The Home Affairs Committee has agreed to the following Report:—

  ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE SECURITY SERVICE

Background

1. The accountability of the executive to Parliament is a fundamental principle in a democracy. Yet until recently the security and intelligence services were entirely exempt from this principle. It was only a series of controversies in the 1980s, combined with the UK's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights,[1] that in 1989 led a Conservative government to introduce the Security Service Act, which for the first time placed the Security Service ('MI5') on a statutory footing. The Act established a Tribunal, supported by a Commissioner, able to investigate complaints from the public and to review the issue to the Service of warrants for entry on or interference with property and for interception of telecommunications.[2] The status of the Secret Intelligence Service ('MI6') and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) remained unaffected however.

2. The overall result was that, even after the 1989 Act, the British intelligence and security services remained among the most secretive in the developed world. Although most of their activities were well known to their counterparts in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, the British taxpayer was obliged to rely on leaks from disaffected former employees and the work of investigative journalists. What little could be gleaned of their activities did not always inspire confidence. Nor did the fact that not a single complaint was upheld by the new Tribunal which, in any case, operated in complete secrecy.[3]

3. In 1992, emboldened perhaps by the spirit of glasnost that prevailed elsewhere in the world, the then Home Affairs Committee asked the Home Secretary at the time, the Rt Hon Kenneth Clark MP, if it might take evidence from the then Director-General of the Security Service, Mrs Stella Rimington, whose responsibilities—theoretically at least—came within the Committee's remit.[4] The answer was a firm 'no'. Only when it was pointed out that Mrs Rimington was already dining with certain favoured journalists did the Home Secretary relent. A private lunch was arranged at the Security Service headquarters between Mrs Rimington and six members of the Committee. The Committee, however, took the view that a free lunch was no substitute for proper parliamentary scrutiny. In January 1993 it published a report concluding that the Security Service should be made subject to the normal departmental select committee structure.[5] The Government rejected this recommendation; the Committee, said the Government, had paid "insufficient regard to the unique nature of the Security Service and to the personal nature of the Director-General's accountability to the Home Secretary".[6] The Government did, however, concede that the matter would be kept under review.

4. This led in due course to the Intelligence Services Act 1994 which altered the position significantly. As well as putting the SIS and GCHQ on to a statutory footing similar to that of the Security Service, it established the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) composed of Members of both Houses of Parliament to monitor the work of all three intelligence and security Agencies. For the first time parliamentarians were to be involved in the scrutiny of the security and intelligence services. The ISC, however, suffered from the obvious drawback that it was a statutory and not a parliamentary committee. It enjoyed none of the powers of a select committee. Members were appointed by the Prime Minister, and could therefore be dismissed by him. The Committee reported to the Prime Minister who could decide which parts of its report could or could not be published. It was heavily dependent on the goodwill of the agencies for the information it received and, until recently at least, lacked any facilities for independent investigation.

5. Since the last election it has been followed by further steps towards greater openness. A practice has been begun of holding an annual debate in the House on the work of the intelligence and security agencies.[7] Details have been published of the number of personal files held and the basis on which they are kept,[8] and a mechanism established for preserving and in due course publishing files thought to be of public interest. In addition, the reports of the ISC itself have shed light on areas of security service activity which hitherto had lain in darkness. These developments have been an important advance on what had gone on before.

6. Nevertheless we remain concerned that the principle of parliamentary, as opposed to statutory, scrutiny of the intelligence and security services has not yet been conceded. We are also mindful that the new arrangements have not yet been tested in a crisis. We do not want to wait for another crisis of confidence of the sort that has occurred in the past[9] only to discover that the existing scrutiny arrangements are inadequate. We are anxious to take advantage of the new healthy climate of openness so that the mechanism for accountability can be got right once and for all. That is the purpose of this inquiry.

2  Under the Security Service Act 1989. Back

3  Other than in the form of publication of an Annual Report by the Commissioner; statistics on the number of complaints received and dealt with by the Tribunal and the Commissioner are contained in each year's Report. Mr David Bickford, a former legal adviser to the intelligence and security services, believed that "the fact that no complaints have been upheld against the Security service or SIS is indicative of the lengths the agencies go to get the law and the balance of rights correct" (see Appendix 2, p. 25). Back

4  Section 1(1) of the Security Service Act 1989 (the Act which established the Security Service on a statutory basis) provides that the Security Service is to operate under the authority of the Secretary of State. Under Section 2, the Director-General of the Service is to be appointed by the Secretary of State and is to make an annual report on the work of the Service to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. Back

5  Accountability of the Security Service, First Report, Session 1992-93, HC 265; the invitation for some members of the Committee to lunch with the Director-General was received before the Report was agreed, but took place afterwards (see para 19 of the Report). Back

6  Cm. 2197. Back

7  Debate on the security and intelligence agencies Official Report 2 November 1998. The Security Service has also published a new (1998) edition of the booklet on its work ("MI5 The Security Service", published by The Stationery Office, Third edition). Back

8  Official Report 29 July 1998 cols 251-4w and 3 February 1999 cols 619-20w; see also 20 January 1998 cols 519-520w and adjournment debate at Official Report 25 February 1998 cols 341-348. Back

9  Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, Peter Wright, Cathy Massiter. Back