Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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David R. Tanks 1 : "Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: Are ICBMs a Future Possibility?" Introduction India and Pakistan are both seeking indigenous ballistic missile capabilities. Pakistan is desperate for a missile-delivered nuclear deterrent against India's superior power; it also has some concerns that Israel might mount a preemptive attack against its nuclear and missile development sites. Conversely, while India finds Pakistan annoying, its primary security concern is China. India worries about China's superior military capabilities (proven in the 1962 Indo-Chinese border conflict) and is envious of the international recognition and prestige that China has garnered as a missile-armed nuclear power. Thus, India is driven to develop advanced military capabilities by two factors: its military security vis--vis China and its intense desire to gain international prestige commensurate to that accorded other major powers (especially China). 2 On the other hand, China is clearly assisting Pakistan to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities as a means of diverting India's attention from Sino-Indian differences. 3 As complicating factors, both India and Pakistan hold a special hatred for the other, both are very sensitive to slights to their national sovereignty, and both (especially India) resent the United States for treating their missile development efforts differently from that of other states (e.g., Saudi Arabia's acquisition of DF-3 missiles from China, Israel's development of the Jericho I and II, and Japan's development of a family of space launch vehicles). 4 In short, many Indians believe the United States is conspiring to thwart Indian efforts to gain their rightful share of international prestige and influence. 5 However, both India and Pakistan are desperately poor states and thus vulnerable to international sanctions. As a result, the United States has been partially successful in using export restrictions and sanction threats to slow the rate at which Indian and Pakistani missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been developed. Notwithstanding this partial success, nuclear and missile capabilities are continuing to grow in South Asia. The key questions that will be explored in this paper are: What is happening in South Asia with regard to nuclear and missile development and what is the prognosis for the future? A Look at India India is generally credited with having sufficient fissile material to build 60-200 nuclear weapons, with most reports placing the figure at 85-100. 6 Regardless of the actual numbers, India is a nuclear power, but one that is very uncertain of the reliability of its nuclear weapon designs. As will be shown, India's nuclear-design uncertainties act as a brake on its offensive missile development program. Nuclear development. India's only test of a nuclear device occurred in 1974 when it detonated a 12 KT (or less) plutonium fission device in a 107 meter deep hole at Pokran in the Rajasthan desert (near the Pakistani border). 7 India termed the test a "peaceful nuclear explosion." As a matter of policy, Indian scientists have always defined a nuclear weapon as a warhead mated with a delivery system. 8 Thus, by definition, India can claim that it has no nuclear warheads. However, Indian scientists and engineers have worked steadily since 1974 to refine and expand India's nuclear capability. For example, reports surfaced in 1985 that India was working on a thermonuclear device. 9 The veracity of those reports was strengthened when in 1989 the Director of U.S. Central Intelligence told a Senate Subcommittee that India was seeking to purify Lithium-6, which he called an "indication of interest" in thermonuclear devices. 10 In the same time frame, fusing tests were carried out by the Indian military to verify that a nuclear bomb could be attached and released from Indian aircraft. 11 From 1980 onward, pressure has been building in India to conduct another nuclear test. Indian scientists are anxious to measure the efficiency of new approaches to bomb-making "including miniaturization of warheads and new triggering mechanisms." 12 It is believed that the "miniaturized warheads" are boosted fission devices. Moreover, there have been recurring reports that India has developed a thermonuclear device. 13 One report even claimed that the attempted nuclear test in December 1995 (canceled under U.S. pressure) was of a "hydrogen" device. 14 Yet, without testing, Indian scientists and policymakers cannot be certain that India's thermonuclear weapon design will function or that other states will credit India as being a nuclear power. 15 Indians routinely note that China was not given much international respect until it developed nuclear weapons and missile delivery capabilities. In terms of nuclear nonproliferation, since India has an extensive civil and military nuclear program, which includes 10 nuclear reactors, uranium mining and milling sites, heavy water production facilities, a uranium enrichment plant, fuel fabrication facilities, and extensive nuclear research capabilities, 16 it is now impossible to stop India's nuclear program by means of a nuclear export control regime. In the future, India plans to commission fast-breeder reactors, thorium 232 reactors (which will yield U233--a plutonium-type substance), and nuclear-powered submarines. 17 In short, India has the capability of becoming an overt nuclear power if it is willing to absorb the short-term economic and political pain that the resulting international sanctions would inflict. Missile Programs. India has methodically built an indigenous missile production capability, using its commercial space-launch program to develop the skills and infrastructure needed to support an offensive ballistic missile program. For example, during the 1980s, India conducted a series of space launches using the solid-fueled SLV-3 booster. Most of these launches put light satellites into near-earth orbit. Elements of the SLV-3 were subsequently incorporated into two new programs. In the first, the new polar-space launch vehicle (PSLV) was equipped with six SLV-3 motors strapped to the PSLV's first stage. 18 More importantly, the Agni IRBM technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3 booster as its first stage. 19 In short, India's missile program routinely adapts previously developed space technology to new applications. It is well worth the time to review the key missile applications: * Prithvi. The Prithvi I is mobile liquid-fueled 150 kilometer tactical missile currently deployed with army units. It is claimed that this missile is equipped only with various conventional warheads (which stay attached to the missile over the entire flight path). The missile is of particular interest to the United States (and potential buyers) in that has the capability of maneuvering in flight so as to follow one of six different preprogrammed trajectories. 20 Based on the same design, a modified Prithvi, the Prithvi II, is essentially a longer-ranged version of the Prithvi I except that it has a 250-kilometer range and a lighter payload. (It is suspected that any nuclear missions will be executed by the Prithvi II.) Currently, the Prithvi II has completed development and is now in production. When fielded, it will be deployed with air force units for purpose of deep target attack against objectives such as air fields. For the Indian Navy, a 350-kilometer version of the Prithvi is under development. The new system is being called the Dhanush, testing is planned to begin in December 1998. 21 It is unclear whether or not this system will be deployed on India's new nuclear missile submarine (under construction). * Agni. The 2500-kilometer Agni technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3 booster for its first stage and a liquid-fueled Prithvi for its second stage. Three test shots were conducted before the U.S. successfully pressured India into suspending testing (1994). Of particular interest, the Agni tests demonstrated that India can develop a maneuvering warhead that incorporates endo-atmospheric evasive maneuvers and terminal guidance in the reentry vehicle. India has also developed the carbon-carbon composite materials needed for long-range missile components and reentry vehicle ablative coatings. 22 Recent Indian articles have proposed that the 4000 to 5000-kilometer Agni II project be aggressively pursued. 23 Unlike the Agni I, the Agni II will have a solid-fueled second stage. 24 Although India has claimed that the Agni would be equipped with a conventional warhead, the cost of the missile cannot be justified unless it is used as a nuclear delivery vehicle. It is clear that one of the major constraints for this program is the lack of a proven nuclear warhead. Nuclear testing is a key related issue. India developed its own thermonuclear design which has not been tested; India also lacks a data base of nuclear test results upon which to develop a computer simulation model. * PSLV. The Polar Space Launch Vehicle is a 44.4-meter four-stage missile comprised of a huge 9.2 ft diameter booster equipped with six SLV-3 strap-ons, a 9.2 ft diameter liquid-fueled second stage, a solid-fueled third stage, and a liquid-fueled fourth stage. The Indians claim that the first stage generates nearly one-million pounds of thrust. 25 This missile has successfully launched a 1200 kilogram (5-meter resolution) Indian imaging satellite into an 800-kilometer high orbit in September 1997. 26 During its next excursion, this missile will triple-launch a reconnaissance satellite and two piggy-backed light-weight satellites in an attempt to prove the missile's value to the commercial space-launch world. 27 Unfortunately, some of the skills required to launch three satellites on separate trajectories from the same missile also contribute to building the prerequisite skills necessary to aim MIRVed warheads. * GSLV. This three-stage missile will allow payloads of 2500 kilograms to be lifted to geo-transfer orbit, 22,000-miles high. The missile will use the first two stages (a solid and a liquid) of the PSLV, but replace the third and fourth stages with a single cryogenic stage. In addition, the six solid-fueled strap-on motors used in PSLV launches will be replaced with four 9.2 ft diameter liquid-fueled strap-ons, which are being adapted from the PSLV's 40-ton second stage. 28 This missile is expected to make its maiden launch in first-quarter 1999. 29 * Surya. The Surya is an unconfirmed ICBM program that has been discussed repeatedly in the Indian press. It is reported that the program began in 1994; the missile design is thought to be based on the PSLV. Although the existence of this program is doubted by some, the amount of public discussion, to include budget figures, have led many analyst to suspect that such a program exists. 30 It is generally thought that the missile will have a range of 8000-12,000 kilometers. If such a missile should achieve a 12,000 kilometer range, it would be able to strike targets in the United States north of an arc extending from Raleigh, NC to Eugene, OR (if launched from New Delhi). India's missile program did not reach its current stage unaided, it was nourished by imports of critical technologies and components from countries such as the United States, France, Germany, Israel, and Russia. Some of these imports were overt, some clandestine. 31 Although the United States has acted in recent years to curtail such activity (mainly through the MTCR), reports persist of continued Russian and Israeli involvement in India's space and missile programs. 32 While Indian commentary acknowledges that MTCR restrictions have slowed their missile program, the program is continuing to make progress. A Review of Pakistan Pakistan is generally credited with having fissile material for 10-30 nuclear weapons. 33 Pakistan's original nuclear design was based on a uranium implosion design that was obtained from China during the early 1980s. The design was tested by China in 1966 as part of its fourth nuclear test. 34 China's fourth test live-fired a missile 894 kilometers to Lop Nur where its warhead detonated with a yield of about 12 KT. Thus, Pakistan received a tested nuclear design, one that is known to function. 35 As will be discussed, Pakistan has been moving forward with its nuclear development, but its missile program lags behind India's. The question is, "How much will Chinese and North Korean assistance change that equation?" Nuclear developments. Dr. A. Q. Khan, a German-educated metallurgist, was previously employed at the uranium enrichment facility (URENCO) in Almelo, Netherlands. In 1975, one year after India exploded its nuclear device, Dr. Khan left URENCO taking with him a copy of the uranium centrifuge blueprints and a list of URENCO's key suppliers. Shortly thereafter, he was appointed to his current position as the director of Pakistan's nuclear-weapon laboratories at Kahuta. He has also been a major force in Pakistan's missile development program. During the intervening years, Pakistan has developed an extensive nuclear program. Much of the materials needed for this program were obtained from the West, to include Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, and the United States. 36 In this effort, Pakistan successfully created dummy companies, trans-shipped dual-use materials through multiple counties, or out right stole or smuggled needed components. 37 During recent years, the United States has tried to contain Pakistan, but those efforts have not been totally successful since Pakistan's underground procurement network, coupled with Chinese assistance, has continued to provide the needed tools, materials, and technical knowledge required. 38 The intelligence community has credited Pakistan with miniaturizing and packaging their nuclear device for missile delivery, although there is some doubt as to the degree that effort has been successful. 39 Moreover, Pakistan completed an unsafeguarded 40-50 MW PHWR reactor at Khushab in 1996. 40 Russian special service experts claim Pakistan is now producing plutonium. As a result, Pakistan should be able to construct 1-3 plutonium-based warheads per year which are smaller, lighter, and more powerful than those based on a uranium design. As a result, Pakistan's future missile-delivered nuclear potential should improve. 41 Missiles. Pakistan established, with U.S. assistance, a civilian-based research organization (SUPARCO) in 1961. This organization developed two rockets with limited range and payload capacity. Around 1980, Pakistan embarked on a program designed to produce indigenously constructed ballistic missile systems for military use. The current program includes both liquid- and solid-fueled missiles, both of which are benefiting from Chinese and North Korean assistance. * Hatf I (Hatf: name of the Holy Prophet's sword). Unconfirmed reports indicate the 80-kilometer Hatf I missile was shelved following three unsuccessful test flights. 42 Other reports claim that a few copies of the missile were produced and are believed to be armed with chemical warheads. 43 Regardless of the current status of the Hatf I, it is a relatively inconsequential missile system. * Hatf II. The 300-kilometer indigenously developed Hatf II missile project may have been an unsuccessful endeavor in that the missile system reportedly experienced persistent problems with directional control. It is believed that the original indigenous development program may have been shelved. 44 * Chinese M-11 (Hatf II?). China began supplying solid-fueled M-11 missiles to Pakistan around 1991 (or perhaps before). This missile has a 300-kilometer range carrying a 500-800 kilogram warhead. While the estimates of M-11s in Pakistan's possession range from 30-84 systems, the actual number of M-11s in Pakistan's inventory is likely near the upper end of the scale. 45 It is also known that China assisted Pakistan with the construction of an M-11 missile assembly plant; a team of Chinese technicians reportedly provide technical advise and, as needed, rotate special teams to the plant to deal with particular problems. This on-site assistance seems to be augmented with training in China for Pakistani missile technicians. 46 It is likely that recent Pakistani references to a Hatf II missile system refers to the Chinese M-11 missile. 47 * Hatf III (M-9 or modified M-11?). In July 1997 a story broke in South Asia that Pakistan had tested an 800-kilometer missile. A couple of days later, the Pakistani Government acknowledged that a missile had been tested, but did not identify its range. Shortly thereafter, former Pakistani army chief, General Beg, said the range of the Hatf III should be increased to 800 kilometers. It is widely believed in India that the missile in question is a 600-kilometer Chinese M-9. 48 Conversely, most U.S. reports claim that the missile is an improved M-11. Either way, Pakistan apparently has a 600-km solid-fueled missile. * Ghauri. On April 6, 1998, Pakistan tested a 1500-km liquid-fueled missile, one capable of carrying a 700-kg payload. U.S. officials claim the tested missile was based on the Nodong-2, a missile long rumored to be under development in North Korea. Reportedly, the missile flew roughly 800 to 1000 kilometers during its 8-10 minute flight on April 6th, reaching an apex of 350-kms altitude. (It should be noted that the Nodong missile incorporates a separating warhead section.) Pakistan is believed to have assembled this missile in-country using mostly North Korean and indigenously produced assemblies and components, with perhaps some specialized Chinese components and technical assistance being provided as needed. 49 Apparently, North Korea and Pakistan have had a long history of nuclear and missile cooperation. This cooperation has been marked by a long series of monthly cargo aircraft flights between these two states, the frequency of which increased recently. 50 Undoubtedly, North Korea also benefited from access to the Ghauri test, since it flew further than any North Korean missile to date. More Ghauri tests are planned. * Ghazni. On April 15, 1998, Dr. A. Q. Khan told reporters that the Ghauri missile would be followed by the development of the 2000-km Ghazni missile. 51 He claimed that both the Ghauri and Ghazni missiles were completely indigenous, though inputs for them have been procured from different parts of the world. 52 It is interesting to note that North Korea's Taepodong 1 (which is also the first stage of the 4000-6000 km Taepodong 2) is reported to have a range of 2000 kms. If indeed the Ghauri is the Nodong 2, than it may be that the Ghazni is the Pakistani version of the Taepodong 1. It is a possibility that bears watching. Prognosis of Future Missile Developments In making judgments with regard to future nuclear and missile developments, the most difficult problem to deal with is assessing the synergistic effects that will develop from foreign assistance to some countries indigenous missile development efforts, both with regard to the speed with which the assisted programs will develop missile capabilities and the motivation that the accelerated progress will inspire in other states to match or surpass the observed accomplishments. Even so, some reasoned judgments can still be made as to the most probably course that future events will follow. India. India clearly has the physical capability to develop an ICBM by 2005-10. It seems highly likely that design work on the rumored Surya ICBM is underway. As for a warhead, India clearly has the means to design and test a warhead for an ICBM. The unknown factor in the equation is political will. It seems very unlikely that India will long tolerate Pakistan testing 1500- or 2000-kilometer missiles while India does nothing with regard to its own missile program. Therefore, it seems probable that India will develop and test the Agni II within the next 1-3 years. Where the program goes from that point may depend on the United States handling of the situation. If the U.S. should impose blanket sanctions against India, the sanction threat will be gone. India will have no further reason to exercise restraint. A full fledged nuclear and missile development program would almost certainly be executed. Considering the resentment that sanctions would generate, India would probably field the Surya. At the same time, India's situation in South Asia could in itself generate an imperative to develop nuclear/missile systems. The growing power of China, the proliferation of missiles in other states in the region (Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria, Egypt, etc.) coupled with a continuation in the trend toward increased levels of Hindu nationalism in India, could result in an Indian decision to become a nuclear armed missile power regardless of the short-term costs. In either case, it almost seems certain that the United States will retaliate, thus setting up the conditions for India to develop an ICBM capability. Consequently, the preponderance of pressure seems to point toward a future in which India will be armed with a limited number of ICBMs. Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear program is fairly well developed. In terms of uranium technology, Pakistan is almost self-sufficient. However, its missile development program is still heavily dependent upon foreign assistance. Thus, the key to Pakistan's future strategic capabilities is highly dependent on foreign assistance factors. If North Korea and China help Pakistan develop the Ghazni, its 2000-km range would put most of India at risk, however, Pakistan would still be unable to target Israel. Thus, it seems likely that Pakistan's missile capabilities will be limited to regional targets for the next decade. The one exception to this judgment would be if North Korea should collaborate with Pakistan to develop the Taepodong 2 (4000-6000 km range). That capability would give Pakistan the ability to target Israel and Central Europe. It might also help North Korea develop the capability sooner to target Alaska. The possible leakage of sensitive technologies from Pakistan to other states must also be considered. In the past, Pakistan has quietly collaborated with North Korea, Iran, and possibly other states on nuclear and missile technology issues. If, as seems likely, Pakistan continues to test IRBMs, the United States may feel forced to tighten sanctions against Pakistan. Such a move may increase Pakistan's activity level in sharing sensitive technologies with other states. Thus, it must be considered that in the future Pakistan might become a significant contributor to international proliferation in the future. India's Nuclear Infrastructure Trajectory Ground Range Pakistan's Nuclear Infrastructure ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. David Tanks is a senior defense analyst with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). Has led and supervised study efforts dealing with transparency in armaments, U.S. military support to the counter-drug war, future roles for international organizations in Europe, defense conversion in the former Soviet Union, and U.S. economic and strategic factors and their interrelationship with defense reinvestment and arms transfer considerations. 2. A summary of India's missile motivations is contained in Ali Abbas Rizvi, "Indian Missile Programme," Asian Defence Journal, May 1995, pp. 20-27. 3. "Experts Discuss Ghauri Missile Implications," Delhi All India Radio Network, transcribed in FBIS-NES-98-098, April 8, 1998. 4. For example, see Air Commodore Jasjit Singh's comments in Dinesh Kumar, "Prithvi: US Concern Is To Legitimize Pak Missile Program," Munbai The Times of India, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-118, June 17, 1997. Note: Jasjit Singh is a member of the three-person task force appointed by the new BJP government to recommend the composition and powers of the proposed Indian National Security Council (NSC), see Rajesh Ramachandran, "Task Force Report On National Security Council in a Few Weeks," New Delhi REDIFF On The Net, April 11, 1998. 5. For a sample report see "Daily on Pentagon's Paranoid Forecasting," Delhi The Hindustan Times, transcribed in FBIS-NES-98-100, April 10, 1998. 6. Brian Chow, Richard Speier, and Gregory Jones, The Proposed Fissile-Material Production Cutoff: Next Steps (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995), pp. 9, 13, 44. 7. WPS Sidhu, "India's Nuclear Tests: Technical And Military Imperatives," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1996, p. 172. 8. Ibid., p. 170. 9. Ibid., p. 172. 10. Stephen Engelberg, "CIA Chief Wary Of Pakistani Nuclear Program," The New York Times, May 19, 1989, p. A7; and David B. Ottaway, "Signs Found India Building An H-Bomb: W. Germany Shipped Beryllium, CIA Says," The Washington Post, May 19, 1995, p. A29. 11. Sidhu, op. cit. p. 173. 12. John F. Burns, "India Denies Atom-Test Plan But Then Turns Ambiguous," The New York Times, December 16, 1995, p. A4; and Raj Chengappa, "Testing Times: India's Nuclear Policy," India Today, December 31, 1995, p. 50; "AEC Chief Says India Ready `To Go Nuclear'," Bangalore Decccan Herald (Internet Version), March 4, 1998. 13. For some examples see Ali Abbas Rizvi, "The Nuclear Bomb and Security of South Asia," Asian Defense Journal, April 1995, p. 27; and "India: 9/3/95," The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1996, p. 106. 14. K.K. Sharma, "India Said To Have H-Bomb, May Test It," Newsday, December 27, 1995. 15. India has attempted to conduct at least three nuclear tests since 1974. See Sidhu, op. cit., pp. 172-73; and "AEC Chief Says India Ready To Go Nuclear," Bangalore Deccan Herald (Internet Version), March 4, 1998. 16. Andrew Koch, "Nuclear Testing In South Asia and the CTBT," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996, pp. 98-104. 17. For additional reading see Ibid.; Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Technical Snags Frustrate Indian Nuclear Sub Program," Defense News, June 24-30, 1996, p. 40; and Biman Basu, "India: Commentary Views Breakthrough Achieved in Nuclear Field," Delhi All India Radio, transcribed in FBIS-NES-96-215, November 3, 1996. 18. For a good discussion of the PSLV see, N. Gopal Raj, "The Importance of PSLV," The Hindu, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-272, September 29, 1997. 19. "Missile Forecast, Agni," Forecast International, The Teal Group, February 1996, pp. 1-2. 20. Pravin Sawhney, "Prithvi Position: India Defends Its Missile," Jane's International Defense Review, July 1997, p. 43. 21. John Wilson, "Sources Report New Version of Prithvi," Delhi The Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-98-104, April 14, 1998; and Srinjoy Chowdhury, "Work On Indian Missile Program Reported," Calcutta The Telegraph, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-98-104, April 14, 1998. 22. "Kalam: Reusable Missiles Under Development," Delhi The Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-334, November 30, 1997. 23. J.F.R. Jacob, "In The Line Of Fire, Higher Direction Of Defense," The Times of India (Internet version) January 28, 1998; and Brahma Chellaney, "Article Views Phase II of Agni Program," Delhi The Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-NES-98-056, February 25, 1998. 24. "India Refires Agni Project To Counter Pakistani Test," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 5, 1997, p. 3. Note: The recent testing of Pakistan's Ghauri missile has resulted in intensified calls in India to get on with the development of the Agni II. 25. Michael Mecham, "India Sees Commercial Future For New Booster," Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 12, 1996, p. 62. 26. "India Uses Own Rocket for Major Launching," International Harold Tribune, September 30, 1997, p. 2; and "In Orbit," Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 13, 1997, p. 17. Note: In the year 2000, India plans to launch an indigenous 2.5 meter resolution imaging satellite. 27. Conversation with Dr. Rajeev Lachan, Counselor, Indian Space Research Organization, April 9, 1998. 28. Mecham, op. cit.; and K. Kasturirangan, "Aerospace Technologies: A Terrestrial Focus," IEEE Spectrum, March 1994, p. 42; and Michael Mecham, "India Sees Commercial Future for New Booster," Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 12, 1996, p. 62. 29. Lachan, op. cit. Note: Russia is providing India with seven cryogenic engines. India has an indigenous cryogenic development program ongoing. 30. N.C. Menon, "India: Continuation of Missile Project Urged," Delhi, The Hindusstan Times, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-097, May 19, 1997; Soumyajit Pattnaik, "India: Regional Balance of Missiles Detailed," Delhi The Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-115, June 14, 1997; John Wilson, "India: Article Views Country's Missile Program," Delhi The Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-195, July 14, 1997; and "Agni Sans Fire," Delhi The Hindustan Times, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-216, August 4, 1997. 31. Ghani Eirabie, "US Duplicity Over Missile Policy Questioned," Karachi Dawn (Internet version), July 1, 1997. 32. Nonattribution conversation with an Israeli IAI manufacturing executive, 1997. 33. For a good overview of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure see Andrew Koch and Jennifer Topping, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: A Status Report," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 109-113. 34. Ian Brodie, "Spies Proved China Helped Pakistan Get Nuclear Bomb," The Times, April 2, 1996, p. 14; and Pravin Sawhney, "Standing Alone: India's Nuclear Imperative," Jane's International Defense Review," November 1996, p. 27. 35. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Pakistan Plans Tit-for-Tat Test Of Nuclear Blast, Officials Say, The Washington Post, March 6, 1996, P. A14. 36. Kathleen C. Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 24; Early Warnings on Pakistan, Middle East Defense News, October 12, 1992; and Marcus Warren, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program at a Screwdriver Level, The Washington Times, February 20, 1996, p. A1. 37. See Bailey, op. cit.; Rai Singh, "Indian Commentary Views Alleged Nuclear Smuggling by Pakistan," All India Radio General Overseas Service, Transcribed in FBIS-TAC-96-003, February 6, 1996; and E. A. Wayne, "Bhutto Denies Pakistan Has Nuclear Weapons," The Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 1989, p. 7. 38. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Pakistan Has A-Weapons For Missiles, U.S. Fears," The International Herald Tribune, June 14, 1996, pp. 1&12; "PRC Said Aiding Pakistan Develop Missiles With N-Warheads," The Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-202, July 21, 1997; and Rai Singh, "Indian Commentary Views Alleged Nuclear Smuggling by Pakistan, All Indian Radio General Overseas, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-96-003, February 6, 1996. 39. "India: SAPRA--Pakistan Deploys Nuclear Tipped M-11 Missiles," Delhi, The Economic Times,, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-161, June 10, 1997; Bill Gertz, "Pakistan Deploys Chinese Missiles," The Washington Times, June 12, 1996; and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Reports Cites China-Pakistan Missile Links," The Washington Post, June 13, 1996. 40. Ashraf Mumtaz, "Pakistan: First Indigenously Developed Nuclear Reactor Completed," Karachi Dawn, transcribed in FBIS-NES-96-048, March 7, 1996. 41. Bill Gertz, "China Aids Pakistani Plutonium Plant," The Washington Times, April 3, 1996, p. 4. 42. Rai Singh, "Threat From Pakistan's Hatf-3 Missile Viewed," Delhi Jansatta, translated in FBIS-TAC-97-198, July 17, 1997. 43. Aabha Dixit, "Article Views Pakistan's Missile Program As Serious Threat," Calcutta The Telegraph, transcribed in FBIS-NES-96-173, September 2, 1996. For an interesting summary of Pakistan's chemical weapon's program, see Manvendra Singh, "Pakistan Continues Chemical Weapon's Build Up," Delhi Indian Express, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-191, July 10, 1997. 44. Ibid. 45. "Defense Minister Remarks On Pakistan, Missiles Detailed," Bangalore Deccan Herald (Internet Version), transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-210, July 29, 1997. 46. "China And Pakistan's Missiles," Foreign Report, Jane's Information Group, May 2, 1996, pp. 2-3; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Linked To Pakistani Missile Plant," The Washington Post, August 25, 1996, p. A1; and Prakash Chandra, "Pakistan Said Enhancing Range of M-11s," Delhi The Hindustan Times, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-115, June 14, 1997. 47. Pravin Sawhney, "Chinese Missile Technology Transfer Alleged," Delhi The Asian Age, transcribed in FBIS-NES-96-168, August 27, 1996. 48. Shubha Singh, " Report Views Pakistani Missile Programs, Warheads," The Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-191, July 10, 1997. 49. In an article submitted to Jane's Defence for publication in the near future, North Korean expert, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., provides a detailed account (fully referenced) of the long-term cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea regarding nuclear and missile developments. The PRC is strongly suspected of providing critical components. 50. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Says North Korea Helped Develop New Pakistani Missile," The New York Times, April 11, 1998; and, Takayuki Shimbun, "Ghauri Missile Suspected as DPRK's Nodong No. 2," Tokyo Mainichi Shimbun, Morning Edition, translated in FBIS-EAS-98-102, April 12, 1998. 51. "Top Pak Scientist Hints At Nuclear Bomb," Reuters & PTI, April 16, 1998. 52. Ibid.


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