Threats - Security Service MI5
At any one time there is a range of threats of
differing types, which the Service must address
with finite resources. A key task for the Service
therefore is to ensure that resources are
allocated according to the nature and
comparative gravity of those threats. Annually,
the Service’s judgments on these matters are
validated externally, including by Ministers. The
chart below gives an idea of how the relative
proportions of the Service’s effort against the
main threats have varied since 1990.
Security threats to the UK have changed greatly
in recent years, most notably with the end of
the Cold War, which in turn ended the Service’s
long-standing focus on the very substantial
threat posed by the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies. In parallel, the threat
to British parliamentary democracy from
subversion diminished over a number of years
and is now negligible. However, the fall of the
Soviet bloc generated instability throughout
the former Soviet Union and beyond; that
instability and the loss of centralised control
added to other threats, including the proliferation
of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of
mass destruction, and the spread of organised
crime. Espionage against the UK has continued,
although the overall level of threat has reduced.
Terrorism has persisted throughout.
Terrorism
Since the late 1960s, the Security Service has
been involved in combating terrorist threats
to British interests, both within the UK and
overseas. The proportion of the Service’s
resources devoted to countering both Northern
Ireland-related and international terrorism has
increased substantially over the years. In recent
years terrorist attacks of all kinds worldwide have
averaged almost 60 a month, so terrorism is
likely to remain a focus of activity by the Service.
Countering terrorism is a complex task, not
least because of the difficulty of obtaining
accurate information about the intentions and
activities of secretive and sometimes highly
organised groups, many of which are based in
inaccessible areas overseas, sometimes under the
protection of regimes whose interests they also
serve. The collective effort – both nationally
and internationally – as well as the techniques
involved, have had to keep pace with the
increasing sophistication of terrorists and their
operating methods.
In an open and democratic society, the initial
advantage is likely to lie with the terrorists. In
particular, there are limits to what can be done
to prevent attacks which are planned and
launched from abroad. The Service’s principal
objective is therefore, over time, to erode the
capacity of terrorist groups to initiate and
sustain campaigns against British interests and
those of Britain’s allies. There have been
significant successes – many of them invisible
to the public – in preventing acts of terrorism
both in the UK and abroad, in helping law
enforcement agencies to arrest terrorists and in
otherwise disrupting their activities.
Terrorism related to Northern Ireland
Between 1969, when the most recent phase
of the Troubles began in Northern Ireland, and
April 1998, more than 3,000 people lost their
lives, and more than 30,000 were injured as a
result of terrorist violence. Substantial economic
damage has also been caused. In addition to
the human casualties, the cost of city-centre
bombings, such as those in the City of London
in April 1992 and April 1993, in London’s
docklands in February 1996 and in Manchester
in June 1996, was substantial.
The main terrorist organisations on the
republican side – the Provisional IRA (PIRA),
Republican Sinn Fein’s ‘military wing’, which
calls itself the ‘Continuity IRA’, and the Irish
National Liberation Army (INLA) – have sought,
by violent means, to create a unified republic in
the island of Ireland. Although they have been
most active in Northern Ireland, republican
terrorist groups, especially PIRA, have carried
their attacks to the British mainland and to the
continent of Europe. Foreign nationals as well
as British subjects have been killed and injured
as a result. British politicians have been killed
and on two occasions PIRA has attempted to
kill members of the Cabinet: the bombing of
the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton
in 1984 and the mortar attack on Downing
Street in 1991.
Northern Irish loyalist paramilitary organisations,
notably the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the
Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), have all been
involved in a violent campaign in response to
what they claim to regard as the threat posed
to the protestant community in Northern
Ireland by republican terrorism. Much of their
activity has been essentially sectarian in
character, often resulting in the random murder
of Catholics who may have no connections of
any kind with republican terrorism. Before the
ceasefire declarations in August 1994, loyalist
groups were murdering more people than PIRA.
Both loyalist and republican groups, especially
PIRA, have for some years sought support from
outside the island of Ireland to sustain their
campaigns of violence. Such support has
included the provision of weapons and finance.
PIRA’s principal supplier during the 1980s was
Libya, but the organisation has also acquired
weaponry and related equipment via
sympathisers in North America; through thefts;
and from the arms black market in Europe.
Other groups have been less ambitious, relying
mainly on small scale purchases from dealers
and criminal contacts. Funds have frequently
been obtained through criminal activities in
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland,
but they have also been obtained further afield
– for example by loyalist groups in Britain and
by republican groups from sympathisers overseas.
In Northern Ireland the Security Service works
in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in
respect of Irish-related terrorism. On the
mainland of Great Britain, the Security Service
was given lead responsibility for intelligence
work against Irish republican terrorism in 1992.
This role was in addition to its existing work
against loyalist terrorist activity on the mainland
and against all overseas manifestations of
Irish-related terrorism (such as weapons
procurement and PIRA attacks in Europe).
Between 1992 and April 1998, the Service’s
work with the police against Irish republican
terrorism resulted in 18 convictions for serious
terrorist-related offences. Many intended
attacks, including large city-centre bombings,
were prevented. In addition, various attempts by
loyalist terrorists to obtain weaponry from the
mainland have been disrupted in joint
operations with the police.
The Service’s work on the threat from terrorism
relating to Northern Ireland is set against the
backdrop of political developments, including,
significantly, the agreement reached in
April 1998 which set out the basis for a political
settlement, subject to referendums North and
South of the border. As with all of its work, the
Service monitors closely any changes in the
nature and level of the threat, including that
posed by groups opposed to the peace process
(such as the recently created 32 County
Sovereignty Committee), and makes adjustments
to the effort deployed accordingly.
International Terrorism
For many years the UK has also been exposed
to the threat of terrorism originating overseas.
British interests, and the interests of its friends
and allies, have been threatened and attacked
at home and abroad. Nationalist or separatist
struggles in Europe, North Africa, the Middle
East, the Indian sub-continent and the Far East
have given rise to such terrorism, while
minorities, religious extremists and others have
used violent methods to advance their causes. As
an illustration, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group
(GIA) has been responsible for widespread
massacres in Algeria itself, as well as a series of
bombs in France in 1995; the Palestinian group
HAMAS mounted a series of suicide bomb
attacks in Israel; and Egyptian terrorists carried
out three major attacks on tourist buses between
1995 and 1997, as well as an attack on tourists
in Luxor in November 1997 in which 58 people
(including six Britons) were murdered. These and
other similar groups have supporters in the UK.
Britain’s involvement in multi-national
peacekeeping and similar international
initiatives – such as in the Gulf and in former
Yugoslavia – has also resulted in a terrorist
threat to British interests. For example,
buildings used by British and allied forces were
the targets of large vehicle-bomb attacks in
Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996.
British citizens and businesses are vulnerable to
terrorism, both as targets in their own right and
as bystanders to others’ quarrels. British soldiers,
officials, business people and tourists have all
been the victims of terrorism. As well as
widely-reported events such as the July 1994
bomb attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in
London, recent years have seen Britons involved
in terrorist-related kidnappings in Kashmir,
Indonesia, Colombia, Chechnya, Yemen and
Cambodia, and caught up in the terrorist
seizure of the Japanese Ambassador’s residence
in Lima in December 1996. In addition, some
terrorist groups and their supporters have
sought to use Britain as a place to raise funds,
procure equipment and recruit new members –
activities which are in themselves usually
non-violent, but which can often contribute
significantly to terrorism elsewhere.
Some states have used – and some continue
to use – terrorism as an instrument of foreign
policy, either by means of their intelligence
services or through sponsorship of surrogate
terrorist groups. For example, the investigation
of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie in 1988 resulted in warrants being
issued for the arrest of two Libyan officials,
believed to have been involved in the attack. The
targets of state terrorism have also included their
own dissidents and émigrés. State sponsorship
has included the provision of weapons, training,
finance and refuge to terrorists.
Like other industrialised states, the UK has been
affected by developments in technology, and
particularly in information technology and
military weaponry, which give terrorists access
to greater sophistication and know-how than
a generation ago. The Security Service needs
to keep abreast of these developments in
order to continue to counter the threat posed.
In addition, the Service investigates any
indications that terrorists or other extremists
might be developing or trying to obtain
chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological
materials as terrorist weapons.
As in the field of Northern Ireland-related
terrorism, the Security Service works closely with
UK law enforcement agencies and with overseas
security and intelligence services to disrupt
terrorist activity – not only specific attacks,
where pre-emptive intelligence permits, but also
the procurement of weapons and funds. Recent
years have seen both kinds of disruption
successfully employed against UK-based
terrorists or their supporters. In responding to
terrorist attacks against British interests
overseas, the Security Service works closely with
the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and with
both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) and the British mission in the country
concerned. The Service also advises the FCO
and other relevant government departments
on the changing terrorist threats to British
interests abroad.
Espionage
During the Cold War the Security Service
devoted much of its effort to countering the
skilful and well-resourced intelligence services
of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.
The collapse of Soviet communism in 1991 and
the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought
fundamental changes to this area of the
Service’s work. Most Central and East European
Intelligence Services, formerly little more than
Soviet surrogates, were reformed to serve new,
democratically elected governments. The
Security Service, along with other western
security and intelligence agencies, took the
opportunity to assist many of them in their
efforts to reorganise and reorientate their work
and functions. This assistance included advice
on how to integrate their intelligence machinery
within the framework of a democratic system of
government. These new relationships have
developed to allow the exchange of information
on subjects of shared concern, such as
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
A range of countries seek to advance their
political, economic and military objectives using
covert methods against the UK, and the
spectrum of interests on which they are seeking
to gather information is wider than in the past.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and the
UK have developed a new and increasingly
cooperative relationship. Despite this, however,
Russia has retained its substantial and active
overseas intelligence collection effort. After a
period of retrenchment in the early 1990s, both
the civilian and military Russian intelligence
services renewed their efforts to send
intelligence officers to London. A number
of cases illustrate the continuing Russian
espionage threat in the 1990s: in the UK,
Michael John Smith, who worked for electronics
companies engaged in sensitive government
work; in the US, Aldrich Ames (CIA), Harold
James Nicholson (CIA) and Earl Edwin Pitts
(FBI); and Francis Temperville, a former
employee in the Directorate of Military Affairs at
the Atomic and Energy Commission in France.
All of these were convicted of spying for Russia.
The Security Service’s counter-espionage work is
focused on:
- investigating leads that may result in the
identification of spies who are providing
foreign countries with sensitive information
damaging to the UK’s national security or
economic well-being; and
- disrupting the activities of those foreign
intelligence officers who ‘talent-spot’ and
recruit as agents individuals who have
access to British secrets.
A few of the spies who have been identified in
the UK in the past were controlled directly from
abroad, but the great majority have been run by
foreign intelligence officers based in this country.
Historically, the Government has insisted that
nationals of certain countries obtain visas before
being allowed to enter the UK. This allows the
Service to recommend, where necessary, that a
visa be refused on national security grounds.
Over the years, this precaution has severely
hampered foreign intelligence services in their
efforts to place intelligence officers in the UK
to recruit and run agents.
As well as those who work under cover of
postings in the diplomatic community, foreign
intelligence officers have also tried to gain
access to sensitive information in the UK by
masquerading as trade officials, businessmen or
members of scientific delegations. The greater
flexibility of modern travel and the growing
emphasis on the acquisition of sensitive
commercial, economic and technical information,
mean that foreign intelligence services may
increasingly use short-term visits of this sort as
cover for their intelligence operations.
On their home ground, or in other countries
where they encounter little opposition from the
local security agencies, foreign intelligence
services are able to be far more aggressive in
their espionage efforts against British interests.
Consequently, for many years the Service has
worked with other government departments,
especially the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and the Ministry of Defence, to protect
government personnel and premises overseas
from espionage attack.
Proliferation
Since 1992 the Service has played a part in
countering the threat posed by the spread of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), namely
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and
their strategic means of delivery (usually ballistic
missiles). The collapse of the former Soviet
Union has led to increased dangers in this area.
The sale of WMD components and missiles is an
attractive source of revenue for economically
hard-pressed countries. There are ready buyers,
particularly in the Middle East, for materials
either to rebuild confiscated stocks or to
provide a deterrent against an aggressive
neighbour. More than 20 countries are currently
seeking to evade international controls to
develop WMD capability. Some are hostile to
the UK and its allies; some have unstable
regimes. Iraq’s use of chemical weapons
in the past has been well publicised.
There is therefore a substantial threat from
proliferation which goes far wider than the UK.
The response of the international community in
seeking to prevent proliferation is expressed in
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under
which the UK, as a signatory, has a duty to act
against proliferators. The direct threat to the
UK is twofold: first, that UK armed forces will
be exposed to the threat of WMD when
deployed overseas; and secondly, that the UK
will itself come within reach as longer-range
missiles are acquired by potentially hostile or
unstable countries.
Much of the material, technology and expertise
required for WMD programmes can be found in
the UK. Although the UK has stringent export
18 controls in place, the countries that are trying
to procure equipment and know-how use
increasingly sophisticated, covert and devious
methods to circumvent these controls. These
include the use of front companies and
middlemen, and of students sent to the UK for
postgraduate study. There are also increasing
indications of the use of non-proliferating
countries as apparent destinations for
WMD-related materials, which are then shipped
on to their true customers.
The Security Service, acting in cooperation with
other government departments and agencies, aims
to counter proliferation activity in the UK by:
- investigating attempts by proliferator
countries to procure materials and
expertise from the UK which could aid
WMD programmes;
- investigating the potential benefits to
WMD programmes that students and
academics from countries of concern may
obtain from study in the UK (the
intangible transfer of technology). When
necessary the Service may advise that
such students and academics should be
refused entry to the UK; and
- visiting UK companies, chambers of
commerce, universities, and professional
and trade associations to raise their
awareness of the activities and
requirements of proliferator countries, and
to obtain information on their dealings
with them. For instance, more than 700
companies have been visited since the
start of the programme in 1992.
Serious Crime
On 14 October 1996 new legislation extended
the Service’s statutory remit to include
supporting the law enforcement agencies in
work on serious crime. This change in the
Service’s remit reflected the Government’s
intention that Security Service expertise should
also be deployed in the fight against serious
crime. The Service’s work in this area has been
financed from within existing Service resources.
The 1996 legislation makes it clear that the
primary responsibility for work against serious
crime remains with law enforcement agencies.
Close working relationships with those agencies,
including the National Criminal Intelligence
Service (NCIS) are therefore central to the way
that the Service carries out its work in this area.
The legislation requires there to be
arrangements governing how the Service fulfils
its role in serious crime work. Under these
arrangements, the Service is tasked to take on
investigations on a case-by-case basis, where it
is agreed that its particular skills, knowledge or
capabilities are likely to help the investigation.
The Service will then bring to bear its
investigative capabilities as required, with a view
to assisting the law enforcement agency to
collect the necessary intelligence.
Subversion
Subversion in the UK is essentially an historical
phenomenon. The Security Service Act does not
use the term ‘subversion’, but provides a
definition of it by reference to actions which are
“intended to overthrow or undermine
parliamentary democracy by political,
19
industrial or violent means”. The concept of
subversion was therefore focused on hostility to
the democratic process. It embraced both
extreme left wing (Communist, Trotskyist) and
extreme right wing (Fascist) subversive groups,
and included those whose allegiance lay with
countries hostile to the UK. Historically, Britain
faced a very real threat from subversive
organisations which sought to undermine
parliamentary democracy – and had the
capability to do so – most notably during the
Cold War. Indeed some of these organisations
made no secret of their intentions. Their
activities were of concern to successive
governments and were an important subject of
attention by the Security Service. A particular
focus of this work was to deny members of
such groups access to sensitive government
information. This was achieved through the
vetting process announced in 1948 by the
Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.
Subversive groups (including, in the past,
Communist organisations) have sought to
infiltrate and manipulate bona fide
organisations, such as trade unions or pressure
groups, as a way of exercising influence out of
proportion to any support they could achieve
through the ballot box. The Service investigated
the activities of the subversive groups, but not
the organisations they sought to penetrate. The
Service never investigated people merely
because they were members of trade unions or
because they campaigned on particular issues
such as nuclear disarmament.
Since the late 1980s, and particularly following
the end of the Cold War, the threat from
subversive organisations to British parliamentary
democracy has declined and is now insignificant.
Protective Security
The Service also works to reduce the
vulnerability to those threats through its
contribution to the protection of government
assets and the UK’s critical infrastructure. This
aspect of the Service’s work is integral to its
function of protecting national security.
Protective security is concerned with protecting
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
information and other important assets. It
encompasses such problems as how to protect
against acts of terrorism; against unauthorised
access to buildings or computer systems; and
against eavesdropping or interception of sensitive
communications. The work has many aspects,
including advising on locks and cabinets, passes
and passwords, building structures, guards,
fences, walls and intruder detection systems. It
includes vetting arrangements for those who are
authorised to have access to the protected assets,
making them aware of threats and encouraging
them to act securely. It also includes contingency
planning, for when things go wrong. The
Security Service provides specialist advice to
Government on all of these matters. Its role is
threefold: assessing the threats, advising on
policy and practice and assisting with the
security planning of major projects or
important installations.
Protective measures must be appropriate to the
threat. The Service’s intelligence branches
identify and, as far as possible, take action to
counter specific threats to national security.
They also study the ways in which hostile
organisations operate: for example, the modus
operandi of terrorist organisations and the kind
of weapons they employ; and the methods used
by foreign intelligence services, together with
the types of intelligence they are trying to
acquire. Such information provides the basis for
assessments of the level and type of threat to
individual departments and the assets they
hold. Taking into account additionally the
number of security incidents, such as computer
viruses and hacking, theft or accident, the
Service is able to provide assessments of the
nature and extent of different kinds of threat
which need to be protected against.
The development and coordination of the
Government’s central policy framework on
protective security is the responsibility of the
Cabinet Office. The Service provides specialist
advice on the practical development of that
policy. Where security of IT systems is
concerned, the Service operates jointly with the
Communications-Electronics Security Group in
GCHQ. Within the Government’s central
framework each department is responsible for
the security of the assets it holds and is
required to identify the risks to those assets,
drawing on the threat assessments provided by
the Service. They then implement security
measures to reduce vulnerability to these risks
in the most cost-effective way. The Service is
able to provide guidance on how to do this,
but responsibility for identifying risks and
implementing security measures rests with the
department itself.
The Service also advises certain organisations
outside central government. For example, it
advises those parts of industry which are involved
in sensitive government defence and other
contracts. It also advises those elements of
commerce and industry whose services and
products are of critical national importance:
those which, if damaged, would cause
unacceptable economic disruption, widespread
loss of services or serious hazard to the public.
The industries concerned include air, rail and sea
transport, oil, gas, water, telecommunications,
power generation and distribution, and banking.
Vetting
The purpose of personnel security measures,
of which vetting forms a part, is to provide an
acceptable level of assurance that people with
authorised access to sensitive government
information or valuable assets will not abuse
that access – for example, by passing secret
information to a foreign government, or using
it for personal financial advantage. As with
protective security as a whole, overall policy in
this area is set by Government, while individual
departments have responsibility for their own
security within the framework of that policy.
This means that departments conduct their own
background enquiries (such as police record
checks, references, interviews etc) on applicants
to sensitive posts and make their own decisions
on whether or not to employ particular
individuals. The Security Service does the same
for its own staff. The vetting process is overt:
security clearance cannot be sought for an
individual without his or her consent.
Since before the Second World War, the Security
Service has assisted government departments
and organisations by providing a service of
record-checks on candidates for sensitive posts.
In 1948 the Attlee Government formally
introduced security vetting aimed at excluding
both communists and fascists from positions
where they might damage the security of the
state. In support of this policy, during the Cold
War the Service sought to identify members of
subversive organisations. The ending of the Cold
War has substantially altered the view that is
taken of individuals with a record of
involvement in various subversive organisations,
and in recent years the main emphasis has been
on protecting government information and
important installations from individuals with
terrorist connections. The policy of vetting for
sensitive positions in government was
reaffirmed in 1994 by the Prime Minister,
John Major.
The Security Service Act 1989 stipulates that
the Service may disclose information for use in
deciding whether someone should be employed
only if it does so in accordance with
arrangements approved by the Home Secretary.
Under those arrangements, if the Service finds
that it has a relevant record on a candidate for
a sensitive post, it will make a brief summary
assessment of the suitability of the individual
purely on security grounds. In the vast majority
of cases, the Service has no record of the
individual concerned. The existence of a record
does not necessarily imply that an adverse
assessment will be submitted. In 1997 the
Service gave assessments in fewer than 0.1% of
the vetting cases submitted by departments for
checks, the majority relating to some degree of
connection with terrorism or espionage.
The Security Service’s role in the vetting of an
individual by a government department is based
solely on its records – the Service does not
investigate or interview candidates for sensitive
posts, nor does it look into aspects of their
character or behaviour. Even where the Service
does disclose information in response to a
vetting check, its assessment may contain the
judgment that the information need not on its
own prevent the candidate from having
sensitive access. In those cases the department
considers whether it has other grounds for
doubting reliability before reaching a decision.
In respect of the Service’s contribution to
vetting by departments, the oversight
arrangements that form part of the Security
Service Act 1989 provide recourse to the
Security Service Tribunal. The
Tribunal’s responsibilities include the
investigation of complaints from individuals
who believe that the Service has improperly
disclosed information about them in a
vetting context:
“If and so far as the complainant alleges that
the Service has disclosed information for use
in determining whether he should be
employed, or continue to be employed, by any
person or in any office or capacity specified
by him, the Tribunal shall investigate whether
the Service has disclosed information for that
purpose and, if the Tribunal finds that it has
done so, they shall determine whether the
Service had reasonable grounds for believing
the information to be true.”
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/mi5/threats.htm
Created by John Pike
Maintained by Steven Aftergood
Updated Thursday, August 06, 1998 6:30:35 PM
