Signals Intelligence Programs and Activities
Russia continues to maintain one of the most sophisticated SIGINT
programs in the world. The GRU's Sixth Directorate uses over 20 different
types of aircraft, a fleet of 60 SIGINT collection vessels, satellites, and
ground stations to collect signals intelligence. Together with FAPSI, the
GRU operates SIG1NT collection facilities in over 60 diplomatically
protected facilities throughout the world. These agencies also operate large
ground collection facilities within the territory of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, at Cam Rank Bay, Vietnam, and at Lourdes, Cuba.
These activities provide the Russians with worldwide SIG[NT collection
capabilities.
The SIGINT facility at Lourdes is among the most significant intelligence
collection capabilities targeting the United States. This facility, less than
100 miles from Key West, is one of the largest and most sophisticated
SIGINT collection facilities in the world. It is jointly operated by the GRU,
FAPSI, and Cuba's intelligence services. The complex is manned by over
1,000 Russian personnel and is capable of monitoring a wide array of
commercial and government communications throughout the southeastern
United States, and between the United States and Europe. Lourdes
intercepts transmissions from microwave towers in the United States,
communication satellite downlinks, and a wide range of shortwave and
high-frequency radio transmissions. It also serves as a mission ground
station and analytical facility supporting Russian SIGINT satellites. The
facility at Lourdes, together with a sister facility in Russia, allows the
Russians to monitor all U. S. military and civilian geosynchronous
communications satellites.[17] It has been alleged that the Lourdes facility
monitors all White House communications activities, launch control
communications and telemetry from NASA and Air Force facilities at
Cape Canaveral, financial and commodity wire services, and military
communications links. According to one source, Lourdes has a special
collection and analysis facility that is responsible for targeting financial and
political information. This activity is manned by specially selected personnel
and appears to be highly successful in providing Russian leaders with
political and economic intelligence.
The former Soviet Union also used a variety of other means to collect
signals intelligence. The Soviets operated SIGINT collection sites in over
60 countries from diplomatically protected embassies, consulates, trade
legations, and residences. It is possible that these activities are continuing in
the United States. The location of a number of Russian diplomatic facilities
in the United States would provide Russian SIGINT collectors with access
to sensitive information. Russian collection activities could derive sensitive
information on Government policies from monitoring Government activities
in the Washington, DC area, and sensitive financial and trade information
using Russian facilities located in New York, San Francisco, and Seattle.
The location of microwave towers and cellular communication repeaters in
the vicinity of Russian diplomatic facilities in these cities increases the
potential damage from collection activities. In the past, vans from the
Soviet Mission to the United Nations were observed in the vicinity of the
GE Americom satellite ground station in Vernon Valley, NJ, and vans from
the San Francisco consulate were observed in the vicinity of AT&T
microwave towers in Northern California. In both cases, the vans
appeared to be conducting SIG1NT monitoring at these facilities.
The Russians have probably also continued the Soviet practice of using
covert mobile collection platforms. During the Cold War, the Russians
frequently used tractor-trailers, and other vehicles with concealed SIGINT
collection equipment to gather intelligence in Western Europe. Western
intelligence officials estimate that the Soviets conducted over 7,000 covert
vehicular SIGINT operations in NATO countries annually. During these
operations, the Soviets gathered electronic order of battle (EOB) data,
monitored exercise communications, conducted direction finding
operations, and calibrated Soviet SIGINT satellites to determine
geolocation accuracies. The Soviets also allegedly used clandestine
collection vans located in Mexico to monitor activities at White Sands
Missile Range in New Mexico and Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California. Vans operating from Tijuana, Mexico reportedly were able to
monitor all of Southern California and Western Arizona. There have also
been reports that Aeroflot aircraft and clandestine collection vehicles have
been used to collect SIGINT data inside the continental United States.
The Russians also use satellites for collecting SIGINT. The first Soviet
SIGINT satellite was the Cosmos 189 ELINT satellite, which was
launched in 1967. Over the next 24 years, the Soviets placed over 200
SIGINT satellites into orbit. The Russians continue to maintain a robust
presence in space. During 1994, the Russians conducted 48 spacecraft
launches, 50 percent of which were military missions including advanced
imagery systems, ocean reconnaissance, and electronic intelligence
collection. In 1995, the Russians have programmed 45 space launches;
again approximately 50 percent will be military missions.
The GRU is tasked with operating Russian ELINT satellites. ELINT
satellites use active and passive techniques to detect specific targets. They
complement the data provided by imaging satellites and assist in developing
a more complete picture of an adversary's forces or intentions. These
satellites are designed to track and geolocate radio and radar emanations
of ships at sea, mobile air defense radars, fixed strategic early warning
radars, and other military emitters for the purpose of identification,
location, and signals analysis. The data can then be used for targeting,
offensive and defensive engagement planning, and countermeasure
development.
Collection activities are managed by the Cosmic Intelligence Directorate,
and data analysis is performed by the Decrypting Service of the Sixth
Directorate. Currently, there is no evidence of the existence of a Russian
COMINT satellite, however, it is likely that the Russians could develop
such a system if they wished.
Facilities
Programs
Sources and Resources
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/program/sigint.htm
Created by John Pike
Maintained by Webmaster
Updated Wednesday, November 26, 1997 5:56:23 PM
