Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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W. Seth Carus 1 : "Israeli Ballistic Missile Developments" Not a great deal has been written about Israeli efforts to develop ballistic missile capabilities. There are substantial, and often unappreciated, gaps in publicly-available information about the Israeli program. Thus, while Israel is generally believed to be the Middle East country with the most capable ballistic missiles, reliable information about its capabilities and concepts of operation is scanty. As a result, much of what is said about the program is speculation, sometimes highly informed but often dubious and unreliable. 2 Israel was the first country in the Third World to develop and deploy a missile with a range of more than 300 km. It is also the first country to develop and deploy a missile with a range of greater than 1,000 kilometers. And, it is generally agreed that the Israelis possess missiles with considerable accuracy. However, while Israel now admits to possession of a ballistic missile system, it has still provided no details 3 . The designation for the family of Israeli-produced missiles, Jericho, reportedly is the name originally assigned it by the U.S. intelligence community. 4 Luz and Shavit II The origins of the Israeli ballistic missile program date to several rocket and missile programs in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Israel began development of guided missiles in 1954, and in 1958 Israel's military research and development establishment, Rafael, tested a land attack missile known as the Luz. This missile was proposed in ground-to-ground, air-to-ground, and ship-to-ship versions. The ground-launched version had a range of about 27 kilometers. The Artillery Corps fielded one battery of the missiles, although it apparently was not viewed favorably by the army's leadership. In addition, the ship-launched version entered formal development, but the program was abandoned and replaced by the system that came to be known as the Gabriel (developed by Israel Aircraft Industries with Israel Military Industries producing the rocket motors). Rafael had problems with the rocket motors, and never resolved the guidance problems. 5 In addition, Israel also tested a research sounding rocket known as the Shavit II. This was a purely experimental system. There was no Shavit I: the designation of the system was done for propaganda purposes to make the Arabs wonder what happened to the first version of the system. Jericho I Israel's first true ballistic missile was the Jericho I. The first published report of this system appeared in a September 1971 New York Times article. According to the first report, the system was known as the Jordan and had a 300 mile range. At that time, the system had been successfully test fired. 6 A month later, the initial report was clarified to indicate that Israel was producing a missile, known as the Jericho, at a rate of three to six missiles per month. The missile was assessed to have a range of 300 miles with a 1,000-1,500 pound warhead. According to this report, the system was a single stage system. According to this report, the missile had a simple guidance system, sufficiently accurate for a nuclear weapon but lacking the precision needed for nuclear delivery. Each missile was estimated to cost $1-1.5 million. 7 Additional details about the system appear in Seymour Hersh's expose of the Israeli nuclear weapons program. According to his sources, the Jericho I was code-named Project 700. He claims that the entire project was budgeted for $860 million. While his account does not clarify what was included in this budget, it probably covered development costs, production of missiles and launchers, construction of production infrastructure at Israeli defense companies, and the construction of the missile storage facility at Zachariah. Hersh also claims that the program was the brain-child of Ernst David Bergmann, who was (according to Hersh) the father of the Israeli nuclear weapons program. 8 There are a few clues about progress on the system, although little is reliably known. Again, Hersh provides some details. According to his account, by December 1967, it appears that construction at the Zachariah facility was well advanced, sufficiently to impress Yigal Allon, a former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, a leading member of the Labor movement, and an influential figure in Israeli defense policy. 9 At the same time, he claims that there were development problems with the missile itself. The first test of the missile, made in early 1967, revealed guidance problems. 10 Matters were further complicated in 1968 by a French decision to cancel the development program. 11 As a result, development work had to be transferred to Israel. According to Hersh, the missiles became operational in 1971. By 1973 the Israelis had two or three operational Jericho Ipure launchers, along with an unknown number of mobile launchers. This suggests that Hersh believed that there were static launchers, perhaps silos, located at Zachariah. 12 Other sources claim that the system continued to have guidance problems in 1973. 13 Recent reports suggest that the missiles were deployed during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In a 1997 presentation, Yuval Ne'eman, a leading figure in Israel's scientific and national security community, stated that Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff David El'azar "decided to deploy (surface-to-surface) Jericho missiles on 17 or 18 October 1973." According to his account, Israel's Prime Minister, Golda Meir, saw "a need for some degree of alert for the strategic missiles, whatever warheads they had." After the Israelis discovered what were thought to be Soviet-manned Scud missiles, presumably armed with nuclear warheads, "El'azar ordered Jericho missile batteries to be deployed, and not to be camouflaged, on the assumption that such a counterdeployment would be picked up by the Russian satellites and the information relayed to al-Sadat. They were left to guess the type of Israeli warheads being used." 14 The only known picture of what is believed to be the Jericho I is a declassified DIA photograph. 15 It is generally believed that Israel has, or had, about 50-100 of the Jericho I missiles. Certain details of the Jericho I remain a mystery. There is considerable variation in the range assessed. A publicly released CIA report from 1974 places the range at only 260 miles (or about 420 kilometers). 16 More recent accounts give different numbers. In 1988, ACDA reported that the missile had a range of 400 miles (or 650 kilometers). Other sources give ranges of 500 to 750 kilometers. 17 Jericho II In 1985, a press report appeared that claimed Israel was developing a new generation Jericho with a range of 400 miles and significantly improved accuracy. 18 Public information about the system began to grow when the Israelis initiated a series of test launches into the Mediterranean. According to one source, there were seven launches between May 1987 and March 1992. Six were fired from the missile test facility at Palmichim, and one was launched from an "operational site" in the Judean Hills. 19 These missiles were tested to a maximum range of 800 miles (about 1300 kilometers). 20 In 1991, following the first Iraq's Al Husayn missile attacks on Israel, the Bush Administration was worried that Israel might respond using ground forces or air strikes. Such actions were viewed as politically dangerous to the coalition then waging war against Iraq. In addition, administration officials thought that the presence of Israeli forces in Iraq would complicate military operations for the coalition. United States reportedly encouraged Israel's leaders to limit any response to use of ballistic missiles. The request was rejected out of hand by Moshe Arens, then Israel's Defense Minister. According to Israeli sources, Israel the Jericho II was not operational. As a result, Israel could not rely on the new version of the Jericho, even if it had wanted to launch one. These accounts report that Yitzhak Rabin, the previous Defense Minister, had refused to provide funding to make the missile operational, believing that the money could be better spent on other projects. According to the Israeli account, a decision was made following the Gulf War to deploy the Jericho II, and by 1994 it was operational. 21 It is generally believed that the Jericho II has considerably greater accuracy than the Jericho I. Many observers appear to believe that the system is essentially a version of the Pershing II missile, and that it is equipped with a radar terminal guidance system. Some observers appear to believe that the Jericho II missiles are deployed at the same Zachariah launch site originally developed for the Jericho I. 22 Shavit A considerable amount of information about Israel's missile capabilities has been derived from studies of the performance of Israel's space launch vehicle, the Shavit. It was first launched in September 1988. It is a three stage system built by Israel Aircraft Industries, including two solid-fuel stages produced by TAAS (once better known as Israeli military industries) and a third stage produced by Rafael. 23 It is generally believed that the first two stages are identical to the Jericho II. According to one estimate prepared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a ballistic missile based on the Shavit's first two stages could carry a payload of 900 kilograms to a range of 3,000 miles (about 4,850 kilometers) or a payload of 500 kilograms to almost 4,700 miles (just over 7,600 kilometers). 24 Jericho IIb There are suggestions that there is an advanced version of the Jericho II, sometimes called the Jericho IIb, the Jericho Follow-on, or the Jericho 3. According to these sources, the missile could have a range of up to 2,800 kilometers with a payload of 1,000 kilograms. 25 Foreign Connections The Israeli ballistic missile program has benefited from technology acquired from foreign sources, most notably from France in the 1960s and the United States in the 1970s. In addition, there are continuing assertions that United States support for the Arrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile system is supporting the infrastructure needed for indigenous development and production of ballistic missiles. The French Connection French assistance was critical in the early stages of the Israeli ballistic missile program. According to press reports, in 1963 the Israeli government negotiated a $100 million agreement with Dassault, the French aeronautics company that produced Mirage fighters for the Israeli Air Force, to develop a ballistic missile. This missile, which came to be known as the Jericho I, was flight tested in 1967, and had a planned range of 300 miles (about 500 kilometers). According to the contract, the French were to build 25 missiles, although it is unclear whether these were intended for test purposes or were operational systems. Before it could be completed, however, the French government canceled the contract, and missile development shifted to Israel. 26 After the cancellation of the project, development and production shifted to Israel. 27 The U.S. Connection The United States has played two main roles in the development of Israel's ballistic missile capabilities. First, the Israelis are believed to have obtained technology and materiel from the United States, primarily through the activities of Richard Kelly Smyth. According to a review of his activities, he provided the Israelis with rocket motor propellant, guidance system components, and other paraphernalia. 28 Second, funding for the Arrow tactical ballistic missile program is sometimes viewed as a subsidy to Israelis missile and rocket programs. The South African Connection Israel is believed to have provided extensive technical assistance to the South African ballistic missile program. 29 According to some sources, the South African ballistic missile, allegedly code-named the Arniston by the Central Intelligence Agency, was "an advanced derivative of Jericho-1." 30 Moreover, it is claimed that South Africa's Overberg missile test facility was extremely similar in layout to the Israeli missile test facility at Palmichim, suggesting that the Israelis were instrumental in the design and construction of the South African site. 31 In addition, there are claims that Israel exploited facilities in South Africa for its own ballistic missile development. Once source alleges that Israel made three test launches of the Jericho II missile from the launch facilities at Overberg. 32 The Iranian Connection There is also an Iranian connection with the Israeli ballistic missile program. In 1977 and 1978 the Iranians were negotiating weapons cooperation agreements with the Israelis. Among the projects, it appears, were two surface-to-surface weapons systems: an anti-ship cruise missile and a version of the Jericho missile with a 750 kilogram warhead. 33 Press accounts confused the two projects, and some reporters incorrectly asserted that the two countries were developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile. 34 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. Dr. Carus is with the Center for Counterproliferation Research at National Defense University. Formerly with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he is one of the country's foremost experts on missile proliferation. Has testified before Congress regarding proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and surface-to-surface missile proliferation. 2. The best single account of Israeli involvement with ballistic missiles is Gerald Steinberg, "Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Nonproliferation," pp. 235-253, in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994). 3. Douglas Davis, "Vilna'i Says IDF Lacks Training in Conventional War With Syria" Jerusalem Post, June 19, 1996, p. 2. 4. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 162. 5. Abraham Rabinovich, The Boats of Cherbourg (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 22-23, 29-33. 6. William Beecher, "Israel Building Prototype For a Jet Fighter-Bomber," New York Times, September 15, 1971, p. 3. 7. William Beecher, "Israel Believed Producing Missile of Atom Capability," New York Times, October 5, 1971, pp. 1, 15. 8. Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 174. 9. Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 173. 10. Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 173. 11. On the French component, see Pierre Langereux, "Dassault Lifts Veil Over Jericho Missile. The Ground-To-Ground Tactical Missile Was the Base of Israel's Ballistic Armament," Air and Cosmos/Aviation International (French), December 6, 1997, p. 36, as translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and found at their web site. All subsequent references to FBIS came from the on-line version. 12. Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 215-216. 13. Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1974), p. 283. 14. Amir Oren: "The Atom's Red Line," Ha'aretz, May 23, 1997, p. B5, as translated from the Hebrew by. 15. Defense Intelligence Agency, Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems Handbook--Free World, DST-1000H-283-89, July 1989, p. 20. This is a declassified extract released by the Natural Resources Defense Council, November 15, 1989. 16. As reported in a declassified NIE. See Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p. 362. 17. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 162. Ramon Lopez, "Israel in second secret test of Jericho IRBM," Jane's Defence Weekly, November 19, 1988 p. 1258. 18. "Israel Said to Deploy Improved Jericho Missile," Aerospace Daily, May 1, 1985, p. 5, and "Israel's Jericho IRBM completes long range test," International Defense Review, July 1987, p. 857. 19. William Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), p. 455. 20. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 162. 21. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Friends In Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York: Hyperion, 1994), p. 389, and "Israeli Ability to Strike Iraq Examined," Ha'aretz, February 5, 1998 (internet edition), as translated by FBIS. 22. Harold Hough, "Could Israel's Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1997, pp. 407-410. 23. Gerald M. Steinberg, Dual Use Aspects of Commercial High-Resolution Imaging Satellites, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, February 1998, p. 16. 24. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 163. 25. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 162, and Steinberg, Dual Use Aspects of Commercial High-Resolution Imaging Satellites, p. 16. 26. Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 120, 143. 27. Dassault recently revealed additional details of the MD-620. See Pierre Langereux, "Dassault Lifts Veil Over Jericho Missile. The Ground-To-Ground Tactical Missile Was the Base of Israel's Ballistic Armament," Air and Cosmos/Aviation International (French), December 6, 1997, p. 36, as translated by FBIS. 28. Burrows and Windrem, Critical Mass, pp. 459-466. 29. Washington Post, October 27, 1991, pp. A1, A30. 30. Burrows and Windrem, Critical Mass, p. 448. 31. Burrows and Windrem, Critical Mass, p. 448. 32. Burrows and Windrem, Critical Mass, p. 455. 33. W. Seth Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), pp. 148-149. 34. Elaine Sciolino, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal With the Shah," New York Times, April 1, 1986, p. A17. A close reading of the documents indicates that there were in fact two programs, not one as asserted by Sciolino. The Flower was an antiship cruise missile, although it is usually identified as a ballistic missile project.


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