Organization - Security Service MI5
The Security Service operates under the
statutory authority of the Secretary of State
(the Home Secretary), but it is not part of the
Home Office. In a democracy there is an inherent tension
between the existence of a Security Service with
intrusive investigative capabilities and the
preservation of individuals’ privacy. As long as
covert threats to the nation persist, the Service
may need to invade the privacy of a very small
minority in order to protect the security of the
great majority. But there must also be safeguards.
In addition to its own tightly drawn internal
controls, the Service is subject to the following
external oversight and accountability measures:
- The Director General is accountable under
the Security Service Act 1989 to the Home
Secretary. The Director General is appointed
by the Home Secretary in consultation with
the Prime Minister and is required to submit
a report to them annually. The Director
General is statutorily responsible for all
aspects of the operations and efficiency of
the Service, and for ensuring that it obtains
and discloses information only in accordance
with its functions under the Act.
- The Security Service Act provides for an
independent Tribunal, supported by a
Commissioner (a senior judge), to
investigate complaints about the Service
from members of the public. The
Commissioner is also responsible for
reviewing the issue by the Secretary of
State of Property Warrants under the
Intelligence Services Act 1994.
- The Interception of Communications Act
1985 also provides for a Tribunal,
supported by a Commissioner (also a
senior judge), to investigate complaints
about interception of telephone or postal
communications. The Commissioner is
also responsible for reviewing the issue
of interception warrants by the Secretary
of State.
- Under the Intelligence Services Act 1994,
the Service, together with SIS and GCHQ,
is overseen by the Intelligence and
Security Committee, a committee of
Parliamentarians, on matters of
expenditure, administration and policy.
- The Service’s performance, plans and
priorities are subject to external scrutiny
and validation by a senior Whitehall
committee, known as SO(SSPP), reporting
to Ministers.
The Director General has one Deputy who is
responsible for overseeing intelligence
operations. There are five branches, each headed
by a Director: three branches are engaged in
intelligence investigations and in advising on
protective measures to counter the various
threats; the other two are responsible for
intelligence collection, production and
information management, and for personnel,
security, finance and facilities management.
There is also a Legal Advisers’ department. In
addition, the Service fills the post of Director
and Coordinator of Intelligence (Northern
Ireland), who reports separately both to the
Director General and to the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland.
The Director General, Deputy Director General,
the Directors and the Legal Adviser meet
regularly as the Management Board of the
Service to consider policy and strategic issues.
In particular, the Management Board decides
how the priorities and organisation of the
Service should change to reflect shifts in the
pattern and intensity of threats.
The Service currently employs around 1,900
people (a full-time equivalent strength of
1,860), who are mostly based at its headquarters
at Millbank in central London. The Director
General has a Deputy who oversees intelligence
operations, and there are six Directors. The
Service is divided into branches, each headed by
a Director.
Oversight and Accountability
The Security Service Act 1989 sets out a number
of statutory mechanisms for the accountability
and control of the Service and its work. It:
- places the Service under the authority of
the Secretary of State (the Home Secretary);
- sets out the responsibilities of the
Director General; and
- provides for an independent Tribunal and
Commissioner to deal with complaints
about the Service from the public.
The Act also contained provisions, subsequently
incorporated into the Intelligence Services Act
1994, for the issue of warrants by the Secretary
of State authorising interference with property,
and for the review by the Commissioner of the
Secretary of State’s exercise of this function.
These statutory mechanisms have been
considered and endorsed by the European
Commission on Human Rights in a number of
applications under the European Convention on
Human Rights arising out of complaints to the
Security Service Tribunal. The Service is also
subject to various other forms of oversight and
accountability, notably:
- the provisions of the Interception of
Communications Act 1985, including
a Tribunal to handle complaints about
interception, and a Commissioner who
is responsible for reviewing the Secretary
of State’s exercise of his functions in
issuing warrants;
- oversight by the Intelligence and Security
Committee (ISC), a committee of
Parliamentarians which was established
under the Intelligence Services Act 1994;
- external review and validation of the
Service’s priorities and performance by
a senior Whitehall committee (SO(SSPP))
- Ministerial oversight of the Service’s
funding arrangements;
- scrutiny of the Service’s spending plans
by the Permanent Secretaries’ committee
on the Intelligence Services (PSIS), as part
of the budgetary process; and
- scrutiny by the National Audit Office,
which has access to any of the Service’s
financial records it requires.
The mechanisms for oversight of the Service have
undergone many changes throughout its history,
as different Governments have addressed the
particular requirements of the day. Originally
established under the Prime Minister’s authority,
and later under the Home Secretary with the
Maxwell-Fyfe Directive to the Service of 1952, the
Service is now accountable for its work via the
range of oversight arrangements described above.
The Roles of the Home Secretary and
the Director General
The Director General is appointed by the
Home Secretary, in consultation with the Prime
Minister. The Director General is personally
responsible for:
- the operations and efficiency of the Service;
- making an annual report on the work of
the Service to the Home Secretary and the
Prime Minister;
- ensuring that the Service is politically
impartial; and
- ensuring that the Service obtains and
discloses information only in accordance
with its statutory functions, or (in the
case of disclosure) for the purpose of
preventing or detecting serious crime,
or for the purpose of any criminal
proceedings.
The Director General’s responsibilities in this last
area are met by means of arrangements through
which the day-to-day work of the Service is
controlled. These internal mechanisms are
designed to ensure that the work of the Service
adheres to the principles that:
- the rule of law must be paramount; and
- that methods of investigation must be
proportionate to the threat and
authorised at an appropriate level.
The relationship between the Home Secretary and
the Director General is of great importance. The
Home Secretary receives briefing from the Director
General on threats to national security and
economic well-being and discusses with him or
her matters of policy affecting the Service – for
example, regarding resources or legislation. The
Home Secretary is briefed by the Director General
on major current investigations and has a close
knowledge of the most sensitive aspects of the
Service’s work through the procedure by which the
Home Secretary personally authorises warrants
allowing the Service to intercept letters or
telephone calls, or to interfere with property. The
Home Secretary also receives independent advice
and information from officials in the Home Office,
who maintain close working links with the Service.
The Intelligence and Security
Committee (ISC)
The Intelligence Services Act 1994 established the
Intelligence and Security Committee. Its remit is
“to examine the expenditure, administration and
policy” of the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ.
The Committee comprises nine Parliamentarians,
drawn from both the House of Commons and
the House of Lords. The Committee is
appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation
with the Leader of the Opposition. No member
may be a current Minister of the Crown. The
Committee makes an annual report to the Prime
Minister, who lays it before Parliament, subject
to any exclusions on security grounds.
The Director General of the Security Service (as
well as the Chief of SIS and the Director of
GCHQ) has a statutory duty to provide the ISC
with the information it requires. The agency
heads may only withhold information from the
Committee if it falls within certain categories of
‘sensitive’ information, as defined in the
Intelligence Services Act. This includes details
of sources, operations and methods, as well as
information provided in confidence by allied
foreign services. However, even such sensitive
material may be made available to the
Committee if the agency concerned considers
that it would be safe to do so.
A decision by the head of one of the agencies
to withhold sensitive information from the
Committee is subject to review by the Secretary
of State, who can order that it should be made
available if he or she considers it desirable in
the public interest.
The Security Service Tribunal
The Security Service Act 1989 provides for a
Tribunal to investigate complaints about the
Service from members of the public. The Tribunal
consists of three senior members of the legal
profession, appointed by Royal Warrant. Both the
Tribunal and the Commissioner are
independent of the Government. They visit the
Service to examine its records as necessary.
The Act states that anyone may complain to the
Tribunal “if he is aggrieved by anything which
he believes the Service has done in relation to
him or to any property of his”. The Tribunal
must first establish whether the complainant has
been the subject of enquiries by the Service. The
Tribunal obtains this information directly from
the Service, whose staff are under a legal duty
to produce whatever information is required.
They may also be interviewed by the Tribunal.
If the Tribunal finds that the Service has made
enquiries about a complainant, it must establish
whether the Service had reasonable grounds for
so doing. Similarly, it may be alleged that the
Service has disclosed information about the
complainant for use in vetting for employment.
If this proves to be the case, the Tribunal must
determine whether the Service had reasonable
grounds for believing the information to be true.
If a complaint is upheld the Tribunal must
notify the complainant and report its findings to
the Secretary of State and to the Commissioner.
The Tribunal also has the power to order that
enquiries be ended and records destroyed, and
that compensation be paid to the complainant.
Between the introduction of the Security Service
Act in 1989 and the end of 1997 the Tribunal
investigated 275 complaints. No complaint was
upheld. In the great majority of cases, the
complainants were unknown to the Service.
The Security Service Commissioner
The Security Service Act also established the office
of the Security Service Commissioner. One of the
Commissioner’s responsibilities is to review the
issue by the Secretary of State of property warrants
under the Intelligence Services Act. It is also the
Commissioner’s function, if a complainant to the
Tribunal alleges that the Service has interfered
with his or her property, to investigate whether a
property warrant was issued. If one was, he or she
must also establish whether the Secretary of State
acted properly in issuing it.
The Commissioner – a senior judge – has an
important additional function. If, on investigating
a complaint, the Tribunal concludes that it should
not be upheld, but nonetheless decides that there
should be an investigation into whether the
Service has in any other respect acted
unreasonably in relation to the complainant, it
may refer the matter to the Commissioner. The
Commissioner will then investigate and may report
the findings to the Secretary of State, who has the
power to take any appropriate remedial action.
The Commissioner makes an annual report
to the Prime Minister, who lays it before
Parliament, subject to any deletions judged
necessary on security grounds after consultation
with the Commissioner.
A number of Security Service procedures,
particularly concerning record-keeping, have
been adjusted in response to issues identified by
the Tribunal and subsequently investigated by
the Commissioner. In his annual report for
1991, the Commissioner commented that:
“There can be no doubt that the very
existence of the Tribunal as a body
empowered to investigate complaints provides
the Security Service with a strong additional
incentive to ensure that its procedures are
designed to eliminate the chance of a
complaint being found justified.”
The IOCA Tribunal and Commissioner
Similar arrangements exist under the Interception
of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA), to which
other agencies such as the police and HM
Customs and Excise are also subject. IOCA
established a Tribunal, supported by a
Commissioner, to deal with complaints from
anyone who believes their communications may
have been intercepted in breach of the Act. The
Tribunal, which consists of five senior members
of the legal profession, investigates whether a
warrant has been issued and, if so, whether the
requirements of the Act have been met. If it is
found that the Act has been breached, the
Tribunal must notify the applicant and report its
findings to the Prime Minister. The Tribunal may
also quash the warrant, order the destruction of
copies of intercepted communications and direct
the Secretary of State to pay compensation. In
none of the cases it has investigated has the
Tribunal found against the Service.
The Interception Commissioner, also a senior
judge, reviews the issue by the Secretary of
State of warrants under the Act, and also assists
the Interception Tribunal as required. He or she
regularly visits the Service to examine the
intelligence requirement for interception
warrants and to discuss individual cases. The
Commissioner reports annually to the Prime
Minister and may report at any time if it
appears that the requirements of the Act have
not been met. As for the Security Service Act
Commissioner, the IOCA Commissioner’s annual
report is laid by the Prime Minister before
Parliament, subject to any exclusions judged
necessary on security grounds.
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/mi5/org.htm
Maintained by Steven Aftergood
Created by John Pike
Updated Thursday, August 06, 1998 6:30:35 PM
