FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM The Committee on Government Reform has conducted an investigation of the President’s decision to offer clemency to sixteen FALN and Macheteros terrorists. Subpoenas were issued to the White House for documents, a public hearing was held on September 21, 1999, and this report has been issued. The Committee has reached the following conclusions as a result of its investigation: Some Within the White House Saw Political Benefit in the Release of these Terrorists. One of the key White House staff members during the clemency process wrote that the release of the sixteen terrorists would "have a positive impact among strategic Puerto Rican communities in the U.S. (read, voters)." Other notes produced to the Committee indicate that White House personnel believed that certain Congressmen would not vote with the President unless he committed to releasing the terrorists. Jeffrey Farrow, a key Presidential adviser on this issue, wrote in an e-mail: We should think about a meeting soon with Reps. Gutierrez, Velazquez, and Serrano on the Puerto Rico independence crimes prisoners issue. They have requested one with the POTUS but the options include the VP and John as well. The issue should be resolved soon – the petitions have been before us for a long time. The VP’s Puerto Rican position would be helped: The issue is Gutierrez’s [sic] top priority as well as of high constituent importance to Serrano and Velazquez. The Sentences Imposed Upon the FALN and Macheteros Prisoners Were Fair. The President and his spokesmen represented that the sixteen offered clemency had served sentences in excess of what they would now receive under the sentencing guidelines. This is not true. According to the United States Sentencing Commission, which analyzed this matter specifically, "the federal sentencing guidelines generally would call for sentences as long as or longer than those actually imposed, if the defendants had been sentenced under current law." Furthermore, less than nine months before the President and his spokesman made these statements, a senior Justice Department official informed a Member of Congress, in writing, "[t]he sentences are in line with sentences imposed in other cases for similar terrorist activity." Given the President’s divergence from the Sentencing Commission and his own Justice Department, the Committee believes he should waive executive privilege and release the information he relied upon to make his public representations. The President and His Spokesman Misrepresented Facts Concerning the Terrorists. The President communicated that the sixteen terrorists offered clemency were being held in prison "in effect by guilt by association." In fact, they were incarcerated because they had committed serious crimes and had been sentenced for those crimes. The individuals in question were not the non-violent wing of the FALN or Macheteros. They built bombs, were engaged in a wide-ranging conspiracy, and committed crimes that justified lengthy prison terms. There has been no suggestion that there were errors in the sentencing process. Those Offered Clemency were Violent Offenders. In the days after the clemency offers were made, the President made an effort, through his surrogates, to convince the American people that those offered clemency were non-violent offenders. For example, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, appearing on national television at a time when this issue was headline news (and therefore likely to be the subject of contemporaneous briefings), said "[t]hey’re not individuals who personally were involved in violence." Below are some examples of the "non-violent" offenders offered clemency by the President: Oscar López: An individual so "non-violent" that he wouldn’t renounce violence to get out of prison. In addition to crimes committed in furtherance of FALN goals, he plotted two escapes from federal prison. One was from Leavenworth Penitentiary and, according to a Victim Impact Statement, he "planned to blow up Fort Leavenworth with the most powerful plastic explosives known to the military, riddle guard towers with rounds from automatic weapons, and throw grenades in the path of those who pursued them. To achieve their goals, Lopez and Brown considered killing the inmates who threatened Richard Cobb, killing George Lebosky after they became suspicious of him, and killing firearms dealer Michael Neece to gain his weapons." He set in motion plans to obtain the following for his escape attempt: fragmentation grenades, smoke grenades, phosphorus grenades, eight M-16 rifles, two silencers, 50 pounds of plastic C-4 explosives, eight bulletproof vests, ten blasting caps to use with plastic explosives, 100 thirty-shot clips to use with automatic weapons. In L\ pez’ probation officer’s assessment, "[Lopez’] level of remorse, rehabilitation and positive regard for this court’s process is minimal, if not nonexistent. He demonstrates a sustained consistent commitment to the use of violence and weapons. He will use any means to gain freedom for the purpose of undermining the principles of the United States government. He has already determined that human life is expendable for this purpose." Juan Segarra-Palmer: In 1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that: "The [federal] district judge also found that [Juan] Segarra-Palmer had organized and taken part in the attack in Puerto Rico on a United States Navy bus taking sailors to a radar station, on December 3, 1979, in which two sailors were killed and nine wounded." Edwin Cortés: While planning Oscar López’ escape from federal prison, the following statement by Cortés was recorded by the FBI: "[y]es, but she [Alejandrina Torres -- another recently freed terrorist] has to have it loaded and cocked further back. If they have to shoot, they can shoot." Finally, the seditious conspiracy counts in the indictments of fourteen of the individuals offered clemency included the construction and planting of explosive and incendiary devices (bombs) at 28 separate locations. Those Offered Clemency Were Very Unlikely Candidates for Clemency. Prior to the offer of clemency to the sixteen FALN and Macheteros terrorists, President Clinton had received 3,229 requests for clemency. He had acted favorably on only three of these requests. The sixteen terrorists appear to be most unlikely candidates. They did not personally request clemency. They did not admit to wrongdoing and they had not renounced violence before such a renunciation had been made a quid pro quo for their release. They expressed no contrition for their crimes, and were at times openly belligerent about their actions. Some had been involved in escape attempts from federal prison. One committed parole violations and was re-incarcerated. Some violated prison regulations, including possessing a weapon and a key capable of opening handcuffs. The White House Seemed to Want Clemency More than the Terrorists. Notwithstanding the fact that the sixteen did not express enough personal interest in the clemency process to file their own applications, the White House appeared eager to assist throughout the process. Meetings were held with supporters, and some senior staff even suggested ways to improve the likelihood of the President granting the clemency. Overall, the White House appears to have exercised more initiative than the terrorists themselves. For example, it was a White House working group that suggested President Carter be approached and that a letter be requested. In another peculiar turn of events, a senior adviser on this issue appeared to coordinate a meeting with supporters inside the White House with a demonstration outside the White House. In addition, notes obtained by the Committee indicate that White House aides planned to identify "liberal supporters in key media outlets" in an effort to drum up more support for clemency. At the Department of Justice, the Deputy Attorney General at one point tasked the Pardon Attorney with calling a Congressional office to "see where we stood on getting" a statement addressing repentance. It is highly inappropriate that members of the President’s Working Group and the Justice Department would either organize outside support for the clemency or reach out to prod proponents of clemency to do things that made it easier for the President to find in their favor. Some White House Employees Thought the Sixteen Terrorists Were Political Prisoners. At least one White House employee consistently referred to the sixteen as "political prisoners." Given the crimes committed by the sixteen terrorists, it is disturbing that anyone, let alone a White House aide whose salary is paid by the American people, would deem these individuals to be "political prisoners." In addition, the Deputy Attorney General repeatedly described the sixteen individuals offered clemency as "nationalists," rather than terrorists. The Department of Justice Appears to Have Changed its Recommendation to the White House in Order to Help the White House. The first Justice Department recommendation to the White House appears to have taken an unambiguous stand against clemency. Later, in June of 1997, the White House recognized that the Justice Department still opposed clemency. In July 1999, however, according to a publicly reported leak from the Justice Department, a second report was sent by the Department of Justice to the President and no official recommendation was made. Instead, according to the Justice Department source, the report "contained what law-enforcement officials said was a more carefully worded analysis that presented the President with multiple options for each prisoner, from unconditional release to no leniency whatsoever." If this is true, the Committee is concerned that the Justice Department side-stepped giving an unambiguous recommendation. Law Enforcement Organizations Were Not Adequately Consulted Prior to the President’s Decision. The FBI was not aware that the President was seriously entertaining the petitions for clemency. In addition, the Bureau of Prisons was not consulted. Had the White House asked for a review of the prisoners’ recent telephone conversations, it would have found that several prisoners made remarks advocating violence. The Victims Were Ignored. Victims were unable to get meetings with the White House or Department of Justice. Some had tried to schedule meetings; they were simply rebuffed. Activists seeking clemency did get such meetings. Furthermore, while clemency supporters were updated regularly on the progress of the petition, victims were not even informed of the clemency decisions. The President’s Clemency Offer Worked Against Solving Numerous Crimes. Generally speaking, violent criminals offered clemency have cooperated with law enforcement prior to their being offered clemency. In this case, the President did not even make cooperation with law enforcement a precondition for an offer of clemency. It remains a mystery why the President would not use every tool at his disposal to solve murders, robberies and bombings. Furthermore, by removing any incentive to cooperate, it is now very unlikely that any of the terrorists will ever provide any assistance to law enforcement. The Clemency Decision Undermines the United States’ Position in the International Fight Against Terrorism. The decision to grant clemency to the FALN and Macheteros terrorists sends a clear message that our demands for severe punishment, and our willingness to mete out severe punishment for terrorism, can be hollow. Of greater significance, it sends a message of encouragement to terrorists themselves. The President Has Set a Different Standard for Terrorists Who Are United States Citizens. The FALN and Macheteros terrorists are United States citizens. While they have served lengthy prison terms, the President has supported even more stringent penalties for members of foreign terrorist organizations. For example, he directed missiles to be fired on the camp of Osama bin Laden and an alleged chemical plant in the Sudan. Furthermore, he has been more inclined to strike at foreign terrorist organizations, regardless of the fact that the members have not been convicted of violent crimes under the protections of the U.S. Constitution and criminal justice system. From the perspective of the Committee, it undermines our international war on terrorism if we set a standard for U.S. terrorists that appears to be different than that set for foreign born terrorists. If sympathetic lobbyists can win the early release of terrorists in this country, our position is undercut when we ask other countries to take a hard line on terrorists of their own nationalities. The Clemency Decision Empowered Two Dangerous Terrorist Organizations. As the FBI made clear in a written statement prepared for the Committee’s September 21, 1999, hearing: "The FALN and Macheteros terrorist groups continue to pose a danger to the US. Government and to the American people, here and in Puerto Rico. . . . The challenge before us is the potential that the release of these individuals will psychologically and operationally enhance the ongoing violent and criminal activities of terrorist groups, not only in Puerto Rico, but throughout the world." The President Should Waive His Claim of Executive Privilege. While he may be entitled to do so, the President should not continue to hide behind executive privilege. As many have done before him, the President should waive executive privilege and allow all citizens to gain a full understanding of what information he considered when he decided to release violent terrorists from prison.   I. WHY THE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATED THE OFFER OF CLEMENCY TO THE SIXTEEN TERRORISTS On August 11, 1999, President Clinton extended offers of clemency to sixteen terrorists incarcerated in federal prison. Prior to these offers, he had offered clemency to only three federal prisoners. Thus, offers of clemency to so many members of a terrorist organization came as a great surprise. In an attempt to understand the justification for the offers of clemency, this Committee subpoenaed documents from the White House and the Department of Justice. The President responded by claiming executive privilege over critical documents relating to his decision. In claiming executive privilege, the President refused to provide this Committee with material that would allow Congress an opportunity to see what recommendations were made to the President prior to his decision. Granting clemency to violent terrorists is a matter of national significance. When the lives of American citizens are endangered and the victims of violent crime are treated with contempt, the oversight function of Congress is never more important. This is particularly true when the President of the United States not only withholds information from the people, but also uses the immense power of his office to mislead. This, in essence, is what occurred in the aftermath of the recent offer of clemency to the sixteen terrorists. In such a situation, Congress is obligated to exercise its oversight authority. The White House would have the American people believe otherwise. On September 16, 1999, Presidential spokesman Joe Lockhart said: "I think anyone who looks at the Constitution and understands what it means knows that Congress doesn’t have an oversight role in this case." Mr. Lockhart is wrong, and one can only wonder what prompted him to make such a statement. As Mr. Waxman, the Ranking Minority Member of this Committee, stated at our September 21, 1999, hearing: "the President’s decision was, as he said, on each one individually. Whether he is right or wrong, we will have to try to get as much information as we can to make a judgment." Notwithstanding the President’s claim of executive privilege, this has been what the Committee has tried to do. Prior to the President’s offer to the sixteen FALN and Macheteros terrorists, he had received 3,229 requests for clemency. He had awarded early release to only three of these federal prisoners. This represents the lowest percentage granted by any President since 1900, the date the federal government began keeping relevant statistics. Thus, it came as a surprise that President Clinton would make sixteen offers at the same time, that he appeared to ignore all or most of the traditional criteria for exercise of the clemency power, and that he acted to benefit not just one or two individuals, but an entire terrorist organization. The Committee’s interest in this issue was triggered by two concerns. First, the explanations that have been provided by the President and his spokesmen have not been accurate. For example, on September 9, 1999, the President told the American people that those offered clemency "had all served sentences that were considerably longer than they would serve under the sentencing guidelines which control federal sentencing now." Two days earlier, the President’s spokesman stated: "if you look at even the mandatory sentencing guidelines right now, most of these people have served longer terms than they would have served if they were sentenced now." Ten days later, Mr. Lockhart reiterated this view when he said "their sentences were in excess of what would be given now for those crimes under the mandatory minimum sentences." Driving this point home, he continued: "[t]hey had already served sentences that exceeded what they’d be sentenced for now under the minimum sentencing guidelines which all parties agree are tougher than they were 20 or 30 years ago." The position taken by the President and his spokesman, however, does not appear to be true. According to the United States Sentencing Commission, the Federal Sentencing Guideline range for the convictions of the sixteen offered clemency would require a sentence of "at least 360 months to life." Thus, the Sentencing Commission indicates a minimum sentence of 30 years, which would be served without the possibility of parole. This contradicts the President and his spokesman. Furthermore, a senior Justice Department official made the following statement on December 21, 1998: "the sentences imposed in these cases were within the sole discretion of the federal judges who presided over them. The sentences are in line with sentences imposed in other cases for similar terrorist activity." A number of questions are therefore inevitable. What analysis did the President rely on? What were he and his spokesman referring to? Why won’t the President release the analysis that supports the position he has taken? These are the types of questions that suggest Congressional oversight. If factual representations are being made, and it is not apparent where the facts come from, there is significant cause for concern. Another major area of concern is the President’s statement that: "I did not believe they should be held in incarceration in effect by guilt by association." This point attempts to steer people away from the fact that those offered clemency were convicted of actual crimes and sentenced accordingly. The President’s spokesman, Mr. Lockhart, also supported the President’s argument when he said "the point we have tried to make is we – our justice system is based on you serve time for the crime you’re convicted of, not the crime people believe you’re guilty of." Earlier, Mr. Lockhart had made that point with even more emphasis: You know, we have a system of justice here. You know very well – you may not want to tell your listeners what these people were convicted of, but the justice system knows. The President’s decision was based on looking at the sentencings, the average sentence for crimes, looking at the mandatory minimum sentences that have come in subsequent to the incarceration of these people[.] These statements appear to be an effort to steer people away from the facts. To date, there has been no suggestion that there was any error in the sentencing of the sixteen individuals offered clemency. They were not imprisoned because they associated with criminals. They were not given lengthy sentences because they were close to people who had committed worse crimes than they had. In fact, with a few exceptions, the sixteen were the backbone of organizations that killed a number of people and planted over 130 bombs. But for their code of silence, a function of their complicity in numerous serious crimes, all FALN and Macheteros cases would probably have been solved by now. By freeing these individuals – and thereby removing all incentive for cooperation – the President has worked to guarantee that a number of murders will not be solved. Furthermore, the President has made no attempt to have Congress re-evaluate the statutory bases of the convictions. If the President genuinely believed the statutes resulting in convictions were unfair, it follows that he would ask Congress to change the law. The attempt to depict those offered clemency as a group who were less culpable than other FALN or Macheteros members ignores clear evidence, including videotape footage of some of those offered clemency making bombs. It ignores the fact that one of the individuals offered clemency planned two escapes from prison, planned to disable a guard tower with fragmentation grenades and gunfire, and approved a plan to murder a gun dealer. It ignores the fact that another individual offered clemency kept in close contact with the one FALN member who succeeded in escaping from federal prison. It also ignores a federal court opinion which states: "[t]he district judge also found that [Juan] Segarra-Palmer had organized and taken part in the attack in Puerto Rico on a United States Navy bus taking sailors to a radar station, on December 3, 1979, in which two sailors were killed and nine wounded." Indeed, the effort to portray those who were offered clemency as unfairly tarred by association with other more violent criminals appears to be a calculated effort to mislead people. In short, those offered clemency committed crimes, which resulted in appropriate sentences to lengthy terms of incarceration. Apart from basic misrepresentations about factual matters, it also appears that the President failed to take into account all sides of this issue. In fact, the President seemingly failed to take into account certain basic types of information that would normally be significant factors in the clemency process. For example, victims were ignored. The Federal Bureau of Prisons was not asked to review tapes of telephone calls to and from prison to determine whether individuals were remorseful for their crimes or might be future threats to the community. Even some of the alleged supporters of clemency turned out to be less than enthusiastic in their support. For example, Mr. Lockhart stated that "this is an issue that the Council of Churches, Cardinal O’Connor, Desmond Tutu and former President Carter have all urged the President to take action on." The implication of this statement is that those cited asked for clemency to be granted. This, however, is what Cardinal O’Connor recently said: "I did not ask for the release of the Puerto Rican federal prisoners called FALN." Similarly, Bishop Tutu did not call for the release of the sixteen terrorists. Rather, he wrote the President "I appeal to your office on behalf of my brother Bishop [of Puerto Rico] to consider clemency for these prisoners." This contrasts with what the President himself said about Bishop Tutu’s position: "Bishop Tutu and Coretta Scott King also wrote to seek clemency for the petitioners, since they had received "virtual life sentences" and "have spent over a decade in prison, while their children have grown up without them." Bishop Tutu did not make these comments, nor did he do what the President said he did. The misleading use of respected individuals to justify the clemency decision is another cause of great concern. The President also said he "refused to commute the sentence of Carlos Alberto Torres, who had been indicted by a federal grand jury in 1977 on explosive charges, was identified as the leader of the group, and had made statements that he was involved in a revolution against the United States and that his actions had been legitimate." If this was the standard used for not commuting sentences, it was certainly not applied in a consistent fashion. Others who were offered clemency do not survive the standard articulated by the President – they were indicted on explosives charges, some were described as leaders of the organizations, and they spoke in favor of revolution against the United States and threatened violence against those involved in the judicial process. Oscar L\ pez not only satisfied all the criteria for no clemency, he had planned a violent escape from Leavenworth Penitentiary. The President also stated unambiguously that "political considerations played no role in the process." Documents received from the White House indicate that this is not true. Although the President might maintain that politics played no role in the process from his perspective, it is abundantly clear that other White House personnel who were intimately involved in advising the President were well aware of political considerations and saw the political benefit of offering clemency to the terrorists. For example, Mayra MartR nez-Fernandez, Special Assistant to the co-chair of the Interagency Working Group on Puerto Rico, thought that the release of the terrorists would "have a positive impact among strategic Puerto Rican communities in the U.S. (read voters)." Other notes produced to this Committee show that the Interagency Working Group on Puerto Rico understood that the clemency issue had a significant domestic political importance. One set of notes makes the following point: [Congressmen and Congresswoman] Vel< zquez, Gutierrez and Serrano not voting with President on some important legislation unless he commits to release prisoners right after 1996 elections." Thus, it appears that the President’s statement that politics played no part in the clemency process is, at best, misleading. Finally, it is of some concern to the Committee that the President’s staff -- and the President -- appear to have arrived at the decision to offer clemency before relevant information had been received. The facts received to date make it appear that the decision to offer clemency was made regardless of facts, and that efforts were made once the decision was reached to help the terrorists in spite of their prior refusals to help themselves. Presented with misleading rationales for the clemency offers, this Committee has made an effort to provide the public with a full explanation of the factual background of this issue. The Committee has subpoenaed documents from the White House and the Justice Department, held public hearings involving interested parties and government officials, and prepared this report. The Committee also reviewed testimony presented to other Congressional committees. While the Committee recognizes that the Constitution confers on the President an absolute power to grant clemency to those convicted in federal court of crimes, the Constitution most assuredly does not prohibit Congress from exploring the facts of the clemency process and inquiring into the rationale for its exercise. Given the misrepresentations made in this matter, the Committee believes the President should rescind his claim of executive privilege, and make all documents previously withheld available to Congress and the American people. While he may be permitted to do so, the President should not continue to hide behind executive privilege. As many have done before him, the President should waive executive privilege and allow all citizens to gain a full understanding of what he took into account when he decided to release violent terrorists from prison.   II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On August 11, 1999, President Clinton offered a grant of clemency to 16 individuals convicted and incarcerated for their activities while members of clandestine terrorist organizations promoting the independence of Puerto Rico through violent means. The groups involved were the Armed Forces of Puerto Rican National Liberation ("FALN" or in Spanish, Fuerzas Armadas Liberacion Nacional Puertoriquena) and the Popular Boricua Army (Ejercito Popular Boricua), commonly known as the Macheteros. Throughout the late 1970’s and mid-1980’s these groups claimed responsibility for numerous bombings and robberies, causing a reign of terror in both the United States and Puerto Rico. The FALN operated in the continental United States, while the Macheteros were active mostly in Puerto Rico. The 16 individuals granted clemency were arrested and later convicted in three separate groups. The first group consisted of FALN members Elizam Escobar, Ricardo JimJ nez, Oscar L\ pez Rivera, Adolfo Matos, Dylcia Pag< n, Alicia RodrR guez, Ida Luz RodrR guez, Luis Rosa, and Carmen ValentR n. This group was tried in the Northern District of Illinois, in Chicago, and was found guilty in February 1981. The second group of individuals also was FALN members and was tried in the same district in Chicago in 1985. The three members were Alejandrina Torres, Edwin CortJ s, and Alberto RodrR guez. The last group of individuals was connected to the Macheteros and was tried in 1989 in Connecticut: Juan Enrique Segarra-Palmer, Antonio Camacho Negr\ n, Norman RamR rez Talavera and Roberto Maldonado Rivera. United States law enforcement first learned of the existence of the FALN on October 26, 1974, the date the group issued a communiqué taking credit for five bombings in New York. The communiqué stated: Today, commando units of FALN attacked mayor [sic] Yanki [sic] corporations in New York City . . . These actions, along with bombing of major department stores, for three consecutive days in late spring, and the dynamite blasts at Newark Police Headquarters and City Hall, demonstrate what we have said since 1969: that the Puerto Rican people organizing and arming in order to form a Peoples Revolutionary Army which will rid Puerto Rico of yanki [sic] colonialism [sic]. We have opened two fronts, one in Puerto Rico the other in the United States, both nourished by the Puerto Rican people and allies within Northamerica [sic]. At the time of the first attacks, law enforcement had no leads on who was involved with the FALN. Ultimately, over the next decade, FALN activities resulted in 72 actual bombings, 40 incendiary attacks, 8 attempted bombings and 10 bomb threats, resulting in 5 deaths, 83 injuries, and over $3 million in property damage. Similar to the FALN, the existence of the Macheteros became publicly known when the group sent a communiqué to the United Press International in which they claimed credit for the death of a Puerto Rican police officer on August 24, 1978. The goals of the Macheteros were complete autonomy and sovereignty for Puerto Rico. In order to achieve their goals, the Macheteros conducted an armed struggle against the United States Government, mainly represented through attacks on military and police, in several cases causing the death of U.S. servicemen. In a January 1981 attack, Macheteros commandos infiltrated a Puerto Rican Air National Guard base and blew up 11 planes, causing approximately $45 million in damages. The capture and conviction of the individual members of the FALN and Macheteros brought an end to the reign of terror in Puerto Rico and the United States. Although a few random assaults may have occurred, mostly in Puerto Rico, the continual assaults on New York, Chicago, and law enforcement and Naval officers in Puerto Rico virtually came to a halt with the capture of the individuals to whom the President has offered clemency. Every major law enforcement group has opposed the commutation of the prison sentences being served by these members of the FALN or Macheteros. A. The Capture and Conviction of the Individuals Offered Clemency After the first FALN communiqué, law enforcement agents worked diligently to identify who was involved with the FALN. The FBI formed a team of investigators that operated in the Puerto Rican neighborhoods in both New York and Chicago. However, it was not until December 1976, that they made any significant advances. Chicago police located an FALN "bomb factory" which led to the identification of several FALN members, including Ida Luz RodrR guez and Oscar LopJ z Rivera. All of those identified immediately went underground, leaving their previous lives behind. Although they were terrorists, planting bombs and conducting armed robberies, the FALN members also blended into the community as school teachers and government workers. They were difficult to identify because they literally led double lives. They had jobs and children and never told anyone, not even their closest family members and friends, that they were members of the FALN. One former FALN member, Freddie Mendez, explained that, "he and his codefendants and other members did not socialize with one another. He said that they came together only for official FALN activities and then separated. When apart they occupied themselves with work, school and socialized with friends who were not aware that they were in the FALN." History of the FALN’s Reign of Terror in Chicago and New York Although the FALN’s initial bombings may have been symbolic in nature, that soon changed. On December 11, 1974, the FALN called the New York City Police Department to report a dead body. When a policeman arrived at the abandoned tenement building to investigate, he walked into a booby-trapped explosive device. The explosion left him maimed and permanently disabled. The FALN issued a communiqué taking credit for the bombing, which they described as an "explosive attack against members of the police." The communiqué explained that the attack was in response to the death of a fellow Puerto Rican independentista, Martin Perez, in a Florida prison. Although the FALN characterized Perez’ death as an assassination, authorities found that he committed suicide by hanging himself in his cell. The communiqué warned: "[t]o make it clear, for every repressive action taken against our communities or against FALN independentistas, we will respond with revolutionary violence." Several weeks later, the FALN struck again in what they described as a retaliatory attack for a bombing in Puerto Rico. The FALN communiqué calls attention to their belief that the CIA had plotted the incident. Nevertheless, it is clear that the January 24, 1975, FALN bombing can be meant only to have caused death, destruction and injury, as they planted a timed explosive device to detonate during the busy lunch hour at New York City’s historic Fraunces Tavern. The blast killed four people, injured over sixty and caused extensive property damage. In the communiqué, the FALN stated, "[w]e, FALN, the Armed Forces of the Puerto Rican Nation take full responsibility for the especially detornated [sic] bomb that exploded today at Fraunces Tavern with reactionary corporate executives inside." The communiqué ended with the warning, "[y]ou have unleashed a storm from which you comfortable Yankis cannot escape." The FALN continued its attacks on what it considered "Yanki [sic] imperialism" with the bombing of four New York City buildings on April 2, 1975. The communiqué explained: The bombing of the Anglers Club: an exclusive millionaires [sic] club that boasts of members like the Rockefellers, was a retalitory [sic] attack against that sector of the North American ruling-class which is directly responsible for the actions of the C.I.A. and for the wave of repression which is being murderously implemented in Puerto Rico. . . . Our attack on January 24, 1975 was not in anyway directed against working-class people or innocent North Americans. The targets of our attack were bankers, stock brokers, and important corporate executives of monopolies and multi-national corporations. These are not friends of the working people. But the enemies of humanity everywhere [sic]. Shortly after the April bombings, in June 1975, the FALN carried out its first bombings in the Chicago area. They claimed credit for two bombs that exploded downtown. Another fatal attack occurred on August 3, 1977, in New York. The FALN placed a bomb inside the Mobil Oil employment office, and set it to detonate during the early morning rush hour. The blast killed one man and wounded several others. In addition to their bombings, the FALN, operating mainly in New York and Chicago, also began to set off incendiary devices in numerous busy downtown department stores. On July 12, 1978, a powerful explosion occurred in a residential building in New York City. The subsequent investigation revealed that the apartment was an FALN "bomb factory." Police discovered that the resident of the apartment, FALN member William Morales, was constructing a pipe bomb when the explosion occurred. Morales was seriously injured, losing portions of both hands and his eyesight in one eye. Examination of the apartment turned up materials linked to the FALN members who had gone into hiding in 1976: Oscar L\ pez-Rivera, Ida Luz RodrR guez, MarR a HaydeJ Torres, and Carlos Alberto Torres. Even as police were clearing out the New York apartment, incendiary devices that the FALN previously had planted ignited in several department stores. In addition to other evidence, the police found an FALN manual in the apartment. The handbook states, "The introduction of this set of rules and regulations is done in the interest of preventing errors which traditionally have allowed the enemy to strike death blows to revolutionary organizations." Among other suggestions, the handbook states that a guerrilla group "should start out with an operational army of no less than 50 strictly clandestine guerrilla fighters." Morales, who was injured in the July 12, 1978, explosion, was tried and convicted in 1979 and sentenced to 99 years in prison on state and Federal weapons and explosives charges. Several months after his conviction, Morales made an incredible escape from a third-floor prison room at Bellevue Hospital in New York. Morales had been transferred to Bellevue to be fitted with artificial hands. Prior to the surgery, Morales somehow used bolt cutters to tear open the steel security screen of the cell window and then shimmied down the three story, forty-foot drop. Federal prosecutors say that members of the Black Liberation Army and one of his attorneys assisted him in making his getaway. Morales escaped to Mexico, where he was later convicted of murdering a Mexican police officer. Mexico rebuffed the United States’ requests for extradition of Morales while he was serving out his sentence in a Mexican prison. Later, Mexican authorities allowed him to flee to Cuba, where he was given political asylum. He has never served the 99-year United States sentence. Morales remains in Cuba, and has petitioned the President to allow him to return to the United States. After the incident at the New York bomb factory, the FALN took some time to regroup. Law enforcement developed evidence that during that relatively quiet period, the FALN members had been active in other areas, including the invasion of the Oak Creek, Wisconsin Armory in January 1979, in order to steal weapons. During the operation, which ultimately was unsuccessful, FALN members held Armory employees hostage. It was not until October 1979 that they resumed their bombing operations. On October 17, 1979, the FALN took credit for simultaneous bombings in New York, Chicago, and Puerto Rico, where the FALN previously had not been active. They followed up with several bombings in the Chicago area about a month later. In mid-March 1980, FALN members took over the Carter/Mondale presidential campaign headquarters in Chicago, and the George Bush campaign office in New York. They were armed, and held several employees of the Carter/Mondale campaign hostage. The FALN members held guns to the heads of the employees, forced them to lie down, and then tied them up. They then ransacked the headquarters, stole files, and spray painted FALN slogans on the walls. Days after the invasion, the FALN sent threatening letters to approximately 200 Carter/Mondale supporters and Democratic National Convention delegates in Illinois. The Capture of the "Chicago Eleven" Shortly after the campaign break-ins, on April 4, 1980, 11 members of the FALN were arrested: Elizam Escobar, Ricardo JimJ nez, Dylcia Noemi Pag< n, Carmen ValentR n, Adolfo Matos, Alfredo Mendez, Alicia RodrR guez, Luis Rosa, MarR a HaydeJ Torres, Carlos Torres, and Ida Luz RodrR guez. The arrests occurred in two separate incidents on the same day. At approximately 1:30 in the afternoon, two armed men stole a truck from Budget Rent-a-Car in Evanston, Illinois. Luis Rosa was later identified as the main gunman at the Budget Rent-a-Car office. "At gunpoint, he ordered the personnel at the Budget office to lay on the ground and crawl, or be killed." The truck was seen in a parking lot at Northwestern University an hour after the robbery, and police waited for someone to approach. Soon thereafter, a man and a woman drove up to the stolen truck in separate vehicles, Luis Rosa and Alicia RodrR guez. As police officers approached the two, Rosa attempted to draw the loaded gun he was carrying. However, he was overpowered by the police. Police then apprehended FALN members Alicia RodrR guez and Luis Rosa, both of whom were armed. In addition, police discovered that the vehicles that the two were driving had been stolen at an earlier time. Police later determined that Adolfo Matos had driven the stolen truck to the Northwestern parking lot and left it there to be picked up by RodrR guez and Rosa. Matos and ten other members of the FALN were apprehended later that same afternoon in a residential neighborhood also in Evanston, Illinois. At approximately 3:15 in the afternoon, a resident of an Evanston neighborhood called the police to report some suspicious activity on her street. She had seen joggers around a van, but had seen at least one of the joggers smoking. At 3:30, the responding officers approached the van and spoke with Carlos Alberto Torres, who was then on the FBI’s "most wanted list." The officer did not recognize him, and explained that a neighbor had called complaining of "kids partying in a van." After some discussion the police officers were still not sure about the situation, and ordered everyone to get out of the van. One of the officers looked inside the van, but did not notice anything suspicious. The FALN members might have been permitted to go free if Alfredo Mendez’ false mustache had not begun to slip from his lip. The officers immediately realized there was a problem and ordered the three FALN women to drop their bags. As that occurred, a group of backup police officers rushed to the scene with their weapons drawn. The nine arrested with the van were: Dylcia Noemi Pag< n, Elizam Escobar, Ida Luz RodrR guez, Carmen ValentR n, Carlos Alberto Torres, MarR a HaydeJ Torres, Ricardo JimJ nez, Adolfo Matos, and Alfredo Mendez. Found in the van were 13 weapons, including a sawed off shotgun and several pistols with the serial numbers obliterated. The Investigation Law enforcement officials have two theories relating to the intentions of the FALN members that day. Some believed that the FALN was planning to kidnap wealthy industrialist Henry Crown or a member of his family, as the Crown residence was nearby. To support this theory, investigators found an intelligence dossier on Henry Crown in a New Jersey safe house used by the FALN. The other explanation for their presence in Evanston that day is that they were planning on robbing an armored car. At the time of their arrests, there was an armored truck carrying $200,000 in cash parked at Northwestern University’s loading dock. The authorities could never be sure as the 11 FALN members arrested refused to cooperate in any way with the authorities. They even refused to identify themselves and claimed to be "prisoners of war." As the law enforcement officials continued the investigation, they discovered that the FALN had developed an intricate underground operation. The FALN had set up safe houses in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Newark, New Jersey; New York City; and, Chicago, Illinois. Upon searching the various safe houses, investigators found, among other evidence, sets of false identification, fingerprints of the individuals arrested, and a list of the automobiles that had been stolen over the prior year. A search of the New Jersey safe house revealed a number of intelligence files on private individuals, including one on Henry Crown. The fingerprints of Carmen ValentR n, Adolfo Matos, Elizam Escobar, Carlos and MarR a HaydeJ Torres were found in the New Jersey safe house. Authorities also located a car stolen by the FALN near the house, although most of the documentation on the car was found in the safe house in Milwaukee, where the car was stolen. Authorities searched Adolfo Matos’ home in New York. There they found, "a pamphlet containing a chronology of acts of violence perpetrated by the FALN and other groups of the armed clandestine movement, as well as reproductions of the FALN communiqués which had been released claiming credit for bombings up to the date of publication." Identity papers for Ida Luz RodrR guez were found in Matos’ home as well. In Elizam Escobar’s home in New York, police found extensive lists containing the names and home addresses of various New York City police officers. Law enforcement officials also found a surveillance photo of an FBI agent. In addition, Escobar had maintained a personal calendar in code that included numerous FALN activities such as, "the escape of William Morales, certain bombings, the armed robbery of a Purolator truck in Milwaukee, and most interestingly, a reference to ‘little presents for the Republicans.’" The reference to Republicans coincides with FALN bombings of Republican campaign offices in New York and Chicago. The Milwaukee safe house was leased in one of the false names used by Ida Luz RodrR guez. Law enforcement fingerprinting showed that, at a minimum, the safe house had been used by Ida Luz RodrR guez, Dylcia Pag< n, MarR a HaydeJ Torres, Carmen ValentR n, Luis Rosa, Elizam Escobar, Oscar L\ pez Rivera, and Carlos Torres. The Milwaukee safe house contained a soundproofed firing range in the basement. A search of the house uncovered, "a plethora of FALN-related evidence, including proceeds of various Wisconsin armed robberies, FALN literature, disguises, proceeds of armed takeover of the Chicago Carter-Mondale reelection headquarters, and the original stencil of a threat letter sent to more than a hundred Carter-Mondale delegates[.]" In addition, investigators found a military manual that discussed weapons, explosives, terrorist tactics and past Puerto Rican acts of violence. Enclosed in that manual was a six page document which appeared to be some type of justification for what was called the "military action" taken at Fraunces Tavern in New York. The Trials There were 11 FALN members apprehended in Evanston, Illinois on April 4, 1980. One of those individuals, MarR a HaydeJ Torres, was transferred to the Federal district court in New York to stand trial. She had been implicated in the bombing of the Mobil Oil Building which caused the death of twenty-six year old Charles Steinberg. All 10 of the others apprehended were indicted in Federal district court in the Northern District of Illinois. In addition, law enforcement officials were still searching for Oscar L\ pez Rivera, who also had been named in the indictment as part of the conspiracy, and was considered a fugitive. Ten Individuals Tried in Chicago According to a document containing instructions for FALN members found in the New Jersey safe house, members were advised to, "make no statement if arrested and to declare themselves ‘prisoners of war’ and to demand a transfer to military jurisdiction." In each of their presentence reports the following description of the defendants’ conduct occurs: Each of these defendants, orally and in writing, since the time of their arrest on April 4, 1980, has claimed membership in a clandestine army and has claimed to be at war with the United States. Each has claimed to have been captured by the enemy while engaged in an armed action taking place in their war for independence from the United States. They chant revolutionary slogans, many of which are on court records ranging from, "Long live the armed clandestine movement" to "Long live the FALN." In short, they do not deny doing the things for which they have been charged and convicted. They do, however, feel that as captured soldiers in a revolutionary struggle, they are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and tried by international or military tribunal, or not tried at all. Based on this position, they have steadfastly refused representation to date, both in Chicago and New York, and they have witnessed their trials via loudspeaker and closed-circuit TV from their detention cells. They have made clear that they do not mind the imposition of lengthy prison terms because each believes that successful escape efforts will be arranged with the cooperation of the remaining members of their armed clandestine movement. As the defendants refused to take part in their own trials, the judge entered pleas of innocent for all of them at the arraignment. As part of the indictment, the grand jury charged the 10 defendants with constructing and placing explosive and incendiary devices at numerous locations, specifically listing 28 sites, including: six banks, six department stores, the Chicago Police Department Headquarters, the Chicago Main Branch of the U.S. Post Office, the National Guard Armory, two County Buildings, the Republican Party Office, the Great Lakes Naval Base, two United States Military Recruiting Offices, and the Illinois Naval Militia Building. The prosecution presented 30 witnesses and 65 boxes of evidence to the jury in the course of the FALN trial. In the end, the jurors deliberated only 2 hours before convicting all of the defendants of conspiring to overthrow the United States Government, as well as other charges. At the end of their trials, the defendants were brought before the judge for sentencing. The courtroom turned into a political demonstration; as the judge handed down the sentences, the defendants sang, shouted, and called him a "puppet" and a "clown." As she was being sentenced by the judge, Carmen ValentR n shouted, "[y]ou are lucky that we cannot take you right now. Our people will continue to use righteous violence. Revolutionary justice can be fierce, mark my words." Ricardo JimJ nez shouted at the judge, "[w]e’re going to fight . . . revolutionary justice will take care of you and everybody else." Dylcia Pag< n warned the judge and courtroom, "[a]ll of you, I would advise you to watch your backs." ii. MarR a HaydeJ Torres MarR a HaydeJ Torres, wife of FALN member Carlos Alberto Torres, was extradited to the Southern District of New York to stand trial for the bombing of the Mobil Oil Building in New York City which caused the death of Charles Steinberg. The New York prosecutors could place Mrs. Torres at the scene and link her to the bomb through fingerprint evidence, holding her responsible for one of the deaths caused by an FALN bomb. The Mobil Oil bombing occurred on August 3, 1977. Investigators were able to determine that a bomb consisting of two to three sticks of dynamite had been concealed in an umbrella placed on a coat rack in the employment office. Prosecutors explained how the bombing victim was killed, "[t]wenty-six year old Charles Steinberg was in immediate proximity to the coatrack, and the rear of his head was blown off in the explosion, resulting in his immediate death." The bomb was set to explode at 10:40 am, a busy time of the day when many people would be in the office. Very early on that morning, a young woman wearing sunglasses and a wide brimmed hat entered the employment office and asked to fill out an application. The woman began filling out the application, but inquired as to whether she was allowed to finish it at home. The receptionist told her no, and the woman left the application at the desk. Police were able to remove two fingerprints from the application and identified them as belonging to MarR a HaydeJ Torres. The FALN later issued a communiqué taking credit for the Mobil Oil bombing. In addition, investigators were able to determine that the dynamite used in the Mobil Oil bombing had originally been stolen from a construction site in New Mexico. Because dynamite is marked with a "date shift code" on each stick, the agents were able to determine that the Mobil dynamite was part of the same batch found in the FALN safe house discovered in Chicago in November 1976. Similar to the other FALN defendants in Chicago, MarR a HaydeJ Torres refused to participate in her trial and declared herself a prisoner of war. The jury found her guilty after a four day trial, and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. The group that originally petitioned for clemency on behalf of the FALN members, Ofensiva ’92, had also placed Mrs. Torres on the list. However, because she was convicted of an act that involved the death of another person, her name was removed from the list soon thereafter. Ofensiva ‘92 indicated that she would petition separately. iii. Oscar L\ pez Rivera In December 1980, FALN member Oscar L\ pez Rivera was indicted along with the other 10 FALN members in Chicago, Illinois. However, he remained a fugitive until his capture on May 29, 1981. L\ pez and a companion were in a car in Glenview, Illinois, when a police officer observed them driving erratically. The officer pulled them over and asked for identification, whereupon L\ pez produced a false driver’s license from Oregon. L\ pez first told the officer that they were looking for a United Parcel Service building, then responded that they were looking for a nice spot to eat lunch. When the officer inquired as to where their lunch was, they were unable to produce their meal. A back-up police officer stood next to the car and noticed a gun, pliers, wire connectors and field glasses in the car, along with a large bag. The officers then arrested L\ pez for the weapons violations and traffic offense. Investigators had determined that Oscar L\ pez had been one of the national leaders of the FALN since its first public acts of violence in 1974. In addition, they received information about L\ pez from former FALN member Freddie Mendez who testified about FALN activities, and Oscar L\ pez in particular. L\ pez’ presentence report summarizes the evidence against L\ pez and Mendez’ testimony: Lopez has been personally involved in bombing and incendiary attacks across the country for at least five years prior to Mendez’s [sic] involvement and knowledge, has been a prime recruiter for members of the underground terrorist group, and has been a key trainer in bombing, sabotage and other techniques of guerilla warfare. He has set up a series of safehouses and bomb factories across the country, the searches of which have uncovered literally hundreds of pounds of dynamite and other forms of high explosive, blasting caps, timing devices, huge caches of weapons and stockpiles of ammunition, silencers, sawed-off shotguns, disguises, stolen and altered identity documents, and the proceeds of the armed robberies of locations such as a National Guard Armory, Chicago’s Carter-Mondale Re-Election headquarters, radio and communications companies, as well as a variety of stolen vehicles. Ultimately, Oscar L\ pez-Rivera did not accept the President’s offer of clemency. He remains incarcerated. 1985 Chicago FALN Group On June 29, 1983, authorities arrested FALN members Alejandrina Torres, Edwin CortJ s, Alberto RodrR guez, and Jose RodrR guez (the two RodrR guezes are unrelated). The Government was able to locate and identify the group as members of the FALN through former FALN member Freddie Mendez’ cooperation with the government. Mendez previously had identified Alejandrina Torres and Edwin CortJ s as likely members of the FALN. Beginning in 1982, officers assigned to the anti-terrorism task force conducted surveillance of CortJ s, and determined that he periodically traveled to an apartment building on the opposite end of Chicago from where he lived and worked. They soon discovered that CortJ s and Alejandrina Torres were meeting in an apartment in the building. After further investigation, agents were able to secure court authorization to place a hidden camera and microphone in the apartment in order to monitor the activities occurring within the apartment. The apartment was known as the "Buena safe house," due to its street location. Eventually, agents discovered another apartment, known as the "Lunt safe house." Court-ordered surveillance was installed in that apartment as well. During eight months of surveillance, law enforcement saw and overheard the four FALN members plan and commit various criminal act The Safe Houses Investigators found that FALN member Edwin CortJ s rented the Buena safe house under a fictitious name, and paid the rent by money order. In order to begin their surveillance of the apartment, microphones were installed on January 19, 1983, and video equipment was installed soon thereafter. After only a month of surveillance, agents observed Alejandrina Torres and Edwin CortJ s "cleaning weapons and handling bomb paraphernalia." Federal agents secured another warrant to search the apartment. They conducted their search in the middle of the night on March 9, 1983, and found, "thousands of rounds of ammunition, 24 blasting caps, detonating cord, dynamite, four weapons, false identification and wigs." In addition, under the floor of a kitchen cabinet, they found a map of the Leavenworth prison drainage system. To allow their surveillance to continue, the agents substituted false explosives for the real and disabled the weapons found inside the apartment. Like the Buena apartment, the Lunt safe house was rented under a fictitious name, and Alejandrina Torres delivered a money order to pay the rent. At the beginning of April 1983, the government installed microphones and video equipment. When the government searched the Lunt house, agents found bomb accessories, revolvers, and other weapons. Authorities identified the characteristics of the bomb paraphernalia as the signature of the FALN. Plans for Prison Breaks At the time the authorities were observing the safe houses, they discovered plans to break out of prison two FALN members who had been convicted in the 1981 Chicago cases, Oscar L\ pez and Luis Rosa. L\ pez and Rosa were serving out their sentences at Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary in Kansas and Pontiac State Prison in Illinois, respectively. The first attempt was planned for March 18, 1983, when Oscar L\ pez was scheduled to have x-rays taken at a veterans’ hospital near Leavenworth. Once they discovered the plans, agents kept constant surveillance on the FALN members. Five days before the scheduled transfer of L\ pez, Edwin CortJ s picked up a stolen rental car. The following evening, CortJ s, Torres, and another unidentified individual reviewed the layout and security of the veterans’ hospital and inspected their guns. Edwin CortJ s was heard on the surveillance tape, "[y]es, but she [Torres] has to have it loaded and cocked further back. If they have to shoot, they can shoot." When the authorities learned of the plan, they notified the warden at Leavenworth, who canceled L\ pez’ scheduled transfer. However, Torres and CortJ s, along with the unidentified accomplice, were unaware of the change in plans. On the morning of March 18th, they showed up, in disguises and bulletproof vests, and waited at the entrance to the hospital. Dejected, they eventually left and drove to an apartment they had rented in Kansas City under a false name. The next day the trio returned to the Buena safe house and conspired to break Luis Rosa out of the Pontiac prison. There they studied a copy of the official prison escape response plan. In addition, they went to the trouble of renting an apartment in the town next to the Pontiac prison. Unfortunately for them, authorities had already notified the warden of the plan. Luis Rosa was transferred to Joliet State Prison on March 22nd, the same day the apartment was rented. Surveillance tapes of the Buena safe house made on March 23rd captured Torres and CortJ s complaining of changes made the day before. Plans to Rob the Chicago Transit Authority Shortly after their failed plans to break their former comrades out of prison, Edwin CortJ s and Alberto RodrR guez met several times at the Lunt safe house to discuss a plan to rob a Chicago Transit Authority fare collector. They discussed which lines would be best to hit, and explored the security and layout of the stops and trains. At one point, they discussed what to do about the guards, and Alberto RodrR guez suggested that they, "hit him upside the head" or that they might have to "shoot the guard, which makes a noise." Surveillance indicated that the group had chosen a train stop. CortJ s examined the location carefully, and Alberto RodrR guez showed up there several nights later to do the same. Intending to scare him, a plainclothes team of agents pulled RodrR guez over for questioning. Indeed, an intercepted phone call from CortJ s to Torres told authorities that they had been effective in stopping the plan. CortJ s explained that, "‘the study we were doing on the train had to be canceled when the police stopped ‘the comrade’ in front of ‘the place where it was going to be done.’" The Plan to Assist FALN Fugitive William Morales Although William Morales had escaped from police custody in 1979 and fled the U.S. to Mexico, he remained active in the FALN. According to Morales, he planned the bombings in New York City on New Year’s Eve 1983. In the Spring of 1983, Torres and CortJ s spoke about the need to find their friend "Jorge" a place to live, but worried about the visibility of his disfigured hands. Authorities soon determined that "Jorge" was actually William Morales. By the end of April, CortJ s and Torres had plans to move "Jorge" out of the country in June. They actually placed a call to Morales in Mexico, from which authorities were able to trace his location. Morales told CortJ s and Torres to call him back on May 26, 1983, at the same location. On the designated date, Mexican authorities captured Morales after a gunfight that left a police officer and two of Morales’ companions dead. The day after Morales was arrested, CortJ s and Alberto RodrR guez packed up the contents of the Buena safe house, and moved everything to the Lunt safe house. Plans for Bombings In June 1983, the four FALN members made plans to bomb military facilities in the Chicago area. They drove to various sites and discussed the layout and suitability of different facilities. On June 1, 1983, as they discussed the different military targets, CortJ s was teaching Alberto RodrR guez how to put together a bomb as they sat around the kitchen table in the Lunt safe house. CortJ s told RodrR guez, "[u]sually we don’t show everybody that’s in the organization the way this is done. . . this technique. We’re the only ones that use it. Nobody else uses this. You have to be careful who we show this." On June 28, 1983, CortJ s met individually with Torres and Alberto RodrR guez. That day CortJ s inventoried the bombmaking accessories located at the safe house. In addition, CortJ s and Torres drafted a communiqué which stated, "[w]e warn both governments that failures to respect the human rights and physical well being will be met with the revolutionary violence of our people." CortJ s indicated that all was ready for the bombs to be placed. He and Alberto RodrR guez drew maps and diagrams of the targets and prepared the blasting caps and explosives. Fortunately, they did not get a chance to place the bombs. On June 29, 1983, agents arrested all four FALN members. The Trial The four FALN members were charged with seditious conspiracy, various weapons charges and conspiring to obstruct commerce by robbery. Similar to the earlier FALN trial, Torres, CortJ s, and Alberto RodrR guez all declared themselves "prisoners of war." However, unlike the other members, they did participate in various phases of their trial and even made closing arguments to the jury. The newest recruit to the FALN, Jose RodrR guez, put on a defense. He sat at a table separate from the others and denied affiliation with the FALN, yet admitted that he supported its tactics and goals. Torres, CortJ s, and Alberto RodrR guez openly admitted that, "they believed violence was a morally acceptable and legitimate tool and the only one available, to free their homeland from American dominance." A jury found all four guilty of at least some of the charges brought against them. The Macheteros’ Activities in Puerto Rico The Macheteros, a terrorist group whose goal is the independence of Puerto Rico from the United States, literally translates as "the machete wielders." The group generally carries out its terrorist activities within Puerto Rico, and the name bespeaks the violence for which they are known. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh discussed threats to the United States’ security, stating that, "[t]he EPB-Macheteros has been the most active and violent of the Puerto Rican-based terrorist groups since it emerged in 1978." The Macheteros finance their operations through robberies, the largest being the September 12, 1983, robbery of Wells Fargo. During that operation, the Macheteros stole $7.2 million dollars, the largest armored car robbery at the time. Authorities in Connecticut, where the robbery occurred, brought indictments against 19 individuals involved in the planning and execution of the robbery, as well as the transportation of the money after the fact. Several of the individuals involved in the Wells Fargo robbery remain fugitives. Of those individuals convicted, President Clinton offered commutations or remissions of fines to four: Juan Segarra-Palmer, Norman RamR rez-Talavera, Roberto Maldonado-Rivera, and Antonio Camacho-Negr\ n. The President commuted the sentence of Juan Segarra-Palmer and remitted his fine. Antonio Camacho Negr\ n reached his mandatory release date and was released from prison under conditions of parole. He refused to abide by those conditions, therefore his parole was revoked. Because of these circumstances, the President offered only to remit the fine of Antonio Camacho-Negr\ n. Camacho-Negr\ n refused the offer, and remains in prison. The President remitted the fines of the remaining two individuals convicted for their involvement in the Wells Fargo robbery, Norman RamR rez-Talavera and Roberto Maldonado-Rivera. The first terrorist act for which the Macheteros took credit was the murder of a San Juan policeman in August 1978. Authorities later determined that the group had robbed at least two banks prior to the murder. Ultimately, the Macheteros were responsible for a wave of terror in Puerto Rico that left five dead and caused many millions of dollars in damages. Perhaps one of the more violent acts perpetrated by the Macheteros, was the December 1979 attack on a U.S. Navy bus near Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico, that left two dead and ten wounded. At the time of the attack, the bus was carrying 18 Navy enlisted personnel to a communications transmitter on the eastern end of Puerto Rico. A Macheteros communiqué claiming credit for the attack indicated that it was in reprisal for the death of an independentista in a Florida prison. However, authorities ruled the prison death a suicide after they found the prisoner had hanged himself in his cell. Former Macheteros member Carlos RodrR guez implicated Juan Segarra Palmer, who was granted clemency by the President, in the attack on the Navy bus. RodrR guez told authorities that he attended a Macheteros meeting in mid-November 1979 at which Segarra made an announcement that the Macheteros would attack a Navy bus. The group had discussed attacking other military institutions; however, it dismissed those plans in favor of the Navy bus. Segarra planned and instructed others on the operation, including the orders to shoot at the bus from a moving vehicle, while blocking the bus with another vehicle. The Macheteros met three weeks after the attack to discuss the operation. During the meeting Segarra evaluated the attack, and commented that "while the operation had resulted in two dead, he felt the results should have been more severe." The Macheteros continued to use the ambush effectively. In March 1980, the Macheteros attacked and wounded three U.S. Army officers on their way to the University of Puerto Rico, Rio Pedras Campus, to participate in ROTC activities. In January 1981, the Macheteros claimed responsibility for the bombing of 11 Air National Guard planes, causing $45 million in damages. Segarra, who was granted clemency by the President, implicated himself in the bombing during a conversation with Macheteros leader Filiberto Ojeda Rios: You know, if, if I had to choose the, the three or four people that are really responsible for the Gaviota happening and, and happening the way it happened, right? Successful and making it happen, I would pick four people. I would say, Frank, okay? I would say you, Jumbo and I. In addition, a surveillance tape at the MuZ iz Air Base captured Segarra and two others on the base the night of the bombing. In 1985, the Macheteros took responsibility for the ambush attack on Army Major Michael Snyder as he was riding to work the morning of November 6, 1985. Major Snyder was riding his motor scooter to the base when two men on motorcycles pulled along side him. One of the men pulled out a gun and shot him twice, seriously wounding Snyder. In claiming responsibility, the Macheteros explained that the attack was a reprisal for FBI Director William Webster’s visit to Puerto Rico two days earlier. The Macheteros have engaged in numerous other violent acts, including more recent attacks. Some of the more violent acts which they carried out were: the ambush of four U.S. Navy personnel in retaliation for an exercise performed by the Navy in 1982, in which one member of the Navy was killed; a 1983 robbery of a Wells Fargo truck in Villa Fontana in which one civilian was killed, and; a 1983 robbery of a Wells Fargo truck at San Roberto, Rio Pedras, Puerto Rico, in which the driver of the Wells Fargo truck was killed. The Macheteros have also been active recently. On March 31, 1998, they claimed responsibility for the bombing of the superaqueduct at Arecibo, Puerto Rico. According to a statement by the Macheteros, the attack was in retaliation for "environmental aggression," and was "only the beginning of what from now on will constitute a line of action in defense of our country." The Macheteros also took responsibility for the June 9, 1998, attacks on two branches of the Banco Popular. The Macheteros set off a bomb at the first branch while they conducted a drive-by shooting of the second branch. The Macheteros claimed that the attacks were to show support for the telephone company strike. The Wells Fargo Robbery and Macheteros Convictions On August 30, 1985, FBI agents in Puerto Rico arrested 12 people in Puerto Rico and 2 people in the continental United States in connection with the Macheteros 1983 robbery of $7.2 million from a Wells Fargo armored car in Connecticut. Over 200 agents served 30 search warrants that day in the investigation of the Macheteros, who earlier had claimed credit for the robbery. The FBI indicated that their investigation spanned over 20 months and involved numerous "wiretaps on suspects [sic] homes, cars, phones, nearby pay phones, and a motor home." Ultimately, indictments were brought in Connecticut against 19 individuals associated with the Macheteros for their respective roles in the conspiracy to rob the armored car and later transport the funds. The Robbery Prosecutors described the circumstances under which the Wells Fargo robbery in Connecticut took place: On September 12, 1983, between 9:30 and 11:00 p.m., Wells Fargo guard and co-defendant Victor Manuel Gerena, returned to the Wells Fargo depot in West Hartford, Connecticut after completing his days work, removed a revolver from his co-worker’s holster, placed it to his head and tied him up. He then subdued a second employee, hog-tied him, injected both co-workers with a sleep-inducing substance, and fled with more than seven million dollars. It was not until October 19, 1984, that the Macheteros took credit for the robbery. The group waited to issue its communiqué until all of the money was safely out of the United States and in the Macheteros’ possession, "in a state of maximum security." The communiqué described the robbery as a "military-economic operative" to earn money for the "revolutionary movement[]." It further explained, "in the same manner in which we have seized seven million dollars from the very bowels of American imperialism, the organized force of the Puerto Rican people will know how, in its own time to seize the liberty which will allow us to choose our destiny as a people." According to the communiqué, the actual planning and execution of the Wells Fargo robbery took one and one half years to complete. Integral in that planning was Juan Segarra-Palmer. Segarra was known as the Macheteros’ "Harvard educated thinker," who was responsible for much of the planning involved in Macheteros’ actions. During its lengthy investigation, the FBI was able to untangle the connections and roles of all the individuals involved. They began with information they found in a search while investigating a separate Macheteros offense. In a Macheteros safehouse they found a cache of weapons along with organizational materials describing the manner in which the group was organized, "safe" meeting places, storage facilities, training grounds, and workshops. The documents disclosed that the Macheteros were formed in 1976 with their leader Filiberto Ojeda Rios, and that the group operated through a system of complicated cells. Armed with that information, the FBI was able to secure wiretaps on the homes of Filiberto Ojeda Rios, his car, three public telephones across the street from Ojeda’s residence, the residence of Juan Segarra-Palmer, and the public telephones outside Segarra-Palmer’s residence. Through these sources, authorities learned that Ojeda and Segarra were leaders of the Macheteros and had planned not only the Connecticut Wells Fargo robbery, but numerous other attacks as well. The Investigation and Indictments After developing its evidence, the government was able to secure the cooperation of several witnesses who had been close to Segarra and other Macheteros members. Notably, an associate of Segarra’s, Kenneth Cox, testified that Segarra told him that he committed the Wells Fargo robbery. According to Segarra’s account to Cox, on the night of the robbery Victor Gerena was taken on a motorcycle from Hartford, Connecticut to Springfield, Massachusetts. Shortly thereafter, Gerena was moved to Boston and ultimately to Mexico while hidden in a secret compartment in a motor home. The money, which in total weighed 1,150 pounds, was transported in cars to Springfield. The FBI was able to tie Segarra both to the transfer of Gerena and the money. A woman who was identified as Segarra’s ex-lover, Anne Gassin, also cooperated with the government in its case against the Macheteros. Gassin stated that Segarra told her, "his role in the robbery was to time the different escape routes away from the Wells Fargo depot." His primary role thereafter was to get the money out of the United States. Segarra and Ojeda purchased a motor home that they customized with secret compartments to house Victor Gerena and a substantial amount of the stolen money while crossing the border into Mexico. After his first trip, Segarra made a second trip to Mexico in March 1984. He drove the motor home across the border to Mexico, transporting $2,024,000 of the stolen cash. In September 1984, Segarra bought a new motor home. He and Antonio Camacho-Negr\ n, who was also offered a grant of clemency by the President, worked to customize it in order to hide cash. On September 21, 1983, Segarra, Camacho, and a woman from Puerto Rico drove the motor home to Mexico. On October 19, 1984, with the money safely outside of the United States, the Macheteros claimed responsibility for the robbery. Antonio Camacho Negr\ n’s role in the conspiracy was to "help Segarra conceal the money inside the vehicle." Camacho did, in fact, assist Segarra in building the special panels to hide the money inside the motor home. In addition, Segarra told Anne Gassin that, "Camacho had done this sort of thing before and was skilled in that type of work." In fact, FBI agents first discovered Camacho and his role in the Macheteros when he was seen at a safe house used by Filiberto Ojeda Rios. At the time, he was driving a vehicle known as a Macheteros "safe vehicle." After his identification, FBI agents were able to trace his membership in the Macheteros to July 1984. Documents seized from the Macheteros bookkeeper provided further information into Camacho’s activities. The documents show that "Roco," Camacho’s codename, was a full-time member of the Macheteros in December 1984 and was paid a monthly salary of $600. In addition, minutes of Macheteros meetings show that "Roco" was present when problems during the Wells Fargo robbery were discussed, and actively participated in the conversation. Roberto Maldonado Rivera also participated in the transportation of the Wells Fargo money across the border from the United States to Mexico. Maldonado was responsible for driving the back-up vehicle as Segarra drove the motor home across the border into Mexico on September 22, 1984. Macheteros documents showed that Maldonado, whose "codenames" were "Joaquin," "Jan," or "Jean," had been affiliated with Filiberto Ojeda Rios and other members of the Macheteros since 1970. "A letter sent from the members of ‘Zone 1’ of Los Macheteros to ‘comrades,’ dated April 13, 1985, stated that ‘Jean’ joined the organization in 1977, was expelled in 1978, and rejoined in 1984 giving him a total of two to three years as a member." After rejoining the Macheteros, Maldonado took on significant responsibilities, including membership in the Central Committee, which established Macheteros policies, and the Directive Committee, which implemented those policies. In 1985, similar to Camacho, Maldonado was a salaried member of the Macheteros, paid $500 per month. Norman RamR rez Talavera was an active member of the Macheteros as well. After the robbery, the Macheteros used a small portion of the stolen money to buy toys for Three Kings Day. RamR rez participated in the toy giveaway funded through the stolen Wells Fargo money. RamR rez actually purchased about $5,600 in toys from a ‘Toys R Us’ in Connecticut, using the Wells Fargo funds. He also dressed up as a "King" to distribute the toys and $20 dollar bills in Hartford. RamR rez first came to the attention of the FBI when he was observed traveling frequently with Segarra’s wife. Macheteros documents showed that RamR rez was a salaried member of the Macheteros since June 1980. However, other records show that RamR rez was a general member in 1978, and was listed under "Approved Comrades for Military Action" since July 1979. The Trials and Convictions After he was found guilty by a jury, Juan Segarra-Palmer submitted a statement regarding his actions in the Wells Fargo robbery: I planned and organized the receipt and transportation of the money after it was taken from the Wells Fargo depot and the subsequent toy giveaways in Hartford and Puerto Rico on January 6, 1985. I consider my acts part of the struggle against colonialism and for the self-determination of Puerto Rico and therefore political offenses, not crimes . . . . Segarra did not acknowledge that he had prior knowledge, and in fact planned the Wells Fargo robbery. The judge and jury found differently, and Segarra was sentenced to 65 years in prison and given a $500,000 fine. President Clinton offered both to commute his sentence and remit his fine. Segarra accepted the President’s offer, although under the conditions of clemency, he continues to serve some portion of his sentence. Antonio Camacho-Negr\ n, represented by court appointed counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges leveled in the Connecticut indictment. During his trial, Camacho was asked about the violent activities associated with the Macheteros, in particular the attack on the U.S. Navy bus. Camacho responded, "[c]an anyone condemn David for hitting Goliath with a stone?" Camacho refused to cooperate with the Probation Office, indicating that it was a representative of the Government. The Probation Office provided an assessment of Camacho: First and foremost, it is this officer’s opinion that Mr. Camacho-Negr\ n exhibits the most fanatical demeanor of all of the codefendants [sic] interviewed by this officer to date. He indulges in florid rhetoric and enjoys hearing himself talk. He appears downright obsessive about his present circumstances and is probably extremely hostile and aggressive under his superficial courteous demeanor. After serving out his sentence until the mandatory release date, Camacho was released on parole in February 1998. He was subject to the same terms of release as all other prisoners in his situation would be. However, Camacho returned to Puerto Rico and purposefully violated the terms of his parole. Attorneys for Camacho wrote to the Probation office to let the office know that Camacho was "not available at the moment." His attorneys attempted to make the argument that he should not be subject to the same rules as all other prisoners on mandatory release: Because of his sincere and strongly held political beliefs, he feels he cannot comply with to [sic] onerous supervision conditions imposed upon him after 10 years of incarceration. To require him to comply with those conditions is an interference with his rights to political and personal freedom in violation of prevailing human rights [sic]. If he has to choose between his political beliefs and his personal dignity or complying with your conditions he chooses the first and rather reenter prison [sic]. Camacho-Negr\ n did re-enter prison after his mandatory release was revoked for failure to comply with the terms and conditions of parole. Camacho was not offered a commutation of sentence by President Clinton, rather he was granted a remission of fine, which he refused. Camacho is free to gain release from prison at any time if he is willing to comply with parole conditions. Roberto Maldonado Rivera, an attorney, represented himself during his trial. After he was found guilty of the conspiracy, he submitted a written statement to the Probation Office: My theory of the case rests on the knowledge that I believe I am being persecuted by the government of the United States for my work in human and civil rights for the past two decades in Puerto Rico. I had nothing to do with the Wells Fargo robbery and I believe there is no evidence linking me in any way to a conspiracy in said case. Maldonado steadfastly maintained his innocence both before and after the trial. However, he did state that he was an "ardent independist" and that "he viewed the conflict between Puerto Rico and the United States in a similar fashion as a revolutionary war between the original thirteen colonies and their mother country, England." In addition, he stated that he "does not condemn any violent actions in the pursuit of independence." RamR rez was arrested in Puerto Rico, along with 15 other members of the Macheteros, on August 30, 1985. Prior to his arrest he was overheard in a conversation stating that he "would never be arrested. Have I told you?" He added that he would not permit anyone to "take him abroad [to the mainland United States] . . . they will have to take me dead. I won’t be caught alive. I couldn’t stand being out there." RamR rez, represented by an attorney, pleaded not guilty to the charges brought against him. However, he refused to provide any statement or information to the Probation Office. He was sentenced to five years in prison and released on parole in April 1994. President Clinton offered to remit the balance of his fine, which RamR rez accepted. B. THE SENTENCES OF THE SIXTEEN OFFERED CLEMENCY The following section reviews the counts, crimes, maximum penalties, and sentences of the sixteen members of the FALN offered clemency by President Clinton on August 11, 1999. A variety of documents produced to the Committee by the Department of Justice in response to the Committee’s September 1, 1999, subpoena were sources of information for this summary. Documents include the August 11, 1999, Executive Grant of Clemency, judgment and commitment orders prepared by the courts, presentence reports prepared by probation officers, and progress reports prepared by the Bureau of Prisons. The U.S. Code sections listed for each criminal count are as listed in President Clinton’s August 11, 1999, Executive Grant of Clemency. Elizam Escobar Elizam Escobar was convicted of 7 criminal counts on February 11, 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $50,000 fine and/or a maximum of 80 years in prison. Escobar was sentenced to a 60-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 20 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 3 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 10 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 4 Carrying Firearms During the Commission of Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce by Violence 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 10 years 9 Interstate Transportation of Firearms with Intent to Commit 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) and 10 years Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce 18 U.S.C. § 2 by Violence 10 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 13 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 The total effective 60-year sentence was determined by consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1, 2, 10, and 13 were to run consecutively. Counts 3, 4, and 9 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other counts. On August 26, 1980, Escobar began serving an Illinois state sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). He was confined at the Illinois State Penitentiary until he was remanded into federal custody on January 31, 1981. Escobar’s federal sentence was to run consecutively to the 8-year sentence imposed in the Illinois State Court. 2. Ricardo Jiménez Ricardo Jiménez was convicted of 9 criminal counts on February 11, 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. Jiménez was sentenced to a 90-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 20 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 3 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 10 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 4 Carrying Firearms During the Commission of Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce by Violence 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 10 years 9 Interstate Transportation of Firearms with Intent to Commit 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) and 10 years Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce 18 U.S.C. § 2 by Violence 10 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 11 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 12 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 13 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 All counts of the total effective 90-year sentence were to run consecutively. On August 26, 1980, Jiménez began serving an Illinois state sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). He was confined at the Illinois State Penitentiary until he was remanded into federal custody on January 31, 1981. Jiménez’ federal sentence was to run consecutively to the 8-year sentence imposed in the Illinois State Court. 3. Aldofo Matos Aldofo Matos was convicted of 9 criminal counts on February 11, 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. Matos was sentenced to a 70-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows:   Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 20 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 3 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 10 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 4 Carrying Firearms During the Commission of Seditious 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 10 years Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce by Violence 9 Interstate Transportation of Firearms with Intent to Commit 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) and 10 years Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce 18 U.S.C. § 2 by Violence 10 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 11 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 12 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 13 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 The total effective 70-year sentence was determined by consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, and 13 were to run consecutively. Counts 3, 4, and 9 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other counts. On August 26, 1980, Matos began serving an Illinois state sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). He was confined at the Illinois State Penitentiary until he was remanded into federal custody on January 31, 1981. Matos’ federal sentence was to run consecutively to the 8-year sentence imposed in the Illinois State Court. 4. Dylcia Noemi Pagán Dylcia Noemi Pagán was convicted of 9 criminal counts on February 11, 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. Pagán was sentenced to a 55-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 20 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 3 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 10 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 4 Carrying Firearms During the Commission of Seditious 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 10 years Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce by Violence 9 Interstate Transportation of Firearms with Intent to Commit 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) and 10 years Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce 18 U.S.C. § 2 by Violence 10 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 11 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 12 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 13 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 The total effective 55-year sentence was determined by consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1 and 2 were to run consecutively. Counts 3, 4, and 9 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other counts. Counts 10, 11, 12, and 13 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other counts. On August 26, 1980, Pagán began serving an Illinois state sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). She was confined at the Illinois State Penitentiary until she was remanded into federal custody on January 31, 1981. Pagán’s federal sentence was to run consecutively to the 8-year sentence imposed in the Illinois State Court. 5. Alicia Rodríguez Alicia RodrR guez was convicted of 9 criminal counts on February 11, 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. RodrR guez was sentenced to a 55-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 20 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 3 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 10 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 6 Carrying Firearms During the Commission of Seditious 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 10 years Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce by Violence 9 Interstate Transportation of Firearms with Intent to Commit 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) and 10 years Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce 18 U.S.C. § 2 by Violence 10 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 11 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 12 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 13 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 The total effective 55-year sentence was determined by consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1 and 2 were to run consecutively. Counts 3, 6, and 9 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other counts. Counts 10, 11, 12, and 13 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other counts. 6. Ida Luz Rodríguez Ida Luz Rodríguez was convicted of 9 criminal counts on February 11, 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. Rodríguez was sentenced to a 75-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 20 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 3 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 10 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 7 Carrying Firearms During the Commission of Seditious 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 10 years Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce by Violence 9 Interstate Transportation of Firearms with Intent to Commit 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) and 10 years Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce 18 U.S.C. § 2 By Violence 10 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 11 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 5 years 12 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 5 years 13 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 5 years The total effective 75-year sentence was determined by consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1, 2, 3, 7, and 9 were to run consecutively. Counts 10, 11, 12, and 13 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the other counts. On August 26, 1980, Rodríguez began serving an Illinois state sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). She was confined at the Illinois State Penitentiary until she was remanded into federal custody on January 31, 1981. Rodríguez’ federal sentence was to run consecutively to the 8-year sentence imposed in the Illinois State Court. 7. Luis Rosa Luis Rosa was convicted of 9 criminal counts on February 11, 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Rosa was sentenced to a 75-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 20 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 3 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 10 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 5 Carrying Firearms During the Commission of Seditious 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 10 years Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce by Violence 9 Interstate Transportation of Firearms with Intent to Commit 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) and 10 years Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce 18 U.S.C. § 2 by Violence 10 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 11 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 12 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 13 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2   The total effective 75-year sentence was determined by consecutive and/or concurrent sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9 were to run consecutively. Counts 10, 11, 12, and 13 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other counts. 8. Carmen Valentín Carmen Valentín was convicted of 9 criminal counts on February 11, 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 90 years in prison. Valentín was sentenced to a 90-year term of imprisonment on February 18, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 20 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 3 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 10 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 8 Carrying Firearms During the Commission of Seditious 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) 10 years Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce by Violence 9 Interstate Transportation of Firearms with Intent to Commit 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) and 10 years Seditious Conspiracy and Interference with Interstate Commerce 18 U.S.C. § 2 by Violence 10 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 11 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 12 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 13 Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 All counts of the total effective 90-year sentence were to run consecutively. On August 26, 1980, Valentín began serving an Illinois state sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (3 years), unlawful use of a shotgun (5 years consecutive), and unlawful use of a loaded handgun (364 days concurrent). She was confined at the Illinois State Penitentiary until she was remanded into federal custody on January 31, 1981. Valentín’s federal sentence was to run consecutively to the 8 year sentence imposed in the Illinois State Court. 9. Alberto Rodríguez Alberto Rodríguez was convicted of 5 criminal counts on August 5, 1985, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $60,000 fine and/or a maximum of 65 years in prison. On October 4, 1985, Rodríguez was sentenced to a 35-year term of imprisonment followed by 5 years of probation. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 4 Conspiracy to Make Destructive Devices 18 U.S.C. § 371 5 years 6 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) 10 years 7 Possession of a Firearm without a Serial Number 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i) 10 years 8 Conspiracy to Obstruct Interstate Commerce by Robbery 18 U.S.C. § 1951 20 years The total effective 35-year sentence followed by five years of probation was determined by consecutive and/or suspended sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1, 4, and 6 were to run consecutively. Counts 7 and 8 were suspended. Five years of probation were to follow Rodríguez’ release from custody. 10. Alejandrina Torres Alejandrina Torres was convicted of 7 criminal counts on August 5, 1985, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $66,000 fine and/or a maximum of 61 years in prison. On October 4, 1985, Torres was sentenced to a 35-year term of imprisonment followed by 5 years of probation. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. 5861(d) 10 years 3 Unlawful Storage of Explosives 18 U.S.C. § 842(j) 1 year 4 Conspiracy to Make Destructive Devices 18 U.S.C. § 371 5 years 5 Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Vehicle 18 U.S.C. § 2312 5 years 6 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) 10 years 7 Possession of a Firearm without a Serial Number 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i) 10 years The total effective 35-year sentence followed by five years of probation was determined by consecutive, concurrent, and/or suspended sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1 and 4 were to run consecutively. Counts 2, 6, and 7 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to all other counts. Counts 3 and 5 were suspended. Five years of probation were to follow Torres’ release from custody. 11. Edwin Cortés Edwin Cortés was convicted of 8 criminal counts on August 5, 1985, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $76,000 fine and/or a maximum of 81 years in prison. On October 4, 1985, Cortés was sentenced to a 35-year term of imprisonment followed by 5 years of probation. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. 5861(d) 10 years 3 Unlawful Storage of Explosives 18 U.S.C. § 842(j) 1 year 4 Conspiracy to Make Destructive Devices 18 U.S.C. § 371 5 years 5 Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Vehicle 18 U.S.C. § 2312 5 years 6 Possession of an Unregistered Firearm 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) 10 years 7 Possession of a Firearm without a Serial Number 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i) 10 years 8 Conspiracy to Obstruct Interstate Commerce by Robbery 18 U.S.C. 1951 20 years   The total effective 35-year sentence followed by five years of probation was determined by consecutive, concurrent, and/or suspended sentences for the individual counts. Counts 1 and 4 were to run consecutively. Counts 2 and 6 were to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the other counts. Counts 3, 5, 7, and 8 were suspended. Five years of probation were to follow Cortés’ release from custody. 12. Oscar L\ pez Oscar López was initially convicted of 7 criminal counts on July 24, 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The maximum penalty for these crimes was a $50,000 fine and/or a maximum of 70 years in prison. López was sentenced to a 55-year term of imprisonment on August 11, 1981. The specific criminal counts are as follows: Count Crime Statute Sentence 1 Seditious Conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 2384 20 years 2 Interference with Interstate Commerce by Threats or Violence 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 20 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 Carrying Firearms During the Commission of Seditious Conspiracy and 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) and 10 years Interference with Interstate Commerce by Violence 18 U.S.C. § 2 10 Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Vehicle 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 11 Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Vehicle 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 12 Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Vehicle 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2 13 Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Vehicle 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and 5 years 18 U.S.C. § 2</