bosnia preface

Preface

Peacekeeping is a soldier-intensive business in which the quality of the troops matters as much as the quantity. It is not just soldiering under a different color helmet; it differs in kind from anything else soldiers do. There are medals and rewards (mainly, the satisfaction of saving lives), but there are also casualties. And no victories. It is not a risk-free enterprise. In Bosnia, mines, snipers, mountainous terrain, extreme weather conditions, and possible civil disturbances were major threats that had to be dealt with from the outset of the operation. Dag Hammarskjold once remarked, "Peacekeeping is a job not suited to soldiers, but a job only soldiers can do."

Humanitarianism conflicts with peacekeeping and still more with peace enforcement. The threat of force, if it is to be effective, will sooner or later involve the use of force. For example, the same UN soldiers in Bosnia under a different command and mandate essentially turned belligerence into compliance over night, demonstrating that a credible threat of force can yield results. Unlike UNPROFOR, the NATO-led Implementation Force was a military success and helped to bring stability to the region and to provide an "environment for hope" in which a nation can be reborn. It is now up to a complex array of international civil agencies to assist in putting in place lasting structures for a democratic government and the will of the international community to ensure a lasting peace. The international community, after more than a year of NATO involvement, is just coming to grips with this realization.

Bosnia is a beautiful and fascinating country with rugged mountains and romantic medieval villages and cities. It's hard to understand why someone would want to destroy such beauty, or why the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims would perform inhumane acts of cruelty and atrocities against one another in the name of "ethnic cleansing." Although the media refers to "ethnic rivalries" in Bosnia, the truth of the matter is that all of the combatants were of the same ethnic group—Slavic. Bosnia's Muslims are Slavic, not Arab. However, in the words of Ivo Andric, himself a native Bosnian, "Bosnia is a country of hatred and fear. It is hatred, but not limited just to a moment in the course of social change, or an inevitable part of the historical process: rather it is hatred acting as an independent force, as an end in itself." Hence, with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, with its richly mixed population of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, became the principal battleground, the place where ancient and modern passions combined to fuel unspeakable cruelty.

In the early afternoon of April 6, 1992, gunmen holed up in the upper-floor rooms (the unofficial headquarters of Radovan Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party) of the Holiday Inn in downtown Sarajevo opened fire on a "peace and unity" demonstration across the street in front of the Parliament Building, killing several of the demonstrators. For Sarajevo, these shots marked the start of the war. From then on it was all downhill.

The devastation that swept Bosnia and parts of Croatia was noticeable as soon as one stepped off the aircraft at Sarajevo airport. The control tower had obviously served as an irresistible target for Serb gunners and the airport terminal had been destroyed as well—baggage claim was a pallet at the edge of the tarmac. As one drove from the airport toward downtown Sarajevo, the devastation was even more severe, with homes, gas stations, apartment buildings, and office buildings savagely destroyed. The office building housing the Sarajevo daily newspaper, the Oslobodjenje, was severely damaged, its twin towers burned and collapsed as a result of heavy shelling. However, in spite of constant artillery, tank, and sniper fire, the paper was published every day during the war.

One of the saddest city sites was the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian masterpiece, the Sarajevo Library. A place of intellectual curiosity where many influential people passed through to contribute the best of their culture and intellectual gifts, it was not a player in the war but was ravaged by it. An estimated 1.5 million books were burned as a result of Serb artillery targeted against the facility and its symbol of intellectual curiosity.

Every available open space became a cemetery during the siege of Sarajevo. For example, there was a small cemetery in the park across the street from a large department store (which had a large shell hole in the 2nd floor from a direct hit) in downtown Sarajevo. As one stood on the hill overlooking the Olympic Stadium, one could see a sea of white, which upon closer inspection was actually hundreds of white crosses in a cemetery for those killed as a result of the siege of Sarajevo.

The 1984 Olympic Stadium and Ice Rink too had been severely damaged. The Olympic torch too had become a target for the gunners and was riddled with bullet holes. Standing at center rink, one could see the dust-covered 1984 Olympic clock and scoreboard still hanging in the less damaged portion of the rink—more than half of the rink structure was now a mass of twisted iron beams and girders. The rink was also home for some of the IFOR forces, including a UK military mess hall.

Destruction was not limited to Sarajevo and other large cities. As one flew over the countryside in a helicopter, signs of destruction were visible everywhere, from bridges to factories to single homes to entire villages.

Mostar, a wonderful, romantic medieval Turkish town of winding streets, little squares, and small shops, boasts one of the most famous confrontation lines in the world—the Bulevar, a street of once magnificent buildings shot to pieces by 10 million rounds of small arms fire. The city sits on the banks of the steep-sided Neretva River, which divides East from West. The beautiful Stari Most bridge, which linked the East with the West, was blown away in a fit of senseless Croat aggression in November 1993. Up to that point in time, the bridge had survived the fall of the Ottoman Empire and two World Wars. Banja Luka was also a beautiful city with tree-lined streets, cafes, parks, and the Vrbas River, where children would swim in the summer. It did not see the destruction of other large cities. The destruction was mainly limited to Muslim mosques, the Ferhad Pasha and Arnaudiya, which had been destroyed by either Serb soldiers or thugs who detonated several thousand pounds of dynamite under the mosques. After four centuries, all that remained of them was rubble. Other mosques had been destroyed throughout the country as well—the intent was apparently to destroy history and all traces that the Muslims had ever lived in Bosnia.

Even in the large city of Zagreb, Croatia, there was visible evidence of the war, e.g., roped off areas of land mines at the international airport. There was also a waist-high brick wall that surrounded the UN compound in Zagreb. Each brick in the wall carried the name of a loved one lost in the war—a monument to Croatian suffering.

There were moments of friendliness in spite of the devastation. During a jeep ride from Mostar to Sarajevo, children lined the streets and ran up to the road to wave at us as we passed through the towns—much as children have done in other wars. Almost everyone experienced a memorable encounter with the elderly, who were most appreciative of the NATO-led intervention and showed their gratitude by stopping you in the street and saying "Thank you. Thank you!" This happened to me in the Old Turkish Quarter in Sarajevo.

This book is not, however, about the devastation and suffering in Bosnia and Croatia. Instead, it's about NATO and the participating nations' first-ever effort to put in place a credible NATO-led coalition peacekeeping force to meet the intent of the military annex of the Dayton Accord and establish a stable peace environment. Included are insights into the multinational force experiences, challenges, successes (in particular, human ingenuity in addition to technology and perseverance), and lessons learned in putting in place a one-of-a-kind C2 structure and federated C4ISR system to support the peace operation.

The peace operation was a first in many different respects. The NATO-led operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Joint Endeavor, was NATO's first-ever ground force operation, its first-ever deployment "out of area," and its first-ever joint operation with NATO's Partnership for Peace partners and other non-NATO countries, including the Russians. It was a first deployment of USAREUR in support of a ground operation. This was a first-ever for the French in support of a NATO-led operation. It demonstrated that the alliance could adapt its forces and policies to the requirements of the post-Cold War world, while continuing to provide collective security and defense for all allies. It was also tangible proof that, in addition to carrying out the core functions of defense of the alliance, its military forces had the flexibility to be used outside of the NATO area, for operations under the authority of the UN Security Council and with clear political objectives defining the military tasks. NATO's own military capabilities and its adaptability to include forces of non-NATO countries were decisive factors in the alliance's role in implementing the military annex of the Peace Agreement. The operation showed that the alliance remains vital, relevant, and prepared to deal with the new, multifaceted security risks facing Europe with the end of the Cold War.

Peace operations such as Joint Endeavor place different, and at times conflicting, demands on the supporting coalition military operation, civil-military cooperation, its C4ISR infrastructure, and associated information collection, use, and sharing. There are doctrine, culture, and language differences that need to be coordinated and merged to achieve unity of effort. Unintended consequences accompany the use of commercial and advanced information technologies and services and need to be accommodated. Information operations drive policy and doctrine. For Bosnia, the operation differed considerably from what NATO, the U.S., and other militaries had organized, equipped, and trained for during the Cold War. Lessons from Bosnia provide a window to the future and an opportunity to improve the military support to future peace operations.

Finally, the book tells the story of adapting a "go-to-war" equipped and trained military force to meet the challenges of a major peace operation. In peacekeeping, no operation will be quite like any other; each will have its own complexities, missions, and mandates. But some lessons have been learned the hard way through experience, and are still being learned in Bosnia, which could usefully be applied elsewhere. An attempt has been made to share with the reader the IFOR Bosnia experiences, both good and bad, and to highlight those lessons learned as a result of these experiences.