Recognizing that the deployment and operation of C4ISR capabilities in support of the complex coalition peace operation in Bosnia provided a unique opportunity for learning, Mr. Emmett Paige, Jr., ASD/C3I, tasked the CCRP at NDU on February 15, 1996 to simultaneously collect experiences and lessons learned and to perform an analysis of the effectiveness of command arrangements and supporting C4ISR.
CCRP's charge was broad, covering both the effectiveness of command arrangements and the effectiveness of supporting C4ISR. Hence, the study addressed all of the classic issues of C4ISR, including structures, functions, capacities, doctrine, and training. Furthermore, CCRP was tasked to pull together the related ongoing C4ISR community activities and build a coherent C4ISR story, including lessons learned. The study charter was introduced to the Joint Staff through the J-6 (Director, Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems), and was subsequently coordinated with the J-3 (through the Vice Director for Operations). Both endorsed the effort, and the decision was made that the J-3 would be the official Joint Staff point of contact for the effort.
The CCRP Bosnia study charter listed three major tasking areas: (1) document the build up and evolution of C4I systems and capabilities provided to all echelons; (2) document command arrangements (both formal and informal) as they evolve and the rationales for changes; and (3) assess the effectiveness of command arrangements and C4I systems and the adjustments made to them over time. Command arrangements of interest specifically included those (a) associated with joint operations, (b) within and among U.S. Government (USG) organizations, (c) among military organizations (NATO, Russians, and others), (d) between the United States and NGOs and PVOs, and (e) with local governments and organizations. In addition, CCRP was tasked to unify the C4ISR community activities and put together a coherent lessons learned story.
CCRP was sensitized to the need to be unobtrusive and to minimize demands on military organizations in the theater of operations. In-theater travel and visits, while necessary for some aspects of the study, were limited to those required to support a quality product. Research activities were initiated in February 1996, and it was expected that they would continue for at least 6 months after the exit of major U.S. forces from Bosnia. With the transition of IFOR to SFOR on 20 December 1996, the NDU effort was adjusted to focus on putting the IFOR story together as a first priority. The collection of SFOR experiences and lessons learned was to continue but at a much lower level of effort.
The NDU study was designed to produce a variety of products, and a final report will summarize all of the findings on C4ISR Lessons Learned. Study results have been briefed at C4ISR community symposia and workshops such as AFCEA, MILCOM, the NDU INSS-sponsored NATO symposium, and the Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre workshop on peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Findings were also presented at the Swedish Naval Warfare Centre-sponsored Partnership-for-Peace lessons learned workshop, the NATO Panel 7 workshop on IFOR data collection and analysis, and the CCRP-sponsored International C2 Research symposium.
Using CCRP's approach of crafting balanced Mission Capability Packages (figure 12-1) to deal with emerging issues and opportunities, key findings will be provided to doctrine developers in the joint community and the services. In addition, the results will be used to develop professional military education (PME) materials for use at all levels of professional schooling. Finally, NDU/CCRP will select the most important topics and findings for publication as articles in Joint Forces Quarterly and other visible periodicals as well as books through the NDU Press.
CCRP brought together a multidisciplined, diverse group of analysts and researchers to carry out the major tasking areas of the Bosnia study charter (figure 12-2). A core team was established under the leadership of the Director of the CCRP and consisted of participants from NDU/CCRP, Evidence Based Research Inc (EBR), C4I Integration Support Activity (CISA), MITRE, and Decision-Science Applications Inc. The core team was augmented, as required, with subject area experts from organizations such as DISA, JITC, SOCOM, J2/DIA, and J6Z. Staff from the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) also provided advice and inputs to the effort.
Operation Joint Endeavor was well underway before the NDU study effort was initiated and it was quickly determined that a number of other organizations had initiated efforts that would provide important information that the NDU effort did not need to duplicate. Therefore, CCRP made identifying all related efforts its first priority. These included lessons learned activities, research efforts, and assessments of C4ISR performance in Bosnia. The roundup of all relevant efforts was a key element of CCRP's four part, highly leveraged plan for accomplishing the mission of assessing C4ISR effectiveness and collecting lessons learned.
CCRP achieved its goal of a highly leveraged effort based upon attention to four principles: coordination, collaboration, integration, and focused research. Coordination allowed CCRP to avoid duplication, minimize demands on the commands in the field, and maximize the return on its own focused data collection efforts. Collaboration permitted the effective use of access and expertise in other organizations while also allowing CCRP's expertise to be used efficiently and effectively. Integration of all the work performed, whether by CCRP personnel, those working on their behalf, or those operating under very different charters, allowed CCRP to add value to the work of others and to provide a unique and important contribution. This included collecting products from all sources; comparing and contrasting them to test for consistency of findings across time, space, levels of command, and analyst perspective; and looking across the range of available evidence in order to detect larger patterns. Integrating the mass of material generated and being able to examine it from a relatively neutral perspective, the CCRP team was in an excellent position to detect the trends dominating the Bosnia experiences and the structures and processes that drive them. Focused research by the CCRP team was reserved for key issues that (a) were central to the charter from ASD/C3I and CCRP priorities, (b) focused on topics where CCRP had or could get expertise and relevant evidence, and (c) were not being adequately covered by other agencies or organizations.
CCRP looked beyond conducting its specific technical analyses and developing specific products to helping the community at large do a better job of learning the lessons of the Bosnia experience. Therefore, CCRP devoted some of its efforts to create forums and mechanisms to encourage and facilitate studying the exchange of data, information, and ideas among the many organizations involved in studying the Bosnia experience. Formal and informal exchanges of drafts, professional discussions, workshops, publication of results, and the CCRP C2 symposia and community development programs were and will continue to be used to enrich the study and leverage its impact.
The most successful CCRP coordination initiative was the creation of a "Bosnia C4ISR Roundtable" (figure 12-3), where a range of U.S. activities involved in lessons learned and assessment of performance in Bosnia were brought together in a constructive atmosphere to encourage sharing and cooperation. The first meeting took place on April 10, 1996, with 21 activities involved. This session was an immediate and significant success. Virtually everyone present learned for the first time about one or more activities directly related to their own. Some initial findings were reported orally and consensus existed that the Roundtable should meet regularly. Participants readily agreed that the Roundtable should serve as a mechanism for reviewing draft materials and disseminating products on lessons learned and C4ISR performance.
Immediately after the first Roundtable meeting, CCRP published a directory of the organizations who had attended. This directory included the addresses (including telephone, fax, and e-mail) of the points of contact and a brief description of the relevant activities and interests of each of the organizations. An e-mail network was established to facilitate collaboration, coordination, and sharing of information. This network proved to be very beneficial to all of the participants. Follow-up meetings with a variety of Roundtable participants indicated that they had subsequently made a number of direct contacts with other members of the group and had been able to coordinate and focus their activities much better because of these new linkages.
The second meeting of the Bosnia C4ISR Roundtable took place on 30 May 1996. More than 30 activities or organizations asked to be represented, an increase of more than 50 percent from the first meeting. The agenda included presentations on several efforts that had reached preliminary findings. CCRP briefed the progress of efforts, IDA briefed their charter and first-order conclusions (largely on the planning and deployment phases) from their lessons learned effort for European Command (EUCOM), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covered findings from their analysis of policies and procedures for intelligence sharing in the context of the Bosnia operation, and the CISA team briefed the progress of its C4ISR laydown. The first results of a study by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) were reviewed. Substantive discussion among different agencies was encouraged and proved highly productive.
As implied by its name, the Bosnia C4ISR Roundtable was a meeting among equals. All those U.S. organizations with a charter to collect data or lessons learned related to C4ISR, either in terms of command arrangements or supporting systems, were welcomed, as were those agencies or organizations who were potential consumers of the results of those analyses. CCRP served as the chair of the Roundtable. The organizations listed in figure 12-3 were all self-nominated by declaring that they had a role in Bosnian C4ISR and an interest in its assessment.
Taken together, the Roundtable was a major asset to the broad task of developing valid and meaningful lessons learned on the Bosnia C4ISR experience. While participation was voluntary, the value of the information exchange created a very real incentive for joining and attending. CCRP continued to use the Roundtable for the duration of the IFOR phase of the Bosnia operation. It was a useful mechanism to coordinate efforts and to ensure cross-checking of facts and findings within the community.
The rich set of lessons learned and effectiveness assessment activities already underway (figure 12-4) when the CCRP study started represented both major opportunities and potential problems. On the one hand, the opportunities for synergistic work were obvious. Moreover, as CCRP made contacts in the theater and the U.S. community, virtually everyone indicated a willingness to cooperate and a positive attitude toward working together. Every organization involved in lessons learned or performance assessment also recognized that many different activities were underway. Almost all of them also expressed a strong desire for efficient and effective information exchange in this arena.
At the same time, there was a potential for problems to arise from the number and variety of activities underway. Overlapping missions and redundancy of data collection efforts were the most obvious. The demands on the time of key officers and staff in the field commands and operational headquarters were already high and a multitude of visitors became a significant burden. From the IFOR Joint Analysis Team (JAT) headquarters to the field commands, CCRP's analysts heard complaints about "IFOR Tourism" almost from the first contacts in theater. Some of these comments were pointedly directed at the United States, which reportedly had the largest number of visitors in the theater. Moreover, NATO sensitivity about national access to materials within NATO commands remained high and, reportedly, had not been well handled by U.S. and other national activities.
CCRP's approach was heavily influenced by attempts to take advantage of ongoing efforts where it could focus its limited resources on collecting data and conducting analyses of key issues. Considerable progress was made. By stressing collaboration, working closely with the JAT and selected U.S. activities, establishing mechanisms for cooperation and information exchange, and positioning itself to address key issues in command arrangements and C4ISR, CCRP was able to put an efficient and productive process in place and bring a coherent picture into focus. Having set up the necessary data collection and sharing mechanisms, CCRP became fully engaged in documenting the Bosnia C4ISR experience and identifying and researching key issues.
Three major thrusts existed (figure 12-4) in the IFOR lessons learned arena: NATO's formal effort, the NDU effort directed by ASD/C3I, and the relatively uncoordinated set of initiatives underway within the overall U.S. community. There were also national efforts undertaken by the French and British, but these were not discovered until well into the CCRP study. The NATO process had a formal and relatively integrated structure. The charter of the JAT was explicitly derived from SACEURs Operations Plan (OPLAN), SUPLAN X. The JAT's charter focused on nine issue areas, including several related to C4ISR, particularly C2, force generation, military-civilian plans, execution, public information, and exit. The JAT also had the formal right to locate observers in NATO and IFOR headquarters and command centers in theater and had already done so. While the JAT viewed its charter as limited (primarily at the operational level and above, focused on its nine issue areas), they had the lead in NATO for IFOR operational lessons learned. This enabled them to collect information and conduct interviews on-site and in locations where unobtrusive presence was difficult. The JAT also maintained an extensive automated database on IFOR operations. They produced three interim reports (March 1996, June 1996, December 1996) which were forwarded to SHAPE and COMIFOR for distribution. A final report on IFOR lessons learned was sent to SHAPE in April 1997. In accordance with SUPLAN X, an IFOR/SFOR Lessons Learned Database was established and implemented on CRONOS. This database was the first of its kind in NATO to support an ongoing operation and it continued to be available for SFOR. In regard to the latter, the JAT charter was extended to June 1997 to accommodate the collection of lessons learned associated with the transition of IFOR to SFOR.
Clearly, a constructive interface with the JAT and the formal NATO process represented an important opportunity for collaboration, and this was an immediate priority for the CCRP team. An agreement was arranged between the director of JAT and the director of the NDU/CCRP study team. Under this agreement, CCRP provided both observers and analyst support to the JAT in return for access to data, information, and the Bosnia theater of operation for firsthand collection of experiences and insights. The CCRP and JAT collaborative effort proved to be extremely beneficial for both organizations.
In addition to the JAT, CCRP collaborative efforts were pursued with U.S. organizational elements such as EUCOM, USAREUR, U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE), JAC at Molesworth, Electronic Systems Center (ESC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), AMC/BTIC, CISA (which became an active member of the CCRP core team), DISA/JITC, SOCOM, J2/DIA, CIA, NSA, CNA, IDA, the Air Force Historian, CALL, and the Army War College Peacekeeping Institute (AWC/PKI). The CCRP team had varying degrees of success in this regard, but in all cases, received numerous lessons learned reports and briefings from these organizations. Briefings and reports were also obtained from NATO organizational elements such as the JAT, the IFOR CJ6/CJCCC, the ARRC, the MND HQs, the IFOR Commander for Support (C-SPT), and several other sources.
CISA also undertook two major studies as part of its support to the CCRP effort. An IFOR C4ISR laydown was developed and is now available from them on a CD-ROM. A communications lessons learned assessment was done and is documented in their report, "Compendium of Operation Joint Endeavor Lessons Learned Activities," May 1997. An assessment of BC2A/JBS implementation lessons learned was also done for the CCRP effort by BAH in support of a DARO offer of help to CCRP.
CCRP contacts have also been made with the British and French lessons learned activities. Overall, the number of opportunities for collaboration was very large and potentially overwhelming for the modest size of the CCRP team. However, every effort was made to find and develop efficient mechanisms for collaboration. No significant effort was ignored and all relevant products were captured to ensure that CCRP's analyses and lessons learned were based on the best available insights and evidence.
CCRP assembled, reviewed, and integrated a large quantity of CCRP and non-CCRP briefings, reports, and other material. Products from a wide variety of sources were assembled first, so they would be available to support CCRP's analyses and reduce the effort that was required to create a comprehensive picture. Assembling the variety of views contained in these products put CCRP in a position to see what they had in common, to identify differences, and to assess their relative reliability and validity, as well as the comprehensiveness, reliability, and validity of the overall body of work. Moreover, CCRP was able to both use these products as sources of information in its own analyses and also develop the larger picture of C4ISR experience and performance.
The products covered the entire field of C4ISR. For example, the intelligence community undertook a number of assessments and lessons learned efforts. The CCRP team received inputs from the Task Force Eagle G2 on intelligence operations and ISR system performance in MND(N). Inputs were also received on the U.S. NIC operations in Bosnia and JAC support activities. Very early in the deployment SOCOM sent a team to inventory intelligence systems in the field and assess their contribution to SOF missions. The DCI organized a lessons learned activity that generated several significant reports on information releasability and dissemination. DIA and NSA also conducted their own review of the Bosnia experience. Virtually every intelligence organization with presence in the theater was seeking to place its own experience in context. These efforts were very valuable inputs to CCRP's understanding of the overall C4ISR issues. In addition, the Defense Science Board Bosnia Task Force report on the Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield was also made available to the CCRP team.
More focused efforts were underway from a number of other perspectives. The U.S. research and development community, particularly those elements led by DARPA and the DARPA/DISA JPO through various technology demonstration programs, was assessing the performance of leading-edge services and the process by which they were introduced into the Operation Joint Endeavor command structure. These were valuable sources for lessons learned in the technology insertion process. The Air Force established a Bosnia-oriented integration activity (referred to as the CUBE) at ESC to simulate the network of C2 systems controlling air operations in the theater with a particular emphasis on the CAOC. This allowed them to examine proposals for changes and assess the integration and introduction of new C2 capabilities before deployment into the Bosnian theater of operation. The ESC and Air Combat Command (ACC) also coordinated with the CAOC to assist with decision support system integration and air operation processes enhancements. The ESC lab also provided a Help Desk for dealing with real-time integration issues. The Army's AMC/BTIC served as a clearinghouse for critical technologies and the "nerve center" for tracking and integrating the technology communities' efforts to support U.S. soldiers in Bosnia. The SHAPE Technical Center (now the NATO C3 Agency, the Hague), who was responsible for technical support to NATO's C2, logistics, and transportation decision support systems as well as the new information systems used to support NATO's C2 operations (e.g., CRONOS) in-theater, was also collecting lessons learned and provided valuable insights to the CCRP team. Some of the contractors involved in bringing new technology into the theater and supporting it there were also learning important lessons and they too were documenting their experiences. N.E.T. provided CCRP lessons on the IDNX deployments and EDS provided lessons on the deployment of the IARRCIS.
SHAPE NACOSA and Communications and Information Systems Division (CISD), IFOR CJ6, the CJCCC, the ARRC G6, the MND G6s, and the C-SPT G6 provided insights on the deployment and management of the NATO communication and information networks, including lessons learned. IFOR CIMIC, Public Information, and PSYOP organizational elements provided insights to the CCRP team in the areas of civil-military operations and the IFOR information campaign. IOs, NGOs, and PVOs were also interviewed as a means to better understand the civil-military aspects of the operation.
The doctrine community was also watching operations in Bosnia closely, particularly for lessons learned in coalition C2 as well as civil-military relations. CALL deployed dozens of personnel with the U.S. troops supporting Task Force Eagle and issued four (a fifth in final review) volumes on findings and lessons learned. While largely at the tactical level, this work was very important to capture the U.S. experience. The U.S. Air Force had considerable interest in the Bosnia operation and began a vigorous effort to examine the problems associated with generating an integrated air picture in the theater, but then recognized that this was only a subset of the larger and more crucial issue of generating an integrated battlespace (air, ground, and maritime) picture and was deeply involved in that effort. IDA worked with the Air Force on issues related to air management, largely in the context of the CAOC. The Army War College Peacekeeping Institute held two After Action Reviews (AARs) to examine Title 10 issues that impact on the Army in the Bosnia context. These AARs have been made available to the CCRP study as well.
The AMC completed an analysis of its experiences in supporting the Bosnia deployment. The C2 elements of that report were valuable in the context of NATO lessons learned on this same topic and assisted CCRP in ensuring a balanced appraisal. EUCOM ECJ37 was designated by the Joint Staff J7 to be the theater manager for Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS). IDA was contracted to support EUCOM in this regard and to do an in-depth analysis of the planning, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment phases of the operation. These efforts provided the CCRP team with insights and a channel for monitoring a broader set of inputs relevant to C4ISR. The in-theater commands themselves held lessons learned conferences and meetings covering the deployment, sustainment, and transition of IFOR to SFOR phases of the operation. The results of some of these activities have been provided to the CCRP team in the form of briefing material.
The historians in NATO and U.S. commands were generally well informed and only a few days or weeks behind real-time capturing of important events. The NATO and IFOR historian's material and chronology were accessible through the JAT. The IFOR historian had recorded thousands of hours of interviews with all levels of the command structure. Activities of the other historians were generally releasable by the commands themselves. CCRP has initiated contact with the USAREUR, EUCOM, and Air Force historians to get access to their findings and databases.
Assembling the documentation in itself has created a valuable resource for future research and analyses. By actively reviewing and integrating these materials, CCRP has been able to make a meaningful contribution to the overall national and NATO lessons learned activities. By acting as a clearinghouse for the exchange of such materials, the Bosnia study has also contributed to the coherence and quality of the overall U.S. lessons learned activities.
CCRP's priorities were based on the needs and missions of the C4ISR community. They took two different perspectives: organizational and international. Organizational priority was given to OSD and the Joint Staff, with a recognition that the needs of the CINCs and services were also important priorities. At the same time, however, NATO's needs as a coalition and issues important to the non-NATO coalition partners were not ignored. Rather, they were picked up in the context of U.S. national needs. At the international level, U.S. issues were examined as well as issues that related to U.S. operations in the NATO context, NATO operations, and IFOR or NATO operations involving non-NATO partners. C4ISR was seen first as a military issue, but was also examined in terms of civil-military relations at all levels. CCRP's focused research addressed areas such as support to the warfighter, coalition command arrangements, C4ISR system performance and vulnerabilities, information operations, technology insertion, civil-military cooperation, and the lessons learned process.
The ASD/C3I tasking for the Bosnia Command Arrangements Study was signed out on 15 February 1996 and study data collection began in the March/April 1996 time frame. The early phase of the CCRP study focused on data collection. Monthly visits were made to the JAT to gain insights and to review the database they were putting together on the IFOR operation. In addition to the data collection activity, CCRP also provided analyst support to the JAT during these visits. This too provided useful insights from a NATO perspective. Extensive visits were also made to supporting commands and to the theater of operation. These visits included EUCOM, DISA-EUR, the JAC, the 66th MI, USAREUR, USAFE, NATO, SHAPE, and the SHAPE Technical Center (now the NC3A the Hague). Two extended visits were made under the umbrella of the JAT observer corps to Bosnia and Croatia. In regard to the latter, visits were made to IFOR and the ARRC in Sarajevo, MND(SW) in Banja Luka, MND(SE) in Mostar, C-Support in Zagreb, and COMMZ (FWD) in Split. Visits were also made to the IFOR CJ6 and the CJCCC in Naples. NDU/CCRP also provided two observers to the JAT for duties at MND(N) in Tuzla and at IFOR (FWD) in Sarajevo. In addition, an NDU/CCRP observer and analyst was also provided to the JAT to focus on the area of IFOR information operations. This support included two extended visits to Bosnia and Croatia as well as visits to NATO, SHAPE, and the UN HQs in New York. The NATO and national insights gained through CCRP participation in the JAT observer and analyst activities have been invaluable.
The CCRP team continues to collect experiences and lessons learned from the IFOR portion of the operation, including those emerging from similar activities of the other two framework nations-France and the United Kingdom. Collection activities have also included the SFOR portion of the operation but at a significantly lower level of effort. It is planned to extend the IFOR database and library of lessons learned reports to include those of SFOR and any follow-on NATO activities. As new insights and findings emerge from the ongoing CCRP study activities, these will be documented in professional publications and shared through symposia and other professional forums.
| Bosnia Index | Foreword | Acknowledgments | Preface | I. Introduction | II. Bosnia—Setting the Stage | III. Command and Control Structure | IV. Intelligence Operations | V. Civil-Military Cooperation | VI. The International Police Task Force | VII. Information Activities | VIII. Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle | IX. Counterintelligence and HUMINT | X. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Soldier's Perspective | XI. C4ISR Systems and Services | XII. NDU/CCRP Bosnia Study | XIII. Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned | XIV. Summary | End Notes | Appendix A: The Dayton Peace Agreement Summary | Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events | Appendix C: References | Appendix D: Acronyms | About the Contributing Editor | About the Authors