Operations - Security Service MI5
Each year the Security Service submits its
analysis of the various threats and, thus, its
priorities and plans for the future, for scrutiny
and validation by an inter-departmental
Whitehall committee. This committee, known
as SO(SSPP), also reviews the Service’s
performance against the previous year’s plans.
It is a sub-committee of the Official Committee
on Security (SO), ‘SSPP’ standing for ‘Security
Service Priorities and Performance’. Its terms of
reference include the review of the Service’s
performance against plans and objectives, and
examination of future Security Service
priorities. The committee is chaired by the Home
Office and its membership comprises senior
officials drawn from a range of departments with
particular knowledge of the Service’s work in
countering threats.
The Security Service is not the only organisation
with responsibilities bearing on national
security, or involved in collecting intelligence
about security threats. Others play important
roles within their own specific functions,
notably the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS),
Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ), Departments of State and the law
enforcement agencies. The Security Service works as an integral part of
the UK’s overall intelligence effort, alongside SIS
and GCHQ. The three agencies assist one another
in the pursuit of their functions. The Service is in
close contact with relevant departments in its
work, particularly the Home Office, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and
Northern Ireland Office. There is a close
operational relationship between the Service and
UK police forces, who are responsible for taking
many of the actions arising from the Service’s
work. The Service also cooperates closely with
other UK law enforcement bodies, such as HM
Customs and Excise, and with the armed services.
Overseas, the Service receives assistance from a
wide range of foreign security and intelligence
services (nearly 100 in all). These productive
relationships are key to the Service’s ability to
tackle threats to UK interests internationally.
The particular role of the
Security Service is to:
- investigate – to obtain and then to
collate, analyse and assess secret
intelligence about threats;
- counter – to act, and enable others to
act, to counter specific threats;
- advise – to keep Government, and others
as appropriate, informed of the threats,
and to advise on the response, including
protective security measures;
- assist – to provide relevant assistance to
other agencies, organisations and
departments.
In its approach to its work the Service aims to
achieve a strategic advantage over the ‘targets’ of
its investigations. Over time, the Service seeks to
build up a detailed body of knowledge about
target organisations, their key personalities,
infrastructure, plans and capabilities. This enables
the Service to assess the level and nature of the
threat they pose which, in turn, informs the
further deployment of intelligence resources to
counter their activities. This is a cyclical process
involving adjustments being made continually on
the basis of new intelligence or events.
The assessment of threats is thus a central and
distinctive component of the Service’s work and
provides the basis of decisions about resource
allocation, counter-action and protective
measures. The Service’s judgments about the
magnitude of the various threats to national
security, and hence the distribution of the Service’s
efforts, are subject to scrutiny and validation by a
senior inter-departmental committee (SO(SSPP))
and then by Ministers. Similarly the
Service’s judgments on its priorities are adjusted in
the light of the national requirements for
intelligence drawn up by the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC)
which are also approved by Ministers.
Sources of Intelligence
In carrying out its statutory functions the
Service draws on the following principal sources
of secret intelligence:
- the interception of communications;
- eavesdropping, which involves covertly
monitoring the speech of targets under
investigation;
- surveillance (following and observing); and
- agents within target organisations.
In Security Service terminology an ‘agent’ is a human
source working within or close to a target organisation, who
provides intelligence in secret to the Service. Agents are not
members of the Service.
At any one time the Service may be conducting
many investigations, but only a few will draw on
the full range of techniques. In planning
deployments, the Service aims to operate with the
minimum of intrusion and expense, and in
proportion to the threat. In complex
investigations, several different techniques will be
used in combination, and much of the skill lies in
deciding the most effective blend.
Organisations which pose a threat to national
security often go to considerable lengths to
prevent and detect efforts to investigate their
activities. The Security Service aims to gather
intelligence while ensuring that the targets
under investigation remain unaware of the
Service’s interest in them. Clearly there is a need
to prevent the compromise of a potentially
successful investigation while it is running, but
the Service also needs to look to the future.
Keeping secret the details of intelligence
methods is important if the Service is to retain
them for use in future intelligence operations.
Secrecy is also vital to ensure the safety of
individuals, including agents.
The Security Service Act makes the Director
General responsible for ensuring that there are
effective arrangements within the Service to
control the acquisition and disclosure of
information. A major aspect of this control
is a structure of internal mechanisms designed
to ensure that the Service responds only to
genuine threats, and does so with proper regard
for the law, proportionately to the threat, and
with appropriately senior authorisation for
intrusive measures. These essential safeguards
are also designed to allow fast-moving
investigations to proceed swiftly, with proper
authorisation, but without being hampered by
unnecessary bureaucracy.
Operations under Interception and
‘Property’ Warrants
Operations to intercept mail and communications
on the public telecommunications network
must be specifically authorised by a warrant
signed by the Secretary of State under the
Interception of Communications Act 1985
(IOCA). Interception warrants may only be issued
if the Secretary of State considers that the
warrant is necessary in the interests of national
security, or for the purpose of safeguarding the
economic well-being of the UK against threats
from overseas, or in order to prevent or detect
serious crime.
The Intelligence Services Act 1994
provides for
the issue of ‘property’ warrants by the Secretary
of State. The effect of a property warrant is to
authorise otherwise unlawful entry into, or
interference with, someone’s property – for
example, for the purpose of eavesdropping
or conducting a clandestine search. Property
warrants may only be issued if the Secretary
of State is satisfied that the proposed action is
necessary on the grounds that it is likely to be
of substantial value in assisting the Service to
fulfil its functions, and that what the action
seeks to achieve cannot reasonably be achieved
in another way. It is usually the Home Secretary
who issues interception and property warrants
for the Security Service.
All intended operations of this sort are subject
to extensive scrutiny both within the Service and
outside, for example at the Home Office. Final
authorisation is a matter for the Secretary of
State and is only given on the basis of a formal
submission which contains a detailed account of
why the warrant is required. The submission also
sets out the nature of the threat, the intelligence
background, and confirms that the scope of the
operation falls within the statutory functions of
the Service. Applications for warrants must be
approved by senior managers within the Service,
and are then scrutinised by senior officials
before submission to the Secretary of State.
Arrangements are in place for the most urgent
cases to be processed quickly.
Agents
Agents represent one of the most important
sources of secret intelligence. Agent operations
are run by specially trained officers and can last
for long periods, sometimes for many years. The
Service attaches particular importance to
ensuring that its agents – many of whom are
inevitably at risk through their work for the
Service – are managed securely. Management
arrangements for agent operations are also
designed to make sure that the case is kept
under proper control, drawing on advice from
the Service’s legal advisers as necessary. For
instance, a key objective is to avoid placing the
agent in the role of agent provocateur, by
enticing those on whom he or she is reporting
to commit criminal acts which they would not
otherwise have committed.
The Service pays close attention to the personal
welfare of its agents, both during their agent
career and after their active work for the Service
has ended.
Surveillance
Surveillance operations involve the covert
observation of targets under investigation in
order to obtain intelligence about their
movements and the identities of those with
whom they are in contact. Surveillance is carried
out by highly skilled, specialist officers who may
work in vehicles, on foot or from fixed
observation posts. The Service’s surveillance
section is practised at operating in concert with
others, particularly the police.
Information Management and
Record-keeping
Intelligence operations rely on high quality
record-keeping and information management
systems. Some intelligence leads are too
fragmentary or imprecise to be of immediate
value. Nevertheless, small details – for example,
of the membership and modus operandi of
target organisations – are important because
they provide the raw material on which the
assessment of individual threats is based,
against which new intelligence is judged, and
from which further investigations can be
developed. The Service’s record-keeping is
central to supporting the capacity for sustained,
integrated research and analysis which
underpins all of the Service’s work.
The Service’s records include both paper files
and computer records. Paper files remain for the
present the main working documents of the
Service, but computer-based documents are
becoming increasingly important. The Service
also makes extensive use of computer systems
for the indexing and retrieval of its records. No
government department or other agency has
access to the Service’s databases, although the
relevant authorities will be given access as
necessary to specific information for the
purpose of court cases. Within the Service there
are additional controls which limit access to
particularly sensitive data relating to the
Service’s operations and investigations.
Detailed criteria govern the opening of files on
individuals and organisations. These criteria
specify the circumstances in which opening a
file and initiating enquiries are justified within
the terms of the Service’s statutory functions.
They are kept under continual review and are
formally checked for currency, relevance and
propriety on an annual basis. In his report to
Parliament for 1991, the Commissioner under the
Security Service Act described in detail the
Service’s controls on its files.
The Service currently holds in total about
440,000 files which have been opened at some
time since its establishment in 1909. Of these,
approximately 35,000 files relate to Service
administration, policy and staff, and 40,000
concern subjects and organisations studied by
the Service. About 75,000 files relate to people
or groups of people who have never been
investigated by the Service such as those who
have received protective security advice. This
leaves about 290,000 files which relate to
individuals who, at some time during the last
90 years, may have been the subject of Security
Service enquiry or investigation. Of this 290,000
some 40,000 have been reduced to microfilm
and placed in a restricted category to which
Security Service staff have access only for
specific research purposes. A further 230,000
files are closed so that staff may use them
where necessary in the course of their current
work, but may not make enquiries about the
subjects of the files.
Therefore the great majority of the Service’s file
holdings do not relate to individuals who may
be under current investigation by the Service.
The number of files which fall within that
category is around 20,000. Of that number,
about one third relate to foreign nationals –
typically members or associates of foreign
intelligence services or terrorist groups, leaving
approximately 13,000 active files on UK citizens.
Retention and Destruction of Files
The Service must take account of a number of
potentially conflicting factors when considering
the long-term retention of files which are no
longer of current interest. There are some
specific legal requirements. First, the Service has
a responsibility to provide the Security Service
Tribunal with any details it requires of enquiries
made about a complainant, or of any disclosure
made for vetting purposes, since the Security
Service Act came into force in December 1989;
relevant records must therefore be retrievable.
The Service must also comply with the
requirements of the Public Records Act 1958 in
identifying records of historical interest for
permanent retention and eventual transfer to
the Public Record Office. In practice, this means
retaining files for future release that would
otherwise have been destroyed as obsolete. The
Service receives advice from the Public Record
Office in judging which files to retain on
historical grounds.
In November 1997 the Service transferred to the
Public Record Office the first tranche of its own
historical archives: its surviving records from the
First World War. In considering the release of
historical papers, the Service must take account
of the need to protect former staff and agents.
It remains a fundamental principle that the
identities of agents must be protected. Privacy
issues are also important. The Service must
consider carefully whether it is proper to release
into the public domain intelligence records
which may reflect adversely on an individual
who was suspected of criminality (for example,
as a possible spy) but was never tried in court.
Aside from these specific requirements, the
general principle underlying the Service’s file
retention policy is that it seeks to retain only
those records which will assist it in fulfilling its
functions under the Security Service Act. The
Service therefore keeps under review whether
it might need its older records to fulfil its
functions at a later time, such as for future
investigations prompted by new intelligence.
There is a balance to be struck between the
possible intelligence value of retaining files
and the need to ensure that files are not
kept unnecessarily.
In the period between the Service’s formation in
1909 and the early 1970s, large numbers of
files (well over 175,000) were destroyed as they
became obsolete or following a major
contraction in the Service, most notably after
the two World Wars. This sometimes caused
problems, for example in the late 1960s when
the Service faced difficulties investigating some
spy cases because relevant records had been
destroyed. It therefore became the Service’s
policy to retain records indefinitely. However, in
the early 1990s, following the collapse of Soviet
communism and the associated decline in the
threat from subversion, the review and
destruction process was reinstated. Since then
more than 110,000 files have been destroyed
or earmarked for destruction. The files under
review for possible destruction have included
those opened for counter-subversion reasons,
and retained because Soviet and Warsaw
Pact intelligence services had in the past
sought to recruit spies from within certain
subversive groups.
Intelligence as Evidence and the Law
of Disclosure
Since 1992 the Service’s work has led to its
becoming increasingly engaged in the criminal
justice process. Intelligence material has been
either adduced in evidence, or disclosed to the
defence as ‘unused material’. This has happened
principally in the context of the Service’s
counter-terrorist work. Security Service officers
gave evidence at nine trials between 1992 and
April 1998, all of which led to convictions.
The duty of prosecutors to make material
available to the defence in criminal cases is set
out in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations
Act 1996. The Act recognises that the duty of
disclosure must accommodate the need to
protect sensitive information, the disclosure of
which could damage important aspects of the
public interest, such as national security.
However, it is the courts – not the Service or the
Government – that ultimately decide what must
be disclosed in particular cases.
When planning and carrying out intelligence
investigations that may lead to a prosecution,
the Service has constantly in mind the
requirements of both the law of evidence and
the duty of disclosure. Security Service officers,
working closely with members of law
enforcement agencies, seek to ensure that
operations are properly coordinated with a view
to the possible use of the intelligence as
evidence in court. For these reasons, as well as to
ensure proper internal controls, the Service keeps
detailed records of its operations, including all
meetings with agents, eavesdropping, search and
surveillance operations.
Where an investigation leads to a prosecution,
the defence must be provided with material as
required by the 1996 Act. Prosecuting counsel
considers the Service’s records and advises
which of them are disclosable. If disclosure
would cause real damage to the public interest
by, for example, compromising the identity of
an agent or a sensitive investigative technique,
the prosecutor may apply to the judge for
authority to withhold the material. Such
applications take the form of a claim for public
interest immunity (PII).
Claims for PII in relation to Security Service
material are made by a certificate signed by the
Home Secretary. In deciding whether a claim is
appropriate, the Home Secretary carries out a
careful balancing exercise between the
competing public interests in the due
administration of justice and the protection of
national security. This exercise takes account of
detailed advice from prosecuting counsel as to
the relevance of the material to the issues in the
case. If the Home Secretary considers that the
balance comes down in favour of non-disclosure,
a claim for PII will be made. But the decision on
a PII claim is one for the judge alone. If a claim
is successful, the judge will keep the decision
under review throughout the proceedings.
Relationships
The Service’s direct access to a network of
national and international links is fundamental to
its work. The Service liaises closely with a range of
organisations and government departments both
in the UK and overseas.
The Director General is appointed by the Home
Secretary, in consultation with the Prime
Minister, and the Service therefore has regular
dealings with officials at the Home Office. The Service also
has close links with the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office, the
Northern Ireland Office, the Department of
Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence,
and advises all government departments and
agencies on protective security matters.
The central mechanisms for the coordination and
resourcing of the UK’s intelligence agencies are
based in the Cabinet Office.
For GCHQ and SIS,
the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) agrees the
intelligence requirements and tasking to be laid
upon them and these are submitted to Ministers
for approval. These requirements are then
reviewed annually in a process managed by the
Intelligence Coordinator, and performance
against them is reviewed at the end of each year
by the JIC and by Ministers. The Director General
is a member of the JIC. The Security Service
contributes intelligence on some of the JIC’s
requirements, such as those relating to terrorism,
but its overall priorities are determined not by
the JIC but by its statutory remit to counter
threats. In recognition of this, the Service’s plans
and priorities are validated and its performance
reviewed annually by a separate Cabinet Office
inter-departmental committee established for the
purpose, called ‘SO(SSPP)’.
Intelligence Agencies
The Security Service works closely with both SIS
and GCHQ, whose statutory basis derives from
the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The three
agencies have different but related functions. The
range of mutual assistance is wide, and is based
on a closeness of relationship that promotes
cooperation when a particular result can be
achieved more effectively or more efficiently with
another’s help. For example, Security Service and
SIS resources are shared in some support areas to
avoid duplication. More formally, the Security
Service is one of the many departments that
place tasking on SIS and GCHQ through the JIC
machinery to collect certain categories of
intelligence. In the Service’s case, this is
intelligence relevant to the Service’s functions to
add to its own collection efforts. The Service is a
major customer for intelligence produced by SIS
and GCHQ in areas such as terrorism.
Police and other Law Enforcement
Agencies, and the Armed Services
The Service also works closely with the UK’s 55
police forces, particularly their Special Branches,
and with other law enforcement agencies, such
as HM Customs and Excise, and the National
Criminal Intelligence Service. The Service
receives assistance from the police in many
areas of its work, provides information and
assessments to them on the current threats, and
collaborates closely with them in investigations
which may result in criminal proceedings.
The Service provides support to the police in
two main areas: in the field of serious crime,
the Service works exclusively in support of the
police and other law enforcement agencies; and
in Northern Ireland the Service provides support
to the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which has
the lead role for intelligence work on terrorism
related to Northern Ireland. (The Service has
the equivalent role for all aspects of terrorism
outside Northern Ireland.) The Service also
works with the armed services on a range
of security matters.
With Foreign Security and Intelligence Services
Although the Service is charged with protecting
national security as it relates to UK interests
both in the UK and overseas, its primary focus
is domestic and most of its staff are based in
London. In many areas of its work it in
consequence relies heavily on the support of SIS
and seeks assistance from foreign security and
intelligence services. To this end, the Service has
links with nearly 100 services worldwide.
Executive Powers
The Security Service is a civilian organisation
and its officers have no executive powers, such
as the authority to detain or arrest people. It is
not a ‘secret police force’.
Security Service investigations are shared with
the police or other law enforcement agencies
when there is a prospect of the arrest of people
who are committing or planning criminal
offences. In recent years, the Service has
developed and applied procedures which enable
its intelligence to be admitted as evidence in
criminal proceedings. In addition, the Service
may recommend to the Home Office or to the
Foreign Office that known terrorists or foreign
intelligence officers, for example, be refused
entry to the UK, or be deported or expelled.
However, the decision whether to do so lies
outside the Service.
The Geographical Remit of the
Security Service
Media reporting sometimes reveals confusion
about the geographical scope of the Service’s
work. Threats to national security often come
from abroad – for example, from foreign
intelligence services or from foreign terrorist
groups. Moreover, the scope of national
security extends beyond the British Isles:
British interests worldwide include diplomatic
premises and staff, British companies and
investments, and British citizens living or
travelling abroad. Security threats to British
interests anywhere in the world fall within the
scope of the Service’s functions as set out in
the Security Service Act. In dealing with security
threats overseas the Service cooperates closely
intelligence agencies.
Assassination
The Service does not kill people or arrange their
assassination. It is subject to the rule of law in
just the same way as other public bodies.
The Service’s Role in
Employment Vetting
The Service’s role in the vetting of candidates for
employment in sensitive posts is based solely on
checks against its records. Decisions on employing
staff are the responsibility of the department
concerned and the Service does not investigate or
interview candidates on their behalf.
The Security Service Act stipulates that the
Service may only disclose information for use
in deciding whether someone should be
employed in sensitive work if it does so in
accordance with arrangements approved by
the Home Secretary. If, on checking, the
Service finds that it has a substantial and
relevant security record on an applicant, it
may provide a summary assessment of the
security information. However, the mere
existence of a Security Service record does
not necessarily mean that an assessment will
be made. There is no ‘blacklist’.
Whitehall ‘Leak’ Inquiries
The Service does not carry out inquiries into
leaks of information from Government, except
where national security may be affected.
As part of its protective security role, it does
give advice to Government on security policy
and practice and its protective security section
39
carries out audits of security arrangements
within other departments on request. But it has
no ‘policing’ role.
Trade Unions and Pressure Groups
It has often been alleged that in the past the
Service systematically investigated trade unions
and various pressure groups, such as the
National Union of Mineworkers and the
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
The Service has never investigated people
simply because they were members or
office-holders of trade unions or campaigning
organisations. But subversive groups have in
the past sought to infiltrate and manipulate
such organisations as a way of exerting
political influence. To fulfil its function of
protecting national security, the Service
therefore investigated individual members
of bona fide organisations when there were
grounds to believe that their actions were
“intended to overthrow or undermine
parliamentary democracy by political,
industrial or violent means”. The Service
investigated the activities of the subversive
groups, but not the organisations they sought
to penetrate.
When the Security Service Bill was debated in
Parliament in 1988, the then Home Secretary,
Douglas Hurd, spelt out the basis for the
Service’s work in this area:
“It does not matter if . . . people have
views on the structure or organisation of
Parliament or if they are involved in
seeking to change industrial practices in
this country or to negotiate a better deal if
they are members of trade unions, or if
they seek to challenge or change the
Government’s policies relating to defence,
employment, foreign policy or anything else
. . . Its [the Service’s] sole criterion in
relation to a subversive threat is whether
there is a deliberate intention to undermine
parliamentary democracy and whether that
presents a real threat to the security of
the nation.”
The subversive threat to parliamentary
democracy in the UK is now negligible and the
Service accordingly has no current investigations
in this area.
The Royal Family, Ministers and other
Public Figures
The Service is sometimes alleged to be
responsible for routinely monitoring the
private lives of people because they have a
high public profile, including members of the
Royal Family, Government Ministers, and
Members of Parliament. This is not the case.
For example in 1993, the Prime Minister,
John Major, confirmed that the Service had
had no involvement in any interception of
the communications of members of the
Royal Family.
The Service only investigates individuals whose
activities fall within its statutory remit under
the Security Service Act.
The ‘Wilson Plot’
In his book Spycatcher, the former Security
Service officer Peter Wright claimed that up
to 30 members of the Service had plotted to
undermine the former Prime Minister Harold
Wilson. This allegation was exhaustively
investigated and it was concluded, as stated
publicly by Ministers, that no such plot had
ever existed. Wright himself finally admitted
in an interview with BBC1’s Panorama
programme in 1988 that his account had
been unreliable.
Sir Roger Hollis
It was claimed that former Director General of
the Security Service, Sir Roger Hollis, was a
Russian spy. The Trend inquiry of 1974 cleared
Hollis of that accusation. Subsequently, the
evidence of the former KGB officer Oleg
Gordievsky confirmed this judgment.
Illegal Telephone Tapping
The Service does not tap telephones illegally. In
carrying out interception it fully complies with
the provisions of the Interception of
Communications Act 1985.
Access to Security Service Files
No member of the public is permitted to see
any Security Service files, except for historical
records which have been declassified and
released by the Public Record Office.
Confidentiality is essential to protect details of
investigational and operational techniques and
to maintain the effectiveness of the Service. The
dangers that would be posed by, for example,
members of terrorist groups or foreign
intelligence services embarking on ‘fishing
expeditions’ in the Service’s records are obvious.
However, under the Security Service Act, anyone
who is “aggrieved by anything which he
believes that the Service has done in relation
to him” may complain to the Security Service
Tribunal. The Tribunal has
access to any information it requires to
adjudicate on a complaint.
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/mi5/ops.htm
Created by John Pike
Maintained by Steven Aftergood
Updated Thursday, August 06, 1998 6:30:35 PM
