End Notes

1 CNN World Wide Web home page: The Balkan Tragedy, 1996/7.

2 LTC David Perkins, USA, and Mark Jacobson, USAR.

3 Col. Kenneth Allard, USA (Ret.), Col. Michael Dziedzic, USAF, Pascale Siegel, and Larry Wentz.

4 Fellow Travel, an end of tour paper by Tony Boardman, UK, Headquarters SFOR, 1997.

5 The World Factbook 1992 and 1995, Central Intelligence Agency.

6 "Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and the Public Security Function," Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, Eliot Goldberg, NDU Press, 1997.

7 "Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and the Public Security Function," Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, Eliot Goldberg, NDU Press, 1997.

8 "Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and the Public Security Function," Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, Eliot Goldberg, NDU Press, 1997.

9 Chapter 6, Bosnia and the IPTF, Col. Mike Dziedzic and Andy Bair.

10 IDA report: Operation Joint Endeavor-Description and Lessons Learned, November 1996.

11 Bosnia Country Handbook Peace Implementation Force (IFOR), DoD-1540-16-96, December 1995.

12 IFOR Fact Sheets and IDA report: Operation Joint Endeavor-Description and Lessons Learned, November 1996.

13 IDA report: Operation Joint Endeavor-Description and Lessons Learned, November 1996.

14 IFOR Fact Sheets and IDA report: Operation Joint Endeavor-Description and Lessons Learned, November 1996.

15 There were numerous after action reports, lessons learned briefings, and interviews that served as the basis for this chapter. Those of particular importance were USAREUR Headquarters After Action Review (1997), After Action Report Operation Joint Endeavor 1st AD Intelligence Production (1996) (Capt. Rhonda Cook, USA), Center for Army Lessons Learned reports, U.S. Naval War College report on IFOR C4I and Information Operations, Army War College After Action Reviews, JS (J2) BOSNIA Intelligence Lessons Learned Working Group, IFOR Joint Analysis Team reports, SOCOM SOF Mission Support Lessons Learned, USEUCOM Lessons Learned reports, DCI report on IFOR Intelligence Sharing: Successes and Challenges, Defense Science Board Task Force on Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield, Chapters 5 through 10 of this book and their authors and other interviews and reports.

16 The author would like to thank the many individuals who commented on this chapter in its various stages of development and specifically Lt. Col. Bob Butler, USAF; LTC Mike Furlong, USA (Ret.); Col. Dave Hunt, USA; Col. Don Klemm, USA; LTC Dave Perkins, USA; CAPT Wayne Perras, USN (Ret.); and Tom Rausch, MITRE.

17 USAREUR Headquarters After Action Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, May 1997.

18 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Art. I, 2.

19 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Art. VI, 3.

20 "Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)," Briefing to Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, 24 July 1996.

21 "Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation," IFOR AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, August 20, 1996.

22 David R. Segal and Dana P. Eyre. U.S. Army in Peace Operations at the Dawning of the Twenty-First Century. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behaviour and Social Sciences, May 1996, p. 24.

23 COMARRC Policy Guidance Number 8 - Civil Tasks, March 1996. Page 2, 4.

24 The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, which was to act as the U.S. CIMIC enabling force, was scheduled to deploy at D-13. Deployment did not occur until D-Day.

25 We wish to acknowledge the careful scrutiny and incisive suggestions we received on earlier versions of this chapter from Deputy IPTF Commissioner Robert Wasserman, Maj. Don Zoufal, Col. Larry Forester, Jim Hooper, Lynn Thomas, and Glen MacPhail.

26 Article 1, Annex 11, General Framework Agreement for Peace.

27 Observations provided by Deputy Commissioner Robert Wasserman.

28 On 25 Sep 1996, Mr. Ed van Thijn, Coordinator for International Monitoring, publicly asserted that the postponed municipal elections should be put off for at least 4 more months until the minimal essential conditions could be satisfied. OSCE Mission Chief, Amb Robert Frowick, in contrast, has insisted on going forward with the elections in late November. "Monitor Wants Bosnian Elections Postponed," Washington Times, 25 Sep 1996.

29 The "Principals" were the High Representative, IFOR/SFOR commander, IPTF commissioner, and the Special Representative of the Secretary General who leads UNMIBH. In addition to this core group, when the issues of the day concerned the OSCE or the UNHCR, the heads of these organizations were also included.

30 "Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), Document No. S/1995/1031, 13 December 1995, p.7.

31 If one does the math, this comes out to 1,492. Presumably the additional 229 monitors were added because of a planning assumption that roughly 13 percent would be sick on leave or otherwise unavailable for duty. It is also worth noting that this figure was not adjusted after the Federation downsized from 32,750 to 11,500. Indeed, some 200 officers were added to create a superstation in Brcko after the decision was made in March 1997 to place that contested city under international administration.

32 Kevin F. McCarroll and Donald R. Zoufal, "Transition of the Sarajevo Suburbs," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997, pp. 7-10.

33 Memorandum for the Record, Subject: "UNMIBH Logistical Support to IPTF," from D/Chief logistics Officer to IPTF Deputy Commissioner, 29 July 1996, pp. 2 & 9.

34 Ibid., p. 8. The impact of these logistical shortcomings was also chronicled by an IFOR officer visiting Kiseljak in late June. In his estimation the IPTF station there was "severely under-equipped," the number of vehicles was inadequate, and the commander lacked the means to communicate with officers on vehicular patrols. Consequently, patrolling had been restricted for safety reasons. IFOR Memorandum, 26 June 1996, "Discussion with IPTF Officer in Kiseljak," p. 3.

35 Ibid., p. 7.

36 Ibid., pp. 4 & 8.

37 Op. Cit. in Note 3, p. 7.

38 "All shortages reflect the minimum number to marginally accomplish the mission using common assets, and presuming no equipment failures, losses, or repairs." Ibid., p. 10.

39 Ibid., p. 10.

40 Ibid., pp. 4 & 7.

41 IPTF Memo, "UNMIBH Logistical Support to the IPTF." p. 7.

42 Memorandum for the Director, Joint Logistics Operations Centre, from Chief of the Supply and Services Division, "Support to the UN Mission in B-H (UNMIBH), 27 Jan 95.

43 FAX No. 151-2275, from Chief Medical Officer UNTOFY, to SRSG UNMIBH Sarajevo, "Medical Support to UN Personnel UNMIBH/UNIPTF," 15 Mar 1996.

44 Interoffice Memorandum to the Special representative of the Secretary General and the Civ-Pol Commissioner, from United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters (FMEDO), "Medical Support to UN Mission Areas in the Former Yugoslavia after 31 January 1996," 25 January 1996.

45 Op. Cit. in Note, pp. 1 & 6.

46 Ibid., p. 6.

47 The Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 1A, Article I, Paragraph 1.

48 Kevin F. McCarroll and Donald R. Zoufal, "Transition of the Sarajevo Suburbs," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997, p 8.

49 The Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 11, Article III. In addition, the Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council of 13 December 1995 prior to the deployment of the IPTF states that "..International Police Task Force monitors may be involved in local mediation if conflict arises as a result of actions by local police." Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), Document No. S/1995/1031, 13 December 1995, paragraph 27.

50 The following incidents, summarized by Somers and Reeves, are illustrative:

An example of such a violation is the groundless, ethnically motivated arrest of the Bosniac police chief of Jablanica by Croat police officers on 18 July 1996 after having been brought to Croat-dominated territory for an official police coordination meeting. The Chief was immediately arrested and detained by Croat authorities in West Mostar. An investigative judge commenced criminal proceedings while the Chief remained in detention. IPTF was required to stand by helplessly and attempt to negotiate his release from this ethnically motivated human rights violation. No form of police disciplinary action or prosecution against these Croat officials has resulted from this incident.
In a separate but equally illustrative incident, the Police Chief of Pale, in the Republika Srpska, while intoxicated in a public restaurant, fired his pistol through the windows and doors while other restaurant patrons were present. He subsequently used his loaded pistol to push another patron out of a chair by pushing the pistol against the patron's cheek. Again, no criminal charges were filed. No police disciplinary action was taken against this officer, even after the IPTF Commissioner wrote a strongly worded letter of protest to high ranking government officials.
 
The ongoing case of the four Serbs who were reported as missing persons on the Trnovo Road in Federation territory in July 1996 is illustrative of the continuation of ethnic hostilities through abuse of the criminal justice system. These four persons were discovered accidentally by IPTF monitors in October to be in the Sarajevo Centar Jail. They were being held without charges or bail. As of the date of this study, these persons have neither been charged nor released. It appears that the Federation police may have abducted or directed the abduction of these people for the purpose of conducting a future prisoner exchange. It is even more disturbing to note that one of these persons had been seriously wounded in the abduction and was denied medical attention for a significant period of time. Somers and Reeves, pp. 17, 24-25.

51 As the Secretary General noted in his 13 December 1995 report to the Security Council prior to deployment of the IPTF, "Its effectiveness will depend, to an important extent, on the willingness of the parties to cooperate with it in accordance with Article IV of annex 11 to the Peace Agreement." Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), Document No. S/1995/1031, p. 7, paragraph 27.

52 Somers and Reeves, pp. 17-18.

53 The IPTF Commissioner's Guidance calls upon Bosnian police forces to investigate police misconduct and discrimination scrupulously, and to use external auditors to ensure that written policies are enforced in practice and an independent review mechanism for allegations of police misconduct. Commissioner Guidance, pp. 2, 9, 16, 18.

54 Interview with Maj. Fred Solis, member of the IPTF Special Projects Division, which had responsibility for the vetting program. September 1996.

55 Confirmation of the "re-vetting" process as an IPTF power is found in the Commissioner's Guidance for Democratic Policing in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Part 1, May 1996. This document specifically states that all police officers "not selected for duty in that Canton or its Opstinas, or selected for duty at the Federal level, will be demobilized." P. 5.

56 AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO Message, Date-Time Group 051727 AUG 97, UNCLASS SARAJEVO 005266.

57 The training consisted of a 1-week "Human Dignity" course and a 3-week introduction to international policing standards and the reorganized Federation police structure. IPTF Workshop conducted at the National Defense University on 26-27 June 1997.

58 Pre-election briefing in CIMIC headquarters by IFOR Liaison Officer assigned to the IPTF, 13 Sep 96.

59 They still had to depend on their own comm net: 73 base radios with 10-mile radius, and 178 hand-held radios, one-mile range.

60 3 October 1996 Memorandum from LTC Mike Bailey to Amb Oakley, Subject: "To provide you with thoughts regarding the IPTF."

61 26 September 1996 Memorandum from LTC Mike Bailey to Mr. Michael Arietti, Subject: "Bosnia Trip Report."

62 "Commissioner's Guidance Notes for the Implementation of Democratic Policing Standards in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina," in Commissioner's Guidance for Democratic Policing in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sarajevo: United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996), pp. 1-2.

63 Commissioner's Guidance for Democratic Policing in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Sarajevo: United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996), p. 1.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 "The human rights abuses take many forms, ranging from willful blindness toward enforcing laws to overt criminality. A common form of misconduct is police participation and/or complicity in the kidnapping of members of ethnic minorities in order to amass candidates for the prisoner exchanges which occur on a regular basis with the full knowledge of the international community, including IPTF." Somers and Reeves.

67 "The pre-trial period of the criminal process is, in most cases, subject to abuse, fails to conform to the European Convention on Human Rights, and requires the most immediate corrective measures." "As long as prison officials continue to allow limitless periods of detention of uncharged individuals, without bring this detention to the attention of judicial authorities, rule of law will elude the Entities." "...we were concerned that approximately 50 percent of judges from Republika Srpska and Bosnian Croat courts were not aware of the European Convention on Human Rights and the fact that the fundamental freedoms set out in it were to be incorporated into the legal system. A common response to questioning on this point was that the system already had appropriate safeguards on the subject of Human rights. We found it did not. We also found in general terms that there was a lack of continuing education for judges and possibly as a result of this, a lack of knowledge on the part of all judges concerning changes in the legal system brought about by GFAP, specifically the role of the Human Rights Chamber and its relationship to the legal system."

68 HQ ACE, p. 23, Section 11.1.1.

69 In this article, the author refers to information activities to describe the coordination and synchronization of public information and psychological operations in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. The author chose the term information activities instead of information operations for two reasons. First, NATO does not have an information operations doctrine. Second, according to the U.S. Army's FM 100-6, information operations refers to operations linking together public affairs, civil affairs, psychological operations, command and control warfare, and electronic warfare. Such encompassing information operations did not take place during Operation Joint Endeavor.

70 Department of the Army, Field Manual 46-1: Public Affairs, draft version, November 1996.

71 During UNPROFOR and IFOR missions, major military operations were rare. One of them took place in March 1996, when IFOR seized arms and ammunitions from the Bosnian government. IFOR also seized many documents linking the Bosnian government to Iran. Since then, IFOR military operations have been limited in scope. For example, IFOR is backing up IPTF's inspections of police stations.

72 Colonel Tim Wilton, UKA, ARRC chief Public Information Officer, Sarajevo, October 1996.

73 The PSYOP campaign was called IFOR Information Campaign because of political constraints. During the planning phase of Joint Endeavor, it appeared that the term "psychological operations" generated reluctance among some of the partners in the coalition. To ease those concerns, the PSYOP campaign was labeled IFOR Information Campaign. There is, however, no doubt that the IFOR Information Campaign was a PSYOP campaign. The CJIICTF only comprised PSYOP personnel and assets and conducted operations according to NATO's definition of Psychological Activities. Interview with LtCol John Markham, USA, SHAPE PSYOP staff officer, Mons, 19 December 1996.

74 The PI and PSYOP policies in use at the time of planning were outdated. Both documents dated back to the 1980s and were more relevant to conventional warfighting in central Europe than to a peace operation in the Balkans.

75 When AFSOUTH and SHAPE began planning for Joint Endeavor, two contingency plans already existed: OPLAN 40103 (NATO support for implementation of the Vance-Owen peace plan) and OPLAN 40104 (NATO support for a UN withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina). Both plans were extensive. According to interviews conducted in theater, PI planners relied heavily on annex P to OPLAN 40104.

76 Some of these concepts were not new and had already been tested in real-world operations (during Operations Restore Hope and United Shield in Somalia, for example). The requirements and mechanisms were more complex and more comprehensive, however, during Joint Endeavor.

77 Interview with Capt. Mark Van Dyke, USN, IFOR chief PIO, Sarajevo, 17 October 1996.

78 Interview with Colonel Serveille, FRA, IFOR deputy chief PIO, Sarajevo, 22 October 1996.

79 While the MND(SW) operated in an intimate and rather collegial atmosphere, it is notable that the PI office was in a separate building from most of the command groups.

80 According to Colonel Charles de Noirmont, FRA, IFOR deputy chief PIO, Admiral Smith threatened the major international organizations with withdrawing IFOR support for the Holiday Press Center (where the daily briefings were organized) before the agencies agreed to take partial charge and chair the daily briefing three times a week. Interview with the author, Paris, November 1996.

81 On rarer occasions, U.S. embassy personnel attended the JICC.

82 Captain Mark Van Dyke, USN, IFOR Chief Public Information Officer, "Public Information In Peacekeeping: The IFOR Experience," paper presented before NATO's Political-Military Steering Committee Ad Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping, Seminar on Public Relations Aspects of Peacekeeping, Brussels, Belgium, NATO Headquarters, 11 April 1997. Available at http://www.nato.int/ifor/afsouth.

83 LtCol Furlong, USA (Ret.), Deputy Commander CJIICTF, comment to the author, September 1997.

84 Interview with Colonel Icenogle, USA, MND(N) Joint Information Bureau Director, Tuzla, October 1996. However, some of the U.S. officers in NATO posts did not participate in this teleconference.

85 For example, ordnance exploded in a tent, killing and wounding Italian and Portuguese soldiers. In such a case, where two nations were involved in the incident, only NATO had authority to release information about the circumstances of the incident. In that case, both nations issued statements describing the incident and pointing the finger at the other for responsibility. Interview with LtCol Hoehne, USA, SHAPE chief media officer, Mons, 18 December 1996.

86 Interview with LtCol Paul Brooks, UKA, MND(SW) chief PIO, Banja-Luka, October 1996.

87 In this case, however, IFOR's public announcement angered the IO/NGO community because they did not receive advance warning from IFOR.

88 On 9 January 1996, a Bosnian Serb sniper shot a woman on the Sarajevo tramway. The French immediately fired back at his position. At the daily briefing, the press accused IFOR of standing by and not doing anything. At first, IFOR PI could not counter those accusations because it was not aware of the French response. When they finally became aware of it, the issue was no longer of interest to the media and was reported incorrectly internationally. Simon McDowall, Sarajevo CPIC director, interview with the author, London, February 1997. (For an account of the incident, see Olivier Tramond, "Une mission in‚dite execut‚e par le 3e RPIMA … Sarajevo: La creation d'une zone desparation en milieu urbain," Les Cahiers de la Fondation pour les Etudes de D‚fense, 6/1997, p. 53.)

89 This conflict also reflected the somewhat traditional tension between higher and subordinate headquarters. For example, it seems that the ARRC concurred with the U.S. approach that a unified campaign against the Bosnian Serbs was the best approach. Meanwhile, all divisions felt they should have more freedom to conduct operations relevant to their respective AORs. For example, in summer 1996, Gen. Jackson, UKA, MND(SW) commander, refused to disseminate an edition of The Herald Of Peace (approved by COMIFOR and COMARRC) featuring a front-page article on indicted war criminals with photographs of Mladic and Karadzic. Gen. Jackson felt the article was insensitive to the Bosnian Serbs. After flag-level involvement at IFOR, ARRC, and EUCOM, it was decided that a division could no longer unilaterally block the dissemination of COMIFOR's approved products. In that case, COMARRC sided with the CJIICTF against the division's commander.

90 The French reluctance stemmed from political and historical reasons. After the defeat in Indochina (1954), the French military constituted a PSYOP capability and used it extensively during the Algerian conflict. When many of the PSYOP officers supported the coup des g‚n‚raux in 1961 (a rebellion against the legitimate government), the Ministry of Defense dissolved all the PSYOP units. This issue remains extremely sensitive to many government officials and general officers. However, as a result of IFOR operations, the French command for special operations (Commandement des Operations Speciales-COS) is now developing a PSYOP doctrine and capability.

91 Interview with Major Chris Bailey, USA, PSYOP liaison officer to MND(SE), Mostar, October 1996.

92 The Nation Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 130 states: "While U.S. international information activities must be sensitive to the concerns of foreign governments, our information programs should be understood to be a strategic instrument of U.S. national policy, not a tactical instrument of U.S. diplomacy. We cannot accept foreign control over program content." Under this directive, DoD has consistently refused to place its PSYOP forces under 'foreign' control. The definition of 'foreign' has been extended to include NATO.

93 When LtCol Furlong briefed the Deputy Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe (DCINCEUR) on 6 December 1995 regarding the IFOR product approval process, DCINCEUR agreed to delegate approval authority to COMIFOR and to rely on COMCJIICTF's day-to-day judgment in case of conflict between the NATO and U.S. operations. If a conflict of interest appeared between IFOR and EUCOM's (i.e., USG) PSYOP campaigns, DCOMCJIICTF was to call EUCOM J3 to raise the issue and promote a mutually satisfying solution. According to LtCol Furlong, only one conflict occurred during Joint Endeavor.

94 Ariane Quentier from the UNHCR thought the French (who headed the division) wanted to control her message. On the other hand, PIOs working at the division thought that cooperation was only possible if all speakers agreed to a common message.

95 For example, Nik Gowing (BBC TV) and Kurt Schork (Reuters) publicly praised IFOR efforts to provide relevant information in a timely fashion. R‚my Ourdan, reporter for the French daily Le Monde, thought that IFOR had been forthcoming with its operations. A New York Times reporter commented that Joint Endeavor was the "better military-media relationship he had ever seen."

96 The author would like to thank the many individuals who commented on this chapter in its various stages of development: LTC James Treadwell; LTC Anthony Cucolo; LTC Mike Furlong; Major Steve Collins, JFKSWCS; Major Wayne Mason, JFKSWCS; Major Chris Ives, 2D POG; Major Richard Gordon, Royal Army Education Corps; Major Jack Guy, ACOM; SFC David Gates, 321st POC; SFC Robert Drennan, and SGT Jason Sherer, 346th POC (A); and the students and instructors at the Military Psychological Operations Course, Class 3/97 (Defense Intelligence and Security School, UK). While their guidance and assistance have helped the development of this chapter, I alone am responsible for its failings and shortcomings.

97 Even though the larger conflict is over, the propaganda methods that helped to inflame it have not disappeared. See Jane Perlez, "Serbian Media is a One Man Show," New York Times, Sunday, August 10, 1997. For a more complete overview of the use of propaganda during the war in the Former Yugoslavia see Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, London, 1994 and Pedrag Simic, "The Former Yugoslavia: Media and Violence," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3 No. 5, February 4, 1994.

98 PSYOP are "Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives." Joint Pub 1-02. Indeed, one contentious issue for the PSYOP units in Bosnia was that NATO and USEUCOM did not allow the use of the term "PSYOP." Instead, PSYOP elements were given politically acceptable euphemisms such as Military-Civil Relations or Information Operations, and in the case of the PSYOP Task Force (POTF), the term Combined Joint IFOR Information Task Force (CJIICTF).

99 Though the majority of the personnel deployed to support Task Force Eagle were assigned to the 346th POC, a significant number of personnel from the 321st POC and the 350th POC deployed as part of the 15th POB force package. Elements from the 7th POG were also attached. The practice of patching together ad hoc force packages from available reservists rather than maintaining strict unit integrity has been standard during reserve PSYOP deployments in recent years.

100 During the IFOR mission there was no direct PSYOP support to the Russian brigade in MND(N). The Russian LNOs at HQ TFE would receive IIC products to that Russian troops could disseminate them in their sector. Additionally, in some instances that were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), U.S. loudspeaker teams supported Russian troops during crisis situations in Jusici and Celic. Another problem that the PSYOP community will have to consider is the role that "Command Information" platforms, such as the Finnish and French radio stations (not to mention the U.S. AFRTS and AFN) system, play in the information campaign. After all, there is no way to prevent the local population from picking up these broadcasts as well and thus they may impact upon the same target audiences as the PSYOP campaign.

101 MG Meigs took over from MG William Nash as COMEAGLE when the 1st Infantry Division took over from the 1st Armored Division in November 1996. MG Meigs made these comments during an interview on the ABC News program, Nightline, aired on June 3, 1997. The particular segment focused on the difficulties involved with keeping the peace in Brcko, Bosnia.

102 Recent incidents in Brcko (August 29, 1997), where SFOR troops eventually had to use non-lethal means to break up a public disturbance, should not detract from the successes during the IFOR mission. They may indeed be the exceptions that prove the rule.

103 Much of this paper is based on the operations and intelligence files of BPSE 210 and DPSE 20, including not only materials that originated in the DPSE but those documents sent down from the CJIICTF to the DPSEs and CJIICTF. BPSE and DPSE SITREPS are available at the History and Museums Division, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, located at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Ft. Bragg, NC. Additional information was acquired through interviews and discussions with personnel from the 2nd and 4th POG.

104 For a focused discussion on the overall IFOR Information Campaign see the preceding chapter by Pascale Combelles Siegel.

105 CJIICTF Product Dissemination Summary, 20 May 1997. The Herald of Progress, a more sophisticated monthly periodical, replaced The Herald of Peace in February-March 1997.

106 The outgoing DPSE commander had forwarded his e-mail address through 4th POG to 2nd POG but because 2nd POG did not have any e-mail capability, this information was not passed down to the deploying units. The 11th POB, on the other hand, made great use of electronic mail and conducted a leader's reconnaissance prior to their deployment to Bosnia in January 1997. This resulted in a much smoother transition than the previous rotation had encountered.

107 Some at the CJIICTF believed that the CJIICTF and the CPSE had briefed the incoming tactical units. This definitely was not the case. Those stationed in Sarajevo at the CJIICTF often had different perceptions about what happened in MND(N) than those stationed in MND(N) and vice versa. This certainly reinforces this author's belief that clear and concise communication of intent between the COMCJIICTF through his COMCPSE to the COMDPSE in MND(N) was at best problematic.

108 This disconnect between not only the CPSE and the DPSE but between the DPSE and the BPSEs reflects not only the lack of organic communications equipment within the tactical PSYOP units but the difficulty PSYOP had working within the CJ-3 to S-3 channels in a combined-joint operation. It also may indicate a failure on the CPSE's part to ensure that its subordinate elements had access to all information that it sent out over communications systems such as WARLORD.

109 For an assessment of the role of Force Protection Teams see David D. Perkins, "Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Operations in Bosnia," Defense Intelligence Journal 6-1 (1997): pp. 33-61.

110 Furthermore, a look at the DPSE and SITREPs indicates that a great deal of information passed on to the DPSE did not always make it to the CPSE and CJIICTF. Attached elements such as FPTs and Civil Affairs had a somewhat better reporting system. Reports were made to the supported unit the same way any organic staff element would. While summaries of the day's events went up, details were sent as separate reports. In the case of FPTs each summary referenced a specific FPIR. This report was sent under separate cover but could be accessed by all if required. This meant that the same daily SITREP was sent to all concerned.

111 In particular, each nation had intelligence that was releasable only to its own military. Some intelligence was only releasable to NATO and not non-NATO members participating in IFOR/SFOR, such as the Russians. Although there was a great deal of intelligence available through U.S.-only channels, because of the coalition nature of the mission the CJIICTF did not have direct access to the JDISS or other assets usually available in a SCIF. The only access the CJIICTF had to this traffic was by sending a representative to the NIC in order to "pull down" useful intelligence-often a difficult process in itself.

112 Former CJIICTF personnel insist that some of this information, to include Basic PSYOP Studies, was sent down to DPSE level. If this was the case, the DPSE was not aware that such information was available. In any case the information was not readily available to either the BPSEs or the supported units in MND(N). Still, some CJIICTF personnel indicated that they did not think such information was useful at the tactical level. This again reflects the lack of solid communications between the elements of the PSYOP task force and the problems of continuity inherent during the rotation of forces into and out of theater. Interviews with CJIICTF personnel, May and September 1997, and with DPSE 20 personnel, 1997.

113 One issue that will have to be discussed within the PSYOP community is the requirement to have trained 37F personnel act simply as "drivers" for PSYOP products, especially given the personnel-intensive nature of this operation and the shortage of trained and deployable 37F personnel. Despite clear personnel shortages in MND(N), there were never any replacements or additional TPTs provided by the CJIICTF using the Red Ball soldiers. It is the opinion of this author that this use of PSYOP troops, given the operational situation in theater, was not the most efficient use of valuable resources.

114 In some instances, however, products were delivered within a matter of days if not hours. In MND(N) this was sometimes done by sending products such as loudspeaker or radio scripts via electronic means from the CJIICTF through the CPSE and to the DPSE.

115 Despite the availability of some products announcing the Bosnian elections of September 1996, guides intended to explain the voting registration process did not arrive in MND(N) until after voter registration had ended. In addition products requested in July 1996 to support the RFCT's "Spirit of the Posavina" campaign (a campaign designed to promote multiethnic unity and Civil Affairs actions in the Posavina Corridor) did not arrive until late November 1996 after the RFCT had already re-deployed to Germany. Likewise, after incidents involving IFOR soldiers and RS soldiers at Donja Mahala and Zvornik in late 1996, PSYOP elements in MND(N) waited 2 days before receiving approved scripts to give to local radio stations (and the IFOR station in Brcko). In the meantime local RS radio stations had already put their own "spin" on the story and broadcast it to listeners in the AOR.

116 There is also some confusion as to whether or not products produced and developed specifically for NGOs and IGOs such as the UNHCR and the OSCE had to go through the same approval process as products developed specifically for IFOR units. To the best of this author's knowledge, these products did not have to go through the approval process but were still disseminated by U.S. TPTs.

117 On at least two occasions, supported unit commanders refused to allow the HoP to be disseminated in their AOR. In one case this was due to an article discussing the deadline for voter registration appearing in an issue that was delivered several days after the deadline for registration had already passed. Similarly, one HoP article highlighted that the start of the "Atlanta 96" Summer Olympics was near. This article, however, appeared in an issue that was dated after the Olympics had already come to a conclusion. Although some CJIICTF members insist that the DPSE had the authority to keep products from being disseminated in their AOR, the DSPE commander was not aware of this authority if he did have it.

118 Though some would argue that this set a dangerous precedent by deliberately trying to bypass the PSYOP product approval process, the fact remains that these PAO "products" were approved properly albeit through a different approval chain. In addition, by November, 1996, the CJIICTF gave PSYOP units the authority to use "open source" press releases as legitimate messages that did not have to be screened through the usual approval process. The PSYOP community will have to wrestle with this potentially volatile issue and in conjunction with its counterparts in the Public Affairs (not to mention LIWA and JC2WC) community discover solutions. If no solution is found, it is likely that such "work arounds" will be utilized in future situations that mirror the ones in Bosnia.

119 What the BPSE did in these instances, with the approval of the DPSE commander, was to assist and guide the MPAD's development of the BN commander's radio addresses to the local population-in essence a mini Information Control Group run by the PAO at the BN level. After the BN Commander approved the script (using of course the "guidelines" given to him by his own superiors) the messages were sent to Task Force Eagle (Division) for approval by the Joint Information Bureau (JIB). Using this method the BNs were even able to develop "pre-approved" scripts for contingencies and these scripts could be adjusted and altered as necessary so long as they fit within the "information campaign" guidelines. The reason that these "work arounds" were possible is because to a great degree the PSYOP messages and the "open source" press releases were (or would have been in contingencies) identical. This is often the case with U.S. "white" propaganda operations that have historically been straightforward information campaigns.

120 In defense of the Product Development Center, finding themes, symbols, language, and grammar that would not offend any one segment of the local population was a lose-lose proposition. The purposeful politicization of the language and grammar in the Balkans meant that no matter what dialect IFOR chose to use, someone would take offense.

121 The HoP, as with all IIC products, usually seemed somewhat bland when compared with the local competition. This is because the local papers were often shrill and polemic and not interested in objectivity. The lengthy approval process also tended to water down content.

122 The prototype of the monthly Herald of Progress (unnamed at the time of development) was begun at the end of September by the CJIICTF. The full production of this product was delayed by the deployment of LANDCENT, which directed that The Herald of Peace should continue unchanged through at least December 1996. Another program that developed during this time period was the "our message, their medium" approach, whereby weekly contact would be maintained through articles printed by local newspapers. The British responded to this with the publication of a regional product designed for MND(SW). The popularity of MOSTOVI (Bridges) among the local population resulted in the newssheet becoming a full-blown newspaper by mid-1997.

123 One of the local, family-owned FM stations seemed to have increased its listening audience by broadcasting in stereo. Casual listeners tuned into the station because as they were scanning through their channels the "FM Stereo" light went on their receiver and that attracted their attention. A technical note-there are ways to broadcast and make the stereo light go on individual receivers without actually broadcasting in stereo.

124 The ability of the PSYOP elements within the 2nd BDE, 1st A.D. AOR to get messages to a local radio station during the Mahala-Zvornik civil disturbances in early Autumn 1996 prevented a small incident involving Serbian Police and IFOR troops from turning into a potentially bloody military confrontation and civil disturbance. Likewise, in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR, planning for some contingencies included use of both local and IFOR-run radio stations for tactical purposes.

125 Throughout the deployment the issue arose within TFE as to whether or not the local population would be more receptive to messages broadcast over local radio stations (in line with the concept of "our message, their medium"). Within the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR, the local radio stations had larger audiences, greater technical capacity, and more suitable entertainment formats for reaching a number of different target audiences. The PSYOP elements in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR sector had brief success by using the local stations, but this effort was hamstrung and eventually ended by directives from the CJIICTF. Subsequently, the local commanders turned again to the Public Affairs organizations in order to put out information over the local radio stations.

126 Interviews with PSYOP personnel and a look at BPSE and DPSE SITREPS indicate that on several occasions in November and December 1996, the DPSE did not forward negative criticism of products to the CPSE and CJIICTF.

127 Though the members of the CJIICTF staff vehemently disagree with this assessment, neither the COMCJIICTF nor the COMCPSE during this time period gave any indications that they had any more than a basic understanding of the dynamics of planning and executing an information campaign. In addition the CJIICTF was likely hamstrung due to budgetary and time constraints and thus had to take the common denominator approach to target audience analysis.

128 Though there was no use of the Internet-one of the newest media for PSYOP-as a dissemination platform during the IFOR mission, the CJIICTF did consider the problem. This may have been an excellent medium for dissemination to certain key (urban elite) communicators. Students in Serbia have already had limited experience with the Internet as an effective means of persuasive communication, and called their recent uprising in Belgrade "the Internet revolution." See "The Internet Revolution," Wired Magazine, May 1996. The use of the Internet by the CJIICTF was held up at one time over the legality of using it because by law PSYOP products may not be available to the United States and the U.S. public could easily have accessed PSYOP Internet sites. Other assessments by the CJIICTF determined that the audience might have been too small to be worth the effort. Other U.S. Government entities, however, did use the Internet as a platform for dissemination. During the SFOR mission, the 1st Infantry Division considered its World Wide Web home page as one of several ways to convey information to target audiences. See LTC Garry J. Beavers and LTC Stephen W. Shanahan, "Operationalizing IO in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Military Review (forthcoming).

129 Guidance on complex issues was often lacking, particularly in the latter part of the deployment. For example, many Muslims and Serbs in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR were very upset at the announcement that German troops would be arriving en masse in Bosnia. The typical response was, "you might as well send the Ustache," a reference to the Croat Fascists puppet state of the Nazi Reich. Despite several requests for the "party line," the BPSE could get no answer from the DPSE, CPSE, or CJIICTF on what to say. Eventually, the TPTs used the public affairs guidance provided by the BN MPAD.

130 Unfortunately, some may only remember Colonel Fontenot for remarks he made in December 1995 which irritated the FWF and thus did not support all objectives of the operational PSYOP campaign. Despite the FWF reaction to the suggestion that they may have killed people based upon race or ethnicity, Fontenot's ability to intimidate the FWF probably helped to enhance the safety and security of U.S. troops in the sector-a primary PSYOP, U.S., and IFOR objective. A more comprehensive discussion of PSYOP and force protection issues appears later in this chapter. See also Thomas Ricks, "U.S. Brings to Bosnia the Tactics that Tamed the Wild West," The Wall Street Journal, December 27, 1995.

131 One of the intangibles that may have affected the ability of the key leaders to communicate effectively with the target audiences was the capability and the personality of the interpreters used by these individuals. It may be no coincidence then that Colonel Fontenot, the most effective communicator in the region, had one of the best interpreters in the region. The success of the TPTs was also determined to a large degree by the capability of its interpreters. An important lesson for the PSYOP campaign was that an engineered mix of local and DoD (U.S. national) linguists provided the best way to create products that could span the difficulties imposed by cross-cultural communication.

132 Specifically, in October 1996 the COMCJIICTF ordered the DPSE commander to cease all radio contracting activities with local radio stations. This was ordered as a precaution against any pecuniary responsibilities falling upon the PSYOP chain. The COMCJIICTF also asserted at this time that the local radio broadcasts were COMCJIICTF's responsibility. Though he was correct, the matter was complicated by the fact that the TFE contracting office had set up these contracts with 1st A.D. funds.

133 The force protection measures appear to have been largely a political decision in light of the U.S. experience in Somalia, where U.S. policy took a sharp turn after 18 American soldiers were killed in a single engagement in 1993. Indeed this decision was itself based on the larger belief that the U.S. public no longer expects its soldiers to die in battle. For an interesting take on the issue of "clean" conflicts, see Paddy Griffith, "The Politics of Getting Hurt," Command, summer 1994, pp. 8-13.

134 Specifically, the PSYOP element in the RFCT/TF 1-18 AOR experienced a severe degradation in mission capability during the final 6 weeks of their deployment due to the replacement in late December 1996 of all but one of the BPSE/TPTs vehicles with unserviceable vehicles from the 7th PSYOP Group in MND(SW). Some of the vehicles suffered from what TF 1-18 mechanics cited as the "criminal neglect" of basic PMCS and damage due to improper engine maintenance. This was also exacerbated by a lack of repair parts for U.S. vehicles in the British sector. The vehicle swap, ordered by the CJIICTF, brought missions to a virtual standstill in one sector and limited capability throughout the TF 1-18 AOR. By the time the BPSE was replaced in February 1997 all the elements vehicles were still not mission capable.

135 An additional point should be made that the first two rotations of PSYOP soldiers to the RFCT/TF1-18 AOR (from 4th POG and 2nd POG) both noted in their AARs that the weapons they carried were perhaps not always suitable for a STABOPS environment. They argued that rather than carrying only M-16A2s, soldiers on TPTs should also carry 9mm pistols so that M-16s would not have to be lugged through crowded markets and brought into meetings with local political officials-indeed those situations where a pistol might be a better weapon in tactical terms. PSYOP soldiers in MND(SW) carried both M-16A2s and 9mm pistols and found this to be a satisfactory arrangement. See BPSE 940, 4th Psychological Operations Group AAR and BPSE 210 AAR.

136 Although some in IFOR may have believed the U.S. approach to be "ham handed," this warfighting focus was understood and respected by the local faction military and thus reinforced their acceptance of the IFOR forces. In the words of one experienced peacekeeper, ".you want to make progress, you want belligerents to listen, obey, conform, then you got to carry the biggest stick; and every now and then, shake it at them, or pound one of them." Furthermore, the heavy, hard, and "armed to the teeth" approach convinced the local population that IFOR could indeed provide the people of the Posavina Corridor with one of Maslow's most base needs: security. The velvet touch really only proves useful in a more mature environment-not the type of environment during the initial IFOR mission. My thanks to LTC Anthony Cucolo for these insights.

137 The particulars of the OPORD also meant that PSYOP would not "rate" a MSE or LAN line from the supported unit; therefore, even the availability of the necessary equipment would not have guaranteed operability of that system. The BN commanders determined priority for these lines unless otherwise dictated from above by division or COMIFOR.

138 Ironically, in the last month of the deployment, handtalkies were delivered to the BPSE; however, they proved useless without instructions on how to program them to the correct frequencies and were subsequently returned to the CJIICTF.

139 During the period June 1996-February 1997, the CPSE's role was somewhat ambiguous. In theory, the CPSE acted as the PSYOP Support Element to the ARRC, and as the link between the DPSEs and the CJIICTF. The CPSE, however, proved to be more of an appendage to the operation than a true conduit between the DPSEs and the CJIICTF. Per COMCJIICTF's instructions, guidance to the DPSE would sometimes come directly from the CJIICTF. Similarly, at times the CPSE did not evaluate information that came up from the DPSEs but merely passed it on to the CJIICTF. Finally, the COMCPSE did not, as a general rule, attend the supported unit's Information Coordination Group meetings held by COMARRC. Instead, representatives from the CJIICTF (either the DCOMCJIICTF or the CJ3 of the CJIICTF) would attend these meetings.

140 During the follow-up rotation (February-September 1997) a Theater PSYOP Support Element (TPSE), as well as a DPSE, was based at MND(N). Thus, the COMTPSE could help deconflict the operational PSYOP campaign as orchestrated by the CJIICTF with the needs of TFE. The DPSE commander could then truly provide tactical support to the MND without also having to engage in theater PSYOP planning.

141 On the other hand, the vast majority of the PSYOP soldiers in theater were commended by various commands, to include COMEAGLE. These were not, by any means, gratuitous comments. MG Nash often commented on the quality of the tactical PSYOP soldiers (particularly the reservists) and their ability to contribute immensely to the success of the TFE mission. Indeed, the need to balance OPTEMPO with the recruitment, training, and retention and quality of personnel issues is one that must be addressed by both the RC and AC PSYOP forces.

142 Commanders, to include both COMEAGLEs, expressed their displeasure not only in daily Battle Update Briefs but in their comments during debriefings and to various historical and assessment teams. For example see Chapter 3, "Psychological Operations Support to Peace Operations," BHCAAT 9 Initial Impressions Report (For Official Use Only).

143 Indeed, during a variety of CTC exercises (CMTC, JRTC) to include those at Hohenfelz designed to train-up the 1st A.D. and the 1st I.D. for Bosnia, the PSYOP community had taught the maneuver elements to expect a much more responsive tactical PSYOP effort.

144 In the absence of what Major General Meigs felt was adequate PSYOP support, the 1st I.D. turned to the Land Information Warfare Activities (LIWA) cell to help coordinate and conduct its Information Operations campaign. See Beavers and Shanahan, "Operationalizing IO in Bosnia-Herzegovina." MG Meigs also overcame what he believed to be a lack of support from the CJIICTF by taking a broad interpretation of the guidelines for Command Information in order to put out the information he felt would help his mission in the AOR.

145 Interviews with TFE PSYOP personnel.

146 A MIST team is a five-man PSYOP element with production, linguistic, and area specialties. It usually will support a U.S. ambassador and country team with expertise and advice, as well as print, audio, and A.V. information products. Though by doctrine it would have been based in Sarajevo, it could have been used to support U.S.-only objectives and thus might have been used for TFE in the PSYOP planning role as opposed to a DPSE purpose built tactical coordination element.

147 Indeed, in June of 1996 the USACAPOC Commander stated to deploying troops that as the mission in Bosnia was a new one for the community the PSYOP troops would be "creating doctrine" as they went about their job.

148 This statement is based on comments made by former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) Craig Alderman to then Director for Psychological Operations, OSD, Col. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. Conversation with Dr. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. , summer 1997.

149 There were numerous after action reports, lessons learned reports, briefings, and interviews that served as the basis for this chapter. Those of particular importance were USAREUR Headquarters After Action Report, 5th Signal Command Lessons Learned Book for Operation Joint Endeavor, History of the 7th Signal Brigade's involvement in Operation Joint Endeavor, USEUCOM Lessons Learned, NACOSA briefing on Operation Joint Endeavor Communications and Lessons Learned, IFOR CJ6 Lessons Learned, ARRC Communications and Information Systems Lesson Learned, IFOR C-Support Lessons Learned, CJCCC Information Book, Air Mobility Command Lessons Learned, USAFE Lessons Learned, IFOR Joint Analysis Team report, CISA Operation Joint Endeavor Lessons Learned report, Army War College AAR, SOCOM SOF Mission Support Lessons Learned, JITC C4I Infrastructure Documentation Report for Operation Joint Endeavor, Center for Army Lessons Learned reports, and DISA-EUR Lessons Learned.

150 The author would like to thank the many individuals who commented on this chapter in its various stages of development. In particular-from 5th Signal Command, BG Robert Nabors, USA, Col William Ritchie, USA, and Charles Smith; From NACOSA, GP CAPT Derek Ainge, RAF; The Air Force Historian office: Dr. Jay Smith; William Randall of DISA-EUR; Major Frederick Mooney, USAF; LTC David Perkins, USA; Col Fred Stein, USA (Ret.); and Patrick Deshazo and John Jannis, MITRE.

151 There were a number of key interviews that set the stage for the NDU study and this chapter in particular: USEUCOM (J6): BG Randy Witt, USAF, and CAPT Tom Cooper, USN; BG Robert Nabors, Charles Riggs and 5th Signal Command staff; USAREUR: Col Fred Stein, USA; NACOSA: Gp Capt Ainge, RAF, and staff; SHAPE CISD: Kent Short; IFOR CJ6: CDRE Peter Swan, RN, and staff; AFSOUTH (CSG): Col Bob Hillmer, USAF, and in Zagreb Maj Flores, USAF; CJCCC: Col Rodawowski, USA, Col Dempsey, USA, and Lt Col Stan Howard, USAF; IFOR CJ6 (Sarajevo): Maj Fred Mooney, USAF; ARRC G6: LTC Lester, LTC Grey, and Maj Brand, UKA; MND(SE) G6: LTC DeMaillard, French Army; MND(SW) G6: Maj Pickersgill and Capt Allen, UKA; C-Support G6: LTC Rowe and Capt Bennett, USA; and the IFOR Joint Analysis Team: CAPT Peter Feist, GEN, Wg Cdr Nigel Reed, UKAFO, Cdr Magnussen, NON, Cdr Finseth, NON, Lt Cdr Jon Hill, USNR, and Lt Cdr Carol Clark, USNR.

152 IFOR Fact Sheets.

153 IFOR Fact Sheets and IDA report: Operation Joint Endeavor-Description and Lessons Learned, November 1996.


 | Bosnia Index | Foreword | Acknowledgments | Preface | I. Introduction | II. Bosnia—Setting the Stage | III. Command and Control Structure | IV. Intelligence Operations | V. Civil-Military Cooperation | VI. The International Police Task Force | VII. Information Activities | VIII. Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle | IX. Counterintelligence and HUMINT | X. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Soldier's Perspective | XI. C4ISR Systems and Services | XII. NDU/CCRP Bosnia Study | XIII. Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned | XIV. Summary | End Notes | Appendix A: The Dayton Peace Agreement Summary | Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events | Appendix C: References | Appendix D: Acronyms | About the Contributing Editor | About the Authors