Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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Selig S. Harrison 1 : "Missile Capabilities in Northeast Asia: Japan, South Korea and North Korea" My presentation will deal with the missile capabilities of Japan, South Korea and North Korea, emphasizing the triangular interaction between Tokyo, Seoul, and Pyongyang and the implications for American policy of a Japan and unified Korea armed with long-range missiles. I will focus on the three themes: 1. Japan has developed rocket capabilities in its civilian space programs that could quickly be converted to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles rivaling those of the United States. The Japanese civilian nuclear power program is producing accumulations not only of reactor-grade plutonium but also of supergrade plutonium, which would be especially suited for the miniaturization of warheads and thus for MIRV-type ICBMs. 2. With its technological superiority, a more sophisticated industrial base, and a nascent missile program of its own, South Korea could quickly outstrip North Korea's missile potential if it sought to do so. A unified Korea could draw on the technological achievements of the South as well as of the North and would be likely to seek an independent nuclear and missile potential comparable to that of Japan, starting with the acquisition of reprocessing technology. 3. North Korea's missile development programs are primarily motivated by a desire on the part of the military factions in control of this program to earn foreign exchange through exports for their own profit and for the perpetuation of their power internally. Thus, in order to curb these programs, the United States would have to buy off the factions involved as part of a larger strategy of economic engagement, including the gradual phasing out of Korean War economic sanctions on non-strategic trade and investment. Negotiating meaningful restraints on missile development would require direct U.S. military contacts with the North Korean armed forces, which were proposed to me in Pyongyang in September, 1995; to Kenneth Quinones of the State Department in July, 1996; to former Senator Sam Nunn and former Ambassador James Laney in their August, 1997 visit; and to Senator Carl Levin in his December, 1997 visit. 2 Japan The fact that Japan already possesses, or could readily produce, substantial amounts of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium does not, in itself, mean that it could develop a significant nuclear-weapons capability. It is the sophisticated character of the Japanese space program, with its convertibility to missile development, that makes Japan's potential as a nuclear power so formidable. Japanese space agencies have successfully tested solid-fueled rocket systems that could be directly converted to intercontinental-range missiles. Both of these systems, the J-1 and the M-5, have a payload and a thrust comparable to that of U.S. ICBMs. If converted to ballistic missile applications, the M-5 would give Japan an ICBM roughly equivalent to the MX Peacekeeper, the largest currently operational U.S. ICBM, and the J-1 would give Japan an ICBM surpassing the performance of a Minuteman 3. The range of the Minuteman 3 is about 8,000 miles, and that of the Peacekeeper, some 7,400. The J-1 was developed by marrying a solid-propellant motor from another successfully-tested liquid-fueled rocket, the H-2, to the upper stages of the MS 32, a precursor of the M-5. By firing their existing launch vehicles at long trajectories not suitable for space launches but appropriate for missiles, Japan could greatly increase the throw-weight of a missile relative to the space launch payload. For example, an intermediate-range missile capable of covering China might have a throw-weight as much as three to five times that of the satellite payload of the space launch vehicle from which it is derived. Japan's missile capabilities should be assessed in the context of its civilian nuclear power program. Official projections indicate that buffer stocks of five tons of reactor-grade plutonium are likely at any one time. Non-official critics of the nuclear program contend that plutonium accumulations will range from 11 to 25 tons within five years and as high as 50 tons by the year 2010. (For elaboration of this issue, see my work, Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996.) While there is little doubt that reactor-grade plutonium could be used for nuclear weapons, Japan could also pursue five other avenues to a nuclear weapons program: * Producing weapon-grade plutonium in reactors now used exclusively for generating electricity by shutting them down more frequently for refueling, thereby reducing the irradiation level ("burnup") of the fuel to weapon-grade; * Upgrading reactor-grade plutonium to weapon-grade, or producing highly enriched uranium, through use of a laser-isotope process now under experimental development; * Converting the centrifuges in its uranium-enrichment facilities at Rokasshomura from the production of low-enriched uranium (4.5 percent U-235) to highly enriched uranium usable in compact nuclear weapons (grater than 80 percent U-235); * Separating the supergrade plutonium produced in the natural uranium "blankets" of its Joyo and Monju fast-breeder reactors, which has a higher degree of purity than the plutonium used in U.S. nuclear weapons; and * Producing weapon-grade plutonium in a reactor specifically configured for the purpose. Perhaps the most attractive option in the event of a weapons program would be separating the high-purity supergrade plutonium from the breeder blankets. The prototype fast-breeder-reactor at Monju, which began operating in January 1995, had accumulated an estimated 10 kilograms in its blanket when it was shut down after a sodium leak in 1996. When and if it is restored to operation, an additional 70 kilograms per year could be added to this accumulation, depending on the level of production. Even in the event that it is not restored to full operation, its continued use as a research or experimental facility would permit further accumulations of supergrade plutonium. The Joyo experimental fast-breeder reactor had accumulated 40 kilograms in its blankets when the reactor shifted to a new design in 1994 that no longer requires blankets. Most estimates indicate that, even utilizing reactor-grade plutonium, only four kilograms would be needed to make a relatively simple pure fission weapon with a maximum probable yield of 20 kilotons. Supergrade plutonium is especially suited for the miniaturization of warheads. Since it is a more reliable explosive than grades with less purity, involving less danger of premature detonation, the other components of the warhead could be small and light. Thus, if Japan were to make an ICBM of the MIRV type based on technology drawn from the M-5, each warhead would weigh about 350 kilograms, and the missile would be able to carry between five and ten warheads, depending on its range. The Japanese space effort has entailed the development of guidance and re-entry technology that could be applied to a missile program. Advanced guidance techniques were required to place and keep in orbit the unmanned space platform that was launched by the H-2 in 1995 to collect scientific data relating to research in the evolution of the universe. Japanese officials point out that targeting for a ballistic missile would require a much greater degree of precision in re-entry technology than has yet been achieved. But the extent of precision required would depend on whether the missile would be designed for a "counterforce" strategy (i.e., directed at missile silos or other hard targets) or for a "countervalue" (i.e., 'city-busting') strategy. The Orex re-entry vehicle developed for the H-2 demonstrates mastery of the techniques that would be needed in targeting area targets such as cities. The relevant re-entry technology for this purpose could be perfected in a matter of months. By contrast it would take three to four years for Japan to develop the precision in re-entry technology that would be needed for a "counterforce" strategy. South Korea South Korea has developed its own short-range (176-256 kilometers) Hyunmoo missile and also deploys U.S. Honest John tactical surface-to-surface missiles. Despite U.S. displeasure, the Defense Ministry has been seeking to develop a long-range missile and has pressed the U.S. to renegotiate a long-standing MOU that sets a limit on the range of any future South Korean missiles lower than the MTCR-defined range of a nuclear-capable missile (a missile able to carry a 500-kilogram payload over a range of 300 kilometers). 3 Under the MOU now in force, Seoul would have to get U.S. approval before deploying a missile with a range over the MOU ceiling. South Korean sources say that since the visit of a South Korean delegation to Washington in 1996, the U.S. has signaled that it will not hold Seoul to the letter of the MOU but refuses to confirm this formally, since leakage concerning the South Korean program would undermine U.S. missile negotiations with Pyongyang. Seoul desires membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime as a means of raising the ceiling on the range of its missiles and of acquiring dual-use technology that would further its missile ambitions. 4 In my view, the United States should not grant MTCR status to Seoul and should not raise the MTCR issue with Pyongyang. The most effective way to curb North Korean missiles exports and to achieve a freeze on North Korean missile testing is to provide economic incentives to Pyongyang commensurate with the surrender of foreign exchange earnings and military freedom of action that would result from North Korean compliance with U.S. demands. (See pp. 9-10). In my view the U.S. should remain firm on this issue and should avoid transferring any technology to Seoul in support of its nominally civilian space launch program that could be used to further its missile ambitions. Ultimately, the missile capabilities of North and South alike will be utilized by a unified Korea. In assessing the implications of South Korea's nascent missile program, it is important to bear in mind past efforts by Seoul to develop an independent nuclear capability. Park Chung Hee initiated a secret nuclear program in 1971 and was able to carry it forward without detection for three years until the United States, armed with conclusive intelligence findings, pressured Park in 1975 to stop the program or face the termination of U.S. military support for the South. The program was revived during the Roh Tae Woo regime in 1991 but discontinued once again under U.S. pressure. 5 It is fear of a nuclear-armed Japan, more than a nuclear-armed North Korea, that underlies the South Korean desire to acquire the nuclear option. Many nationalist intellectuals, political leaders and nuclear industry spokesmen in the South argue that President Roh should never have concluded his 1991 denuclearization agreement with Pyongyang, which prohibits reprocessing by both North and South. In this view, it would have been enough to get safeguards barring the diversion of plutonium for military purposes--leaving both North and South alike free to pursue reprocessing for civilian use, just as Japan is doing, while at the same time acquiring the option of a weapons program. Defenders of the 1991 agreement argue that the ban of reprocessing was an unavoidable necessity in the context of a divided Korea in which North Korea was perceived to be developing a nuclear weapons capability. Significantly, both defenders and critics serve notice that a unified Korea will demand the same treatment enjoyed by Japan and will seek a new understanding with the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) superseding the 1991 accord. President Kim Dae Jung, then an opposition leader, told me in May, 1992, that "when Korea is reunified, we will ask the IAEA for permission to build reprocessing facilities so that we are not dependent for nuclear materials on Japan." Roh had to give up reprocessing, he declared, "as a response to circumstances, because we are still divided, but it was opposed by our nuclear scientists and unification would present us with a new situation." The South's ambitious civilian nuclear power program embraces ten nuclear power plants and is projected to expand to 14 unless financial constraints slow it down. Choi Young-Myung, director of research at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, has made no secret of his view that the South should be permitted to reprocess. Choi served as chairman of the Science and Technology Subcommittee of President Roh's Commission on the 21st Century. Addressing a meeting of the Commission on February 27, 1991, he declared that "the nuclear fuel cycle is one area that we must carefully consider, and all possible diplomatic efforts must be used to obtain self-sufficiency in the area of reprocessing technology, since it is an aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle essential to our furnace-style strategy and nuclear fuel development." 6 North Korea In contrast to the absolute centralized control exercised by the late Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il presides over a less cohesive regime marked by ideological, personality and turf conflicts. There is growing evidence of such conflicts between the armed forces, the internal security services, the Workers Party, an assortment of economic bureaucracies and the Foreign Ministry, and within each of these key components of the power structure. Much of this conflict arises over the control of opportunities to profit from foreign economic contacts that are encouraged by Kim Jong Il as part of his effort to open up a controlled induction of foreign capital and technology, primarily in localized free trade zones. Thus, the armed forces, aware of the economic benefits obtained by military factions in China, Thailand, and Indonesia through foreign trade and investment contacts have demanded an increasingly prominent economic role under Kim Jong Il, who is dependent on military support to sustain his position in the face of hostile Old Guard Workers Party elements. For example, anthracite coal exports are controlled by Mabong, a military-controlled conglomerate, while zinc and gold exports are controlled by Rungra, another military enterprise. Even before the death of Kim Il Sung, missile development and missile exports were under the control of several allied military enterprises. Thus, the cessation of exports and freeze of further testing and development sought by the United States in its two rounds of abortive missile negotiations with Pyongyang would require (a) some form of payoff that would directly compensate these enterprises for their lost income and (b) provide broader economic and political incentives for North Korea commensurate with what would be a fundamental change in its military posture. In the first round, the United States offered no specific quid pro quo to Pyongyang. In the second, it offered a selective relaxation of sanctions, relating primarily to mining, that were relevant to North Korean needs but did not concede enough to interest the North Korean military commissars involved. A more realistic approach was adopted by Israel when it discovered in 1993 that Iran was seeking to purchase missiles from Pyongyang. Israel opened talks with North Korean diplomats in January, 1993, offering to establish diplomatic relations and to provide $1 billion in investment and technical assistance in return for calling off the sale. In June, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was about to go to Pyongyang to close the deal until the U.S. stepped in to block it. In American eyes, it is puzzling why North Korea, given its severe economic problems, has not leaped at U.S. offers to trade a relaxation of economic sanctions for North Korean restraint in missile exports and development, and more recently, why it has also refused to make military tension reduction concessions at the four-power peace talks in Geneva in exchange for selective sanctions relief. One key factor in the explanation is that in North Korean eyes, the United States is seeking to move the goal posts, since it agreed unconditionally in Article Two of the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement to "relax barriers to trade and investment" in exchange for North Korea's freeze of its nuclear program. Regarding the threat posed by North Korean missile capabilities, it is clear that it demonstrated SCUD capabilities would be a significant factor in the event of a war with South Korea or Japan. In the absence of a greater disclosure of intelligence information, one outside of the government cannot make a definitive judgment concerning whether, or to what extent, North Korean missiles could at some future point constitute a threat to Alaska, let alone other parts of the United States. Based on my inquiries at the Pentagon and in the Defense Ministry in Seoul, the last and only flight test of the Rodong-I was in 1993. As a report by the Secretary of Defense noted (Proliferation: Threat and Response, November, 1997, p. 8), "both Taepo Dong missiles represent a significant technological departure from the proven SCUD designs. North Korea has little experience flight testing its missiles and has no experience testing multistage ballistic missiles or other related technologies. This lack of test experience could complicate North Korea's ability to evaluate, improve or repair flaws in its missile designs." Taking economic and political as well as military factors into account, my assessment is that the North Korea missile threat has been greatly exaggerated. Substantial economic incentives could be used by the United States, Japan and South Korea to achieve a cessation of exports and a freeze on future testing and development. The basic issue confronting the United States in dealing with North Korea was underlined by an exchange I had with a former senior American diplomat at a seminar in 1993, well before the conclusion of the nuclear freeze agreement. "They can be bought," I concluded, "if the price is right." "I don't want to buy them," he replied, "I want to destroy them." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. Dr. Selig Harrison is a Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Fellow, Twentieth Century Fund; and Director of the Fund's Project on the United Sates and the Future of Korea. Specialized in South Asia and East Asia for 46 years as a journalist and scholar and is the author of five books on Asian affairs and U.S. relations with Asia. 2. See Selig S. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," Foreign Policy, Spring, 1997, pp. 68-72. 3. Peter Hayes, "The Two Koreas and the International Missile Trade," in The International Missile Bazaar, ed. W.C. Potter and Harlan Jencks, Westview Press, 1994, pp. 141-46. 4. Defense White Paper, 1997-1998, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Seoul, pp. 141-46. 5. Yu Yong-won, "Korea Must Obtain Nuclear Armament Capability," Wolgan Chosen, Seoul, October 1991, in Joint Publication Research Service, TND-1-016, October 29, 1991, p. 13. See also Selig S. Harrison, Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 3-4; "North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: South Korean Responses," prepared for a conference on "The Regional Implications of Korean Proliferation," sponsored by the Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, Virginia, May 19, 1992; and "Seoul Planned Nuclear Weapons Until 1991," Jane's Defense Weekly, April 2, 1994, p.1. 6. Yu Yong-won, op. cit. Choi submitted a memorandum to the International Atomic Energy Agency in April, 1990, "Long-Term Policy on National Nuclear Energy Development" stating the same position. He provided a copy of this memo to a Carnegie Endowment delegation headed by the author on April 20, 1992.


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