48. In our view, it is inevitable that the intelligence services will one day become accountable to Parliament. That is the logical outcome of the process of reform embarked upon by the previous Government. The existing arrangements are merely transitional and are still evolving—witness the fact that the ISC itself is now demanding, and has been given, facilities that were undreamed of when it was established only five years ago. We hope that the Government will keep an open mind on this issue. We recognise that, with heavy pressure on the legislative programme, the issue will not be in the forefront of ministerial minds. Nevertheless we hope that they will recognise that it would be better for it to be addressed sooner rather than later, before some unforeseen event of the sort that has occurred in the past causes a crisis which might well have been avoided if arrangements were in place for scrutiny which command public confidence. We believe that it is also in the interest of the intelligence and security services themselves to be subject to a form of scrutiny which commands public confidence and we are encouraged to note that this view appears to be shared by many of those who work within the agencies. We have no doubt that the suggestion of parliamentary scrutiny will meet the stiffest resistance from some within the agencies and from some in Whitehall. We trust that the Government will not succumb. Finally, we repeat our view that the accountability of the security and intelligence services to Parliament ought to be a fundamental principle in a modern democracy.