TACTICAL EXPLOITATION SYSTEM (TES)

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

FOR THE

TACTICAL EXPLOITATION OF NATIONAL CAPABILITIES SYSTEMS (TENCAP) TACTICAL EXPLOITATION SYSTEM (TES)

6 April 1997

1. General Description of Operational Capability.

a. Mission Area. SIGINT and IMINT Pre-processing.

b. Type of System Proposed. A highly mobile, tailorable, scaleable, and modular intelligence pre-processing system capable of receiving, processing, and exploiting national and theater signals and imagery data and disseminating the resulting products to the commander in a timely manner.

(1) The TES falls under the TENCAP acquisition model and does not follow the normal 5000 series acquisition and testing process. This model provides the ability for system development based on technological objectives and informal requirements (formal requirements are developed and published concurrently); and operational user evaluations vice formal Directorate, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) methods. The TENCAP General Officer Steering Committee overseas this process and directs the implementation of all requirements and milestone decisions.

(2) In addition to the specifics described herein, the TES system design shall also satisfy the SIGINT & IMINT Pre-processing Architecture (S&IPA) Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) through interoperability and selective commonality with the Guardrail Common Sensor Integrated Processing Facility and its follow-on system the Aerial Common Sensor Ground Processing Facility, to operate as an integrated system of systems in support of the commander's requirements. The requirements therein describe the mission-oriented resulting performance, and the requirements herein reflect the allocation of performance requirements to the TES.

c. Operational Concept.

(1) The TES will be the national and theater SIGINT and IMINT pre-processing system for the Corps and Echelon Above Corps commander and staff, operative both in the tactical environment and in garrison. It will provide Army Tactical (Corps & Division), Joint Task Force, and Combined Force commanders with a tailorable, scaleable, modular, and easily deployable system, capable of split based operations. The tailorability and modularity of the TES is such that the commander could deploy a single early entry vehicle with generator/antenna (capable of receiving relayed intelligence products and limited raw data). As situations change, the commander can build up capabilities by adding modules based on the commander's needs, the intelligence platforms in theater, the enemy situation, and the lift available. The TES will provide decision support information in both text and graphic formats. As an organic asset, the TES personnel will be fully cognizant of the commander's requirements and methods of operation. This knowledge and TES automated functions will reduce information retrieval, analysis, preparation and dissemination times.

(2) The TES will consist of two sections: a forward and a main. The forward (TES-F) section will be based on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) configuration and will function in support of forward deployed elements of JTF, Corps, Division or Brigade level operations as tasked. The main (TES-M) section will be C-130 drive on/drive-off capable and will function in support of the TES-F and/or HQ elements of JTF, Corps, Division or Brigade level operations as tasked.

d. Support Concept. Because the TES will be based on common hardware, which is essentially commercial equipment adapted for military application, organizational and intermediate direct support maintenance will be limited to fault isolation and verification, evacuation of unserviceables to depot and contractor support activities and issuance of float equipment.

2. Threat.

a. Threat to be Countered. While not specifically targeting any single weapon system, the TES provides a fundamental technical underpinning enabling the execution of AirLand Battle (Army XXI) on the extended, non-linear battlefields of the next century. In its support of an accelerated decision cycle, the TES will foster enhanced strategic, operational and tactical agility in a smaller yet more highly lethal force structure. The TES enhances the capability to mass effects (e.g., artillery and air power) rather than forces, altering fundamentally the nature of mass in modern combat. The modularity, tailorability and mobility provided by the TES allows the pertinent intelligence pre-processing assets to move with the command to provide targeting and other information to US commanders that is more complete, accurate and timely, enabling our forces to control the battlefield in both space and time (information dominance).

b. Projected Threat Environment.

(1) US Forces must be prepared to deploy worldwide, and if necessary, defeat threat forces of varying degrees of military sophistication at any level of conflict. In the 21ST Century, split based operations will be the norm. Vast amounts of information and services which support the TES will reside in CONUS and will be transmitted across the Army's tactical, strategic and sustaining base information architecture. One of the greatest dangers will be the proliferation of advanced technologies that have the ability to damage, disrupt or destroy the elements of the TES, as well as the information residing on them.

(2) The TES is generally collocated with the supported tactical or main headquarters. As such, it will be in the same danger of direct and indirect fire, sabotage, terrorism etc. as the supported headquarters. Additionally an adversary can threaten the TES in three fundamental ways:

(a) Compromise of data by gaining access to sensitive or classified information stored within the sub-systems.

(b) Corruption of data by the alteration of electronically stored or processed information so it becomes misleading or worthless.

(c) Disruption of operations by inflicting damage or causing delays (physically or electronically).

(3) More specifically, these threats include: electronic warfare, signals intelligence, technical attack, directed energy, malicious code, physical destruction, unconventional warfare and unauthorized access.

(4) Individually, or collectively, these threats can distort the picture of the battlefield, effect tempo, lethality, survivability, and battlefield synchronization which all impact on mission performance.

3. Shortcomings of Existing Systems. The current TENCAP suite of systems together do not provide the mobility or functional flexibility required in support of intelligence pre-processing.

4. Capabilities Required. Unless otherwise indicated, all capabilities are considered threshold (T) requirements. If there is an objective (O) requirement it will be identified as such. All key performance parameters (KPP) will also be identified.

a. System Performance.

(1) System Performance Parameters.

(a) To meet lift and scenario requirements, the TES will be configured in a manner that will maximize the commander's ability to tailor which TES segments are deployed and is modular so that additional segments can increase the capability without disrupting functions. (KPP)

RATIONALE: The range of missions a commander must be prepared to meet requires a system that can be tailored to the situation (e.g., available lift, enemy capabilities, intelligence platforms and sensors available, etc.). As the situation changes follow-on segments must be able to integrate with the earlier deployed segment(s) to meet the requirement for additional capability while not impeding on the on-going mission.

(b) The TES-F will be C130 transportable and C130 drive-on/drive-off capable (KPP) and will be built around a maximum of eight HMMWVs and supporting generators, trailers, and antennas (T), four HMMWVs and generators/trailers/antenna (O) capable of deploying with early entry forces and commencing operations within two-hours of arrival.

RATIONALE: The commander requires an early entry capability that is mobile enough to keep pace with the Tactical HQ. The objective is that this mobile system maximizes modularity and tailorability to provide the commander the greatest amount of flexibility in making deployment decisions ranging from a single C130 load (providing, for example, comms, a SIGINT database, and a secondary imagery capability), to the entire forward element (providing sensor control, data receipt, processing, exploitation and dissemination from all TES associated national, theater, and organic platforms/sensors) to meet the demands of the mission, and provide the smallest footprint possible (to meet operational security and lift requirements).

(c) The TES-M, will be C130 transportable and C130 drive-on/drive capable without the use of any special equipment or handling (KPP). It will be built around four vans with prime movers, ten HMMWVs or the equivalent, plus generators/trailers/antennas (T), two vans with prime movers, six HMMWVs, or the equivalent, plus generators/trailers/antennas (O). The TES-M will be capable of deploying/re-deploying at the same pace as the Main HQ element it supports. Set-up/tear-down time will be no greater than that allowed for the main HQ element at the supported echelon.

RATIONALE: The commander requires a national and theater intelligence pre-processing system that can operate with the Main HQ in sanctuary or in theater. It must be self deployable once it has been transported into theater, able to maintain pace with the Main HQ and provide the smallest footprint possible (to meet operational security and lift requirements).

(d) All TES operator (i.e., analyst/supervisor/manager) workstations will be multifunction and able to perform all TES sub-functions (e.g., IMINT, SIGINT, supervisor, resource manager, data base manager, maintainer, etc.) without function specific modification. This requirement does not extend to mission specific workstations that may be an integral part of a TES sub-system (e.g., the Common Data Link).

RATIONALE: The mission of the TES will change depending on the scenario and on which intelligence platform is available at any given time. To maintain flexibility, tailorability and modularity all operator workstations must be able to perform all sub-functions.

(e) The TES will be able to transport and support a sufficient number of operator workstations (the baseline is 18 workstations) to meet the throughput requirements described in TES Mission Scenarios. The TES will also have sufficient expandability to support a workstation surge capability of 200 percent, with no loss in performance.

RATIONALE: To keep pace with the supported HQ, the TES must not be dependent on outside agencies to transport and maintain the required operator workstations. A surge capability is required to meet the support requirement for additional operator capability as dictated by the mission and the availability of personnel.

(f) The main and forward will be capable of transporting the baseline equipment issued; to include but not limited to external workstations, cables, antennas, and supplies.

RATIONALE: To keep pace with the supported HQ, the TES must not be dependent on outside agencies to transport and maintain the required equipment and supplies. A surge capability is required to meet the support requirement for additional operator capability as dictated by the mission and the availability of personnel.

(g) The TES will maintain IMINT AND SIGINT technical and operational databases. The TES-M databases will complement those of the TES-F, while containing additional data necessary to maintain cognizance of additional contingency locations worldwide. The TES-M databases will also serve as TES-F backup databases, and for use in updating TES-F databases at the forward deployed location (T) and/or while enroute to the forward deployed location (O).

RATIONALE: Up-to-date databases are critical in the timely exploitation of intelligence. Redundancy in the databases allows for multiple missions performed by different segments of the TES and for backup in the case of a critical failure or while moving to a new location.

(h) The TES will store its intelligence products in a manner that makes them available to outside users (e.g., Imagery Product Libraries, (IPLs)) and will grant access to these products as the mission dictates utilizing a smart push/pull procedure with supported units (e.g., the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), the Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) Integrated Processing Facility (IPF), the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) Ground Processing Facility (GPF), the Common Ground Station (CGS), the Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS), the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) and all other TENCAP systems (i.e., the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) and the Forward Analytical Support Terminal (FAST)) consistent with approved security regulations.

RATIONALE: Maintaining intelligence products in a digital "library" type environment that can be accessed from remote locations allows supported entities to retrieve the data they require (maximizing available bandwidth), at a time convenient to them (smart pull). This system continues to provide for the push of mission/time critical products to the supported entity. To insure that this system is not overloaded with requests for data from non-mission essential entities, the commander can restrict access permission.

(i) The TES will provide the capability to correlate and display, over digital maps or imagery, enemy and friendly forces based on organic, theater and national sensors; intelligence derived from reports received over the IBS; from theater/national C4I centers; and from the common picture of the battlefield (blue, red, gray and white) received from the ACE.

RATIONALE: The ability to overlay correlated intelligence in a graphic format over digital maps or imagery assists the timely analysis of new intelligence; allows managers and supervisors to focus resources; and facilitates product direction and development.

(j) The TES will be interoperable with the ASAS, the GRCS IPF, the ACS GPF, the CGS, the DTSS the ABCS, all other TENCAP systems (i.e., the MITT and the FAST) and TROJAN SPIRIT.

RATIONALE: Interoperability with these IEW and C2 systems is critical in meeting the commanders intelligence timeliness requirements; allows for near-real-time tip-off and confirmation, and facilitates the smart push/pull environment.

(k) The TES system design will satisfy the S&IPA CRD through interoperability and selective commonality with the GRCS IPF (T) and with its follow-on system the ACS GPF; sharing data bases and where possible, eliminating duplication and corruption of data bases in garrison and deployed scenarios; operating as an integrated system of systems in support of the commander's requirements. (O)

RATIONALE: Interoperability and selective commonality allows the different programs to leverage technology, resources, and lessons learned to lower the overall research development and testing costs and timelines. It begins the process of providing the commander a single focal point to answer mission dependent pre-processing requirements. Meeting the objective requirement of the S&IPA CRD will allow the commander to focus on a single system of systems that can receive, process, and exploit data from national, theater, and organic platforms; perform sensor control on selected theater and organic platforms, and disseminate products. It will also allow the commander to leverage personnel resources against the available spectrum of national, theater and organic platforms and sensors.

(l) The TES will use SIGINT and IMINT data and products internally for cross-INT analysis to include cross-queuing and tip-off for dynamic tasking and retasking. (T) The system will automate this tip-off process within the resource, mission and requirements management processes to include visual and aural alarms to alert analysts and mission supervisors of critical/threat intelligence. (O)

RATIONALE: Cross-INT analysis is critical to the timely dissemination of intelligence. This is especially true with fleeting targets where confirmation is critical to the decision to shoot or not-to-shoot. Analysts will be able to pull products from the databases which can be used as overlays/underlays to aid in their analysis. Initially it is expected that tip-off and alerting resource and requirements managers will be semi-automatic (along the lines that automatic messages are generated) and that more human intervention will be required. Objectively the system should select or suggest a course of action (e.g., change U-2 collection plan), write the new collection nomination, and alert the concerned managers that an action is ready for their approval.

(m) The TES will provide analyst tools (e.g., specific emitter identification (SEI) (T) and assisted/automatic target recognition (ATR)) (O) where necessary to support SIGINT and IMINT processing, analysis, rapid report generation, and dissemination.

RATIONALE: As the number of analysts continues to decrease, automatic tools to aid the analyst in the search for information and to focus the analysts efforts will be required.

(n) While the overall collection management and tasking functions resides in the ACE, the TES will have the capability to dynamically task, retask and synchronize the collection, processing and exploitation of selected theater IMINT & SIGINT platforms/sensors. It will maintain the necessary collection management processors and interfaces and the necessary technical and operational databases to support immediate sensor tasking, data processing and reporting. (T) The TES will have the capability to dynamically task, retask, and synchronize the collection processing and exploitation of national platforms/sensors. (O) The commander will set the thresholds for when the TES may override pre-planned collection missions and the Collection Manager in the ACE will be provided automatic updates to any changes made to the collection plan.

RATIONALE: This capability is critical in reacting to tip-off, confirming the identity of suspected targets, and reacting to a shoot-look-shoot scenario. Lack of sensor control while a platform is in a commands area of interest, reduces a commanders ability to gain intelligence critical to the decision making process in the timelines required. Additionally, as a Common Imagery Ground/Surface System (CIGSS), the TES may be the only ground processing facility in theater; operating in direct support of the JTF Commander. The addition of an objective capability to task national platforms is based on the possibility of future architectures incorporating such a concept.

(o) The TES will be capable of controlling ("virtual joystick") the ASARS2 imaging sensor on the U-2 (T); will be capable of controlling the imaging sensors (EO, IR, RADAR, MSI) on appropriate theater platforms (e.g., U-2, SR-71, HAE, LoHAE) as the platforms and sensors become available. (O)

RATIONALE: To insure the commanders critical intelligence requirements (CCIR), priority intelligence requirements (PIR), and essential elements of information (EEI) are answered in a timely manner. This capability allows for immediate collection retasking in support of tip-off, surveillance of high value targets, and a look-shoot-look capability. It is anticipated that this control will be apportioned to a commander, by the JTF Commander as the platform/sensor enters the commander's AOI. Additionally, as a Common Imagery Ground/Surface System (CIGSS), the TES may be the only ground processing facility in theater; operating in direct support of the JTF Commander.

(p) The TES will be capable of waypoint control on the U-2 (T) and other appropriate theater platforms (e.g., HAE and LoHAE) (O).

RATIONALE: To insure the CCIRs and PIRs are answered in a timely manner. This capability allows for immediate collection retasking in support of tip-off, surveillance of high value targets, and a look-shoot-look capability. It is anticipated that this control will be apportioned to a commander, by the JTF Commander as the platform/sensor enters the commander's AOI. Additionally, as a Common Imagery Ground/Surface System (CIGSS), the TES may be the only ground processing facility in theater; operating in direct support of the JTF Commander.

(q) In addition to theater platforms, the TES will able to receive, process and exploit imagery from the MAE UAV, ARL, ACS, FA-18, F-16, Comanche, Kiowa Warrior, selected commercial imaging satellites and other imagery producing ISR systems as they become available. (O)

RATIONALE: To assist in answering the CCIRs and PIRs in a timely manner.

(r) The TES will not degrade the geolocation accuracy's inherent in any system/sensor. (T) The TES will be able to combine geolocation data to enhance the capabilities of a system/sensor that fails to meet the Artillery School Integrated Battlefield Targeting Architecture (IBTA) criteria for target set/weapons set combinations, but is the most timely data. (O)

RATIONALE: Systems and sensors vary widely in their geolocation accuracy ability. Their inherent capability is dictated by their own requirements documentation which, in general, require they meet the Artillery School IBTA criteria for target set/weapons set combinations. To help insure the IBTA criteria is met, the TES cannot further degrade this capability. When a system/sensor is incapable of meeting the IBTA criteria, but is the most timely information, the TES must be able to combine various sources of geolocation data and methods to generate the required geolocation data in a timely manner.

(2) Mission Characteristics.

(a) The primary TES-F IMINT mission is the immediate receipt processing and exploitation (first phase) of theater imagery. The TES-F will also process and exploit organic and national imagery.

(b) The primary TES-M IMINT mission is to receive, process, and perform immediate and detailed exploitation of national imagery. It will also receive, process, and exploit selected theater and organic imagery received directly when the main is in theater or indirectly when it is in sanctuary.

(c) The TES-F primary SIGINT mission is the immediate receipt, processing and exploitation of organic, theater, and national ELINT data to include COMINT externals.

(d) The TES-M primary SIGINT mission is the detailed analysis of organic, theater, and national ELINT data including COMINT externals.

(e) The TES will support multiple mission requirements extending from peacetime monitoring of multiple areas of interest (AOIs) through focused support of contingency operations from Stability and Support Operations (SASO) to Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs). The TES shall possess the capability to perform the following missions, and have scaleability and modularity within its design to accommodate changes in configuration for each mission. For interface with sensor platforms specifically intended for SASO or Lesser Regional Conflicts and missions (e.g., evacuation of U.S. personnel or drug interdiction), the TES tailorability shall support the needs of operations on a smaller scale than that described, and in deployment sizes and configurations appropriate to the smaller scale operations.

(f) Peace/Pre-Crisis. During peacetime, the TES mission is to prepare for combat operations, through realistic training and preparation of databases in support of contingency planning. TES will support a wide-range of missions, from regional to worldwide, based on the supported command's mission. To be prepared for any possible contingency, TES will require up to 10,000 imagery targets within the database (2,000 active and 8,000 inactive), and 5,000 discrete signals of interest (SOIs) populating up to 20 AOIs simultaneously. During this phase, the TES will most likely be located in CONUS or OCONUS garrison/sanctuary. The Main would support contingency planning and training exercises, while the Forward would support units in local or remote training areas, as a precursor to contingency split-based operations. TES will exercise interface with all potentially required platforms and sensors, through training exercises and demonstrations.

(g) Crisis Action Planning. During this phase of conflict, TES-Main must commence support to situation development focused upon the crisis AOI. Normal multiple-AOI ongoing worldwide contingency planning will not stop, but rather drop to a slightly lower pace of operations. This phase could last as few as 2 to 18 hours, during which time the unit assembles those modules of the TES-Forward for the mission it will support, and gathers from external sources and the TES-Main the most current status in the AOI to which TES-Forward will deploy. During this phase the TES-Main will electronically and physically load into the TES-Forward all the useful preparatory information its operators have gathered.

(h) Early Entry. The TES will support early entry using a split-base concept. The TES Forward will perform receipt, processing, exploitation and dissemination of data from national, theater, and selected tactical and commercial IMINT and SIGINT platforms. The TES Main will deliver analytical products independently and in reaction to TES Forward requests; to augment TES Forward satisfaction of the supported tactical commander's real time and near real time intelligence preprocessing requirements. The minimum capabilities required will allow simultaneous processing of SIGINT and IMINT sensor data, with exploitation and reporting according to mission supervisor direction, derived from the supported operational or tactical commander¹s CCIRs/PIRs/EEI. In support of an MRC size operation the TES Forward will focus on a relatively small area around the initial early entry point. It will track up to 200 discrete SOIs and up to 500 active and 1,000 inactive imagery targets, in up to three specified sub-AOIs. The TES Main will focus on future operations, tracking up to 1,000 discrete SOIs and up to 2,000 active and 5,000 inactive imagery targets, in up to 7 specified sub-AOIs. For threat critical SOIs and targets, S&IP must deliver intelligence products to the commander, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation and fire support elements within seconds to 1-2 minutes of intercept or imaging operations. For less-than-threat critical SOI and targets, S&IP must deliver products to the commander within 10 minutes of intercept and 30 minutes of collection for imaging operations. As part of this process, TES can augment those sensors that cannot satisfy these timelines through cross-cueing of other known reliable IMINT or SIGINT sensors, to update target presence at the reported geo-coordinates with the timeliness constraint transferred to the cued sensor. When no sensor source exists to augment this process, TES must deliver SIGINT derived reports within 5 minutes of receipt of raw data and IMINT derived reports on High Value/High Payoff Targets within 15 minutes of receipt of raw data.

(i) Force Build-Up. During this phase TES-Forward will incrementally add the capability to interface with theater and tactical sensors/platforms, and process their data. These sensors will include the U-2 and the ARL (T); the ACS, Global Hawk, Dark Star, F/A-18R/C and other available imagery sensors/platforms as they may be added to the TES requirements in the future. (O) The minimum capabilities required will allow simultaneous processing of SIGINT and IMINT sensors, with exploitation and reporting according to mission supervisor direction, derived from the supported operational or tactical commander's CCIRs/PIRs/EEI. Assuming the MRC scenario, the TES will process up to 1,000 separately identifiable SOIs within 1 to 5 sub-AOIs, updating threat critical targets to the commander and fire support elements every 5 minutes at maximum, and less-than-threat critical targets to the commander every 15 minutes at maximum; and process up to 1,000 threat critical objects and 2,000 less-than-threat critical separately identifiable ground images, updating threat critical objects and terrain every 10 minutes at maximum and less-than-threat critical objects and terrain every 1 hour at maximum. For threat critical SOIs and targets, S&IP must deliver intelligence products to the commander, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation and fire support elements within seconds to 1-2 minutes of intercept or imaging operations. For less-than-threat critical SOI and targets, S&IP must deliver products to the commander within 10 minutes of intercept and 30 minutes of collection for imaging operations. As part of this process, TES can augment those sensors that cannot satisfy these timelines through cross-cueing of other known reliable IMINT or SIGINT sensors, to update target presence at the reported geo-coordinates with the timeliness constraint transferred to the cued sensor. When no sensor source exists to augment this process, TES must deliver SIGINT derived reports within 5 minutes of receipt of raw data and IMINT derived reports on High Value/High Payoff Targets within 15 minutes of receipt of raw data.

(j) Decisive Combat Operations. Just prior to this phase, TES-Main will forward deploy, and complete the TES-Forward contribution to Army Ground Component Commander's Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, situational awareness and target development and prosecution. The minimum capabilities required will allow simultaneous processing of SIGINT and IMINT sensors, with exploitation and reporting according to mission supervisor direction, derived from the supported operational or tactical commander's CCIRs/PIRs/EEI. Assuming the MRC scenario, the TES will process up to 2,000 separately identifiable SOIs within 1 to 7 sub-AOIs, updating threat critical targets to the commander and fire support elements every 5 minutes at maximum, and less-than-threat critical targets to the commander every 15 minutes at maximum; and process up to 2,000 threat critical objects and 4,000 less-than-threat critical separately identifiable ground images, updating threat critical objects and terrain every 10 minutes at maximum and less-than-threat critical objects and terrain every 1 hour at maximum. For threat critical SOIs and targets, S&IP must deliver intelligence products to the commander, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation and fire support elements within seconds to 1-2 minutes of intercept or imaging operations. For less-than-threat critical objects and terrain TES must deliver products to the commander within 5 minutes of intercept and 20 minutes of collection for imaging operations. As part of this process, TES can augment those sensors that cannot satisfy these timelines through cross-cueing of other known reliable IMINT or SIGINT sensors, to update target presence at the reported geo-coordinates with the timeliness constraint transferred to the cued sensor. When no sensor source exists to augment this process, TES must deliver SIGINT derived reports within 5 minutes of receipt of raw data and IMINT derived reports on High Value/High Payoff Targets within 15 minutes of receipt of raw data.

(k) TES will meet geolocation accuracy criterion through the phases of conflict, coincident with the above reporting requirements, to the maximum extent possible with available technologies, dependent upon sensor accuracies. During peacetime and pre-crisis operations, geolocation accuracies are not critical other than for training purposes, during which operators will address engaged combat operations requirements for geolocation accuracy. All engaged forces phases and the Force Build-Up pre-Combat Operations phase require accuracy for threat critical targets of a maximum of 80 meter circular error probable (CEP) and 10 meter linear error probable (LEP or elevation) for some target set/weapons set combinations, 100 meter CEP and 20 meter LEP for some target set/weapons set combinations, and 500 meter CEP and 100 meter LEP for some target set/weapons set combinations. The TES threshold requirement is that it will not degrade the geolocation accuracy of any given sensor/system. The objective requirement is that the TES will be able to combine multiple sources of geolocation data to satisfy the Artillery School Integrated Battlefield Targeting Architecture criteria for target set/weapons set combinations when a given sensor used by itself fails to meet the criteria.

b. Logistics and Readiness.

(1) The TES shall provide an initial level of on-site forward supply of site spares, repair parts, and consumable items to allow the system to operate independently for 14 days. The TES shall have an initial set of Depot spares and repair parts in accordance with the Integrated Support Plan (ISP). The TES shall provide a spares tracking capability with tracking and accountability by the following:

(a) NSN, if one exists

(b) Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) part number

(c) The latest revision number

The spares tracking system shall be capable of maintaining current status and historical or consumption data on spares, repair parts, warranties, support agreements and OEM agreements.

(2) The TES shall have an operational availability of 96% or better. All modules shall be keyed to prevent incorrect installation. Redundant circuits shall be utilized where possible, and a failure in one circuit is overcome by rerouting through the others and the system degrades gracefully. The TES shall provide a vehicle mounted spares/maintenance shelter(s) for storing, protecting and transporting system spares, consumables and test equipment and providing a climate controlled maintenance work area.

c. Other System Characteristics.

(1) The TES will leverage advanced technology projects from the Department of Defense and National Agencies where they provide advantages to operations within lift and mobility constraints identified herein. Some of the most promising, which the TES design will specifically consider include, ongoing technology demonstrations in areas such as phased-array antenna technology for simultaneous multiple-platform sensor control transmission and data reception; advanced processing techniques such as artificial intelligence; automatic aided or assisted target recognition; multiple-sensor integration within an intelligence discipline; and cross-sensor data integration where this improves target identification or geolocation or both.

RATIONALE: The TENCAP acquisition strategy allows for an accelerated pre-programmed product improvement strategy. To take full advantage of this ability, the United States Army Space Program Office must track cutting edge technology, participate in tests/experiments, and implement the proven technology at the earliest possible time. This helps insure the commander has a cutting edge system more capable of winning the information war that remains tactically mobile, retains flexibility and modularity and meets the commanders lift and mobility constraints.

(2) The TES will be operable by soldiers dressed in NBC MOPP-4 and environmental protective clothing and equipment.

RATIONALE: The acquisition of chemical and biological weapon technologies by third world nations increases the likelihood that soldiers will face these weapons on future battlefields. This capability is required to ensure that wear of NBC and environmental protective clothing does not prohibit operations.

(3) The TES will maximize embedded COMSEC.

RATIONALE: Facilitates rapid set-up and restart of subsystems.

5. Program Support.

a. Maintenance Planning.

(1) The TES will utilize Army maintainers to the maximum extent possible. The system will be designed for ease of maintenance and servicing with minimum personnel, materiel, parts, and special tools and equipment Logistics must provide for 14-days of self sustaining operations during deployments. Organizational maintenance tasks will be designed to be performed by operators and/or maintenance personnel of the support unit. The mean time to repair will not exceed two hours. The minimum total system mean time between failure will be 180 hours.

(2) The TES will integrate Fault Detection/Fault Isolation (FD/FI) to use Built-in-Test/Built-in-Test Equipment (BIT/BITE). System design will achieve, to the maximum extent practical, the reduction of direct off-equipment maintenance actions. The entire system, to include subsystems, will be designed for fault detection, isolation, and replacement down to the LRU, without powering down the system.

(3) All TES equipment must be configured to provide ready access for removal and replacement of LRUs. An LRU is defined as the smallest item (e.g., circuit board) that can be removed and replaced without cutting any components. All LRUs will be configured to minimize connection points to permit rapid and safe removal. Each unmodified, embedded, COTS precision measuring device and government furnished equipment (GFE) cryptographic component is an LRU.

(4) The overall design of the TES shall utilize plug-in modules or units to provide ease of removal and replacement of functional circuits or components. Test points and facilities for connecting test equipment shall be provided to support maintenance.

b. Support Equipment.

(1) No special test, maintenance, or diagnostic equipment for the TES is anticipated.

(2) The Fraction of Failures Detected (FFD) using FD/FI shall be greater than ninety-five percent.

c. Human Systems Integration.

(1) Manpower/Force Structure Assessment.

(a) Combat and materiel developer manpower/force structure assessments have concluded that 62 personnel are required to support continuous corps level operations and sustainment training requirements. The total number of approved TOE slots from all of the legacy systems (i.e., MIES, ETRAC, EPDS, and ETUT) within the all of the commands will satisfy these personnel requirements. A restructuring of current TOE slots across the field will, however, be required as I Corps, III Corps, and the PPB West do not have a MIES or an ETRAC.

(b) TES dedicated operators will possess 350D, 352J, 96D, 98J, and 74C MOS. Additionally, master operators will possess an additional skill identifier which reflects Intelligence Center approved TES training qualifications (whether received at the Intelligence Center or a contracted facility) or a significant time (two years) operating the system. Organizational maintenance and SATCOM functions will be performed by 31-series and 33-series personnel respectively.

(2) Training.

(a) Due to the low level of systems being fielded (six) the Program Manager will provide contractor training for the life of the system, or will provide sufficient training materials at the conclusion of the New Equipment Training (NET) to support the "Train the Trainer" concept of sustainment training. Therefore, there is no requirement to incorporate TES training into the existing TENCAP Data Analyst Course (TDAC) at this time. NET will be provided by the contractor at the contractor facility and/or at the unit. During course preparation TENCAP sites will be queried for input and lessons learned on prior system training. All training material, to include the embedded training, will be validated and verified by the Directorate of Operations, Training and Doctrine.

(b) Embedded training, in the form of simulation software and interactive courseware located on the file server, will be used to sustain the operator at the unit, to train new arrivals, and to maintain a high standard of readiness for all assigned personnel. The embedded training will be able to provide instruction on all major functions and capabilities of the TES and will be able to provide the soldier and supervisor with feedback concerning the proficiency of the soldier being trained. Embedded training must be able to be conducted without disrupting current operations. Embedded training will include the operating systems, data base management systems, COTS and contractor developed software and will be WARSIM compatible and Distance Learning compliant. An additional embedded proficiency training capability will use the scenario driven training of the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT).

(c) If institutional training is required, the following will be provided: (1) the new equipment training team (NETT) will provide instructor training to the Intelligence Center no later than one year prior to training start; (2) the program manager will provide the Intelligence Center training device/workstations, or upgrades to existing components in the TDAC, no later than one year prior to first unit equipped (FUE); (3) the program manager will provide the gross task list (GTL), developed as part of the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) data, no later than one year prior to training start; (4) and a critical task site selection board (CTSSB) will be held to select critical tasks for incorporation into the current program of instruction (POI) for the TDAC.

d. Computer Resources. See paragraph 5.h.

e. Other Logistics Considerations. None.

f. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence.

(1) The TES will be interoperable with the ASAS, the CGS, the DTSS, the IPF, the ABCS, all other TENCAP systems (i.e., the MITT and the FAST), and their follow-on systems. It will also be interoperable with the IEW and C4I systems from the other services (T) and will be interoperable with allied IEW and C4I systems (O). The open architecture requirement for the TES will nullify the need for unique intelligence interfaces, communication, and data base support.

RATIONALE: To function on the 21st century battlefield, all IEW and C2 systems must be interoperable.

(2) The TES will automatically accept, file, store, and display selected SCI and collateral data bases and data base updates from theater and out-of-theater sources. These data bases include, but are not limited to, MI-DB, NDS, ALE, WRANGLER, SOMMS and their follow-on. (T) It will be capable of accessing external on-line data bases for artificial intelligence/enhanced search (AI/ES) query and retrieval of data. (O)

RATIONALE: Interoperability with external data bases is critical in the production of timely intelligence and reduces redundant reporting. As the number of analysts continues to decrease, automatic tools to aid the analyst in the search for information will be required.

(3) The TES will be capable of operating on wide area networks (WANs) with, the warfighter, the ACE, other IEW systems, and national organizations (e.g., NGIC, RTCAE, DIA, NSA, etc.).

RATIONALE: It will be necessary to pass and receive large intelligence products and database updates to/from multiple customers/producers in theater and in sanctuary. To facilitate these actions, it will be necessary to institute a "brilliant" push/pull operating procedure that can only be accomplished on a WAN.

(4) The systems will be compatible and interoperable with common user networks including the Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS), Global Broadcast Service (GBS), Defense Message System (DMS), Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), the Joint World-wide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPRNET) and their follow-on.

RATIONALE: Required to pass data in a timely manner to customers at all echelons.

(5) The TES will interoperate with Quickfire networks, Joint Intelligence/Analysis Centers (JIC/JAC), the national level processing and intelligence centers (e.g., RSOCs, NSA, NGIC and DIA) and selected Army, Joint, (T) and Allied (O) systems and platforms.

RATIONALE: Required to pass targeting information directly to the shooter in a timely manner and to seamlessly interact with national databases.

(6) The TES will provide the commander the maximum flexibility to utilize existing and future communications paths (e.g. land line, point to point, SATCOM) and spectrums (e.g. UHF, S-Band, Ku-Band, C-Band, X-Band) in order to receive, and rapidly disseminate time sensitive intelligence reports, intelligence products and high-quality imagery and graphics.

RATIONALE: Communication links (preferably with large bandwidth pipes) are the long pole in the tent in passing information. To insure that a link is available on demand, it is necessary to have as many redundant communication paths as possible.

(7) The TES will have a robust jointly interoperable broadcast and point to point communications suite, that fully complies with appropriate military communications standards (and appropriate federal and commercial communications standards) for connectivity with joint warfighters at all echelons.

RATIONALE: Communication links (preferably with large bandwidth pipes) are the long pole in the tent in passing information. To insure that the TES can communicate with other services, joint standards must be adhered to.

(8) The TES will rapidly disseminate reports and products in appropriate formats; with emphasis on graphical reporting, using Graphical Situation Display (GSD) or its follow-on.

RATIONALE: Graphical reporting is critical to broadcasting intelligence across the battlefield and presenting to the commander a digital product that can be easily utilized and understood. GSD is the current MIL-STD-2525 graphical icon display software package being incorporated into GCCS Joint Mapping Tool Kit (JMTK); the 5D, DIEPS, MATRIX, and ELT 7000 imagery exploitation packages; and the SENSOREP format of the IBS messages. The GSD GRAPHREP is also the required reporting format in the Common Imagery Ground/Surface System Acquisition Standards Handbook .

(9) The TES will utilize automatic reporting methodologies. These methodologies will include an alarm to the analyst and supervisor that an automatic report is being generated and disseminated. Reports generated in an automatic methodology will carry an appropriate "notice of origin" and will be followed-up with confirming intelligence reports.

RATIONALE: Reporting on critical and fleeting targets requires automatic methods to alert shooters and decision makers in a timely manner. This ability is essential in the completion of the first link in a "look, aim, confirm, shoot, look" operating procedure.

g. Transportation and Basing.

(1) The TES will consist of two sections: a forward and a main. The forward (TES-F) section will be C130 drive-on/drive-off capable and will based on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) configuration. It will function in support of forward deployed elements of JTF, Corps, Division or Brigade level operations as tasked. The main (TES-M) section will be C-130 drive on/drive-off capable without the use of any special equipment or handling and will function in support of the TES-F and/or HQ elements of JTF, Corps, Division or Brigade level operations as tasked. Both sections will be able to function on garrison or tactical comms/networks.

(2) The TES shall be capable of set-up or tear-down by a team of 25 operations personnel in eight hours or less. The TES-F shall be capable of set-up or tear-down in two hours or less.

h. Standardization, Interoperability and Commonality.

(1) The TES will be jointly interoperable (T); will be interoperable with NATO systems (O).

(2) The TES shall comply with the open system architecture standards profile as described in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved Common Imagery Ground/Surface (CIGSS) Acquisition Standards Handbook (CASH). The TES shall also comply with the interoperability requirements of the Joint Technical Architecture, the Army Technical Architecture (ATA) and the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE). For cases not covered by the standards in the documents cited above, the TES shall comply with the standards profiles in the Department of Defense Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management (TAFIM) and the Integrated Open-Systems Standards Profile (IOSSP). In the event of conflict between the TAFIM and the IOSSP, the TAFIM shall be the superseding document. If required, other selected standards shall be non-proprietary, commercially accepted, and widely used.

(3) The TES will maximize the use of non-proprietary, non-modified commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or government off-the-shelf (GOTS) hardware, software and components.

(4) Pull down menus will be used for easy operator interface and user friendliness. The software design will employ modular building blocks. The software will be adaptable, flexible, portable, reliable, reusable, and easily maintainable. The software will use standard programming languages that make maximum use of available software.

i. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Support.

(1) The TES shall use digital maps and terrain data structured in standard National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) data formats. In the event no NIMA format is suitable, the system shall use Army or other standard formats, including those map products developed for a hasty map background.

(2) At a minimum the TES shall be capable of accepting, storing, reading, and displaying the following digital topographic products:

(a) Topographic Line Map (TLM)

(b) Air Target Chart (ATC)

(c) Joint Operations Graphic (JOG)

(d) Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC)

(e) Operational Navigational Chart (ONC)

(f) Jet Navigational Chart (JNC)

(g) Global Navigational Chart (GNC)

(h) World Data Bank II (WDB II) in accordance with MIL-A-89007

(i) Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) in accordance with MIL-A-89007

(j) ARC-Digitized Raster Graphics (ADRG) in accordance with MIL-A-89007

(k) Interim Terrain Data (ITD) in accordance with MIL-A-89007

j. Environment Support. Weather data, as required, is obtained from the Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS). No oceanographic or astrogeophysical support is required.

6. Force Structure. The TES is a Corps and Echelon Above Corps asset. As such, the TES will be fielded one each to the MI Bde's at each corps and to the Power Projection Brigades for a total of six systems. To provide support to the division commander, the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) will migrate to the TES hardware and software baseline. A MITT will be provided to each division to provide the commander with TES-F "like" early entry capabilities.

7. Schedule Considerations. Initial operational capability (IOC) for the TES will be achieved when the first TES is fielded, all support and test equipment are in place, and the unit can successfully perform all operational missions. The objective time frame for this capability is FY00. Final operational capability (FOC) will be achieved when the fielded TES' are capable of meeting the requirements of the S&IPA CRD. The objective time frame for FOC is FY07.