18. We consider in this Report three main models for how committee-monitoring of the Agencies by Parliament should be carried out. These are:

(a)  that the Security Service be recognised as coming within the existing terms of reference of the Home Affairs Committee (and that likewise the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ should be recognised as coming within the terms of reference of the Foreign Affairs Committee);

(b)  that the three Agencies be monitored by a single select committee operating similarly to the departmental select committees, but in this instance operating on a cross-departmental basis (as with the present Public Administration and Science and Technology committees); and

(c)  that the three Agencies should continue to be monitored by a committee of parliamentarians appointed on a statutory basis (the present model).

19. There are thus two principal issues at stake:

-  should any monitoring committee or committees be established on a statutory or parliamentary basis?

-  should the agencies be monitored by a single committee looking at intelligence matters, or should the Security Service on the one hand, and the SIS and GCHQ on the other, be monitored by different committees?

We deal with these questions in turn below.

20. In doing so, we have borne in mind overseas models for parliamentary accountability of the security and intelligence agencies. Some of the key features of the arrangements in certain other countries are as follows:

United States of America There are congressional oversight committees in both Houses, with remits to authorise funding for intelligence activities and conduct investigations, audits and inquiries as may be required; the two committees between them have around 60 staff; access to information is unrestricted and the Director of Central Intelligence has a statutory duty to keep Committees 'fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities', but the agencies are not expected to reveal details of sources and methods.[22]

Canada The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) acts as a 'surrogate' of Parliament, with between 3 and 5 Members who are Privy Councillors (but not members of the House of Commons or Senate) appointed by the Governor; its remit is to review the performance of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), to investigate complaints, and to consider reports concerning immigration and citizenship application; it has a staff of around 12; it has access to all information under CSIS's control except Cabinet confidences.[23]

Australia The statutory Joint Committee on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) reviews aspects of the activities of ASIO referred to it by the Attorney-General, the Senate or the House of Representatives, but excluding such matters as activities relating to foreign intelligence, matters that are operationally sensitive, and individual complaints; it reports its findings to the Attorney General and, with his permission, to Parliament; it receives regular informal briefings from the Director-General of ASIO and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.[24]

Germany and France: Several different parliamentary oversight bodies exist in Germany; the principal one, excluding a budget sub-committee, is the Parliamentary Control Commission which acts as a forum for members to raise particular issues with relevant Ministers rather than for carrying out inquiries. There is no formal parliamentary oversight structure in France.[25]

We have not conducted for this short Report a comparative study on the effectiveness and merits of these alternative systems, but it can be seen that a variety of approaches have been adopted.

23  See Canada's Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984 (source: Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 1997-98. Cm. 4073, p. 59). Back

24  See Australia's Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (source: Parliament of Australia website).  Back

25  See Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 1996 (Cm. 3574 p24). Back