STRAWMAN MISSION NEED STATEMENT
FOR
MULTI-ROLE ENDURANCE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (MRE UAV) (U)
(Potential ACAT __)
NOTE: This Appendix A of the MRE Broad Agency Announcement represents a strawman for the MRE UAV Initial Draft Mission Needs Statement that will be released upon Contract Award, on or about 3 April 2000. It is intended solely to provide general, broad guidance in addressing potential mission needs and deficiencies. It should be used as an early indication of potential areas of interest. It should not be considered to be all-inclusive or binding in terms of mission applications or potential deficiency areas. It should not be used to initiate or bound specific mission area analyses, requirement definitions, or system design studies, as contents are under review and subject to change.
(U) DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE ELEMENT. Identify the major program planning objective or section of the Defense Planning Guidance to which this need responds. Also reference DoD or Military Department long-range investment plans, if applicable.
(U) This Mission Need Statement (MNS) provides for a Multi-Role Endurance UAV, organic to naval expeditionary forces. The MRE UAV will provide surveillance, reconnaissance, surveillance, relay, targeting, and attack (SRRTA) (RTSA), as well as data relay, to Navy and Marine Corps forces operating in the 21st Century.
(U) This MNS responds to the FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), dated April 16, 1998, as well as the National Military Strategy (NMS). It addresses directly all three elements of the NMS: "Shape the International Security Environment", "Response to Full Spectrum of Crises", and "Prepare for an Uncertain Future".
(U) Specifically, Furthermore, this MNS specifically addresses Part II of the DPG:
- Resource Priorities, subparagraphs (1) and (2) (pp.29-30), placing emphasis for readiness and modernization on deployable units and early deployers;
- Smaller Scale Contingency Operations (p.32) and Planning for Major Theater Wars (p.34);
- Responding to Asymmetric and Transnational Threats, Paragraph 1 (Information Operations (pp. 36 – 37)) and Subparagraph (7) Other Threats (p.43);
- Programming Guidance, Conventional Forces directing adequate Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) surveillance and special mission assets to support two Major Theater War scenarios (p.55);
- Tables depicting Navy and Marine Corps Force Structure and Endstrength (p.54);and
- Modernization, Information Security programming guidance for ISR Modernization (p.83)
(U) Additionally, this MNS responds directly to key tenets articulated in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff document Joint Vision 2010: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full-Dimensional Protection, and Information Superiority.
(U) MISSION AND THREAT ANALYSIS. Identify and describe the mission need or deficiency. Define the need in terms of mission, objectives, and general capabilities. Do not discuss the need in terms of equipment or system-specific performance characteristics. Discuss the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-validated threat to be countered as well as the projected threat environment and the shortfalls of existing capabilities or systems in meeting these threats. Comment on the timing of the need and the general priority of this need relative to others in this mission area.
(U) Mission Need: This MNS articulates the need to supplement the organic capability of expeditionary naval forces to perform medium range and/or long endurance surveillance, reconnaissance, relay, targeting, and potentially, attack (both lethal and non-lethal) against a wide variety of possible land and sea-based targets, across the spectrum of conflict. This differs from a UCAV, which emphasizes lethality.
(U) Satisfying this need permits the U.S. Navy to reduce operating costs and enhance performance by sustaining and improving:
- Surveillance and reconnaissance in maritime areas and deep into applicable littorals (potential capability for armed surveillance to be considered)
- Detection, identification, tracking, and targeting of mobile, high value targets
- Ability to fully capitalize uponT the capabilities of an emerging generation of precision weapons (targeting/guidance assistance, potential shooter capability to be considered)
- Communications relay capability
- Near-real time collection, processing and dissemination of intelligence, including but not necessarily limited to: acoustic, signals, imagery, communications, and electronic intelligence
- Minimal casualties to USSurvivability of forces and non-combatants, as well as collateral damage, while operating in a complex and uncertain operational and political environment
- Evolution toward network-centric warfare
(U) MAEMRE UAV is therefore projected to play a key role in the following missions:
- Surveillance
- Reconnaissance
- Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
- Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW)
- Electronic Warfare (EW), including SEAD
- Interdiction/Strike
- Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)
- Force Protection
- Battle Management
- Information Warfare (IW )
(U) Shortcomings of Existing Systems
Tactical UAVs (Pioneer, VTUAV). Payload, altitude, speed and range/endurance capabilities of these systems are too limited to meet the requirements of the MRE mission.
The Predator MAEMAE system, although not organic to US naval forces, has the range, endurance, and possibly the payload capacity required to meet some MRE requirements. However, the existing Predator system would also require extensive "marinization" to become shipboard compatible.
Land and sea-based aircraft (P-3, EP-3, S-3, E-2, EA-6B, F-14 and F/A-18 with reconnaissance pod) currently perform the bulk of the role envisioned for the MRE UAV. To varying degrees all these aircraft have limitations in either range/endurance, or survivability. Even with projected procurements and service life extensions, all of these aircraft except the F/A-18 will be at or near the end of their service lives between 2010 and 2015.
Spaced-based systems are highly capable, but have time, weather, and connectivity limitations. Additionally, they cannot employ weapons or conduct targeting missions. They Space-based systems are frequently heavily tasked by National and Theater-level authorities, and are generally not responsive enough to meet all SRRTARSTA requirements.
(U) Projected Threat Environment: The MRE UAV system will be exposed to a scenario-dependent level of direct and indirect threats. The types and lethality of weapons which could potentially be employed against the MRE UAV will vary from region to region, adversary to adversary. These threats include:
(U) Direct Threats. Those threats which can destroy the UAV in-flight, including surface-to-air missiles and air defense artillery. Fighter aircraft pose a secondary threat. Furthermore, depending on the tactical situation, the Control Station is potentially at risk from attacks by air to surface munitions (including radiation-homing missiles), artillery, and surface-to-surface missiles.
(U) Indirect Threats. Those threats which can damage the UAV or otherwise reduce mission effectiveness. Indirect threats include Information Operations (IO) and Electronic Warfare (EW). UAV sensors may be vulnerable to jamming, spoofing, and camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D). Data/communication links may be vulnerable to jamming, disruption, and deception. In addition, battlefield lasers could theoretically degrade certain UAV sensors and systems, and electromagnetic pulse events could seriously damage UAV components. In addition, UAVs are susceptible to nuclear, chemical, and possibly biological weapons contamination during certain phases of flight.
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) validated threat is described in the following classified threat assessments:
- Naval Strike and Air Warfare Systems (U), ONI-TA-017-98, Jan 98
. Provides the threat assessment foundation to assist in determining future tactical strike and air warfare program requirements and for use in deriving threat statements for program documentation.
- Worldwide Threat to U.S. Navy & Marine Forces, 1997 – 2017, Volume I and II (U), ONI-1200-001-98, Oct 97. Provides an overall description of the extensive ranges of threats along the littorals.
- System Threat Assessment Report for the Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Sep 95.
- Vol. 1: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I), C4I Support, and Electronic Warfare (U) MCIA-1527-001-98, (U) May 98. Specifically addresses threat technologies and innovations which may adversely affect USMC C4I and EW operations.
(U) NONMATERIEL ALTERNATIVES. Discuss the results of the mission area analysis. Identify any changes in U.S. or Allied doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, organization, and training that were considered in the context of satisfying the deficiency. Describe why such changes were judged to be inadequate.
(U) Changes in doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, organization, and training do not appear to be sufficient to provide the level of organic, survivable, interoperable SRRTARSTA required by Naval forces in the 2010 to 2015 timeframe.
(U) A number of existing and planned US systems perform part of the SRRTARSTA role, generally under different operational conditions. These include but are not limited to: USAF surveillance aircraft and UAVs, satellites, fighter/attack aircraft, helicopters, and submarines. All have major limitations in survivability, availability, and/or affordability to provide the full range of capability envisioned to be required by independent sea-based naval forces.
(U) Mission Area Assessment (MAA): An interim MAA relevant to the platforms being considered for replacement was performed using strategy- to- task methodology. The MAA identified and prioritized functions needed to perform the tasks, as well as identifying shortfalls. The MAA identified 61 relevant deficiencies and needs in eight key functional areas, summarized below:
Flight Functions. The MRE UAV should:
- Possess sufficient range, altitude, speed and endurance to cover the full spectrum of targets
- Be able to operate from air-capable ships or from austere locations
- Be responsive to re-tasking during flight
Detect / Locate / Identify/ Track Targets. The MRE UAV should:
- Be capable of detecting, locating, and identifying a full spectrum of targets, including underwater and potentially subterranean, during day, night, and adverse weather
Prosecute Targets. The MRE UAV should be capable of:
- Providing targeting data
- Conducting active and passive EW
- Potentially employing lethal and non-lethal ordnance
Collect Data (Passive). The MRE UAV should:
- Be capable of collecting a wide variety of intelligence information such as environmental and with respect to potential targets.
- BeE capable of disseminating a wide range of data throughout the full Joint C4ISR architecture
Relay Information. The MRE UAV should:
- Function as a full spectrum data relay node
- Provide near real-time transmission of data, both relayed and from own sensors
Survivability. The MRE UAV should:
- Be survivable in a hostile environment utilizing all appropriate techniques, i.e. tactics, signature control (all frequencies), countermeasures and vulnerability hardening
- Be configurable to mitigate survivability enhancements in a non-hostile environment (i.e. "modular/scalar" survivability attributes to maximize mission effectiveness.)
Supportability. The MRE should:
- Be supportable and maintainable at shipboard remote and austere sites
- Be easily transportable and readily deployable
- Require minimum manning
Interoperability. The MRE should fit seamlessly into the Joint C4ISR architecture
(U) POTENTIAL MATERIEL ALTERNATIVES. Identify known systems or programs addressing similar needs that are deployed or are in development or production by any of the Services or Allied nations. Discuss the potential for inter-Service or Allied cooperation. Indicate potential areas of study for concept exploration/definition including the use of existing U.S. or Allied military or commercial systems or product improvements of existing systems. Do not evaluate these alternatives.
(U) Alternatives: Potential materiel alternatives include:
Remanufacture or service life extension of existing manned aircraft and modernization of subsystems
Augmenting Air Force-operated UAV (Predator, Global Hawk) and space-based assets to provide reliable support for maritime operations
Developing a Multi-Role Endurance UAV optimized for the RSTA role
Developing a Naval-variant Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV)
Replacing existing manned airborne assets with a new-design manned aircraft optimized to perform SRRTARSTA functions
Increasing quantities of deployed/planned space based ISR assets in combination with unmanned weapons delivery platforms
Significant modifications and improvements to other land based ISR assets including increases in force structure and weapons capability
(U) Potential for interservice/allied cooperation; applicability of potential modification or commercial solutions: TBD
(U) CONSTRAINTS. Describe, as applicable, key boundary conditions related to infrastructure support that may impact on satisfying the need: logistics support; transportation; mapping, charting and geodesy support; manpower, personnel, and training constraints; command, control, communications, and intelligence interfaces; security; and standardization or interoperability within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or with other allies or DoD Components. Address the operational environments (including conventional; initial nuclear weapon effects; nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination (NBCC); electronic; and natural) in which the mission is expected to be accomplished. Define the level of desired mission capability in these environments.
(U) Affordability: Cost will be a key variable in fulfilling this requirement.
(U) Force Structure: Capability, reliability, maintainability and supportability improvements over current platforms must be achieved without increasing force structure or manpower.
(U) Manpower, Personnel and Training (MPT): MPT analysis will be performed in accordance with Naval Training System Plan (NTSP) directives. This analysis will point to the most efficient possible manning concept, focusing on total ownership costs as well as operational effectiveness.
(U) Interoperability and Connectivity: Interoperability and connectivity between services and between U.S. forces and key allies is mandatory. DOD-common UAV subsystems, and command and control systems will be incorporated the maximum extent possible.
(U) Operational Environment: Subsystems will be expected to operate in an all- weather, maritime environment. Vehicle must be capable of both austere land-based and sea-based operation. Operations in a nuclear, biological, chemical and electromagnetic environment are possible.
(U) Architecture: The design should consider a "system of systems" approach to optimize life cycle cost and performance and must allow full realization of rapid improvements in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities. The approach must permit rapid upgrade and change in response to evolving operational requirements and allow computational and communications resources to keep technological pace with commercial capabilities. More specifically this implies physical element modularity, open systems information architecture; automation of Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4I), system maintenance and support functions; integrated systems security; and embedded training.
(U) JOINT POTENTIAL DESIGNATOR (JPD). Indicate the Joint Potential Designator established through the validation process.
Joint interest potential--TBD