Scrutiny of 'operational' matters
15. Before discussing the relative merits of having
a statutory or a parliamentary basis to a scrutiny committee's
work, it is appropriate first of all to consider an issue relating
to the effectiveness of any scrutiny arrangements, namely the
extent to which they should enable 'operational' matters to be
examined. While the formal remit of the ISC—the expenditure,
administration and policy of the Agencies—is wide-ranging
(and is expressed in exactly the same terms as those of the departmentally-related
select committees[19]),
the provisions protecting 'sensitive' information from being made
available to the ISC mean that, theoretically at least, it is
barred from considering operational matters.
16. Mr Bickford regarded the restraint on the power
to examine operations as a significant drawback to the ISC's effectiveness.
He expressed the point as follows:
"The agencies are as good or as bad as their
operational success. The management, administration and financing
of the agencies may look immaculate, but this means little in
terms of real effectiveness. Oversight which excludes operational
effectiveness is a bit like investing in a quoted company without
knowing what its bottom line is ... oversight should deal with
operational issues, both as to possible abuse and as to operational
effectiveness".[20]
He argued therefore that there would have to be clarity
over an oversight committee's powers "to delve into highly
secret operational matters". He took the view that there
was no more reason to suppose that members of a parliamentary
committee would put secrets at risk, possibly inadvertently, than
do judges, prosecutors, civil servants, police or customs, in
legal trials where operational issues arise.[21]
17. In practice, the boundary between what is an
'operational' matter and what is not cannot anyway be precise
and there must be a certain amount of flexibility over what ought
to be covered by any such exclusion. But we agree with Mr Bickford
that scrutiny is unlikely to be properly effective if all operational
matters are excluded from an oversight committee's remit. We therefore
consider that any scrutiny committee's remit, whether parliamentary
or statutory in basis, should not be too constrained in this way.
We understand that in practice the ISC is able to go somewhat
beyond a narrow interpretation of its powers in this respect.
19 Standing Order No. 152 lays down that each committee
is "appointed to examine the expenditure, administration
and policy" of the relevant government departments. Back
20 Appendix
2, p. 26. Back
21 ibid.,
p. 27. Back
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