1.  THE PROGRESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES, SPECIFICALLY THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT), THE PROPOSED FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY AND THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (ABM)

The Arms Control and Disarmament Consequences of the Deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems

  The United States is choosing to develop a National Missile Defence (NMD) system to create an inpregnable shield against missile attack in response to the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. The aim is to counter the perceived threat of attack from "rogue" states such as North Korea and Iran. This threat is arguably minimal. Current plans also envisage the incorporation of spaced-based launchers to destroy ballistic missiles, leading to the militarisation of space. In addition there are proposals to deploy Theater Missile Defence (TMD) systems in East Asia and the Middle East, to provide protection in regional theatres of war. The Clinton Administration has set the end of June 2000 as a deadline to decide whether to proceed with the NMD system. The cost of the first phase of NMD is estimated to be $10.4 billion over five years, but the total cost of a full system could reach $100 billion. This would include space-based components and new radar systems.

  National Missile Defence systems against strategic missile attacks are hard to rationalise. No current threat justifies them and they are not cost effective—it would be far cheaper for the enemy to deploy more strategic ballistic missiles with multiple warheards than for the defenders to develop and deploy anti-ballistic missiles to attack them. These factors are not likely to change in the foreseeable future.

  Moreover, these plans violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the USSR and USA, which is meant to stabilise policies of mutual assured destruction on which American and Russian military postures depend. The ABM Treaty is widely held to be the cornerstone of Cold War, and post-Cold War, bi-lateral strategic stability. The US Administration is seeking to modify the ABM Treaty to allow the deployment of NMD. Moscow is opposed to any such modification. The controversy would spoil any chance that the Duma will ratify the START II Treaty. The Russian concern is that even a limited NMD could have significant capabilities against Russia's dwindling ICBM force and would, therefore, destabilise the US-Russian strategic nuclear balance.

The legality of Theatre Missile Defence systems

  This raises another issue as to whether the deployment of TMD systems would be legal under existing treaties. The 1972 ABM Treaty restricts the testing and deployment of ballistic missile defences. However, at the Helsinki summit on 21 March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that each side might deploy TMD systems if they do "not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and will not be tested to give such systems that capability". Under the agreement, TMD systems must not be tested against targets moving faster than five kilometres a second. As long as this restriction is obeyed any TMD system can be legally developed, tested and deployed.

  TMD systems fall into two categories: lower-tier TMD and upper-tier TMD. A lower-tier TMD, like Patriot PAC-3, Navy Lower Tier, MEADS and Arrow, designed to intercept ballistic missiles of ranges up to 1,000 kilometres (re-entry speeds of up to three kilometres a second) cannot intercept strategic missiles and has nevery been restricted by the ABM Treaty. Until the 1997 Clinton-Yeltsin agreement, there was much debate about whether upper-tier TMD systems that intercept ballistic missiles with greater ranges and re-entry speeds are allowed by the ABM Treaty. The Agreement removes any doubts. It is now legal to test and deploy the US THAAD system, designed to intercept ballistic missiles with ranges up to 3,500 kilometres (re-entry speeds of up to five kilometres a second). (For comparison, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 10,000 kilometres has a re-entry speed of seven kilometres per second.)

  However, under the 1997 Clinton-Yeltsin agreement it is not legal to deploy the US Navy Theater Wide System. The illegality lies in the fact that if upper-tier TMD systems designed to intercept missiles with ranges of up to only 3,500 kilometres are effective, they will also be capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with ranges up to 10,000 kilometres. This would "pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side" as forbidden in the 1997 agreement.

  In the words of the Union of Concerned Scientists: "Unless the capability of an upper-tier theater defense is marginal against theater missiles with a range of 3,500 kilometres (which the defense is designed to intercept), it will have an inherent capability against ICBMs. On the other hand, if such defenses are not capable of intercepting an ICBM, then they would have no or very limited capability against long-range theater ballistic missiles." This is why the development and deployment of upper-tier defenses is restricted by the 1972 ABM Treaty.

  The guidance systems employed can also determine the strategic capabilties of proposed TMD systems, This is because the areas defended by upper-tier theatre defences are determined more by the capabilities of the system radars, ground-based or ship-borne, than by those of the interceptors. In this context a 1998 Pentagon study concluded that the integration of the planned US Navy Theatre Wide system into the planned ground-based NMD system would add 600 or so Navy interceptors to the ground-based NMD system, producing a much improved system. The Pentagon argues that the Navy Theatre Wide system cannot intercept ICBMs, but this is based on the radar (called SPY) carried on the Aegis cruisers that will carry the system. However, if the interceptors are guided by the more sophisticated sensors deployed with the planned NMD system, such as the SBIRS-low space-based missile-tracking system of the up-graded ground-based radars, to be deployed with the US NMD system, then the Navy Theatre Wide system would have a strategic capability.

  The SBIRS-low satellite tracking system is designed for use in both TMD and NMD systems. In particular, SBIRS-low would transform the Navy Theatre Wide system from an upper-tier theatre system not a wide-area system capable of intercepting ICBMs that could augment, or even serve as, a NMD.

Russian and Chinese responses to an American NMD

  The Russian Duma has reacted angrily to proposed US amendments to the ABM Treaty. Russia is likely to respond to any abrogation of the ABM Treaty by the USA by placing greater reliance on its hair-trigger launch-on-warning doctrine, reducing worryingly short decision-making times whilst increasing the risk of unauthorised or accidental release of weapons. A Russian response is also likely to focus dwindling resources on enhancing its offensive nuclear capabilities in order to restore some credibility to is deterrent. This would involve slowing down the rate of dismantlement of its existing ICBMs equipped with Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Russia could also respond to an American NMD by equipping the new single-warhead mobile Topol-M (SSS-27) ICBM with multiple warheads, perhaps three MIRVs per missile. The Russians claim the Topol-M is equipped with counter-measures against a ballistic missile defence system—a lower trajectory and a booster rocket that burns for a relatively short time. These counter-measures would help the ICBM evade the NMD tracking system. Russia is apparently deploying Topol-M ICBMs at a rate of about 10 a year. Whether or not Russia could afford to increase this rate of deployment or to deploy effective counter-measures against a US NMD is another question. China may also react to an American NMD by expanding and modernising its strategic nuclear forces at a faster pace than currently planned.

NATO AND US NMD

  American plans for a NMD system are strongly opposed by NATO allies who believe that such a system would provoke a new arms race and erode European security. Western Europeans fear that a national missile defence would, by protecting the US, have adverse effects on the transatlantic alliance. European NATO states are much wedded to the principle of shared risk in which an attack on one is treated as an attack on all, a principle that has been the basis of NATO strategy ever since the birth of the alliance. If the US can retreat behind a missile defence shield this principle would be violated. They are also concerned about the fact that a new US system based in Alaska will have serious consequences for China that has deployed relatively few ICBMs. There is also the likelihood that a US system would set off an Asian arms race involving Taiwan and Japan. US encouragement to Taiwan and Japan to deploy missile defences may also provoke an arms race in the Far East. Ballistic missile defences may, therefore, destabilise regional and global strategic balances in a most serious manner. The British Government would be wise to oppose their development.

  Submitted by Dr Frank Barnaby, Scientific And Technical Consultant to Oxford Research Group. Dr Barnaby, a nuclear physicist by training, worked at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston (1951-57). He was Executive Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (1967-70) and Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1971-81).

1.  THE PROGRESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES, SPECIFICALLY THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT), THE PROPOSED FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY AND THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (ABM)

A Treaty prohibiting the production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: will it be effective?

  When the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (often called a cut-off treaty) gets underway, it is clearly important that the negotiators attempt to achieve the most effective treaty possible. An effective treaty would significantly strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. An ineffective treaty is likely to be counterproductive and may further weaken the regime. The effectiveness of a treaty will depend firstly on whether or not it includes existing stocks of fissile materials produced for military purposes and, secondly, whether or not nuclear weapon-usable civil fissile materials are included.

  As defined in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/75L, a treaty banning the production of fissile materials would, at a minimum, cover the production of weapon-grade plutonium (plutonium containing more than 93 per cent of the isotope plutonium-239), weapon-grade highly-enriched uranium (uranium enriched to over 90 per cent uranium-235), and uranium-233 for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or outside of international safeguards. A more comprehensive cut-off than this minimum one would include: plutonium of all isotopic compositions, (except plutonium containing more than 80 per cent of the isotope plutonium-238); uranium enriched to over 20 per cent in the isotope uranium-235; and uranium-233. This would include all the weapon-usable fissile materials.

  We then have two possible types of cut-off:

1.  A treaty banning the production of fissile materials in military facilities;

2.  A treaty banning the production of fissile materials in military facilities and the civil reprocessing of plutonium and the enrichment of uranium to more than 20 per cent in uranium-235. The scope of a cut-off treaty is therefore not only a matter of whether or not past as well as future production of fissile materials should be included, but also whether civil fissile materials should be included as well as military ones. Of particular concern is separated civil plutonium (reactor-grade plutonium) because it could be used to produce nuclear weapons. That reactor-grade plutonium can be used to fabricate nuclear weapons is recognised by nuclear physicists and was proved by the British who exploded such a device in 1956 and by the Americans who exploded at least one such device in the 1960s.

STOCKS OF FISSILE MATERIALS

Plutonium

  Currently, the world's total stock of plutonium, civilian and military, is about 1,650 tonnes. Of this, about 1,400 tonnes are civil plutonium and about 250 tonnes are military plutonium. About 90 tonnes of military plutonium are not currently being used in nuclear weapons, the rest is situated in nuclear warheads. The world's civil nuclear-power reactors are currently producing about 70 tonnes of plutonium a year[64]. Currently, about 250 tonnes of civil plutonium have been separated from spent nuclear-power reactor fuel elements in reprocessing plants, like the British Sellafield plant. The remaining civil plutonium is unprocessed and contained within nuclear waste. There is, therefore, about the same amount of separated civil plutonium in the world as military plutonium.

  Nuclear weapons can be manufactured from plutonium containing almost any combination of plutonium isotopes, although some isotopic concentrations are more suitable than others. All plutonium must be considered to be potentially nuclear weapon-usable, except for plutonium containing 80 per cent or more of the isotope plutonium-238[65].

Highly-enriched uranium

  The situation with highly enriched uranium is different from that with plutonium. The bulk of the world's stock of highly enriched uranium (about 1,4000 tonnes) is military; only about 1.5 per cent is civil. Moreover, the highly enriched uranium removed from dismantled weapons can be disposed of relatively easily by mixing it with natural or depleted uranium to produce low-enriched uranium for nuclear-power reactor fuel. Low-enriched uranium is not usable in nuclear weapons. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that highly enriched uranium is used to fuel nuclear-powered warships, a military use.

DIFFICULTY OF SAFEGUARDING CERTAIN CIVIL NUCLEAR FACILITIES

  A serious problem facing the international nuclear safeguards system, operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is that the most sensitive plants with regard to the diversion of weapon-usable materials—particularly uranium-enrichment facilties, plutonium reprocessing plants, and plants producing mixed-oxide (MOX) nuclear fuel—are impossible to safeguard effectively[66]. Using existing and foreseeable safeguards technology it is not possible for a safeguards agency to detect the diversion of quantities of weapon-usable fissile materials, which could be used to fabricate one or more, or even many, nuclear weapons. This is of serious concern to the verification of a treaty banning the production fissile-materials for nuclear weapons. For example, a commercial plutonium-reprocessing plant (like the plant at Sellafield) cannot be safeguarded with an effectiveness greater than about 98 per cent (some say 95 per cent). This means that at least 2 per cent of the plutonium throughput will be unaccounted for. Much of this uncertainty is connected with the uncertainty about the amount of plutonium entering the plant [67]. A typical plant will have a throughput of about seven tonnes of plutonium a year. About 140 kilograms of plutonium a year, enough to produce 10 or more nuclear weapons a year, will be unaccounted for. This is a major and fundamental weakness in the international nuclear safeguards system, a weakness which cannot be rectified and which will apply to any safeguards system.

CONCLUSION

  It is concluded that a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons would not be effective unless it puts under international safeguards the military plutonium and highly-enriched uranium already produced as well banning the future production of these materials. Moreover, such a ban will not be effective unless it includes the production of civil fissile materials, particularly civil separated plutonium, which can be used in nuclear weapons. The verification of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons would be much simplified if the treaty covered civil weapon-usable fissile materials.

  Submitted by Dr Frank Barnaby, Scientific and Technical Consultant to Oxford Research Group. Dr Barnaby, a nuclear physicist by training, worked at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston (1951-57). He was Executive Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (1967-70) and Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1971-81).

5.  THE UK'S ROLE IN ENCOURAGING NON-SIGNATORY STATES TO SIGN APPROPRIATE TREATIES AND IN IMPROVING THE MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS

  Nuclear weapons remain a predominant threat to the planet. Of the 36,000 in existence, 4,500 of these are still on hair-trigger alert and subject to accidental and unauthorised firing. The world came close to accidental nuclear exchange in January 1995 when a Norwegian weather rocket was interpreted by Russian command and control as an incoming US Trident missile, causing activation of the "nuclear briefcase" for the first time in Soviet/Russian history. Eight minutes into the 10-minute launch-on-warning decision-making timeframe the mistake was realised.

  The perceived strategic stability derived from the Cold War doctrine of mutually assured destruction has disappeared. In its wake we find serious instability in (i) the deteriorating Russian command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure (ii) the implications of proposed American abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and (iii) the overt nuclearisation of the Indian sub-continent.

  Although the United States and the Russian Federation are no longer locked into Cold War nuclear confrontation and have taken some steps towards downsizing their excessive nuclear weapon capabilities, they have proved themselves to a greater or lesser extent unfit, both politically and technically, to manage the complex of issues around nuclear arms control and can no longer be relied upon to steer the nuclear non-proliferation regime in a positive direction. Russian capabilities are severely limited by political and economic problems, whilst the credibility of declared US policy on a number of nuclear issues has been seriously harmed by recent US actions. The relaxation of international tensions and the arms control treaties of the early 1990s have given way to disarmament deadlock and a return to Cold War rhetoric against a background of continuing proliferation. This submission examines possible roles for the British Government as a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) and as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

BRINGING IN NON-SIGNATORY STATES INTO APPROPRIATE TREATIES

  The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in April 1998 represent the most direct challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. These tests were fuelled by an international structure in which the perceived political utility of nuclear weapons continues. Britain and the other NWS established this structure through the Cold War doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and continue to sustain it through their failure to fulfil their nuclear disarmament commitments under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The result is that power, status, and in the last resort survival, are all still seen as enhanced by membership of the nuclear club. It is this perception that strongly undermines the non-proliferation regime, and played a part in the Indian decision to test.

  This structure was endorsed in the 1999 review of the NATO Strategic Concept that reaffirmed the right to use nuclear weapons first in any conflict scenario. The perpetuation of this doctrine of first-use of nuclear weapons continues to legitimise possession of, and attach a high political value to those weapons, impeding non-proliferation efforts. It also invites proliferation of chemical and biological weapons as readily obtainable "force-levellers" to deter nuclear weapon state interference.

  Not only has this structure acted as a driver for South Asian nuclearisation but it will continue to act as a driver in other regions of the world. Hence continued possession of nuclear weapons by Britain as a politico-diplomatic tool serves to promote nuclear proliferation to the detriment of British security, and may reduce our international standing as we are seen as part of the proliferation problem, rather than as part of the solution.

  India, Pakistan and other non-signatories to the NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) argue that they cannot join a non-proliferation and disarmament regime that they perceive as discriminatory and against their security interests. The West has dismissed these claims and demanded that India, Pakistan and others adhere unconditionally to the NPT and CTBT. This approach will not result in nuclear roll back and lost all effectiveness following the US Senate vote on the CTBT.

  Only genuine multilateral steps towards nuclear disarmament by the established NWS that reduce the saliency of nuclear weapons in the international system will address these concerns and bring non-signatory states into appropriate treaties. Until then South Asia will remain one of several potent nuclear flash points with very real and re-current risks of regional nuclear exchange, with global consequences.

  Underlying such steps is a need to move away from the Cold War mentality that endures inside military bureaucracies in all the NWS. The persistence of such thinking is one of the main driving forces behind nuclear proliferation as it continues to prioritise nuclear weapons as the crucial element of national defence in a world very different from that of Cold War when the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was initially espoused. In the post-Cold War world global influence derives from many other factors, such as economic strength, trade and effective international peace-keeping operations. The possession of nuclear weapons is no longer a convincing indicator of international power and authority.

  In April 2000 a review of the NPT will take place at the UN in New York. This review conference is of particular significance as we approach a crossroads for the continued viability of the treaty. A significant number of Non-Nuclear Weapon States are dissatisfied with the progress of nuclear arms control and fulfilment of disarmament obligations by the NWS, compounded by the failed CTBT ratification vote in the US Senate. Further lack of progress at the NPT review in April 2000 and de facto recognition of India and Pakistan as possessing nuclear weapons may lead to the unravelling of the NPT, and the development of nuclear weapons by other states such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Egypt etc within the next decade.

LEADERSHIP: THE ROLE BRITAIN CAN PLAY IN STEMMING AND REVERSING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

  It becomes clear, therefore, that new international leadership is urgently required if we are to prevent further nuclear proliferation. Britain is in an ideal position to take this lead. Our position within Europe and the Commonwealth is strong, as is our relationship with the USA; we have the smallests nuclear arsenal of the NWS, and we have unilaterally done much in the 1990s to further nuclear disarmament. We need to build on this firm foundation.

  Unilateral British progress towards fulfilment of its duties under the NPT:

—  In March 1998 RAF free-fall gravity nuclear weapons were decommissioned leaving about 200 Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles;

—  The following month the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was ratified in Britain at the same time as France;

—  In July 1998 the Strategic Defence Review announced a downgrading in the normal alert status of Trident boats, extending "notice to fire" from hours to days;

—  Britain has set an example of transparency ahead of any other country by disclosing the size of our stockpiles of nuclear material and by Spring 2000 a complete account of defence fissile material production will be available.

  The NPT review conference in April presents an excellent opportunity for Britain to propose further measures in the same direction, in concert with other states. These could represent the first multilateral steps towards the eventual safe global elimination of nuclear weapons entirely in line with government defence policy, and encourage non-signatory states to embrace the non-proliferation regime.

  We identify four short-term measures that the British Government could realistically introduce:

1.  Take the lead in negotiations for a treaty to ban the production world-wide of the fissile materials used to make nuclear weapons. This would reduce the risks of proliferation and increase the transparency necessary for multilateral disarmament;

2.  Convene a conference of all the NWS to define how nuclear weapons world-wide can be taken off hair-trigger alert. This would immediately reduce the risk of nuclear holocaust happening by accident, making the world a much safer place;

3.  Promote negotiations to multilateralise the ABM treaty. This would prevent the collapse of this fundamental global safety measure;

4.  Within NATO, Britain could take the lead in the current re-consideration of NATO's nuclear policy, in the direction of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons in the international system;

5.  In the United Nations Britian could cease to veto Resolution No 54/54G "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world: the need for a new agenda", put forward by the new agenda coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) in 1998 and 1999. A text of the Resolution is attached. We invite the Foreign Affairs Committee to examine the congruence of this Resolution with current Government policy.

CONCLUSION

  Nuclear weapons disarmament remains an issue of vital importance to British and global security in the light of continuing proliferation. There is a need, and an opportunity, for the smaller NWS to introduce and support positive steps, both unilateral and multilateral, towards resolution of the global nuclear weapons question. The present British government is in an ideal position to take such a lead, which would find widespread political support nationally and internationally. This would be in line with Britain's good track record on promoting definitive international measures for banning chemical and biological weapons; to do the same for nuclear weapons would be both consistent and an example of responsible national leadership in a dangerous world. Britain would have far more credibility in encouraging current non-signatory states to sign the appropriate treaties by adopting a more pro-active stance rather than waiting for progress in fora that are clearly failing. Such leadership in multilateral disarmament would enhance our international status, prestige and long-term security whilst improving our relations with non-nuclear regional powers throughout the world.

65   Mark, J Carson, "Reactor-Grade Plutonium's Explosive Properties", Nuclear Control Institute, Washington DC, August 1990. Back

66   Berkhout, F and Walker, W, "Safeguards at Nuclear Bulk Handling Facilities", in Poole, J B and Guthrie, R, (eds), Verification 1992, Verification Report 1992, Brassey's, London, 1992, p 199-209. Back

67   Johnson, S and Islam, N, The "Current IAEA Approach to Implementation of Safeguards in Reprocessing Plants", Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Facility Operations-Safeguards Interface, 1991. Back