center was established at the JAC to populate the LOCE server with information from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and other national sources for distribution to IFOR elements. The STU-IIB, the NATO-approved secure voice equipment, was used extensively by IFOR, but a large number of the U.S. forces deployed to Bosnia with STU-IIIs that were not interoperable with the STU-IIB.
The U.S. intelligence processing system used at Echelons Above Corps (EAC) did not "talk" to the Echelons Corps and Below (ECB) systems such as JDISS. To fix the problem, an EAC processing system such as JDISS had to be deployed to ECB intelligence centers. The lack of connectivity between EAC and ECB systems was caused by security restrictions on certain intelligence information being processed with other kinds of intelligence information. Different levels of classifications and security accesses accompanied this information. Different kinds of intelligence data were compartmentalized and communicated to higher and lower users within their own stove-piped arrangements. This was a root cause of the proliferation of intelligence processing systems.
Liaison became a very important interoperability issue in IFOR. With 34 participating nations, it is easy to see that not all assigned personnel understood or spoke English, although English was the language of the operation. Therefore, liaison personnel were used to bridge the communications gap and facilitate coordination between organization elements. There were liaison cells in the CJCCC for representatives from the MNDs, ARRC, NACOSA, DISA, EUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE. The intelligence and Special Operations Forces communities used and provided liaison personnel. The MNDs used liaisons with the forces assigned to them, such as the Russian brigade in MND(N), and between themselves and with IFOR and the ARRC.
Although interoperability is continuing to improve, there is still a long way to go to achieve seamless integration of NATO, national strategic and tactical, and commercially provided CIS systems and services.
The shortfalls in the existing NATO CIS infrastructure were known at the start of IFOR. The mechanism for overcoming the shortfalls was already in place and identified within the NATO CIS Contingency Assets Pool (NCCAP) concept. The NCCAP concept combined the Allied Command Europe (ACE) CIS Contingency Assets Pool, mainly for land and air users, with the Maritime CIS Contingency Assets Pool, which was for naval users. Under the NCCAP concept, a pool of deployable CIS equipment would be procured and maintained for NATO and made available for contingency operations and exercises. Some equipment (new single- and multi-link TSGTs) was already being procured, but not delivered, when the operation started. In NATO, advance procurements are not generally planned for equipment with short manufacturing time scales in order to take full advantage of the latest commercial hardware and software technology. Contingency funding authorization is given to support rapid implementation on a need basis. The pool is enhanced where necessary with deployable assets made available by the nations. The provision of CIS assets for Bosnia was consistent with the NCCAP concept. Although the NCCAP concept was in place, there was initially very little equipment actually on hand. Furthermore, the detailed operational procedures for its use had not been finalized. Heavy reliance was therefore placed on the framework nations' national CIS assets, particularly those provided by the United States, and on leased PTT/VSAT/IDNX connectivity provided by NATO. In addition, greater reliance had to be placed on emergency procurement.
Generally speaking, NATO committees proved to be responsive and reacted flexibly to emergency CIS requests. There were some instances where the NATO CIS procurements failed to arrive in time to meet the operational commanders' requirements. In these cases, the NATO procurement cycle was too slow or unable to meet emergency requirements. In some cases, the contractor was unable to deliver and this resulted in failure to meet the operational requirement. One particular case in point was the failure of FLEXLINK to provide commercial SATCOM services. Due to the financial collapse of the FLEXLINK Company, it became necessary to find another vendor to provide the service. The Interstate Electronics Corporation (IEC) ultimately took over the contract from FLEXLINK and was responsible for providing an extension of NATO's E1/IDNX network into Bosnia to connect key IFOR locations via commercial SATCOM exclusive of the host nation's infrastructure. Because of the need to re-let the contract, the operational capability was implemented late. The implementation delay severely limited IFOR's ability to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the operation. In May 1996, the IEC network became fully operational and provided the key services and necessary bandwidth down to the IFOR, ARRC, and MND levels.
International competitive bidding was only really imposed by the NATO Infrastructure Committee for the acquisition of the TACSAT terminals. Almost all other procurements were through Basic Ordering Agreements set up by the NC3A and AFSOUTH with a range of suppliers. In some cases, market surveys were employed before deciding on the most cost-effective provider. The time pressure imposed by the operational situation mandated a pragmatic balance between cost and delivery time in all cases.
For the IFOR operation, NATO authorized over $100 million dollars for CIS expenditures. More than $60 million was spent on communications alone, the major items being UHF/SHF tactical satellite terminals, UN VSAT service leases, commercial E1 leases, the IEC commercial SATCOM/IDNX network, and the UHF SATCOM channel lease from the United States.
The pervasive use of COTS information products and services propelled NATO and IFOR into the Information Age and a new way of doing business. There was extensive use of e-mail and a reduced reliance on formal messaging systems. The formal message traffic (the NATO TARE message network) by volume (megabytes per day) was less than 10 percent of the total IFOR daily data network traffic. PowerPoint briefings were used to inform and were readily distributed over the data networks. The data networks were also used for collaborative planning and distribution of wide-band information such as images, although at times this was slow due to the limited bandwidth of the interconnecting links (64kb/s or less). The bandwidth limitations were driven by NATO constraints on minimum cost solutions and unavailability of NATO-approved crypto equipment to run the links at higher rates.
Secure VTC was used extensively by IFOR and the ARRC for collaboration and coordination and as time went on, it became the medium of choice for conducting business. The VTCs were also used by subordinate IFOR elements to conduct day-to-day business. The VTC systems performed reasonably well when operating, but they were subject to outages due to SATCOM link bit error rates, crypto synchronization problems, and PICTURETEL software lock-outs. Numerous maintenance problems occurred and when they did, there was a lot of high-level pressure put on the maintenance staff to get them repaired quickly. Such pressure may have led to addressing the symptom and not necessarily the problem in many instances.
During the early deployment phases, different telephone handsets were present in command center locations. In some cases, it was reported that as many as seven different handsets were provided due to the multiple NATO, UN, and national voice networks. Although the various networks were interfaced and it was possible to progressively navigate through them, the networks were not integrated as a system with common numbering, routing, and signaling plans and directory services. Because of manpower shortages, time constraints, and constant change, telephone book and number management was a problem. There were multiple phone books at any one time (e.g., at least three phone books existed for the U.S. network: AFSOUTH, USAREUR FWD, and Task Force Eagle) and production coordination was sporadic. Phone book and dialing instruction distribution was a problem as well. As a result, calling from one network to another required some knowledge of the operational characteristics of each of the tactical systems, how they were interconnected, and the correct dialing sequence to progress from one network to the other. People frequently carried a dialing plan on a 3"x5" card in their pockets when traveling in Bosnia or found such a plan posted near the telephones.
The military tactical voice networks also were not very user friendly. The variety of multinational users at the theater and strategic levels found them difficult to use. The end-to-end network performance was also marginal, so users tended to default to using the UN VSAT network to do business since its operation was similar to a commercial telephone system. Unlike the military networks that were end-to-end security protected, the UN VSAT was not. One could use STU-IIBs on the UN VSAT but they were in short supply. Over time, a number of the tactical phones were removed, but there were still several different types of telephone handsets in the command centers.
The leased service offered by the UN to IFOR did not meet IFOR expectations. The UN VSAT network could not handle the load IFOR put on it. There were problems in getting priority responses from the UN to provide service for new IFOR subscribers/users and to take maintenance actions to resolve performance problems. There was no single UN focal point for actions in response to IFOR requests for service-the CJCCC element in Zagreb established a UN liaison position to facilitate working with the UN.
The new data network capabilities provided IFOR the opportunity to share information more efficiently and quickly (nearly simultaneously) at all levels of the command structure. This was a vast improvement over the previous procedures requiring the corroboration of data successively reported through each level in the chain of command. It was also possible to exchange information that bypassed ("skip echelon") intervening levels of the command structure. The ability to electronically bypass levels of command to obtain information firsthand was occasionally used in the interest of expediency and providing information up the chain of command, but sometimes at the expense of leaving others in the dark. Towards the end of the IFOR operation, the problem was not one of a lack of information but rather one of finding the useful details among the wealth of information available.
The CRONOS LAN and WAN management was evolving with the operation and had been the source of some problems during the early phases of the IFOR operation because of the need for SOPs and trained network management and administration staff. There was also a conflict in the management responsibilities of the CJCCC and NACOSA caused by the SHAPE/AFSOUTH C2 differences. The NC3A, the Hague, maintained a CRONOS help desk that was connected to the network and was available to support requests for assistance from the theater.
Managing all of the information available to the commander and his staff was a difficult problem. Users lacked adequate tools to search for available information. Likewise, there were inadequate tools for managing information collection, storage, and sharing. This was particularly true early in the operation in the areas of coordinating, integrating, and fusing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and making this information available to the user. A mixture of NATO and national prototype and operational systems were used in an attempt to fuse various land, sea, and air pictures into a common tactical picture. The maritime and land pictures provided to the tactical commanders were of good quality. The air picture in the CAOC, made up from a variety of sources, was of particularly high quality. However, there was no overall integrated maritime/air/land picture provided to the commanders.
There were other sources of information such as the Internet and local and international media that needed to be incorporated into the IFOR information base. In terms of sharing classified information, security releasability was also an issue that needed to be addressed to ensure that information was put in the hands of those that needed it in a timely way without revealing sources and methods, but stringently protecting highly sensitive information.
Although extensive use was made of e-mail, VTC, and data network services, voice communications still played a major role in conducting the IFOR operation. This was true in spite of a grade of service that, at times, could exceed a 20-percent probability of blocking for call attempts during the early phases of the IFOR operation. The end-to-end voice quality was marginal especially if the call had to be routed through several different tactical switched networks. The UN VSAT network performance proved to be marginal, especially for calls out of the area of operation. Voice network performance improved towards the end of the IFOR phase of the operation, especially with the implementation of the IPN.
IFOR estimated that about 91 percent of the network capacity was dedicated to voice services, 6 percent for VTC, and 3 percent for data services. On the other hand, 5th Signal Command estimated that about 50 percent of the U.S. network was dedicated to voice services and 25 percent each for VTC and data services. If the U.S. intelligence network capacity were added to the U.S. statistics, data would certainly exceed 75 percent of the overall network capacity.
There were high hopes for extended use of cellular services in Bosnia, but effective coverage from the commercial networks could only be achieved in some parts of Croatia. A number of offers were made by cellular vendors to implement cellular services in Bosnia but were met with political opposition by the FWF PTTs. There was a proposal to operate from IFOR compounds. This had the added advantage of physical security. ARRC-Main was opposed to taking on such a responsibility because of the additional support and manpower implications. There was also a question regarding the effectiveness of the coverage of such a system. By the end of the IFOR operation, the PTT implemented a limited coverage cellular capability in Sarajevo.
Problems with viruses were experienced not only with the CRONOS and IARRCIS but also with most computers brought into the theater. The Center for Army Lessons Learned reported that within the first 60 days of operation nearly every Army computer brought into theater had been infected. Infected diskettes brought into the command centers and the swapping of diskettes (including infected ones) between the unclassified and classified systems were major sources of the problem and its proliferation. There was also a lack of personal discipline and standard operating procedures. Virus detection and correction measures were put in place along with a user information awareness campaign. Laptop computers were placed at the entrance to command centers with virus scan programs and a notice posted that all diskettes had to be scanned before being taken into the command center. Use of games on the command center computers-another source of viruses-was forbidden. C-Support in Zagreb used a diskette color-coding scheme to prevent confusion regarding classified versus unclassified. They also developed a set of operating instructions. Neither of the C-Support approaches were implemented IFOR-wide.
While most of the detected viruses were relatively benign, their ubiquitous presence underscored the vulnerability of the computers and data networks to systematic hostile attack. There was a need for improved intrusion detection capabilities for the data networks. A related issue was the lack of adequate data network configuration management and control. The CJCCC needed better configuration management tools and procedures. Security was an ongoing responsibility for which improvements were made over the duration of the operation.
Dust and dirt caused problems with disk drives and servers, creating the requirement for protective measures such as covering up computers when not in use and vacuuming the work areas and the computers themselves more frequently. Commercial power failures and fluctuations caused major CIS outages for those sites that did not have a UPS backup capability and power-line surge protectors. Sometimes the power failures were a result of planned outages. For example, the commander of the Croatia compound in Zagreb, where the UN and the IFOR C-Support were located, performed an unannounced base power outage. The interruption shut down the UN and C-Support CIS capabilities. Needless to say, swift action was taken to acquire a UPS capability to support the UN and IFOR C-Support CIS systems. Power was a serious problem that required high-level attention to get the necessary UPS capabilities deployed.
The extension of secure services to non-NATO coalition partners was also an issue that had to be dealt with by IFOR. Security policy modifications were required to accommodate the release of classified information and liaison teams were provided to non-NATO units assigned to IFOR, such as the U.S. INTEL team with the Russian brigade and the U.S.-provided narrow-band voice terminals for the PfP nations supporting the operation. IFOR CJ6 suggested that NATO might consider the use of commercially available security products to facilitate secure communications with non-NATO troop contributing nations in support of future peace operation security needs.
Network and system management of IFOR's communications and information network proved to be a major challenge (figure 11-20). An IFOR organization structure had to be created, agreed upon, and staffed quickly. The U.S Joint Pub 6-05 provided the basis for the establishment of the CJCCC to manage IFOR's network. System tools had to be acquired to monitor and manage the networks. There were multiple NATO and national players, such as SHAPE's NATO CIS Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA), the AFSOUTH CISD, the IFOR CJ6, the CJCCC, the ARRC G6, the MND G6s, and the national J6s. The roles, relationships, and activities of these organizations needed to be established and coordinated. Furthermore, overlaps in organizational responsibilities needed to be worked out since the distinction between strategic, theater, and tactical became blurred. SHAPE and AFSOUTH OPLANs and C2 differences did not help the staff attempts to resolve these overlaps. NATO communications and ADP were managed separately, and this needed to be accommodated by the CJCCC. Over time, these issues were resolved and the CIS system provided reasonable services. However, the CIS system for the most part was never heavily stressed during the IFOR operation. Therefore, the performance of the networks and the supporting management organization were never tested under more hostile or stressful conditions.
The management of the U.S. C4ISR networks was a challenge as well. C4 and ISR were managed separately as well as communications and ADP. The ISR systems were managed by different organization elements. The blurring of the strategic, theater, and tactical boundaries was a problem for the United States too. There was no doctrine defining the demarcation point between U.S. strategic, theater, and tactical systems. This had to be dealt with at the outset of the operation since strategic- and theater-level capabilities were deployed into the tactical area, resulting in overlapping responsibilities for the management organizations and no clear definition of who had end-to-end assured service responsibility.
The use of e-mail, PowerPoint briefings, PCs, and video teleconferencing not only dominated the mode of operation at division and above but was also beginning to penetrate below division as well. Tactical systems, however, still dominated at division and below. The maneuver units relied on tactical line-of-site communications. The use of non-tactical communications was at the commander's discretion. Commercial systems such as INMARSAT with STU-III and STU-IIB were used. There was also a desire for broader access to commercial services such as cellular and commercial SATCOM. Desktop and laptop computers were based throughout the tactical area. Early on these were 286 and 386 machines but it soon became necessary to deploy 486 and Pentium machines to handle the volume of data and accommodate the RAM needs of storage-hungry programs such as MS Office. Rotation of troops also added some unintended consequences. The arriving units would at times bring with them the latest version of software applications, contributing to some interoperability problems when trying to share products from different versions of software applications.
The IFOR information revolution largely stopped at the division headquarters level in Bosnia. In some cases such as MND(N) and the U.S. forces in Croatia and Hungary, higher bandwidth services were extended to the battalion level. Every U.S. base camp had telephone service and secure and non-secure data and e-mail capabilities. However, the communications and information system support to the IFOR warfighters changed very little, and the warfighters continued to operate much as they had in the past. Operations were conducted using acetate-covered 1:50,000 maps (see picture), outmoded tactical equipment, and sensor or reconnaissance systems organic to ground units.
The use of TCP/IP-based networks is proliferating for the unclassified military and commercial networks (the NIPRNET and Internet) and for the classified military networks (the NATO CRONOS and LOCE and the U.S. SIPRNET and INTELINK). Furthermore, the data networks are increasingly being relied upon by the military for supporting operational C2 and intelligence traffic. Although the IFOR and national networks performed reasonably well overall, there were problems with congestion and assured service when equipment failures and traffic-loading situations were encountered at major nodes or operations centers. Under the stress of real hostilities, where one or more operations centers or nodes are attacked or destroyed or extreme traffic overloads are encountered, the networks could gridlock or fail, catastrophically denying service to essential C2 users. The redundancy, robustness, and resiliency of the IFOR network design and supporting network and system management structure were never really tested operationally. The IFOR network and system management capabilities and structure to support C2 traffic under extreme hostile conditions were not part of the design criteria, nor was such a capability implemented. It was tough enough to create a capability to manage the integrated peace operations network derived from NATO and national systems. Alternative (low bandwidth) fall-back systems (TARE/AUTODIN and C2 voice networks) were not implemented as a reconstitution or continuity of service capability even with the danger of open hostility, as was the possibility with the RS faction. The VTC network had similar weaknesses and was a "bandwidth hog" as well. If one or more nodes or operations centers were attacked, the bandwidth to support or reconstitute VTC service would most likely not have been available. Voice conference systems such as that provided for the ARRC by PTARMIGAN could have been used as a limited conferencing backup capability. There were a couple of satellite failures that highlighted the vulnerability of the IFOR network. Actions were taken to build in some additional redundancy and establish contingency plans for reconstitution of critical C2 links.
MND(N) Command Center
Although the deployed high-technology systems generally supported the headquarters far more effectively than they supported the soldier on the ground, there were, of course, exceptions. Many innovative uses were made of the U.S. military's array of advanced technologies (mainly in the area of ISR) to more effectively support the headquarters and the soldier on the ground. In fact, Bosnia (mainly MND(N) and the CAOC) became a model for the U.S. doctrine known as "Information Dominance" and technology test beds.
U.S commanders, in particular, reported that a virtual flood of new technologies followed their deployment to Bosnia. These technologies were generally inserted incompletely and imperfectly. Many of the new systems and technologies were deployed without doctrinal support, concepts of operations and training, and logistic support packages. As a consequence, they could not be fully employed. Moreover, because they had not been through full and systematic development and testing, trained military operators were not available. Initial operations and maintenance had to be provided by contractors or the government development team personnel. Even so, these new technologies reportedly still made excessive demands on military operator personnel who had to find the time to train, learn to maintain the equipment, and develop concepts of operation. In many cases, this meant that new systems were underutilized because their full functionality and potential were not understood.
The advanced technology capabilities deployed in Bosnia were essentially stove-pipe systems and capabilities that were overlaid on the operational networks. Hence, one of the major challenges the United States and IFOR faced was the integration of these capabilities and systems into the operation and then being able to exploit them to the maximum extent possible.
Air Force and Army initiatives were directed at trying to put discipline into the technology insertion process and facilitate the deployment of advanced technologies to the theater. In January 1996, the Air Force Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom AFB established a Joint Endeavor Laboratory, now the C2 Unified Battlespace Environment (CUBE). The laboratory replicated the C3I functionality of the CAOC in Vicenza, Italy, and was used for rapid problem solving and system integration testing of new capabilities before operational deployment to the theater. A 24-hour hotline was established to support technical assistance requests from the field. ESC also deployed technical assistance teams to the CAOC to help resolve on-site integration and configuration management problems. In December 1995, the Army Materiel Command established a Bosnia Technology Integration Cell (BTIC) to serve as a clearinghouse for critical technologies and the "nerve center" for tracking and integrating the technology community's efforts to support U.S. soldiers in Bosnia. The BTIC focused its efforts on prospecting for systems that would provide American forces with a technological advantage for operations such as anti-mine, anti-sniper, communications, and surveillance.
NATO too established an advanced technology laboratory to facilitate the introduction of new capabilities and functionality into the NATO CIS systems such as CRONOS and ADAMS. The laboratory facility at the NATO C3 Agency, The Hague (NC3A) replicated the NATO CIS systems deployed in support of IFOR and was used for rapid prototyping and system integration testing. A CRONOS Help Desk was established and manned 24 hours a day to provide on-line technical assistance and answer requests for help from the field. The NC3A also deployed technical assistance teams to help resolve problems in the field.
There were concerns expressed by other nations such as the United Kingdom and France that they could not keep up with the pace of U.S. technology and that this could have significant interoperability and operational implications for future coalition operations. A clear lesson from Operation Joint Endeavor was that advanced technologies are of military value and are suitable for deployment only when they are accompanied by coherent doctrine, organizational support, equipment, people, and the ability to effectively integrate them into the operational environment. It is also important to note that not all coalition partners can afford the latest C3I technologies. Furthermore, some high-tech nations such as the United States may not be willing to share their latest capabilities with all members of a coalition of the willing, and not all coalition members use the technologies of these nations either. These are the realities of coalition operations and the way of the future. The push for the use of advanced technology will and should always be there and therefore needs to be more effectively accommodated.
Finally, as long as systems development and procurement lead times for military systems remain significantly longer than the rate of technological change in communications and automation, commercial products will be the only practical means of delivering state-of-the-art capabilities. So the challenges of augmenting military systems with commercial systems must be met and overcome.
A lot has been learned from Operation Joint Endeavor that can be applied to future peace operations. Some have particular significance for future NATO operations and the realization of the NATO CJTF and NCCAP concepts. Others can be applied to coalition peace operations in general. Some experiences are simply the realities of complex coalition operations. Others are experiences re-visited, and still others are lessons yet to be learned or in the process of being learned as a result of the IFOR experience. In the latter case, lessons learned are used in the context of the Center for Army Lessons Learned definition, "a lesson is learned when behavior changes." The following is an attempt to characterize some of the Joint Endeavor C4ISR experiences in these three categories. There is no priority of importance implied by the sequence in which they are presented.
In summary, the experiences from Bosnia reinforced the importance of information dominance. Getting the right information to the right person at the right time has significantly improved but has not yet reached or impacted the soldier on the ground to the same extent that it has changed the way business is done at higher headquarters. C4ISR interoperability continues to be a challenge, not only among the military coalition systems but also with commercial products and leased services and the systems used by the IOs, NGOs, and PVOs. Operational use of advanced information technologies and commercial products and services has become a reality and needs to be factored into the planning and training for peace operations. Innovative training and exercises and adherence to international standards are means to improving this situation as the world moves into the global Information Age.
One should not forget, however, that potential adversaries of the NATO alliance and the United States, in particular, will not be so foolish as to neglect glaring weaknesses in the C4I networks implemented in support of the IFOR operation. Active countermeasures against these networks may be the case in future operations. Doctrine and tactics based upon an assumed information dominance and freedom to communicate may not be sufficient the next time around, even for peacekeeping operations.
In conclusion, agility and accommodation continue to be keys to success, as well as some plain old good luck. Let us not forget, however, that the success of the IFOR C4I and national C4ISR network implementation and operation was in the final analysis because of the professionalism, dedication, and ingenuity of the men and women who were there and those who supported them. Good people make it happen.