Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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Technology Transfers: David C. Isby, John M. Myrah and Henry Sokolski April 9, 1998 On 9 April 1998, System Planning Corporation hosted an unclassified roundtable discussion on Russia for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. SPC assembled three prominent experts on the alternative pathways to acquire ballistic missile capabilities: John M. Myrah, of Thiokol, Henry Sokolski, from The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and David C. Isby, of Sparta Incorporated. This paper summarizes their findings and notes key areas of consensus and dissent. An Industry View of Ballistic Missile Threat: John M. Myrah According to John Myrah, there are three main problems relating to the ballistic missile threat: defining the aggressor; identifying our enemies; and proving guilt through current U.S. statutes. Since the end of the Cold War, identifying the aggressor has become increasingly difficult. Although U.S. intelligence assets focus on terrorist states, it is impossible to track every terrorist. Myrah pointed out that terrorists may attack, not only from a terrorist state, but also from friendly territory. In such an event, against whom should the United States retaliate? Myrah also emphasized that the U.S. has difficulty controlling information that can be used against the United States by an aggressor. Moreover, current U.S. regulations are ineffective for controlling technology. Cases Myrah offered multiple examples where sensitive information can be obtained through open-sources. The first case describes information on U.S. strategic plans that are available through the Internet. The second example pointed out that foreign students, including those from terrorist states, are given access to the best scientific and technical education in the world. Further examples show that U.S. government computer systems are subject to attacks from hackers. Myrah's fourth illustration referred to defense-related items, such as gyroscopes and inertial devices, that are being exported by other countries (like Russia, where engineers are paid approximately $100 per month) to known proliferants like Iraq and Iran. By contrast, relatively harmless technology, such as rocket motor casings, are subject to needless bureaucratic control. Lastly, Myrah stressed that political favoritism is allowed to dictate policy on technology transfer. In particular, Loral and Hughes are under investigation for transferring missile guidance technology to China. A recent New York Times article reported that the Clinton Administration gave a quiet go-ahead to one company for sharing similar information. David Isby also cited U.S. missile technology exports to China (the Loral and Hughes case specifically). The Administration position on such matters, claimed Myrah, makes it extremely difficult to prosecute such violations. Moreover, the Administration's willingness to bypass arms control regulations sends conflicting signals to interested domestic and international audiences regarding U.S. position on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and export controls. Solutions to the Problems? John Myrah offered some solutions to the problems included limiting or controlling who has access to our institutions of higher learning, especially scientific and technical knowledge. He suggested employing the people who can be of the most use to us, like hackers, to build a better security system for computer information. Moreover, he advocated convening an inter-agency group of senior-level people to revise export controls. These senior-level officials would be on standby to make decisions that junior officers are perhaps not qualified to make. Academia's View of Space Technology Transfers and Missile Proliferation: David C. Isby and Henry Sokolski Henry Sokolski and David Isby focused on space cooperation as a path to missile proliferation. The 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) "Emerging Missile Threats to North America within the Next 15 Years" states that a select group of countries with space-launch vehicle (SLV) could convert them into Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) within 5 years. Sokolski and Isby argued that SLV technology and technical know-how may break existing "Scud missile technology barriers," thus eliminating propulsion obstacles. As a result, more strict controls need to be applied to SLV technology transfers. Another issue of concern raised by Sokolski and Isby highlighted ongoing U.S. financial and technical assistance to Russia and China despite continued violations of international arms control efforts. Isby pointed out the transfer of missile technology and defense items to Iran by Russia. Ballistic missile programs in North Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan have been aided by international assistance, particularly Russian and Chinese. Russia and China Space-Launch Cooperation with the U.S. In an effort to alleviate commercial pressure to launch U.S.-made satellites, the U.S. entered into an agreement with China to allow China to launch U.S. satellites with PRC's SLV. U.S. industry focused on enhancing the reliability of Chinese launch capabilities in order to improve the safety and reliability of a Chinese launch. The U.S. government was not inclined to share this launch technology for fear that the information could later be used to assist China's missile development. Thus, the U.S. favored the existing faulty Chinese design to limit U.S. assistance for China's SLV program and perhaps to hinder the re-export of U.S. technology in the future. Russian Missile Cooperation A similar agreement was initiated with the Russians after the fall of the Soviet Union. While the cooperation progressed, Russia continued to transfer missile technology to Iran. The U.S. gave hard currency to pay for these launches, which Russia has used to finance missile development and export activities. Sokolski noted that one Russian firm contracted with the Indian Scientific Research Organization (ISRO) to sell cryogenic upper stages to India, a transfer prohibited by the MTCR. The U.S. has turned a "blind eye" to Russian exports because of political pressures to maintain positive U.S.-Russia relations and commercial pressure. Both men agreed that the United States has been reluctant to impose sanctions on Russia or block exports due to diplomatic sensitivities. Another issue addressed by Isby and Sokolski was intangible technology--technical know-how--which is transferred through electronic means or conversations. This information exchange facilitates timely, reliable, and accurate placement of the satellites in space. This dual-use information may be transferred to targeting technologies for ICBMs. Conclusions Sokolski predicted that the U.S. would continue to tolerate Russian and Chinese cooperation with Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and India. He believes that the U.S. will continue to engage in space cooperation with Russia and China even though their behavior is accelerating missile proliferation. Two trends in proliferation could emerge within the next five years. First, there will be an overabundance of space-launch capabilities, which are fueled by economic incentives and moderated by U.S. cooperation (financial and technical). These space-launch capabilities could be transferred to missile development programs and thus further missile proliferation. The second trend will be an increase in nations mastering Scud missile technology and seeking to improve Scud capabilities by possibly "spinning on" SLV technologies.


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