The NATO Alliance proved that it can be flexible and adaptable and showed that with clear political guidance, the operational military arm can accomplish tasks given to it by its political authorities. The successful deployment of the NATO-led IFOR in support of Operation Joint Endeavor can be attributed to a number of factors. First, there was the pressure of world opinion to take action given the massacres in the country, the previous failures of the UN, and the opportunity for achieving a more permanent settlement provided by the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA). Second, relative to other international organizations (UN, WEU), NATO had an effective military and political structure. NATO had exercised its capabilities both politically (in the Partnership for Peace program) and militarily (in Operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force) to bring stability to this part of the world. Finally, NATO had an intact command and control system, one based on 45 years of cooperation and refined during NATO operations in support of the UN in Bosnia.
The first ever out-of-area operation for NATO was a military success, but there were a number of key issues that IFOR had to address early on to ensure that it would happen. First, the Dayton Accord did not designate a single authority to synchronize the military, political, economic, and humanitarian aspects of the mission. Ad hoc arrangements were initially employed to facilitate collaboration and cooperation and more formal arrangements were employed later through participation in the Office of the High Representative (OHR)-established Joint Civil Commission (JCC).
Second, the civil-military activities in support of peace operations were new for NATO. There was no common understanding by commanders and staff at all levels of IFOR of the capabilities, roles, and mission of Civil Affairs units and personnel, referred to as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Furthermore, the civil-military aspects did not receive sufficient attention during the planning and initial execution phase of the operation due to the heavy emphasis on the military enforcement aspects of the Dayton Accord and force protection.
Third, information operations for peacekeeping were also new for NATO. The NATO and SHAPE doctrines on public information and PSYOP had just been revised. National PSYOP doctrine differed and the command and control of PSYOP contingents remained with the participating nations (mainly the United States with participation from the United Kingdom, Germany, and to a lesser extent France) and was not placed under NATO C2 during the IFOR operation. The public information, civil affairs, and PSYOP aspects of the IFOR information operations required special attention to ensure coordination and synchronization of related activities. Ad hoc committees were established at the IFOR and ARRC levels to facilitate coordination.
Fourth, NATO had no in-place ability to deploy forward its strategic C4I capabilities. There was little to no Bosnia telecommunications infrastructure because it had been destroyed by the war and NATO air strikes. NATO, therefore, had to rely heavily on the national tactical assets of the framework nations-particularly the United States (the major contributor), the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent France. The UN VSAT network, which was already in place, was used extensively and commercial products and deployable commercial SATCOM services were employed to extend NATO's strategic network connectivity into Bosnia and to provide information services to the deployed headquarters and forces.
There were other factors that influenced NATO and national activities in preparation for and execution of the IFOR deployment. The operation was occurring at a time when NATO and the nations were reducing force structures. Non-NATO and PfP nations would be involved with NATO in a real-world operation for the first time as well as the Russian Federation and there was little NATO guidance on how to proceed with these first-time events. In addition to being the first out-of-area operation, it was also the first major ground operation ever. There were multiple OPLANs that added some confusion. NATO would be taking over from the UN and other peacekeeping agencies and this had some built-in uncertainties. Deployment would take place in the depth of winter in difficult terrain. The likelihood of hostilities was a major concern because of the fragility of the peace arrangements in Bosnia. There were morale problems associated with deploying troops over the Christmas period. Therefore, one should not underestimate the degree of difficulty NATO and the nations faced as they prepared for and deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor.
The threats in Bosnia were real. Three former warring factions, not only with significant combat power but also with robust intelligence collection capabilities, were waiting for the arrival of NATO forces and it was not clear how they might react to the IFOR deployment. The FWF also had a propaganda and disinformation campaign in operation and targeted against IFOR. Terrorists, organized crime, and petty criminals were also part of the threat. Finally, minefields were numerous and added risk to deployed personnel.
The local, national, and ethnic media were well established and generally trusted. The population of Bosnia was to a large extent literate and relatively well educated and used to all forms of media that characterize an "information society."
Upon arrival in country, IFOR made it very clear to the FWF at the outset that they were there to enforce compliance with the Dayton Accord and would use force if necessary. Checkpoints were bulldozed, road blocks shut down, the FWF separated, and their forces and equipment placed in cantonment areas and barracks. Violations were experienced from time to time: weapons were discovered in unauthorized locations, soldiers and tanks in the ZOS, and unauthorized police checkpoints. Such violations were not tolerated and swift actions were taken when the FWF tested IFOR's resolve. The IFOR information campaign was also a powerful tool in getting the message to the FWF and the local population.
In the end, the Bosnia theater was more peaceful than expected. Except for a few overt physical attacks on facilities and personnel, the FWF were generally in compliance with the GFAP. One must be reminded, however, that the situation could have changed for the worse at a moment's notice.
Certainly, IFOR's tremendous military firepower was a deterrent but the military also put a lot of faith in the deterrent power of information dominance. IFOR was able to make it clear to the FWF that they could monitor them any time of the day or night and under any weather conditions. The ability to see, understand the situation, and strike with precision no doubt had its effect in deterring aggressive actions on the part of the FWF. In the words of MGEN William Nash, Commander MND(N), "We don't have arguments. We hand them pictures and they move their tanks."
Operation Joint Endeavor was, of course, an Operations Other Than War (OOTW) with all of the associated ambiguities, complexities, and challenges. As experienced in other OOTWs, these operations tend to be frustrating because the structure that militaries take for granted, such as a unified chain of command and clear, simple rules of engagement, are lacking.
For many reasons, OOTWs are usually messy and almost always involve ad hoc coalitions of the willing with politically driven command arrangements. More often than not they involve, at least in practice, a consultative environment in which key parties need to develop and maintain a common understanding of the mission, issues, and progress toward meeting the end state. Planning and executing such operations are complicated by factors such as short time lines, a highly dynamic environment, and uneven capabilities and experience among coalition members.
In almost all instances, OOTW operations are not able to rely on the in-country infrastructure to support their C2 needs and require augmentation of the limited indigenous capabilities with national tactical military systems. Given that a number of different players are usually involved and given their desire to use systems they are comfortable with, these operations typically begin with a "Federation of Systems" with the inevitable interoperability challenges and security disconnects. These are simply the realities of such operations and were true for Operation Joint Endeavor as well.
Bosnia was a somewhat schizophrenic operational environment. In MND(N), force protection measures were strictly enforced and troops were required to wear full battle gear and travel in four-vehicle convoys. For other parts of the area of operation, the force protection measures were less severe. The headquarters facilities were located in urban and/or open areas and many employed limited traditional lethal and physical protection such as heavily armed guards, tanks, barriers, sandbagged bunkers, and obstacle courses in access areas.
Protection for U.S. forces will always be a significant issue. In Bosnia, U.S. force protection took on a higher degree of importance than had been seen in other U.S. military peace support operations. It was a formal part of the OPLAN mission statement and permeated all aspects of mission execution. Many non-U.S. IFOR participants believed that U.S. force protection measures were politically motivated and not based on a realistic threat assessment. MGEN Nash, Commander MND(N), defended the tough self-protection standard as important for both safety and discipline reasons. Furthermore, in his view, "the American soldier today is...more of a target than soldiers of other countries and they deserve all the protection I can give them."
Enforcement of force protection was inconsistent between U.S. service members serving under a U.S. command and those under NATO control. Civil agencies were concerned that this inconsistency was sending mixed signals to the warring factions. The stringent U.S. force protection measures hampered civil-military cooperation activities and the ability of U.S. soldiers to move away from the peace-enforcement-only mindset. It appeared to many that the second- and third-order effects of the stringent force protection measures were neither fully understood nor properly anticipated. Some easing of the rules occurred over time as the operation evolved and more civil affairs work was performed off post.
OPSEC was particularly challenging for the IFOR operation. The operational environment was reasonably stable for Bosnia and the lack of an obvious threat created the possibility of a relaxed security posture and increased complacency. Other types of OPSEC risks had to be managed as well. There were numerous television and print journalists questioning soldiers. On a daily basis, hundreds of local national workers entered IFOR areas of operation. It was a challenge for the CI and HUMINT operators to keep a close eye on these daily visitors.
There were COMSEC and INFOSEC issues that had to be dealt with as well. Although the military communications and information systems operated SECRET system-high, there were other systems that were not secure. The UN VSAT network, INMARSAT, cellular, and the commercial PTT telephone systems were not protected and they were used frequently for command and control purposes. The commercial Internet was also used frequently. Configuration management and information protection measures were slow in implementation. An enormous amount of classified and unclassified material was produced; extra care had to be taken when dealing with mixed classifications of information. There were releasability issues related to sharing information and capabilities among 30 plus nations. Diskettes were shared between classified and unclassified systems and there was a lack of discipline and standard operating procedures to effectively control the situation.
Security was an ongoing responsibility for which improvements were continuously made over the duration of the operation.
In today's high-technology environment, information can determine the success or failure of the military operation. The "CNN effect" (i.e., unsubstantiated media reports), coupled with the "information revolution," created formidable challenges for the military. In Bosnia, there was media presence throughout the country when IFOR arrived. The information networks serving the media, IFOR, and its coalition member nations provided the ability to share information at a speed and efficiency never before experienced. Frequently, media reports of incidents would reach the home country and/or higher headquarters before the commander on the ground was aware of the situation and able to react.
There were e-mails to home from the troops in the field and Internet home pages were used by the NATO and national public affairs organizations to inform and update the general public on IFOR operations. The ease with which information could be shared fostered active, and sometimes lengthy, reporting (such as daily situation reports). Higher headquarters were constantly apprised of matters both large and small. Occasionally, headquarters and other command elements would use the networks to bypass intervening organizations in order to get information firsthand, sometimes leaving the broader community in the dark. The problem soon became one of finding the useful details among the wealth of information available rather than a lack of information. Because of the improved ability to inform and influence, the Public Information Office and the IFOR Information Campaign (IIC) became important tools of the Bosnia operation.
As noted earlier, in some areas of Bosnia, such as those occupied by the Serbs, an information campaign targeted against NATO was already in full operation when the IFOR troops arrived. Hence, the IIC was at a disadvantage at the outset because it had to compete with an already established and effective campaign that could get inside of the IFOR decision loop and outmaneuver some of the initial IFOR efforts. A contributing factor was NATO rules of engagement for the IIC. The campaign was forbidden to use disinformation and deception and could not take actions that undermined the factions, take sides, or directly refute FWF disinformation activities.
IFOR also had some problems adapting to the local population's media consumption habits. While IFOR relied primarily on printed material (The Herald of Peace and Mircko, posters, and handbills) and radio to start with, the Bosnian's preferred medium was television. Also, IFOR radio transmitted on AM and the Bosnians listened mostly to FM radios. Adjustments were made to accommodate other media forms such as FM radio and television, including the use of local radio and television facilities as well. The U.S. PSYOP platform, Commando Solo, was not deployed until the SFOR phase of the operation to support the September 1997 election activities.
The IIC proved to be a difficult task for IFOR and the jury is still out on its overall success. It was certainly a success in the first 9 months of the operation in support of force protection and Dayton Accord compliance activities and for the September 1996 national elections. There were also some other successes such as the raid on Fortica (terrorist training camps) and Operation Volcano, the destruction of 250 tons of Bosnia Serb munitions. The success on the civil, economic, and humanitarian side of the operation was not as obvious. A top-down driven campaign plan with top-down driven products was viewed as an important contributor to the military successes.
The intelligence community also faced challenges unique to supporting a coalition peace operation. Traditionally, intelligence tends to focus on the enemy. However, it is not always clear who the enemy is in a peace operation.
The bulk of the national intelligence systems supporting IFOR were designed for go-to-war, not peace, operations. The NATO intelligence doctrine, principles, and practices were being revised at the outset of the operation. In the case of the United States, "force protection" and the Army maneuver warfare doctrine drove the U.S. intelligence architecture put in place for Joint Endeavor. In reality, though, the IFOR operational environment was relatively benign and the peace support operation was not maneuver warfare.
The Bosnia intelligence operating environment was marked by large areas of operation and interest, difficult terrain, and poor weather conditions. There were multiple belligerent factions and a "front line" that was 360 degrees. The operation had to adapt to differences in NATO and national methodologies and procedures. The operation had to monitor a wide spectrum of threats, including the FWF, criminal activities, extremists, civil disturbances, and terrorism. FWF equipment storage sites and barracks, the ZOS, mass gravesites, and potential "hot spots" caused by freedom of movement, resettlement, and inter-ethnic conflicts had to be monitored as well. The nature of the operation muddled any clear division among strategic, theater, and tactical levels. Finally, equipped to function in a tactical fight, NATO and the national tactical intelligence capabilities were less prepared to function in a peace support role. Doctrine, CONOPS, procedures, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities had to be adjusted and augmented to accommodate peace operation requirements.
Experience with other OOTWs also clearly demonstrated that although non-intrusive means of collecting information were especially useful, HUMINT was usually key. In Bosnia, the man and woman on the ground collecting firsthand information about political leaders, business people, the condition of roads and bridges, withdrawal of forces from the ZOS, weapons and ammunition in cantonment areas, freedom of movement violations, and demonstrations and ethnic incidents proved invaluable. Over time, HUMINT became the dominant player in the IFOR intelligence operation.
The other intelligence disciplines proved important as well. SIGINT provided warning and a hedge against conventional threats. IMINT used the full spectrum of traditional assets from handheld to U.S. national to monitor verification sites and for the surveillance of "hot spots" and FWF compliance activities. There were also some non-traditional IMINT sources such as the Combat Camera Crew products, the AH-64 gun camera tapes, and the OH-58 cockpit tapes that proved invaluable. In addition, downlinked UAV imagery provided near real-time surveillance support. Many areas had land mines or were difficult to access from the ground; hence, the use of the advanced surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities avoided the need to put soldiers in harm's way. OSINT provided indications and warning of increased tensions in local areas, supported predictive analysis efforts, and helped focus other collection efforts. The "Night Owl," which was produced by the United States at Camp Lukavac in MND(N), provided a daily summary of news and media commentary-a Bosnia version of the Pentagon's "Early Bird." Through its publication and use, commanders and staff were able to gain a better appreciation for the political, economic, and cultural environment. MASINT was used to support treaty compliance, early warning, and force protection.
The cumulative effect of the intelligence operation sent a clear signal to the FWF that IFOR was capable of knowing all and seeing all-Information Dominance. The U.S. military's phenomenal array of technology on the ground, in the air, and in space helped keep a risky operation relatively casualty-free. The counterintelligence and HUMINT activities in Bosnia were also essential to accomplishing the force protection mission by providing the information and intelligence the commander needed to manage and avoid risk and still accomplish the mission.
The real "peacekeepers" in a peace operation are the humanitarian relief organizations that provide aid for the present and hope for the future. They are there before the military arrive, remain during the military presence, and stay after the military leave. Although Bosnia was a mature theater of operation for them, the military planners gave little (minimum) consideration to their experience, expertise, and activities in preparing for the IFOR operation. As a result, the military support to the humanitarian aspects of the operation was more reactive than proactive, especially during the early stages of the operation.
Military interaction with civilian organizations was more than civil-military cooperation. Civilian agencies (NGOs, PVOs, and IOs) had developed a network of influential contacts, compiled historical and specialty archives, and established relationships with local leaders and business people. They understood the infrastructure of the region, as well as the political and economic influences. These civilian agencies and centers of operation were both sources and consumers of intelligence information.
The humanitarian relief organizations tend to have limited communications and information system capabilities, especially in the theater of operation. Typically, they will use the in-country telecommunications infrastructure to the extent possible but many also have their own HF and/or VHF radios. These radios, however, may or may not be interoperable with the military systems they come in contact with during peace operations. In Bosnia, the NGOs/PVOs/IOs had reasonably good communications capabilities since many had already been in country for at least 4 years. They had access to the UN system and some of the regional PTT services in the country could be used as well.
Communicating and sharing information with the NGOs/PVOs/IOs was a new experience for NATO. The humanitarian relief organizations bring with them cultural and language differences that need to be understood and dealt with by the military in order to avoid misunderstandings, unnecessary competition, and mistrust. The need for the military and civil organizations to work together toward a common goal in Bosnia was not fully appreciated by the military at the outset. The emphasis by IFOR and the U.S. forces, in particular, on the military aspects of the Dayton Accord inhibited early progress in developing the civil dimension. Many of the new civilian agencies such as the OHR were consumed with problems in setting up their own organizations and cooperation with IFOR was not their main concern.
Civil-military activities prior to IFOR were very narrowly conceived by NATO and were generally regarded as "rear area" activities associated with host-nation logistic support and alleviating refugee interference with military operations. This combat-oriented doctrine had little relevance in the Bosnia context. The essence of the IFOR mission was to maintain a safe and secure environment so that reconciliation and reconstruction could take place. Since mission accomplishment depended upon effective civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), such cooperation and the CIMIC organizational element, in particular, became a vital "front line" asset. Widespread civil-military coordination and cooperation did not really occur until the May 1996 time frame. To quote Admiral Leighton Smith, COMIFOR, "In November we never heard of CIMIC. We had no idea what you did. Now we can't live without you."
Coalition peace operations are accompanied by other doctrine, cultural, and language differences that challenged the overall coordination of the mission and ability to achieve unity of effort. Although a common language (such as English or French) was needed to participate, many of the players were not able to speak or understand the language used, placing an added burden on the coordination activities.
In Bosnia, PSYOP and CIMIC doctrines differed. The U.S. approach to PSYOP was to centrally manage and control at the highest level of command, whereas other nations such as the United Kingdom favored delegation to lower levels of the command structure, e.g., division headquarters. For CIMIC, there was no common understanding or approach at the outset of the IFOR operation. The ground commanders lacked a basic understanding of the role and value of CIMIC. This lack of understanding led to misperceptions that the CIMIC activities were contributing to mission creep and resulted in some unanticipated constraints being placed on their operation until their value became more apparent to the commanders. Unofficial doctrine and practices were essentially developed as the operation progressed. In the end, both the PSYOP and CIMIC operations were run out of their respective headquarters in Sarajevo.
Finally, with more than 30 different nations participating, it was a significant challenge to merge the cultural perspectives to achieve unity of effort and avoid cultural clashes. Liaison activities became very important and were used effectively to facilitate coordination and to bridge the language gap.
NATO's ability to influence events during the early preparation for IFOR deployment helped avoid problems encountered by UNPROFOR and ensured a clearer definition of military tasks under a unified chain of command. Consequently, the language hammered into the General Framework Agreement made it clear that IFOR would "operate under the authority of and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of command." UNSC Resolution 1031 provided NATO with the mandate and the necessary political authority to direct NATO and non-NATO forces under IFOR. However, NATO's robust military terms of reference highlight the paucity of authority for the civil activities of the High Representative-the weak link in the implementation of the Dayton Accord. In any future operation that depends on the success of both military and civil tasks, NATO will want to ensure that its civil counterpart also enjoys a commensurate amount of authority to fulfill its responsibilities.
The lack of unified political direction for the overall peace implementation process was a
risk to the success of IFOR. The General Framework Agreement established three
structures for implementation: an Implementation Force for the military aspects, a High
Representative to coordinate civil tasks, and Donors Conferences to stimulate
reconstruction. Given the UN's reluctance to take the lead, there was no internationally
recognized political organization providing overall political direction. Consequently, the three
structures remained virtually autonomous, operating within a loose framework of
cooperation and without a formal structure for developing unified policy. The absence of a
standing political organization with which the North Atlantic Council could coordinate policy
exacerbated the inherent difficulties of synchronizing the civil-military implementation of the
peace process at the strategic level and NATO's role in implementing the Peace Agreement.
There were some NATO and U.S.-related command arrangement shortfalls. Command
and control differences existed between SHAPE and AFSOUTH/IFOR and between
IFOR, the ARRC, and the Multinational Divisions, the most significant being with the U.S.
MND(N). There was the need for a better definition of the command relationships between
NATO, USCINCEUR, and USAREUR. Forces in a multinational environment operate
with two chains of command: one for operations and the other for command, administrative,
and logistical matters. The absence of a clear definition led to some inefficiencies and
confusion during the operation. At the center of this issue was how the Army (Component)
fulfilled its Title 10 responsibilities. The root cause of the problem was the absence of a U.S.
Joint Task Force command equivalent that had the authority, expertise, and staffing to
sufficiently provide U.S. C2 and coordinated logistics for out-of-sector U.S service
members. In addition, in accordance with National Security Decision Directive 130, the
U.S. PSYOP forces were not placed under IFOR C2. These forces remained under
USEUCOM control. This caused some problems in the product coordination and approval
process and limited the flexible use of PSYOP elements at the tactical level. The U.S. Civil
Affairs and IFOR/ARRC CIMIC elements experienced command and control problems as
well. Furthermore, having two headquarters (IFOR and ARRC) in the same local area of
operation created problems not only for CA/CIMIC activities but also for the Public
Information Offices too. Another important C2 shortfall was inadequate early coordination
with humanitarian organizations, particularly the NGOs and PVOs already in country.
The AFSOUTH was made the operational-level headquarters for Operation Joint Endeavor. However, AFSOUTH was neither staffed nor equipped to lead an expeditionary land force into combat. The ARRC, NATO's rapid reaction force, was established as IFOR's corps-level land component command. The three framework nations (the United States, United Kingdom, and France) formed the basis for the multinational divisions (North, South West, and South East, respectively). OPCON and OPCOM of the divisions were also assigned to the ARRC. IFOR headquarters was split between Naples and Sarajevo and the ARRC's headquarters was located at Ilidza near Sarajevo, placing two major command headquarters within a few miles of each other. The U.S.-led MND(N) was the largest division and included brigades from Turkey, Russia, and a third non-U.S. brigade referred to as the NordPol brigade (made up of troops from Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Poland). The British-led MND(SW) was built around a British brigade along with troops from Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark. Finally, the French-led MND(SE) was the smallest division and was comprised of troops from France, Italy, and Portugal. Both the British and French already had a large number troops in Bosnia in support of UNPROFOR and the Rapid Reaction Force. Hence, the bulk of the deployment activities for IFOR were the NATO command unit forces, the U.S. forces, and the forces of the non-NATO participating nations.
Maritime and air operations were run through COMNAVSOUTH, COMSTRIKFORSOUTH, and COMAIRSOUTH. The command of air operations was achieved by designating the IFOR Air Component Commander as the Joint Force Air Component Commander. A single-layer C2 structure was established at the CAOC in Vicenza, Italy, and was responsible for the entire air effort, simplifying the C2 for air operations. Collection management authority for aerial intelligence platforms (such as Predator) was a CAOC responsibility as well. The IFOR Regional Air Movement Control Center that was collocated with the CAOC exercised airlift movement control. This facilitated coordination with the other air operations. The air tasking process brought together all of the different tasking requirements and unified them in a single order, the Air Tasking Message.
The U.S. SOF established a Special Forces operating base in San Vito, Italy, and a forward operating base in Sarajevo under IFOR. Liaison control elements were assigned to coalition and NATO units to integrate intelligence, operations, communications, close air support, and medical evacuation. SOF also assisted in surveying and monitoring the zone of separation, supported civil-military activities, and provided liaisons with the FWF. Commander, Special Operations Command Europe (also Commander, Special Operations Forces, IFOR) assumed OPCON of all SOF elements in support of Operation Joint Endeavor except for SOF afloat, PSYOP, and CA forces. U.S. PSYOP forces remained under USEUCOM C2 and CA forces under USAREUR command. As noted earlier, the command relationships of the U.S. PSYOP and CA forces were not clearly defined at the outset of the operation and this caused problems for the deployed forces. There was a Combined Joint Special Forces Operations Task Force located in Sarajevo which the U.S., UK, and France SOF elements supported. The United Kingdom and France also had their own national SOF units supporting MND(SW) and MND(SE) respectively.
An IFOR Commander for Support (C-SPT) was established in Zagreb, Croatia. His responsibilities included coordinating the sustainment, movements, medical, engineering, and contracting operations of the national logistic elements; and commanding selected IFOR units in support of the deployment, execution of peace implementation, and redeployment of IFOR. C-SPT was also designated as the single point of contact for all IFOR matters pertaining to relations with the Croatian government. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) established a field office in Split, Croatia. They were responsible for all NATO common-funded contracting and contracting for all scarce resources in theater. They provided liaisons with C-SPT and the framework division headquarters. NAMSA headquarters in Luxembourg held all contracts for the theater. The ARRC COSCOM commander was designated the COMMZ Forward Commander and was located in Split, Croatia, as well. He was responsible for reporting movement into theater to C-SPT. Finally, three National Support Elements were established to support the framework nations' movement activities: the United States in Kaposvar, Hungary, the British in Split, Croatia, and the French in Ploce, Croatia.
Some of the IFOR C2 relationships were politically driven. For example, a special agreement was required between the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and the Russian Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev, for the employment of Russian forces in IFOR. This agreement provided SACEUR (General Joulwan) control of the Russian brigade through the Deputy Commander of IFOR for Russian Forces, Colonel General Shevtsov. COMARRC exercised tactical control (TACON) of the brigade through the Commander MND(N) in whose area the brigade operated. OPCON remained with the Russian chain of command. As with other politically dominated C2 structures, this arrangement would be problematic under stress, particularly if new missions were required. It did, however, initiate military cooperation between Russian and NATO forces.
IFOR established a Joint Military Commission (JMC) as the central body for commanders of military factions to coordinate and resolve problems. Two or more FWF military representatives (usually commanders) attended meetings under IFOR supervision to coordinate joint activities, disseminate intent and instructions, and resolve differences. COMIFOR delegated routine JMC chairmanship to COMARRC who issued instructions to ensure the parties' compliance with the military aspects of the GFAP. Below the COMARRC level, the MNDs, their subordinate brigades, and battalions established subordinate military commissions. At these lower levels, the JMC activities included disseminating policy, issuing instructions to factions on policies and procedures, coordinating GFAP-required actions, resolving military complaints or questions, coordinating civil-military actions where appropriate, and developing confidence-building measures between the parties.
The integration of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations and other non-NATO nations under NATO C2 was a success for several reasons. First, NATO already had experience dealing with the PfP nations through the NATO PfP Program and related exercise activities. Second, innovative command arrangements were employed at several levels. For example, national officers were brought into the multinational HQs and senior national officers were "dual hatted" as deputy commanders.
The command arrangements for the Public Information Office (PIO), PSYOP, and CIMIC operations and some aspects of the intelligence operations (e.g., CI /HUMINT) also required innovative adjustments to effectively integrate them into the overall IFOR command structure and operation. OPLAN 40105 called for PIO and coalition press and information centers with each of the major IFOR headquarters. In Sarajevo, IFOR and the ARRC decided to share a single press center located in the Holiday Inn but this caused confusion in the chain of command because of the dual command relationship and sometimes conflicting guidance. At the multinational divisions, the commanders preferred to bring their own national PI assets to run the PI program and this too introduced some confusion into the IFOR PI operation due to conflicting IFOR and national doctrine, procedures, and guidance on the nature and amount of information to be released to the media.
In spite of formidable obstacles and a somewhat chaotic beginning, NATO and its member nations installed and operated the largest military-civil Communications and Information Systems (CIS) network ever built to support a major peace operation.
NATO had never attempted peace enforcement. Consequently, there was no doctrine, experience, or accepted practices to guide CIS planning and implementation-the NATO CJTF was just a concept and not doctrine. Furthermore, there were multiple NATO and national CIS organizations involved in the planning, implementation, and management activities related to the IFOR deployment. AFSOUTH and SACEUR OPLANs reflected differing perspectives on CIS network management. The Dayton Agreement assigned frequency management responsibilities to IFOR even though NATO had no established capability. These factors contributed to CIS organizational problems at the outset for the IFOR CJ6. As a result, it was necessary to create a Theater Frequency Management (TFM) capability to address the Dayton Agreement tasking and a Combined Joint Communications Control Center (CJCCC) to facilitate NATO and national coordination and focus the planning and management of the CIS aspects of the IFOR operation.
The communications and information needs of operations such as the Public Information Office, IFOR Information Campaign, Engineers, PSYOP, CIMIC, CI, and HUMINT were not completely formulated or necessarily fully understood at the outset of the operation. The need to be able to interface with and provide some limited support to the NGO/PVO/IO community was also underestimated. Therefore, the requirements were not adequately articulated to the CIS planners and providers so that the necessary services could be made available at the outset of the operation to support these activities. The CJCIMIC operation in the Burger building in downtown Sarajevo only had a few local telephone lines to conduct business in the early stages of operation. If they needed information services or a broader IFOR communications capability, they had to go to IFOR headquarters at the Tito Residency several blocks away. The CIMIC and some HUMINT operations vehicles lacked radios for communicating while operating in the countryside. The engineers also generated a requirement for force protection communications since they too were frequently scattered throughout the country.
Established NATO policy precluded the use of the Internet for operational purposes. However, the engineers and legal and medical personnel needed to use the Internet to access reference material. The PIO also needed Internet access for media interaction and more effective communications and information services to be able to quickly inform the chain of command of media-related, time-sensitive issues. The PIO could use the Internet to get English translations of Croatian and other international press releases and news articles. The NATO policy makers were slow to make a change regarding the use of the Internet.
The timely distribution of Combat Camera and CI/HUMINT digital camera and other video products was a problem faced early on in the operation. Adjustments had to be made to accommodate these needs. One of these adjustments was the integration of the U.S. CI/HUMINT commercial notebook computer-based data acquisition, management, and communications system into the SIPRNET-the capability is referred to as TRRIP. Linking the U.S. MSE network with the SIPRNET via Trojan Spirit provided broader bandwidth connectivity to the battalion level for TRRIP and other intelligence users and over time significantly enhanced the operational effectiveness of the CI/HUMINT teams in particular.
NATO's existing CIS infrastructure was not able to satisfy the requirements for this first out-of-area operation. The so-called NATO CIS Contingency Assets Pool (NCCAP) concept, which envisaged a core of deployable and earmarked national equipment, pre-authorized funding for contingency purchases, and use of national assets, was not sufficiently mature to support the operation. Significant enhancements were needed to extend NATO systems to the deployed forces and to improve the in-area CIS capabilities. Heavy reliance was placed on the framework nations' tactical CIS assets, particularly those provided by the United States, and the lease of PTT/IDNX connectivity by NATO to extend services into Croatia initially and later into Bosnia. Pragmatic and unconventional steps were taken to procure CIS capabilities. In addition, service was leased from the UN VSAT telecommunications network, which was already in operation in Bosnia and Croatia, and used by IFOR to support both the deployment and sustainment phases of the operation. Other systems and services were acquired through "emergency" acquisition procedures and leasing.
CIS support for air and naval operations remained in place following Deny Flight, Decisive Force, and Sharp Guard and did not require special efforts to integrate them into the IFOR operation. There was a similar arrangement for the Special Forces CIS support. Although a Reserve Force was never allocated to IFOR, the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit offshore remained an option and had to be considered in the development of the CIS architecture.
Due to the lack of Bosnia telecommunications infrastructure and cross-IEBL connectivity, mountainous terrain, and high cost of clearing land mines and providing force protection for mountain-top radio relay sites, an extensive tactical military satellite communications network was deployed to provide the required connectivity into the area of operation. The network used U.S. and UK national tactical satellite ground terminals that were placed in or near urban areas where the headquarters facilities were located and were provided force protection commensurate with these facilities. NATO only had one TSGT at the time of deployment and it was deployed to Sarajevo to support HQ IFOR. As the operation evolved, commercial VSAT services were extended into the Bosnia area of operation as well.
For any military operation, a certain amount of "learning on the job" is expected. However, the deployment into a generally urban environment, coupled with the extensive use of commercial products and services, created a need for more intensive on-the-job-training than had been anticipated. The CIS staff had to be prepared to operate in both a fixed (rewire buildings for telephone and LAN services) and tactical environment. In many cases, it was necessary to pull tactical equipment out of the vans and install it in a commercial office-like environment. Staff was required to operate across multiple disciplines (e.g., pull cables and install LANs). The use of commercial technologies such as VSATs, IDNXs, VTCs, ROUTERs, digital switches, and other data network products and services added training requirements. In fact, it was necessary to establish a special training program at the NATO Latina training facility for the IDNXs.
Dealing with contractors and the Croatian and BiH PTTs also provided new challenges. Both the military and the contractors were on steep learning curves. Inadequate spares were purchased for equipment procured under emergency procedures and the repair time for assets under warranty was excessive. In the early phases of the IFOR operation, CIS was in a permanent state of flux. CIS personnel at all levels worked on improving the CIS infrastructure with remarkable enthusiasm and initiative. The success of the CIS implementation and operation was, to a large degree, due to their abilities and dedication.
In preparation for the execution of OPLAN 40104, the extraction of UN forces, a leased E1 (2mb/s) network was extended by SHAPE/NACOSA into Croatia and the United States into Hungary. By the end of May 1995, an IDNX-based strategic backbone information network was fully operational. The NATO TSGT was deployed to Camp Pleso (Zagreb) and used to extend SHAPE headquarters voice, message, and data services to the Zagreb area through the use of the REPLICA system, a SHAPE reach-back capability. With the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 14 December 1995, the mission changed and Croatia and Hungary became the embarkation points for NATO and national troops deploying into the region. OPLANs 40105 and 10405 provided the guidance for the deployment of these forces and the supporting CIS infrastructure.
A complex mixture of NATO, national, UN, and civilian and commercial networks and components provided IFOR CIS services (i.e., voice, message, data, and VTC services). National tactical equipment was used to establish the core IFOR telecommunications infrastructure. The U.S. TRI-TAC system provided a large portion of the strategic- and theater-level telecommunications infrastructure supporting organizations such as SHAPE, AFSOUTH, IFOR, C-SUPPORT, COMMZ, and the NSEs. NATO also provided some. The UK tactical system, PTARMIGAN, provided the telecommunications support for the ARRC and between the ARRC and the MND headquarters. The United States, United Kingdom, and France used their tactical systems to support division-level communications including service to those forces assigned to their divisions. TRI-TAC/MSE equipment was employed in support of MND(N) and the U.S. NSE in Hungary. PTARMIGAN was used to support MND(SW) and the UK NSE in Split. French tactical systems already in place were used to initially support MND(SE). The tactical system RITA was deployed in the March 1996 time frame to provide additional support to MND(SE) and its NSE in Ploce. The Italian system, SOTRIN, supported the Italian brigade in MND(SE) and the German tactical system, AUTOKO, supported the German contingent in MND(SW). The data and VTC networks were largely derived from commercial products and services. Commercial VSAT and IDNX products and services supplemented the tactical satellite backbone connectivity provided by the U.S. and British tactical satellite systems.
STANAG 5040 was employed to provide an analogue interface between the national tactical and strategic voice networks, between TRI-TAC and the NATO strategic voice network, IVSN, and between TRI-TAC and the commercial networks such as the UN VSAT and the Bosnia and Croatian PTTs. The Interim Digital Interface PTARMIGAN (IDIP), designed by the United Kingdom for this operation, provided a digital interface between PTARMIGAN and the TRI-TAC/MSE systems. STANAG 5040 was used for the TRI-TAC to RITA interface as well as by SOTRIN and AUTOKO interfaces with RITA and PTARMIGAN respectively.
The NATO CRONOS Wide Area Network and the Interim ARRC CIS network (both client-server architectures, employing Microsoft Office for office automation and providing M/S e-mail service) provided valuable crisis response and command and control capabilities for the IFOR operation. However, they lacked common standard operating procedures and needed more efficient network management. VTC was used extensively by IFOR and the ARRC and as time went on, it became a key element in conducting business. VTC was also the C2 system of choice for the U.S. Army forces.
INMARSAT was used extensively and commercial cellular services were available in some areas of Croatia and towards the end of the IFOR phase of the operation in the Sarajevo area as well. Unclassified Internet was also used frequently and demands for service increased throughout the operation. Internet use by NATO, IFOR, and national elements was not planned; its use simply grew with user demand. An interesting side note, the Internet was used by the factions to tell their story (e.g., Serbs used it for their disinformation campaign). The UN and humanitarian relief organizations also made extensive use of the Internet to inform the international community of their actions.
The U.S. LOCE system was extended to division headquarters level and above to support IFOR intelligence needs. Nations also provided national intelligence support and services to IFOR through liaison officers and National Intelligence Cells (NICs). A mixture of prototype and operational systems were used in an attempt to fuse various land, sea, and air pictures into a tactical picture. The maritime and land pictures provided to the tactical commanders were of good quality. The air picture (referred to as RAP-Recognized Air Picture) in the CAOC, made up from a variety of sources, was of particularly high quality. However, there was no overall integrated maritime/air/land picture. The CRONOS network was used to distribute the RAP to the IFOR C2 nodes.
Network and system management of IFOR's communications and information networks proved to be a major challenge. An IFOR CIS organization structure had to be created, agreed upon, and staffed quickly. The U.S. Joint Pub 6-05 provided the basis for the establishment of the CJCCC to plan and manage IFOR's networks. System tools had to be acquired to monitor and manage the networks. There were multiple NATO and national players (e.g., SHAPE's NATO CIS Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA), the AFSOUTH ACOS CISD, the IFOR CJ6, the CJCCC, the ARRC G6, the MND G6s, and national J6s) whose roles and relationships needed to be established and their activities in support of the operation coordinated.
There were overlaps in network and system management organizational responsibilities that needed to be worked out since the distinction between strategic, theater, and tactical became blurred. NATO communications and ADP were managed separately and this needed to be accommodated by the CJCCC. There were stove-piped network implementations that had to be accommodated as well. The NATO and national C4 and I and national ISR systems were managed separately. Coordination and collaboration became key ingredients in the evolution of the IFOR network management structure and capabilities. Over time, these issues were resolved and the CIS system provided reasonable services. However, the CIS system for the most part was never heavily stressed during the IFOR operation. Therefore, the performance of the networks and the supporting management organization were never tested under more hostile or stressful conditions.
Historically, interoperability has been one of the most difficult areas to deal with and this operation was no exception. The analog-based STANAG 5040 was still the norm for interfacing strategic, theater, and tactical voice systems. No digital interface existed for interfacing strategic and tactical networks. The TTC-39D experienced interface problems with the Ericsson MD-110 switch used by the UN and IFOR. The STU-IIB is a NATO-approved secure voice equipment and was used extensively by IFOR. A large number of the U.S. forces that deployed to Bosnia brought with them STU-IIIs that were not interoperable. The Interim Digital Interface PTARMIGAN (IDIP), designed by the United Kingdom for this operation, was used to provide a digital interface between the UK PTARMIGAN and the U.S. TRI-TAC/MSE tactical systems. The IDNX deployment required the certification of some 50 interface arrangements.
There were no automated interfaces between the IFOR data networks (CRONOS, IARRCIS, and LOCE) and national networks. The CRONOS was not interfaced with LOCE or the ADAMS networks even though information was manually transferred between the systems. The main reason for this was security considerations. There were no approved secure guard gateways that could accommodate an automated interface. The ADAMS movement control system and JOPES required a manual interface for exchanging information. U.S. intelligence processing systems used at echelons above corps (EAC) did not "talk" to the echelons at corps and below (ECB) systems. To fix the problem, some EAC systems such as the U.S. Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) had to be deployed to ECB intelligence centers. Exercises such as INTEROP 95 and Mountain Shield helped to work out many of the integration and interoperability issues in advance of the deployment and also provided excellent training for the organizations that deployed in support of the operation. However, while interoperability is improving, there is still a long way to go to achieve seamless integration of CIS systems and services.
The pervasive use of COTS information products and services propelled NATO and IFOR into the Information Age and a new way of doing business. There was extensive use of e-mail and a reduced reliance on formal messaging. The formal message traffic (the NATO TARE message network) by volume (megabytes per day) was less than 10 percent of the total IFOR daily data network traffic. The VTC was used daily by IFOR and ARRC command elements for collaboration and coordination. For USAREUR and its deployed commanders, VTC became the C2 system of choice. The VTCs were also used by subordinate command elements to conduct day-to-day business. PowerPoint briefings were the medium of choice for presentations and were readily distributed over the data network. A cottage industry of "PowerPoint Rangers" emerged, as the presentations became very sophisticated. The briefing packages frequently exceeded a megabit in size and placed heavy loads on the data networks as they were distributed around the theater. The data networks were also used for collaborative planning and distribution of wide-band information such as images.
The new capabilities provided the opportunity to share information efficiently and nearly simultaneously at all levels of the command structure. This was a vast improvement over the previous procedures, requiring the corroboration of data successively reported through each level in the chain of command. It was also possible to exchange information that bypassed ("skip echelon") intervening levels of the command structure. The ability to electronically bypass levels of command to obtain information firsthand was occasionally used in the interest of expediency and providing information up the chain of command but sometimes at the expense of leaving others in the dark.
Managing all of the information available to the commander and his staff was a serious problem. Users did not have adequate tools to search for available information. Likewise, there were inadequate tools for managing information collection, storage, and distribution. This was particularly true in the area of coordinating, integrating, and fusing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and making this information available to the user. There were other sources of information such as the Internet and local and international media that needed to be incorporated into the IFOR information database. In terms of sharing classified information, security releasability was also an issue that needed to be addressed early in the operation to ensure that information was given to those who needed it in a timely way without revealing sources and methods, but stringently protecting highly sensitive information. There were 36 coalition partners, some of which NATO had never shared classified information with before. A special category, IFOR-releasable, was established for the operation.
Although extensive use was made of e-mail, VTC, and data network services, voice communications still played a major role in conducting the IFOR information operation. This was true in spite of a grade of service that, at times, exceeded a 20-percent probability of blocking for call attempts. In addition, the end-to-end voice quality was marginal if the call had to be routed through several different tactical switched networks.
The IFOR information revolution largely stopped at the division level in Bosnia. In some cases, such as MND(N) and for the U.S. forces in Croatia and Hungary, higher bandwidth services were extended to the battalion. Every U.S. base camp had telephone service and secure and non-secure data and e-mail capabilities. The U.S. intelligence community extended 128kb/s service to brigades via Trojan Spirit II deployments to the brigade level. On the other hand, the communications and information system support to the IFOR warfighter, in general, changed little and they continued to operate much as they had in the past. Operations were conducted using acetate-covered 1:50,000 maps (seen in all command centers), outmoded tactical equipment, and sensor or reconnaissance systems organic to the national ground units. The command centers were located in urban buildings, tents, semi-destroyed buildings, or the back of armored vehicles.
Although the deployed high-technology systems generally supported the headquarters far more effectively than they supported the soldier on the ground, there were exceptions. Many innovative uses were made of the U.S. military's array of advanced technologies (mainly in the areas of ISR) to more effectively support both the headquarters and the soldier on the ground. In fact, Bosnia became a model for the U.S. doctrine known as Information Dominance. The operation also became an advanced information system technology test bed for both NATO and advanced technology-driven nations such as the United States.
IFOR commercialization efforts came in several forms. First, commercial products and services were used to augment the military systems deployed, as was the case with the IDNX and VSAT. The NATO data network CRONOS and the U.S. data networks NIPRNET and SIPRNET were based on commercial products and provided the strategic- and theater-level information services required for C2 operations. The NATO and U.S. VTC networks were also based on commercial products. Commercial products and services were also an integral part of advanced technology capabilities deployed to theater, e.g., the U.S. BC2A/JBS information services and broadcast network. Commercialization played a role in the IFOR exit strategy and was used to replace tactical military telecommunications systems with commercial products and services.
The use of commercial products and services had its challenges. Competitive bidding did not always realize the best product for price. Contracting arrangements differed among the different factions. There were no Radio Shacks/Tandys to buy spare parts or urgent capabilities. Maintenance support was complicated both in terms of adequacy of repair facilities, excessive repair cycles for assets under warranty, ready access to spares, and quality and use of vendor maintenance personnel. The latter included ethnic constrains such as the inability to easily use a Croatian maintenance person in a Serb area. Most vendors in theater would deal in cash only. Documentation and training packages in many cases were inadequate. Integration of commercial and military systems was not always straightforward. In spite of these difficulties, commercial products and services were used extensively and in many cases quite successfully.
IFOR's plan for the commercialization of their communications network was aimed at reducing the costs to NATO, allowing for the timely withdrawal of tactical systems, and reducing IFOR's dependence on the UN VSAT network. The plan was to install ERICSSON MD-110 digital switches at the major headquarter locations, expand the commercial VSAT/IDNX network, and lease E1 connectivity from the Croatian and BiH PTTs where available. The evolution of the commercial network (referred to as the IFOR Peace Network (IPN)) was slower than IFOR would have liked. The main difficulties centered on the slow reconstruction of the BiH PTT infrastructure and the continued unwillingness of the FWF PTTs to provide cross-IEBL connectivity.
The United States also had major commercialization efforts in Taszar and Kaposvar, Hungary, and Tuzla, Bosnia. In both the NATO and U.S. commercialization initiatives, a tactical military overlay system remained to support essential C2 requirements.
There were unintended consequences associated with the TOA to LANDCENT and the removal of the ARRC CIS systems. The UK EUROMUX tactical system and the U.S. MSE tactical system did not replace the functionality of ARRC's PTARMIGAN system, e.g., secure voice conference capability and secure SCRA. The UK IARRCIS and THISTLE information systems, which were used by the ARRC to build and distribute the ground order of battle and other C2 and intelligence information, were pulled out and replaced with the NATO CRONOS and its prototype C2 and intelligence applications PAIS and CRESP. The ARRC's geographic support, which provided the map and boundary databases used by all IFOR command elements, was not removed but arrangements had to be made with the United Kingdom to lease the system to NATO. And finally, the CIS capabilities of the Allied Military Intelligence Battalion were also impacted by the withdrawal of ARRC equipment. These capabilities all required replacement to adequately support the SFOR operation.
According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, "A lesson is learned when behavior changes." Many of the IFOR experiences were not new and therefore were lessons yet to be learned. A major factor contributing to this situation was the inability to effectively share lessons already learned. The process is flawed. This point was made many times over by those interviewed by both the NDU/CCRP study team and the IFOR JAT. Frequently the observation was made, "if I had only known this before I deployed." Today's information technologies certainly provide the means for enhanced collaboration, sharing, and knowledge building. For example, IFOR-related home pages on INTELINK (e.g., EUCOM and INTEL community) and the commercial Internet (e.g., IFOR, SHAPE, and Task Force Eagle) are excellent examples of capabilities in place to serve selected community needs. The real issue is one of community will, and of who assumes the leadership role to put such an enhanced capability in place to serve the broader community needs as a whole.
Certainly NATO and the participating nations have learned a lot from the IFOR experience. Some experiences have particular significance for future NATO operations and the realization of the NATO CJTF and NCCAP concepts. Others can be applied to coalition peace operations in general. Whether these experiences become lessons learned is yet to be determined, but some of the more important IFOR-related experiences to be considered are as follows.
- C4ISR systems and services
- Intelligence operations
- Information Campaign
- E-mail replaced the formal message handling systems
- VTC was used extensively for C2 and decision making
- PowerPoint briefings were the medium of choice for presentations
- Enhanced collaboration and information sharing took place
- C4ISR systems and services (military and civil systems)
- Intelligence operations
- Doctrine, CONOPS, and TTP
- Language differences
- Cultural differences
- NGO and IO interfaces
- Operational C2 and decision making
- Organizational structures and virtual headquarters
- Insertion into and substitution for go-to-war capabilities
- Human factors and use of information
- Information discovery tools
- Information protection
- Lack coalition releasable COMSEC/INFOSEC capabilities
- Lack configuration management and network vi- rus and intrusion detection/protection capabilities
Bosnia was, in many regards, a living prototype of a post-Cold War operation. It was the kind of operation we may expect to see more of in the future and if we learn the correct lessons from the operation and act upon them, the payoff could be considerable. One should not forget, however, that potential adversaries of the NATO alliance and the United States, in particular, will not be so foolish as to neglect glaring weaknesses in the C2 and intelligence arrangements and C4ISR systems and services implemented in support of the IFOR operation. Doctrine and tactics based upon an assumed freedom to communicate and information dominance may not be sufficient the next time around, even for peacekeeping operations.
The experiences from Bosnia reinforced the importance of information dominance and the information campaign as force multipliers in peace operations. The public information campaign and the IFOR Information Campaign in support of force protection and implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Accords were successes. The IFOR Information Campaign in support of civil reconstruction, economic recovery, and humanitarian activities was less successful. No one organization was responsible for orchestration, an integrated information campaign that addressed the political, civil, economic, and humanitarian aspects of the operation.
The political, civil, economic, and humanitarian aspects of peace operations require close cooperation between the civil organizations and the military. This, too, was reinforced by the Bosnia experiences.
Agility and accommodation continue to be keys to success as well as some plain old good luck. Overall, the IFOR operation was a military success because of the professionalism, dedication, and ingenuity of the men and women who were there and those who supported them.
| Bosnia Index | Foreword | Acknowledgments | Preface | I. Introduction | II. Bosnia—Setting the Stage | III. Command and Control Structure | IV. Intelligence Operations | V. Civil-Military Cooperation | VI. The International Police Task Force | VII. Information Activities | VIII. Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle | IX. Counterintelligence and HUMINT | X. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Soldier's Perspective | XI. C4ISR Systems and Services | XII. NDU/CCRP Bosnia Study | XIII. Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned | XIV. Summary | End Notes | Appendix A: The Dayton Peace Agreement Summary | Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events | Appendix C: References | Appendix D: Acronyms | About the Contributing Editor | About the Authors