Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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Gil Siegert: "The Chinese Space Program" INTRODUCTION On 17 March 1996 the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eighth National People's Congress adopted the Outline of the Ninth Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, and Long Term Targets for the Year 2010. 1 Space is considered within these endeavors. In formulating these targets, three specific challenges were seen as critical for consideration. First is that of increasing domestic demand for space related services, telecommunications specifically, but also including remote sensing for land management and disaster warning and mitigation, and an autonomous satellite navigation system. Second, competition from the already established space powers, the US and Russia in particular, is seen as a challenge. The third challenge foreseen by the Chinese is that in trying to reach the first goal, domestic markets can become controlled or occupied by foreign space companies. On the last point, the Chinese cite the figure that 80 percent of the Chinese domestic transponder market is occupied by foreign satellites and that currently, services and operations in the fields of meteorology, navigation and remote sensing are all essentially dependent on foreign satellites. Coupled with the economic considerations associated with enhancing Chinese space infrastructure are the growing national security concerns China perceives resulting from a growing appreciation for the implications of the U.S. "revolution in military affairs (RMA)". It would seem that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and defense R&D community have begun the process of recognition and debate beyond its immediate shock at the display of high-tech warfare against Iraq in 1991. On October 26, 1995, the China Defense Science Technology Information Center (CDSTIC), the information clearing-house and think-tank connected to the ministry-level commission in charge of China's defense industries (Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense(COSTIND)) held a seminar on the topic of "military technical revolution." Bringing together persons from the Academy of Military Sciences, the National Defense University, the armed forces, and defense-related industries, the seminar addressed "the intention, characteristics and development" of the military technical revolution, and the "need to renew concepts and bring about overall development in PLA military theory research." 2 China has eight hundred and sixty four National Science and Technology institutes. Although a 1995 Chinese government report called for turning most research laboratories into business centers dedicated to spurring economic growth 3 the problem with doing that goes back to maintaining a proper balance between the need to disband organizations and the political need to maintain employment levels. The sheer number of organizations involved with the multiple structural modifications creates its own degree of confusion in defining the current Chinese space industry infrastructure. There are also countless organizations within organizations. Further, references are still made to organizations by their former names which exacerbates confusion and results in differing references being made to the same or officially non-existent organizations. For example, in a 1996 western publication it was stated that "The Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics, a research and production base under the Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MASI)...." 4 yet MASI officially disappeared from the organization charts after the 1993 reorganization, and the Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics has been renamed the Shanghai Academy of Space Technology. 5 From an organizational security perspective, the Chinese are likely delighted by this continued confusion. While this potential cunning bit of Chinese infowar likely gives the Chinese more credit for deliberate strategizing than is warranted, the effect is to increase the difficulty for non-Chinese to fathom the nature of the Chinese space infrastructure. Also like the former Soviets, the Chinese utilize a parallel government system whereby at each level (central, province, etc.) there are both government mechanisms and party mechanisms, with the party holding ultimate power. Unlike the Soviets, however, the Chinese also made the military a third partner. That means that the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which includes all the services, can be used not only for international security purposes but domestic policy goals as well and is in many respects beyond the government's jurisdiction. The PLA holds a bureaucratic rank equal to that of the State Council that is the government's highest level of authority. Within these three vertical organizational pillars of China's government, there are also multiple connecting horizontal bars. For example, while the party is still the holder of ultimate power, another aspect of bureaucratic organization that must be considered is the xitong. Xitong literally means "system." They are functional groupings of bureaucracies that together deal with a broad task the top political leaders want performed. They are usually headed by a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the most powerful party sanctum. In other words, the various xitong are the party arm of bureaucratic organizations, adding yet another circle to the dizzying web of interrelationships within which decision-making takes place in China. Xitong cover a wide variety of areas, though six have been identified as particularly relevant to the management of the country: Party Affairs, Organization and Personnel, Propaganda and Education, Political and Legal Affairs, Finance and Economics, and the Military. Once decisions are made at this level, they can then be safely passed to the government for implementation. One might argue that the Chinese system is organizationally confusing but in practice operates much like in the West. Certainly, stovepiped organizations, the inter­agency process and separation of powers (and confusion) can be found in the West and could be analogized to various Chinese counterparts. Also, governmental agreements with subsequent awarding of private contracts and subcontracts are common. But the analogy does not hold in a number of senses: as referenced earlier as critical, the legalities restraining institutions in the West are missing; the open scrutiny of decision-making is missing; dissemination of knowledge amongst parties is severely limited; and the behind­-the-scenes "Big Brother" presence of the party overshadows everything. CHINESE SPACE AND SPACE-RELATED ORGANIZATIONS The principal organizations governing space development and operations include: The State Council. Established in 1954 to replace the transitional Government Administrative Council, the State Council is headed by the premier and has 14 members. It includes commissions and ministries within its purview, with commissions responsible for issues which can involve multiple ministries. The State Planning Commission, for example, is in charge of long-term and annual plans, and the State Economic Commission is responsible for resolving interministerial issues resulting from plan implementation. Much of the work of the ministries is focused on development and the urban economy, while in the rural regions the party is still dominant. The commission directly relevant to space is the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). Space Leading Group (SLG) in the State Council. Founded in April 1989, this group was described in Yanping Chen's 1993 article 6 as the top group responsible for policy making and mission coordination among the central government agencies. Its purpose was stated as coordinating coherent space activities in China, similar to an organization called the Central Special Committee that existed in the 1960's and 1970 s led by Zhou Enlai. That Committee was, like many others, disbanded during the Cultural Revolution. The members of the SLG, as of 1993, were stated as being "the Prime Minister of the State Council, the Chairman of COSTIND, the Vice-Chairman of the State Committee of Science and Technology, the Minister of Aerospace industry, the Vice-­Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Vice Chairman of the State Committee of Central Planning.'' 7 The role of the SLG today is unclear. Some sources summarily dismiss it as now defunct. The Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). The National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTIC), the original oversight organization for both missile and nuclear weapons development chaired by Nie Rongzhen, and the National Defense Industry Office were merged in 1982 to form COSTIND. It is directly tied to the State Council and is responsible for both aerospace and strategic weapons, on the civil side controlling the launch sites and tracking, telemetry and control (TT&C). It is also the coordinating organization for space, and as such divides both projects and resources among interested parties, e.g. the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (MRFT) and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. Hierarchically, the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC or CAC) and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) are under COSTIND. Project consideration begins in COSTIND for CASC. Although COSTIND theoretically has no direct authority over CASC, its influence and control is significant, through several mechanisms. First, COSTIND is CASC's link to the State Council, which is the ultimate authority for funding. Second, and more importantly on a day-to-day basis, COSTIND's power is via control of personnel. COSTIND appoints the Chief and Deputy Chief Designers for key projects within CASC's purview. Recently, COSTIND leadership transitioned from Ding Henggao to Cao Gangchuan. In a somewhat surprising move, Cao was appointed from outside. The Deputy Director was and remains Lt. Gen. Shen Rongjtin. He is the senior military officer in charge of China's space efforts. In an interesting example of the Confucian-based family tie system that is prevalent in China, Ding is married to Nie Li, daughter of COSTIND founder Nie Rongzhen. Apparently concern that family influence was becoming too strong even by Chinese standards, and a bad property deal, led to Ding's downfall. State Science and Technology Commission. This group, headed by Song Jian, is responsible for developing macro-level policy concerning space, primarily involving research and academics. Chinese Aerospace Corporation (CASC or CAC) & Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA). In 1956, the Party's Central Military Commission created the Fifth Academy within the Defense Ministry to be in charge of missile research and development. Within that organizational scheme, a number of sub-academies were also created. For example, the First Sub-Academy was in charge of general configuration and rocket engines and the Second Sub-Academy was in charge of guidance systems. Many of these Sub-Academies were subsequently renamed. The First Sub-Academy became the First Academy in January 1965, generally responsible for Carrier Rocket Research. In 1965, the Fifth Ministry became the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building. Then, in 1982, the Seventh Ministry was redesignated as the Ministry of Space Industry (MASI). There were multiple academies within the MASI purview, many of which sold their products overseas after the Chinese push for capital in the 1980's. There was, for example: the First Academy, the pedigree of which was previously mentioned; Second Academy (producing anti-aircraft missiles for sale abroad); the Third Academy (producing anti-ship missiles for sale abroad); and the Fourth Academy, in charge of solid rocket motors. Companies were then specifically set up as outlets for these sales. China Precision Import-Export Company (CPMlEC) was an export company set up for missile and arms trade. Those academies which were successful in export sales were rewarded twofold: by showing their relevance to the national economy they were rewarded with government funding and they were also able to supplement their government funding with part of their "earnings." Indeed the DF- 15 was developed for hard currency by the First Academy, and it likely could bring in $200,000 8 on the arms market. Until 1984/85 all of these were classified organizations along the lines of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in the United States and very much military dominated. Even by Western standards, MASI was a large fully state-owned entity. It employed about 55,000 technical personnel and a support workforce of about 250,000, and operated approximately 100 factories and 80 research and design institutes. 9 Today CASC and CNSA have assumed the responsibilities (personnel, buildings, etc.) of MASI. The principal role of CNSA is to serve as China's policy organization and interface with other national space agencies, while CASC exerts primary control over the national space program on a day-to-day basis. Basically, CNSA handles external matters while CASC handles internal matters. There is considerable sharing of personnel between CASC and CNSA. For example Mr. Hua Chongzhi and Mr. Lao Ge are both Deputy Directors for the Department of Foreign Affairs of both organizations. Today, CASC is a corporation with 270,000 employees, including over 100,000 engineers. CASC primarily engages in research, design, test, manufacture and commercialization of various space technological products and civilian applications. Further, as a national level company, launch vehicles, satellites and other space products in China are within its exclusive domain. CASC has achieved success in the fields of launch vehicle technology, cryogenic propellant rocket technology, satellite retrieval and multi-payload launches, and possesses the capability of launching satellites into low Earth orbit (LEO), sun-synchronous orbit (SSO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). China and CASC are particularly proud that space spin-offs have been widely applied to multiple sectors of the Chinese national economic development effort. Beyond satellite applications and ground equipment, its main civilian products include electronics, automobiles, communications, computers, automatic control systems, petrochemical equipment, medical apparatus, packaging machinery, and consumer electronics. To date CASC has established technical cooperation and trade relations with more than 50 countries, regions and international organizations. Almost 100 joint-venture enterprises are set up in China and abroad. There are multiple institutes under CASC (see diagram 1.1 ) and much like the former "bureaus" in Russia, some have been able to respond to commercialization efforts more than others. China Academy of Space Technology (CAST). Formerly known as the Fifth Academy, CAST is responsible for the design and manufacture of DFH communications satellites, FSW recoverable satellites and Earth resources/remote sensing satellites. Under its purview, the 504 institute in Xi'an is responsible for commercial payloads. China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC). This organization was specifically established to provide commercial launch and tracking, telemetry and control (TT&C) services. Like other Chinese space organizations, it is subordinate to COSTIND, but not through CASC as are most others. CLTC manages one aerospace command and control center (Xi'an, XSCC), three satellite launch centers (Jiuquan, Xichang, Taiyuan), one comprehensive TT&C network (Xi'an) and two research institutes. In all, the organization claims a workforce of more than 20,000, of whom some 5,000 are engineers. Pictures of personnel at the controls during launches frequently show men in uniform. 10 According to a former TT&C personnel manager in China, the military still operates the launch sites. Spacecraft built by civilian organizations in China or abroad are handed over to the military security organization at the launch site. As such, they are ultimately owned by COSTIND, which then takes approximately 1/3 of the profits from commercial launches to cover fuel, infrastructure and personnel costs. Combining the fact that the launch sites are under the purview of the military and the military is a key jobs program within China, and that aerospace generally is among the fields from which the government is reluctant to disband employees, few personnel cutbacks are likely and inefficiencies are said to abound. Indeed one Chinese launch expert speculated that as many as one-fifth of the launch personnel could easily be eliminated, but without much optimism for improvement in the near future. Located in the ancient city of Xi'an, XSCC manages China's spacecraft TT&C network. This includes the command and control center, fixed and mobile stations, instrumentation ships and re-entry instrumentation airplanes. XSCC has served its role since the launch of China's first satellite in April 1970. Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (JSLC) is located in northwestern China in the Gobi desert. It is the earliest and largest satellite launch center in China, created in 1958 for military launch activities. It is primarily used to launch to medium and low orbit inclinations, including recoverable capsule launches. In the 1960s and 1970s Mao decided to spread out the launch facilities for strategic reasons, primarily in response to the Russian threat. Sites were specifically selected for their remoteness in accordance with his Third Line (San Xian) strategy, and built for military purposes. Other considerations for sites came into play also. That the latitude coordinates of Xichang are similar to those of Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is thought likely not coincidental. As mentioned earlier, after the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese still had considerable Soviet space hardware to work from and the biggest actual loss was in utilization knowledge. For that they had to rely on published data, which came primarily from the United States. Launching from the same latitude as KSC allowed the Chinese to emulate the expectations for such technical points as the proper rocket attitude and altitude. When China decided to enter the commercial launch field in the 1980s, they sought technology from the West for improving capabilities. Because of the obvious dual-use, technology transfer considerations, however, such support was not forthcoming. The Chinese have subsequently concentrated on upgrading their facilities indigenously, and spent considerable funds, sometimes without badly desired and needed near-term payback. Indeed facilities for launching LM-2E rockets from Jiuquan were assembled for a potential Globalstar contract, which then went elsewhere. 11 Taiynan Satellite Launch Center has been used for polar orbits since 1988. Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC) is located in Sichuan province, in southwestern China. It is located at latitude 28 degrees N and an altitude of 1500 m. XSLC is comprised of two launchpads, one dedicated to the LM-3, and the other is used for the LM-2E, LM-3A, LM-3B, and the new LM-3C, and mainly used to launch geostationary spacecraft. All domestic communications satellites and commercial satellites are launched from there. The second pad, for the LM-2E, was built in 14 months to better position China to respond to the commercial market. China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT). The former First Academy, which was also known at one time as the Beijing Wanyuan Industry Corporation, was founded at the outset of the Chinese missile technology program in 1957. CALT and the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology are primarily responsible for launch vehicle construction. CALT managed the development of the LM-2C and hyperbolic and cryogenic engines. Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST). Founded in 1969 and formerly known as Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics, SAST is now responsible for the first and second stage structures on the LM-3 launch vehicle and is responsible for the LM-2D and LM-4 boosters. SAST is also known to have developed the Feng Yun-2, a geostationary meteorological satellite, 12 as well as a medium-range surface-to-air missile for the export market, capable of tracking multiple targets, 13 evidencing its proficiency in both civil and military technologies. Even during this period of privatization, these bureaus and academies are still dependent on government funds because of the dual-use nature of their work. There has, however, been limited competition initiated between the formerly exclusively specialized institutions. For example, the Sinosat telecommunications satellite being built as a joint-venture between China and the German aerospace firm DASA was opened to competition within China by CASC. CAST was institutionally stronger in the field, with far more experience. SAST also bid planning to initiate an entirely new design, whereas CAST intended to use/modify the standard DFH-3 platform. A senior experts group was convened, and selected SAST. Two years later, however, Mr. Liu at CASC intervened and gave the contract back to CAST, apparently for varied political reasons. China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). Originally set up by MASI as a kind of legitimate "front" for the defense-related industries wanting to get involved in foreign sales, the CGWIC is now the exclusive organization in China responsible for launch service marketing, commercial negotiation, contract execution and performance with a legal person status. Organizationally, CGWIC has "partnerships" with many if not most of the other Chinese space entities, to provide one-stop shopping for international customers. The uniqueness of this arrangement is important. "CGWIC has two attributes that are different from other international space trading companies in the West. First, it is the only export window for Chinese space products in the international market. Second, it is the only legal entity pricing Chinese space products. The prices of space products reflect the negotiated costs from its Chinese partners and the profits of CGWIC." 14 Second Artillery. The Second Artillery of the PLA is the Strategic Rocket Force. The intertwined nature of this organization with the others is significant. The First Academy, for example, builds the carrier rockets utilized by the Second Artillery and hence is technologically tied to all other aspects of the Chinese space program. Historically, the Second Artillery has been strictly a tool of the higher ups, rather than an initiator of policy or strategy. Lewis and Hua say, for example: "The soldiers of the Second Artillery and their comrades in the First Academy merely imagined that nuclear strategy was a matter to be debated and decided upon by the leaders in the Central Military Commission." 15 Politically the Second Artillery is, however, likely the strongest within the PLA, receiving far more modernization funds than some counterparts. Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication (MPT). The MPT is a functional department under the State Council governing the P&T industry. It is responsible for the macro-control of China's communications industry, making overall plans, coordinating projects, and supervising operations. 16 There have been a multitude of so-called "private companies" created, which are actually under the purview of MPT, as providers of telephone services. China Telecom is by far the largest. Within approximately the past five years, however, other companies, such as China United Communications (China Unicom) have also emerged, as competition under the same master. Chinese Academy of Science. This organization is most often referenced in conjunction with space science work being conducted by universities. Likely it plays primarily a coordinating role. China Satellite Launch Agents of Hong Kong, Ltd. This group was established to promote the commercial use of Chinese recoverable spacecraft. Chinese Society of Astronautics. A technical organization that also is said to assist in overseeing space development. 17 Its role in this area, however, is quite nebulous. People's Insurance Company of China (PICC). PICC is a state-owned company that, inter alia, offers insurance to customers of the various Chinese launch service. CURRENT SPACE PROGRAM LAUNCH PROGRAMS With the successful launch of AsiaSat-1 in 1990 on a Long March-3 rocket, China joined a short list of countries and organizations involved in the commercial launch business. The insurance associated with the launch is an important element of China's commercial launch, particularly since in 1997/98 it is among the most important factors concerning China's future in the commercial launch field. China has experienced seven launch failures of varying degrees from December 1992 through August 1996 18 , ranging from a launcher exploding before ever reaching the pad, to satellites in low orbits, to catastrophic explosions killing people on Earth. These difficulties have resulted in a general loss of confidence in the Chinese Long March launcher family among the commercial satellite vendors and a subsequent increase in insurance rates. Launch failures are always undesirable, but for the Chinese, theirs came at particularly unfortunate times as within the next two years launch contracts will likely be signed for the majority of new global mobile phone networks being developed which rely on low-orbit satellites: e.g. Iridium and Globalstar, backed by Motorola and Space Systems/Loral. The Chinese fear, which is justified, is that they could miss out on the launch contracts for these ventures to a substantial degree because of the lack of confidence and concomitant insurance issues now associated with the Long March boosters. "'There is a crunch over the next 12 to 18 months,' said Chris Lanzit, satellite business-development director for U.S.-based Hughes Electronics, which built ChinaSat. `There is tremendous growth in the number of satellites being launched and not enough vehicles. By 1998 a whole lot of new vehicles will be available. 19 Insurance is particularly critical to China's remaining economically competitive in the international launch market. Without the income derived from the launch market, many of their other space programs financed through launch would have to be seriously curtailed or draw funds from other important sectors. Some analysts have said that "...the Chinese programme is rapidly becoming uninsurable..." 20 because of its outdated technology, particularly data-handling facilities. Others are not so pessimistic. Rates for insuring a launch on LM did drop from 27% of the amount insured to about 19%, which is still above the cost of less than 17% on Europe's Ariane 4 booster but still considered in the `tolerable' range." 21 After two later accidents though (Intelsat 708 and ChinaSat-7) rates for the LM-3B went up again to between 20-30%. All, however, seem to agree that if the launch difficulties which have recently plagued the Chinese continue and the insurers pull the plug then China will miss out on planned-for revenue. The Chinese are keenly aware of this dilemma and have made restoring confidence in the Long March their number one space priority, even above development of new launchers. Both a vehicle for delivering small satellite payloads and a vehicle which could be used for planetary exploration or manned spaceflight have been cited as desirable and within Chinese consideration by the new President of the China Great Wall Company, Zhang Xinxia. 22 In both cases development would heavily depend on funds derived from the commercial program, so the plans almost inherently become moot without a viable, meaning perceived reliable by the launch market, commercial launcher. Comparatively speaking, the success rates of Arianespace and Lockheed Martin are usually cited at approximately 95% and the Proton 93%. China, however, has plummeted to about 80%. 23 With the August 18, 1996 launch failure, China's failure rate was 30%, 3 times higher than what industry experts consider "reasonable." Such statistics are somewhat questionable since there is considerable design carry-over between military and commercial systems. For example, a reorientation problem with LM-2E was traced to a component that had worked successfully in the M11, 24 but did not work in the LM-­2E and had to be reworked. Subsequently, failures of military systems that are not reported in the West may have an impact on the commercial program. Concerns about the launch failures are particularly high because three of the last five failures have involved Western satellites, which have left some in the business wondering if there is an integration problem. 25 Publicly, both sides say that integration is not an issue, but both sides also claim a reluctance of their counterparts to share the necessary information to make a complete and valid analysis. Based on the known compartmentalization problems that seem inherent to the Chinese system, integration problems are not a particularly far-fetched conclusion for outside analysts to draw. Another issue of concern is maintenance. The Chinese are not particularly known for taking a high maintenance approach to buildings and hardware generally, preferring in many cases to just tear things like buildings down and start over. In the space business, however, this approach is simply too expensive. But in China the issue is not one of being overly consumptive, it is one of not understanding that certain items are "high maintenance," requiring constant care and upkeep to work properly. In one sense, it is quality control, but it extends beyond the production phase and into usage. Again, this seems to be a cultural or systemic factor, evidenced by decay of even relatively new structures in any Chinese city, in factories, and even at "preserved" historical sites. Another consideration in a similar vein is that although Chinese scientists purport to adhere to the ISO 9000 international standards for documentation, some outside analysts question their real commitment to adhering to even their own specifications, saying that the Chinese must constantly, if subtly, be reminded and prodded to stick with the planned program. Recovery from the launch failures has so far proceeded well, but slowly. After ChinaSat-7, there were successful launches of a LM-3A carrying a DFH-3 satellite and a LM-3 with a FY-2, both Chinese payloads. The big test, however, came with the successful August 1997 launch of a LM-3B, the same vehicle configuration that slammed into the hillside in 1996. 26 That rocket carried a large, Philippine-owned Mabuhay communications satellite called Agila 2, built by Space Systems/Loral. Insurance rates for Mabuhay were reported at 22% if successful, 32% if it was a failure. Obtaining insurance for another LM-3B scheduled for launch in late September or early October 1997, carrying the Apstar 2R, was dependent upon the successful launch of Agila 2. "Consistency" will be the key to convincing the foreign launch market that the Chinese problems have been resolved. Generally, it must be considered that the more capital Beijing is able to earn through commercial launches, the less imperative earning money through missile sales becomes. Clearly, both will be pursued. Beijing, however, is far more likely to trade missile sales for something else that they want if hard currency can be earned elsewhere. If capital is not available from commercial launches though, missile sales will likely be pursued far more vigorously. China offers a wide variety of launch vehicles at competitive pricing. It costs approximately $110M to carry a 3-ton satellite on Arianespace, $100M on a Lockheed-Martin launcher, and $70M with China. Russian launch prices are only slightly higher than China but they are booked up for several years. China's available launch inventory includes: Long March 2C (LM-2C). With a payload capacity of 2,800 kg, the LM-2C is suitable for many low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite missions and is mainly used for launches of recoverable satellites. To date, LM-2C has had fourteen successful launches in succession including the launch of the Swedish satellite FREJA as a piggyback payload on October 6, 1992. LM-2C/SD is a three-stage vehicle developed according to the Iridium launch mission requirements. It consists of two stages upgraded on the basis of LM-2C and a smart dispenser (SD) developed with flight proven technologies and hardware. Long March 2D (LM-2D). The LM-2D is a two-stage launch vehicle, developed on the basis of the 1st and 2nd stages of the LM-4. The propellant for the two stages is N2O4/UDMH. The payload capacity for 220 km low earth circular orbit is 3700 kg. To date, three recoverable satellites have been successfully launched by LM-2D. Long March 2E (LM-2E). The two-stage LM-2E launch Vehicle has first and second core stages similar to those of the LM-2C. There are four boosters strapped on to the first stage of the launch vehicle each with a height of 15 meters and a diameter of 2.25 meters. The LM-2E mainly provides low earth orbit (LEO) satellite launch services and has a LEO capacity of up to 9,500 kg. The LM-2E has launched satellites for the OPTUS. APSTAR. ASIASAT and ECHOSTAR satellite programs. Long March 3 (LM-3). The LM-3 launch vehicle is well-known in the international commercial launch community for the successful launches of the AsiaSat-1 and APSTAR-1 and 1A communications satellites. China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT) developed the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen engine for the third stage of this launch vehicle with capability of re-starting in a vacuum environment. The successful development of LM-3 in 1984 makes China the fourth country in the world capable of launching geosynchronous satellites. The geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO) capacity of the LM-3 is 1450 kg. Long March 3A (LM-3A). Designed and developed from advanced LM-3 technology, the LM-3A introduces powerful cryogenic third stage engines, a more capable control system, greater flexibility in the attitude control system and improved adaptability. LM-3A has a geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO) capacity of 2,600 kg and can be used for LEO, sun-synchronous orbit (SSO) and polar orbit satellite missions. The LM-3A's first test flight was successfully conducted on February 8, 1994. Long March 3B (LM-3B). The LM-3B launch vehicle was designed with a LM-3A launch vehicle as the core stage with four liquid boosters strapped on to the first stage. The core stage of LM-3B is identical to LM-3A's except that the stage tanks have been extended and reinforced, the fairing has been enlarged, and the control and telemetry systems include minor modifications to accommodate the strap-on boosters. LM-3B is capable of launching a payload of up to 5,000 kg into geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO) as well as performing missions to other orbits. In addition, LM-3B is also capable of accomplishing payload attitude adjustments, re-orientation and spin-up requirements, and dual or multiple launch requirements. Long March 4 (LM4). LM-4 is a three-stage launch vehicle. The 1st and 2nd stages of LM-4 are developed on the basis of LM-3. The 3rd stage is newly developed. The propellant for all three stages in N2O4/UDMH. The payload capacity for 900 km SSO is 1650 kg (corresponding to a singular burn of the 3rd stage engine) and 2800 kg (corresponding to two burns). To date two meteorological satellites have been successfully launched by LM-4. While the Chinese would prefer to exploit their support of the commercial launch market in such a way as to improve their launch procedures and transfer as much western technology and procedures as possible, controls on exports to China from the various licenses are required from the US government. All licenses are issued by the Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) within the Department of State (DOS). Not only do they cover the export of technical interface data; the export of tooling and electrical connectors for the launch vehicles umbilical wiring; hardware and equipment; but for items on the Munitions Control (MC) list there were a number of provisos which had to be adhered to. The list below illustrates the tenets which, official or not, many people still feel are supported to some degree or another. 27 * The Chinese shall only be given data related to the form, fit and function of the interfaces between the spacecraft and launch vehicles and launch site. Specifically, information may be exchanged related to orbit requirements, launch window, weight, center of gravity, physical envelope, dynamic loading, electrical power usage, interface adapter requirements, radio frequency plans, safety plans, test flows, separation characteristics, ground handling and test equipment, and flight event sequences. * What may not be transferred to the Chinese is governed by the principle that the spacecraft and its launch program cannot be used as a tool to assist China in the design, development or enhancement of its satellite, launch vehicle or missile programs. * In a more subtle vein, the governing principles behind the licenses also prohibit the transfer of substantive information as to how a program is executed in a typical Western aerospace company. Specifically, test philosophies, organization rationale, industrial relationships and other procedural issues are not permitted to be transferred. * Finally, the US government requires that their representatives maintain full visibility of the spacecraft to launch vehicle integration program. In practice this means that US government representatives attend all interface meetings and have visibility of all technical exchanges with China. Safeguards against technology transfer have been and remain fairly comprehensive, targeting not just technology, but know-how. Recalling the Chinese utilization of US publicly released information in relation to launches from Cape Canaveral to further their own program as a very simple example, prudence is not unreasonable. The Chinese have openly expressed bitterness about US refusal to release an external accident report, which is interesting and somewhat ironic considering their own security-conscious attitude. In the case of the launch failure reviews, the first external accident review the Chinese participated in was after the 1995 Apstar 2 failure. There, two outsiders and one Chinese jointly reviewed the data, but failed to come up with a conclusion that all could agree on, with the split being between the Chinese representative and the two non-Chinese. Together, these two experiences with accident reviews have made launch customers concerned about apparent Chinese hesitancy in being forthright in the review process, or accountability. SATELLITES PROGRAMS Communications. Linking the rural and inland regions of China to the more coastal cities has already been cited as a constant consideration, indeed priority, of the Chinese modernization program. Remembering the many historical examples of uprisings in the those regions as a result of feeling cut off from the concerns of central government, China's leaders today want to avoid that mistake of the past. Still, currently only about 3.76% of China s population have phone service. 28 China has been using space links as its chief means of communication between regions since 1984. By mid-1986, five Chinese cities, Beijing, Lhasa, Urumqi, Hohhot and Guangzhou, had domestic public communication lines. As of 1995, construction was completed for ten domestic and international optical trunks, between: Beijing-Hankkou-­Guangzhou, Beijing-Huhehot-Yinchuan-Lanzhou, Hangzhou-Fuzhou-Guizhou-Chengdu, Beijing-Shenyang-Harbin, Beijing-Taiyuan-Xian, Hankou-Chingqing, Jinan-Qingdao, Nanjing-Hangzhou, Urumqi-Yining and Sino-Korea lines. 29 China's posts and telecommunications industry is growing at a high rate. The Chinese public communications network virtually completed the transition from manual to automatic operation and from analogue to digital technology in 1995. The growth rate of the total turnover of P&T services exceeded that of the Chinese GNP for the eleventh consecutive year. The total turnover of P&T services in 1996 was $11.78 billion and the revenue was $11.77 billion, depicting a growth rate of 42.2 percent and 43 percent respectively over the prior year. An investment of $11.78 billion was made in P&T fixed assets, an increase of 27 percent over the prior year, increasing the total P&T fixed assets to $31.2 billion. 30 Urban and rural telephone exchange capacity quadrupled in five years, reaching 85.1 million lines. The growth of the telephone market in China, particularly regarding mobile telephones, has surpassed all predictions. Although CASC reports that it has developed and manufactured more than thirty various kinds of satellites for science and technology experiments, most fall into three categories: low orbit recoverable remote sensing satellites; geosynchronous communication-broadcasting satellites; and sun-synchronous (or polar orbit) meteorological satellites. The Dong Fang Hong communication satellite already referenced is the workhorse of the stable. Neither of the only two DFH-2 satellites ever built are currently operational. DFH-2 had a relatively low capacity, with only four transponders, and provided only a short-lived, partial solution to Chinese communication needs. The first DFH-3 satellite had a fuel leak and was never put into service. The second DFH-3 was launched in May 1997 and is rumored to have some technical problems that render it less than fully functional. Both DFH- 1 and DFH-2 were completely indigenous in design and manufacture. DFH-3, however, relies heavily on foreign-sourced parts and was basically a Western design assembled in China. This was a new approach by which the Chinese hope to eventually develop larger, more powerful satellites. The result, however, has been less than satisfactory. The DHF-3 satellite design is outwardly similar to many satellites, with a rectangular body and solar panels deployed from two sides. The payload has twenty-four transponders, half receiving and transmitting on each of two orthogonal linear polarizations. The six higher power transponders are for television distribution, the others are for telephony. Some analysts have compared difficulties with the DFH-2 and 3 satellites with the still on-going struggle between Civil Aviation Association of China (CAAC) to buy western-built commercial aircraft, primarily from Boeing, and Aviation Industry of China (AVIC, formerly the Ministry of Aviation) desire to build aircraft in China. In the satellite-world parallel, the MPT wants western satellites, while CASC wants to be the MPT's supplier. MPT has a long history of disappointments with CASC: the DFH-2 which failed to reach orbit in December 1991 due to a LM-3 third stage problem; a DFH-­3 failure in late 1994 attributed to leaked fuel; and the ChinaSat-7 failure to reach orbit because of a LM-3 third stage problem. This policy issue will be an important one in the future. Satellites are utilized for purposes beyond private communication also. Using satellite television as a tool for education has been a part of China's modernization drive for many years. The problems faced were and remain arduous, involving not just the students but the training of teachers as well. In 1988 it was stated that, "...there are 8 million teachers in elementary and middle schools and 2.4 million of them require training to be able to teach all levels in China's nine-year compulsory education. There are also 2.6 million people needing further on-the-job education, and training in a specialization." 31 China had already set up a program in 1986, called China Education Television (CETV) as part of the second phase of the "Leasing for Transition" program. The program was broad based, including teacher training, television universities, and adult basic education aimed at working adults who wished to learn in their free time. Already it is estimated that more than two million people received university and technical education through TV transmitted courses, as well as management and technical training. 32 Remote Sensing. The Chinese launched two land survey satellites in 1984 and 1986, which took more than 3,000 land images, each one covering 32,000 square kilometers of the Earth's surface. 33 Remote sensing activities have expanded rapidly in China over the past 15 years and now embraces more than 460 institutes and agencies, and more than 10,000 researchers. Although on one hand this could be indicative of a flurry of activity, it is also surely indicative of the need to keep people employed, with the likely corollary of inefficiency which is seen in other sectors. It is thought that the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics are heavily involved with remote sensing; the Shanghai institute of Technical Physics building optical sensors. The main satellites used by China for land management, vegetation monitoring, cartography and other such applications are Landsat (US), Spot (France), JERS-1 (Japan) and its own FSW series of recoverable capsules. The FSW series satellite are recoverable satellites which use the LM-2C and LM-3D as launch vehicles. China has successfully launched and recovered fourteen satellites since 1975. 34 The camera system carried by China's FSW-2 type spacecraft can be used for military reconnaissance and remote sensing. The camera carries 2,000 meters (6,600 ft) of film and has a resolution capability of at least 10 meters (33 ft). 35 The FSW-2 was launched in October 1996 using a LM-2D from the Jiuquan launch site. China is currently developing its first Earth resources remote-sensing satellite, the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), in partnership with Brazil. CBERS, will feature a CCD camera (with 20 m resolution), a multispectral infrared scanner (160/180) and a wide-field imager (258m). The Shanghai Institute of Terrestrial Physics has been a key player working with Brazil on CBERS. China is also expected to build a new radar remote sensing satellite for launch in about 2002, for both civil and military uses. Apparently, it would be comparable to Canada's Radarsat and the European Space Agency (ESA) Earth Resource Satellite (ERS) 1-2 vehicles. The comparisons are not coincidental. The technology sought to be used is beyond what China has now, and outside participation would be necessary. Both GEC-Marconi and DASA are said to be interested in the potentially lucrative deal, with estimates of the satellite in the $250-million-class. Meteorology. China, with its expansive land mass and need to warn its population of meteorological events and aftermaths such as typhoons and flooding, is pursuing a meteorological satellite capability. Two FY-I satellites preceded the first FY-2, launched in 1997. An earlier FY-2 was the satellite which exploded in the integration hall at Xichang in April 1994. The Chinese have announced that they are also planning development of a more advanced geosynchronous-orbit weather satellite system, as well as enhancements of their polar-orbit spacecraft. Navigation. Although the PRC has yet to establish a navigation satellite network, research for such a system has been underway for many years, and a future space-based navigation capability is an acknowledged goal. A prototype navigation satellite was built by the early 1980s but was never launched. In appearance the spacecraft resembles the Shi Jian 2 scientific satellite launched on 19 September 1987. The navigation system was possibly of the US Transit and Russian Tsikada class. More recent writings have indicated a desire to deploy navigation satellites by 2000. 36 A hand-held receiver compatible with GPS satellites, the VT 900, has already been developed by the Chinese Carrier Rocket Technology Institute. 37 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Partners bring technology and money to the table, both items the Chinese are seeking. China has been anxious to expand its cooperation opportunities with the US beyond the small number of space science projects already underway. In addition, efforts are underway to open up the defense R&D and production system to outside influences, especially in the context of increasingly friendly military-technical relations between China and Russia. 38 The US has been reluctant because of technology transfer concerns and regulations, as well as political pressure from those who want to take a tougher line with China. US businesses, however, have also been pressuring the administration to allow them to respond to the tremendous Chinese market potential. "The market is huge but US companies have a tremendous disadvantage compared to the Europeans, because of their ability to offer the kind of technology transfer packages that are restricted under U.S. Law...We have to find a better way to 'cooperate from a Chinese perspective.'" 39 This according to Thomas J. Dwyer, vice president for business development with Lockheed Martin International Ltd. Unfortunately, the things that the Chinese are looking for may be short-term advantageous for business but have potentially clouded long-term consequences. In January 1997, France and China began exploring a number of cooperative efforts in space, primarily focusing on commercial Earth observation and joint space science missions. On 16 May 1997 the Chinese and French Governments agreed to a broad cooperation accord on space research and satellite construction. The agreement came as part of a bilateral meeting in Beijing, believed to include Earth observation and space science missions. Earlier talks about launch vehicle cooperation were not mentioned. 40 China also signed a broad space agreement with Ukraine in June 1997. Specifics have not become known. Agreements with countries such as Ukraine and Russia are particularly worrisome because their financial situation and the need to prop up their own missile industries makes them amenable to selling technology which otherwise might not be available to the Chinese. For example, there is concern about attempts to purchase SS-I8s from Russia. "Russian technology transfers could facilitate China's development of advanced cruise missile weapons, and one has reason to question whether China can be persuaded to forego exporting them, the MTCR notwithstanding." 41 China says it is interested in purchasing SS-18s to improve their space launch systems, though for what purpose is unclear. It is clear, though, that it would likely not be for exploration or manned spaceflight in the near future, not with other more pragmatic issues to tackle first. As mentioned earlier, China is currently developing a remote-sensing satellite, CBERS, in partnership with Brazil. It is interesting that on this project, some of the most troublesome problems that came up were over Chinese concerns over unwanted technology transfer to Brazil and the legal arrangements. 42 Although the CBERS project inception can be traced back to 1985, with a launch date initially scheduled for December 1992, the project almost immediately slipped behind schedule due to difficulty with funding on the Brazilian side stemming from political turmoil in Brazil generally, and lack of support for the project specifically. Indeed it was not until 1992 that a secure funding commitment in Brazil could be obtained. Since then, estimates for launch on an LM-4B have ranged from early 1998 to the year 2000, with the earlier estimates likely now being the more accurate. The Chinese are particularly anxious to enter into joint ventures with foreign companies, for the multiple returns brought. Outside of Chengdu, a factory where the Chinese were making nose cones for McDonnell-Douglas planes shows the benefits to China such as technology and jobs. Another example involves the EuraSpace GmbH joint venture between Daimler-Benz Aerospace (DASA) of Germany and CASC. Euraspace will produce the Sinosat series of communications satellites for Chinese domestic use, with DASA providing the antennas and attitude control systems for the DFH-3 satellites. Created in 1994, the initial investment in the company was reported as $4.4 million, with the first Sinosat satellite to be launched in early 1998. That satellite will replace the DFH-3 that failed early in orbit due to an on-board defect. DASA officials estimate that a dozen satellites could be built through this joint venture arrangement, which also includes Aerospatiale of Paris. In return for the technology transfers from the European firms, they will receive satellite concessions. FUTURE TRENDS IN THE CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM Chinese priorities for the future in space will be pragmatic. In the civil area, it is highly likely that since commercial launches provide the funds to finance a variety of other space ventures it will be their number one priority. Reestablishing reliability must take immediate priority over new launcher development, with serialization of the LM then also remaining a near-term goal. Commercial satellites will likely also be supported and remote sensing capabilities expanded. Beyond this, everything becomes nebulous: manned space, reusable launch vehicle, planetary exploration, etc. In the military realm, the Second Artillery remains the favored child of the PLA, with emphasis likely to be placed on hardware with both modernization potential for them, as well as export sale. Cross utilization of technology will conceivably also not just continue, but increase. Indeed the DF- 15, for example, may benefit in the future from integration of Global Positioning System guidance improvements. Launchers. Until bookings for the Long March manifest are again on the upswing it can be expected that development of new vehicles will be put on indefinite hold or work slowed significantly. The Chinese have been working on a new oxygen/hydrogen vehicle. The first stage for the new heavy-lift (Ariane-5 class) booster is apparently just entering design. From Chinese descriptions, the technology is indicated to be similar to the sophisticated Ariane Vulcain and Japanese LE-5 engines. 43 Militarily, strategic forces are the number one budget allocation within PLA. They are moving from a minimum deterrent strategy, primarily in response to the Russians, to one of limited deterrence with more flexibility, including tactical weapons and neutron bombs, in response to both Russia and the US. There are concerns that China is trying to upgrade its ballistic missile fleet with foreign technology, particularly MlRVs. 44 That they have already successfully accomplished multi-payload launches is certainly a step toward that capability. Talk in the US on Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is very distressing to the Chinese, just as SDI was in the 1980s, as something they did not and do not have the technical ability to respond to, and therefore having the possibility of rendering the PLA arsenal virtually obsolete. Satellites. With telephone service available to under five percent of the Chinese population, telecommunications is and will remain a priority for Beijing. Plus, with the reversion of Hong Kong, China's investment stake in Intelsat, the world's largest provider of satellite-based telecommunications services, nearly doubled. Their interest now extends beyond Chinese borders from a business perspective. Government supported aerospace concerns are under constant pressure to generate revenue as both evidence of their utility and hence justification for government support, and as a supplement to the still decreasing amount of government support available. It is widely believed that the former Fifth Academy, now known as CAST, would like to build communications satellites for commercial sale. There are multiple problems, however, which will have to be first overcome. First, the desire to sell abroad for currency generation will have to be balanced with the need to fulfill domestic communication needs. This relates to the Chinese policy goal of taking their own domestic satellite market back from foreign domination. All three goals, hard currency, domestic communications, and market independence, contribute to the stability equation which pervades all policy planning. It is hence likely that government support for pursuing this objective will be forthcoming, with the understanding that the commercial sales aspect will take the longest to reach fruition because of the other obstacles to be overcome. The other obstacles are technical. The Chinese are not currently economically efficient enough to produce for the international market. Also, the satellite technology is moving so quickly in some fields, like solar cells, that the Chinese cannot keep up. For example, although the Chinese have done some very good work with silicon in that area, most Western industries have already moved on to galium-arsenide. This means that the Chinese would still have to buy major components from abroad, as is the case with the DFH-3, to keep up with the international market. This quandary of "which satellite" also reflects back to the internal CASC-MPT disagreement over whether to utilize a DFH design (built by CAST, favored by CASC) or a new design relying on Western components (MPT favored). Since CASC is known to have championed CAST before, in the Sinosat "competition," it can be expected that they will continue to do so. Whereas MPT is looking for satellites offering the highest possible performance, CASC is looking to provide jobs and perpetuate their own bureaucratic position, as well as satellite performance. This CASC-MPT disagreement about how to proceed in the future will be further complicated by the Global Mobile Personal Communications Satellites (GMPCS). Introduction of GMPCS services through such systems as Iridium, Globalstar, and others could be perceived by organizations such as the MPT as threatening its bureaucratic power base, and subsequently resisted. 45 Having China launch some of those satellites could mute some resistance from CASC, though whether that incentive would appease MPT is not as likely. China has had some success at producing space batteries and has long experience in that area. In 1992, Sweden first used Chinese nickel-cadmium space batteries in their FREJA satellite. Performance reports for the six ampere battery have been good and the Chinese have a second project with Sweden ready for launch (on a Russian launcher) in 1998. Brazil also purchased two solar cells for the Brazilian satellite DCS-2 from the Chinese Space Power and Development institute. In 1996, Lockheed-­Martin asked to look at the Chinese batteries for possible purchase. The Chinese indeed sent twelve eighty-ampere batteries to Lockheed-Martin in 1997 for testing, a considerable increase in capability from those used in FREJA. With this kind of technical encouragement, a case could likely be made for further resources as there is an identifiable potential for both near-term and long-term payoffs. Remote Sensing. Remote sensing is probably the prime area in which civil program efforts will foster added military benefits for the Chinese. Critical parameters and performance figures for the major subsystems and components frequently overlap or are identical in civil and military space systems, such as imaging systems which are moving toward higher resolution and faster data delivery. 46 For example, the commercial products of SPOT and LANDSAT satellites were used extensively in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm for broad ­area search and mission planning. Geographic Information Systems (GIS), comprising personal-computer hardware and very sophisticated software (e.g. AutoCad), now permit users to make very accurate digital maps with GPS data outputs. One can use such hardware and software capabilities for more than just preprogramming the route of a cruise missile. Better maps and commercially available satellite imagery allow third world states to develop better targeting by improved photogrammetric techniques. 47 China's plans are clearly ambitious. Their challenge is to match ambitions with resources and technology. Not surprisingly or nefariously, that will likely be their primary motivation for entering into any international cooperative project. China fully intends to build a military capability equal to that of the United States, but only after it has achieved a level of economic development sufficient to underpin its superpower ambitions. In the meanwhile, the military must improve its ability to defend China in the event of an unforeseen conflict, to enforce China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, and to carry out the forcible reunification of Taiwan with the mainland if called upon to do so. Although these are short-term goals in the grand scheme of Chinese strategic objectives, they will still require considerable improvement over a period of a decade or more. Once the PLA achieves these objectives, in the second or third decade of the next century, it will turn its attention to the broader goal of matching the full range of American military capabilities, particularly its advanced weaponry and long-range power projection capabilities. In the interim, the PLA is addressing some of the more technology-oriented aspects of 1990s-style high-tech warfare. It is investing in modern command-and-control communications systems, short-range ballistic missiles for the operational deep strike mission, improved air defenses, and night vision systems. Chinese publications also discuss the need for electronic warfare and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, but it is not clear whether they have developed or begun fielding such systems. There has been little discussion of intelligence processing and fusion systems such as the U.S. All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), or of dedicated communications links for intelligence dissemination. A central feature of current U.S. doctrine is the effort to give the tactical commander the clearest picture of the battlefield possible, down to the brigade and even battalion level. This requires high-capacity, robust communications links, standardization of data formats and transmission protocols, interoperability of intelligence communications among different systems and services, powerful information processing systems at the lowest command levels, and a commitment to the free flow of intelligence information to tactical commanders. Chinese interest in enhancing their space infrastructure directly contributes to advancing their progress toward an information-based military capability. Obviously, we know less about Chinese tactical intelligence than about many other subjects; nonetheless, available sources do not indicate any effort by the Chinese to implement such an elaborate and open intelligence environment. So the overall prognosis is that the PLA may achieve the kind of capabilities demonstrated by U.S. forces in the Gulf War, though it is likely to take at least 10 and probably 20 years for it to do so. Still, it is not so much a matter of available technology, or even creativity in the application of technology that could hinder China's realization of achieving an information-based RMA. The greatest impediment to China achieving an information-based revolution may in fact be its authoritarian political system. In America at least, it seems that the creativity and initiative that fuel the information revolution can only flourish in a permissive, free-market environment where the free flow of information is encouraged. China will, of course, obtain and apply information technology developed elsewhere, to include some significant capability to manufacture and modify systems for its own use. As long as the free flow of information is perceived as a threat to the political order, however, China is likely to lag far behind in the application of information technology. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. "Fast-track development of space technology in China," Space Policy, May 1996, 139. 2. Liberation Army Daily, October 29, 1995, cited in PLA Activities Report, Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General, October 1995, pp. 26-27. 3. Arthur Fisher, "A Long Haul for Chinese Science," Popular Science, August 1996, 37-39 4. Mark Williamson, "Chinese Space Show," SPACE and Communications, November-December 1996, 29. 5. Nicholas L. Johnson and David M. Rodvold, Europe and Asia in Space, 1993-94, Prepared for USAF Phillips Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117, by Kaman Sciences Corporation, Colorado Springs, CO, 15-16 6. Yanping Chen, "China's Space Commercialization Effort, Organization, Policies and Strategies," Space Policy, February 1993, 45-53. 7. Chen, 1993, 48 8. Michael A. Dornheim, "DF-15 Sophisticated, Hard to Intercept," Aviation week &Space Technology, 18 March 1997, 23 9. Yangping Chen, "China's space commercialization effort," Space Policy, February 1993, 46. 10. See: Mark Ward, "Exploding China's Dreams," Interavia, 16 March 1997, 14. 11. Although it is sometimes professed that these facilities were specifically built for the LM-2E as part of the Chinese manned space effort. 12. Michael Mecham, "China Plans Seven Missions for Long March Booster in 1997," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 November 1996, 25. 13. Michael Mecham, "China Displays Export Air Defense Missile," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 December 1996, 61 14. Chen, 47. 15. John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs," International Security, Fall 1992, 20. 16. The APT Yearbook, 1997, 307. 17. `Chinese Detail Small-Satellite Efforts," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 October 1996, 33. 18. Eight failures if the November 1995 launch of AsiaSat-2 is included. In September 1996 Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co (AsiaSat) sought $58 million from launch insurance providers citing damage to the satellite believed to have been incurred by a rough ride to orbit on a Long March vehicle. Patrick Seitz, "AsiaSat Seeks $58 Million on Insurance Claim," Space News, 16-22 September 1996, 3. The allegations have been disputed, however, and whether proven or not remains to be seen. See: Bansang W. Lee, "No Presumptions," Letter to the Editor, Space News, 9-15 June 1997, 12,13. 19. Simon Fluendy, "Up in Smoke," Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 September 1997, 69. 20. Mark Ward, "Exploding China's dreams," Interavia, 16 March 1997, 15. 21. James R. Asker, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 January 1996, 43. 22. Zhang Xinzhai, "The Achievements and the Future of the Development of China's Space Technology," Aerospace China, Sumer 1996, 25. 23. Zhang, 25. 24. The M11 is a two-stage, solid propellant fueled, second generation ballistic missile with a 300 km range and 500 kg payload capacity. R&D was begun on it in 1985 and a photograph of it was displayed at an exhibition in 1988. Lewis and Hua, 1992, 11-12. 25. Ward, 15. 26. Agila 2 had to expend extra fuel after launch to move 3,000 km to the correct orbit. "Agila 2 Uses Extra Fuel to Reach Proper Orbit," Space News, 8-14 September 1997, 2. 27. Gordon Pike, "Chinese launch services: a user's guide," Space Policy, May 1991. 113 28. The APT Yearbook, 1997, 307. 29. The APT Yearbook, 1997, 308. 30. The APT Yearbook, 1997, 308. 31. Wu Guoxiang, "China's space communication goals," Space Policy, February 1988, 43. 32. Presentation by Baosheng Chen, "Overview of the Chinese Civil Space Program," Washington, D.C., 3 June 1997. 33. Zhu Yilin and Xu Fuxiang, "Status and Prospects of China's Space Programme," Space Policy, February 1997, 70. 34. Further, in August 1987 and August 1988, two FSW satellites were used as a microgravity test platform for Matra of France and the German Aerospace Research establishment, respectively. 35. Craig Covault, "Chinese Manned Flight Set for 1999 Liftoff," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 October 1996, 22. 36. Xinhua News Agency, 13 February 1993. 37. Xinhua News Agency, 9 December 1992. 38. The content and impact of Chinese arms and technology imports are documented and analyzed in Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Search for "Superb and Secret Weapons," Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 39. Craig Covault, "China Seeks Cooperation, Airs New Space Strategy," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 October 1996, 31. 40. Space News, 19-25 May 1997, 2. 41. Gormely and McMahon, 156. 42. See: Jose Monserrat Filho, "Brazilian-Chinese space cooperation: an analysis," Space Policy, May 1997, 153-170. 43. Craig Covault, "Chinese Manned Flight Set for 1999 Liftoff," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 October 1996, 22. 44. Joseph C. Anselmo, "U.S. Eyes China Misile Threat, "Aviation Week & Space Technology," 21 October 1996, 23. 45. Steve Watkins, "Asian Nations Resist Opening Doors to global Phone Services," Space News, 15-21 September 1997, 4, 32. 46. Berner, 95 47. Dennis M. Gormley and K. Scott McMahon, " Proliferation of Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: Prospects and Policy Implications, " in Sokolski, 144


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