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BASE CLOSURES (Senate - June 17, 1991)

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Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have been looking for some time that I might speak without interrupting the Senate's other business concerning the matter of the base closure law and some really startling developments as they relate to the Philadelphia Navy Yard. When I make these comments, obviously as a Pennsylvania Senator, I am vitally concerned about what happens to an installation in my State, but I make the comments about the Philadelphia Navy Yard because of its established value to national defense.

We have just been through a traumatic experience in the gulf war where it is claimed that air power was the critical factor in our victory there. Much of the air power flew off aircraft carriers in the region, and those carriers, to a substantial extent, were rehabilitated under the Philadelphia Navy Yard's service life extension programs.

When the Congress passed the base closure procedures pursuant to a decision by the Congress with the executive to downsize the Department of Defense by some 25 percent over 5 years, there were specific provisions enacted to provide standards and basic fairness in the decisions which were to be made. I submit, Mr. President, that as a result of disclosures which have come to light earlier this month, the Department of the Navy has failed to disclose relevant information in what amounts to grossly inappropriate conduct. I would characterize it only in that manner at this point. The specifics will become clear as I outline precisely what has happened.

Mr. President, a starting point, although not really the beginning point, would be a letter which I sent to the Secretary of the Navy on April 19, 1991, where I asked for certain information which demonstrated that there had been a deviation from the base closure criteria.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of that letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, there was concern expressed by a number of us, both in the House and in the Senate, concerning what was happening with respect to the information provided by the Department of Defense. Then the General Accounting Office published a report on May 5, 1991 which has portions which are very pertinent to what we are considering at this moment. At page 46, the General Accounting Office said as follows:

Due to the limited documentation of its process, we also could not assess the reasonableness of the Navy's reocmmendation for closures. However, we reviewed and recalculated the Navy's ship berthing capacity analysis and found that excess capacity would remain even with the closure of the recommended bases.

The Navy's Base Structure Committee, which was charged with making base closure realignment recommendations, began its review of the Navy's basing structure in late January 1991. However, the committee did not fully explain its process to us until May 7, 1991, when it informed us that after review of data prepared by its working group the Base Structure Committee decided that much of its data were biased in favor of keeping bases open and were inadequate for an objective assessment of the Navy's basing needs.

I underscore, Mr. President, the GAO's conclusion that the data was `inadequate for an objective assessment of the Navy's basing needs.'

Then at page 48 the General Accounting Office report specified three reasons that the Navy's process were inadequate.

First, due to a lack of supporting documentation, the GAO `could not determine the basis for the committee's military value ratings for Navy installations.' Next the GAO found that in explanation committee members stated that `not all yellows are equal' and `not all greens are equal,' which was the coding system. So the very basics of the Department of the Navy's conclusions were muddled. And, last, the GAO concluded, `although required by the Office of the Secretary of Defense policy guidance to develop and implement an internal control plan for its base structure reviews, the Navy did not assign responsibility for developing and implementing such a plan.'

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks the full text of pages 46 and 48 be included in the Congressional Record, which will save time in the presentation at this moment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

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Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair again.

Mr. President, I later wrote Secretary of Defense Cheney by letter dated May 17, 1991, because of a failure of the Department of the Navy to provide information, and this letter bears upon the sequence of events. So I ask unanimous consent at this point that the full text of the letter be printed at the conclusion of my remarks which will enable me to abbreviate the comments at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, a report was made to me by Mr. Morrie Ruffin of my staff about his continuing efforts to secure information from the Department of the Navy, and his finding that the Navy may have made a calculation not to answer our request until May 24, 1991. The relevancy of that day is that the Base Closure Commission had scheduled a hearing for May 22, in Washington, and a hearing in Philadelphia for May 24. If I did not receive the information until May 24, it would be too late for me to use that information in the presentation of arguments. It is obviously an indispensable matter for due process to have the information to use in argumentation before the Base Closure Commission in objecting to the closure of the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

Mr. President, we could not receive a copy of that routing slip because the Navy refused to let Mr. Ruffin have it. This sequence is set forth in some detail in a memorandum from Mr. Morrie Ruffin to me dated May 15, 1991, where Mr. Ruffin pointed out `He then mentioned to me that he had a copy of a routing slip attached to the letter which gave a due date for the response of May 24, 1991.' But when Mr. Ruffin asked for a copy of the transmittal memo it was refused.

Again my comments can be abbreviated by including this full memo at the conclusion of my remarks. So I ask unanimous consent that it be included at the conclusion of my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 4.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, slightly out of sequence but relevant structurally, I later obtained a copy of this memorandum from former Secretary of the Navy, Will Ball which shows conclusively that the Navy's intent to answer the inquiries of my letter of April 19, 1991, was to have a response on May 24, 1991, which as I have noted precluded my using the information in scheduled hearings on May 22d and May 24th. I ask unanimous consent that this routing slip be included in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 5.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, in the context of what was happening I was gravely concerned and decided to take this matter up directly with the Secretary of Defense. And there was fortuitously scheduled on May 21, a meeting of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee where Secretary of Defense Cheney was scheduled to testify for his one appearance, which in the tradition of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is scheduled at the conclusion of the other hearings.

At that time, Mr. President, I raised the matter with the Secretary of Defense and handed him a letter, which is very brief, as follows:

Dear Dick: I have decided to hand you this letter with the enclosed memo at today's hearing to be certain you get it forthwith. I am very, very concerned about the Navy's department routing slip which gives a due date of May 24th to my letter of April 19th, 1991, since the response would be too late for my presentation on the Philadelphia Navy yard at either the Washington hearing of May 22nd or the Philadelphia hearing of May 24th. I would appreciate your personal review of the situation and your prompt response with a copy to Secretary of the Navy Garrett.

Later that day, I received a one-page response from the Secretary of the Navy which on its face obviously was totally inadequate. So that the Record may be complete, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Garrett to me dated May 21, 1991, together with an enclosed chart be included in the Record at the conclusion of my comments.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 6.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, on the face of this record, when the Base Closure Commission had its hearing on May 22, 1991, where the evidence was conclusive that the Navy had deliberately withheld information until after the Base Closure Commission hearing on May 22, and did not plan to provide the information to me until May 24, I made a very strong charge which I think was totally supported by the facts: At the May 24 hearing with the Base Closure Commission, I said that the Navy was guilty of fraud, which is the intentional withholding of relevant material. That is a strong charge but I said that and I repeat it today, because I think the facts support it.

Later on May 22, the Base Closure Commission released two documents which supported the assertions I had made about the Navy's failure to reveal relevant documents. It is my conclusion that the Base Closure Commission had these prepared in advance but they fit hand in glove with the assertions, with the representations and arguments which I have made earlier.

One document, Mr. President, said that the Base Closure Commission found `gaps of information in the Navy process'; that the `staff learned that the Navy's BSC applied--that is the Navy's Base Structure Committee--a great deal of undocumented subjective judgment to a major Navy facility study'; that `despite general explanations of the process, the Commission is still unable to determine if the subjective judgment of the Navy's group was applied fairly and consistently to all bases in all categories in accordance with the force structure plan and the Department of Defense criteria mandated by law.'

I ask unanimous consent that the full two-page text be included again at the conclusion of my floor statement today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 7.)

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, then there was an additional document captioned `Chairman Courter today released the following statement'--and it specifies in part `On Monday of this week, members of the Commission staff met for 4 1/2 hours with the Navy's base closure group in an effort to determine how their conclusions were reached.'

Then he goes on to say, `The Navy group employed a great deal of subjective judgment in drawing up their list of recommendations for closure and alignment.'

Further, Chairman Courter's statement said, `GAO and the commission staff have pointed to an alarming lack of information about the Navy's decisionmaking process.'

Mr. President, following the May 22 hearing, where I concluded the Navy had engaged in fraud, and the Base Closure Commission itself had supported the conclusive fact that the Navy had not been as forthcoming with the materials as they should have been, many members of the Pennsylvania delegation and I then continued to try to find out precisely what the underlying facts were. We then had access to materials which were supposed to have been in the files of the Department of the Navy, which the Department of Navy had never given to us, and which supported the conclusion that the Philadelphia Navy Yard should remain open.

On June 4, 1991, Congressman Weldon and I met with Department of the Navy personnel and some staff from the Base Closure Commission and went through, in a very protracted meeting lasting almost 2 hours, our sense that the Navy had withheld specific information and that there was a document where a recommendation had been made by responsible naval personnel that the Philadelphia Navy Yard should be kept open.

I then returned, Mr. President, the next day, on June 5, late in the afternoon. The Senate was in session, and we were voting until close to 6 o'clock. I met on that day again with Navy personnel and, at that time, confronted them with a page from a document which had not been turned over to me, or others requesting information. Page 10 of the document, Mr. President, stated:

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Closure of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, without retention of the large carrier-capable docks, creates a shortfall in dry dock capability for emergent docking of aircraft carriers. The only other carrier capable drydock available on the East Coast under Navy control is at Norfolk Naval Shipyard.

And then the memorandum goes on to point out, `The cost of providing a dedicated dock under contract is considered prohibitive.' The upshort of this memorandum, Mr. President, is a factual basis saying that the Philadelphia Navy Yard should remain open.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this be printed at the end of my floor statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kerrey). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 8.)

Mr. SPECTER. After confronting the naval officials present at the meeting, they then gave me a report which contained that page and other pages, with a letter of transmittal dated 5 June 1991.

I emphasize and repeat that this was not given to me until after I had confronted them with the document and the page just referred to.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the cover letter from Admiral Lang to me dated June 5, 1991, be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 9.)

Mr. SPECTER. Two key pages of a very voluminous document, which I am not including in the Record at this time because it is too voluminous, but one key page contains a percentage utilization at naval shipyard dry docks, which shows conclusively that there would be utilization way in excess of 70 percent, which is the standard the Navy has sought to comply with so there would be at least a 30-percent vacancy for emergencies.

I ask unanimous consent that this page be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 10.)

Mr. SPECTER. Here is the cover sheet specified in a letter from Admiral Claman, Commander of Naval Systems Command, Chief of Naval Operations, recommending option two, that the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard be left open.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 11.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, it seems to me just astounding that, given the status of the law and the requirement that the Navy provide interested members of the Pennsylvania delegation, or other interested parties, including the Base Closure Commission, the Navy would in fact not make such documentation available.

That prompted me to write to the Secretary of Defense on June 6, 1991, asking for his immediate personal action. Let me read a couple of paragraphs:

Dear Secretary of Defense Cheney, I urge your immediate personal action on serious wrongful conduct by Department of Navy personnel in withholding critical information favorable to the Philadelphia Navy Yard. We have now caught Navy personnel redhanded in concealing data which supports keeping the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard open.

On June 4, 1991--

And then I recite the activities Congressman Weldon and I had undertaken, and I recite the critical documents, and then I conclude with the handwritten notation:

Mr. Secretary, this is not evidence of a smoking gun. This is evidence of a firing gun.

Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Navy, relevant naval personnel, and members of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey delegations.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter of June 6, 1991, to Secretary Cheney, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 12.)

Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent that my letter of the same date to the Defense Base Closure Commission also be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 13.)

Mr. SPECTER. Congressman Weldon, Mr. President, then supplemented these findings by locating additional data which favored keeping the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard open. And Congressman Weldon made those documents available to the Base Closure Commission by a letter dated June 13, 1991.

I ask unanimous consent that Congressman Weldon's letter be printed in the Record following my floor statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 14.)

Mr. SPECTER. Congressman Weldon forwarded to the Base Closure Commission a memorandum from Admiral Hekman dated December 19, 1990, which said:

While I realize that the Secretary has been briefed and has concurred with the proposal to mothball the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, I strongly recommend that this decision be reconsidered.

Admiral Hekman went on to say that the Philadelphia Shipyard ought to be kept open.

I ask unanimous consent that Admiral Hekman's memo be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 15.)

Mr. SPECTER. Admiral Hekman submitted an additional memorandum dated March 15, 1991, where he says in part:

I continue to take the position that retention of a credible repair capability at Philadelphia for naval shipyards homeported in the northeastern area is the most cost-effective solution.

I ask unanimous consent that Admiral Hekman's memorandum dated March 15, 1991, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my floor statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 16.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the documentation by Admiral Hekman shows in addition to the concealment by the Department of the Navy facts and materials supportive of keeping the Philadelphia Navy Shipyard open. It shows, in addition, a prejudgment by the Department of the Navy that the Secretary had already made his mind up on December 19, 1990, without going through the procedures mandated by law, and that that decision remained in effect on March 15, 1991.

We are looking further into the specifics, of the legal requirement of due process, that the Philadelphia Navy Shipyard should have an opportunity to present those arguments without the prejudgment having been made by the Secretary of the Navy in what has been a bias all along for a nuclear Navy.

Mr. President, I have taken some time to outline what has occurred before the Base Closure Commission and what has occurred with the categorical refusal of the Department of the Navy to turn over to this Senator and other Members of Congress information which we had a right to in advance of the Commission arguments on May 22 and May 24.

At this juncture, the procedures followed by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy are fatally flawed. The only appropriate course at this juncture, which I have asked for in the letter to the Secretary of Defense, dated June 6, 1991, is to take the Philadelphia Navy Yard off the base closing list.

But there are issues here that go far beyond what is going to happen to any single installation. These are issues which touch the integrity of the Department of the Navy in failing to turn over documentation at the request of this Senator, and in a calculated way, scheduling the turnover of that information on May 24; and then in the failure to turn over documents which are supportive of keeping the Philadelphia Navy Yard open.

Mr. President, I had said to the Navy officials at the June 4 meeting that we are all on the same team; we are all working for the people of the United States of America. And if the facts support closing any particular installation, so be it. But it is inappropriate, wrongful, and unconscionable for the Department of the Navy to fail to turn over information to Members of Congress, Members of the Senate and Members of the House, that we have a right to see in formulating our own judgment as to whether the Navy shipyards should stay open, and in formulating our arguments to be presented to the Base Closure Commission.

This is a matter where I have not yet heard from the Secretary of Defense. This is a matter which may require action by the inspector general of the Department of Defense. But the people of the United States are entitled to answers as to how the Department of Defense is proceeding clearly in violation of the base closure law.

I make these facts available at this time so that my colleagues may have the availability of them, so that the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense may see that we continue to press for this important information and ultimately for an accounting by the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense for this grossly inappropriate conduct.

I thank the Chair.

I yield the floor.

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Exhibit 1

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, April 19, 1991.

Hon. H. Lawrence Garrett III,
Secretary, Department of the Navy, The Pentagon, Washington, DC.

Dear Secretary Garrett: Upon reviewing the `detailed analysis' that the Navy is using as justification for making its base closure recommendations, I am extremely concerned by what looks to be a significant deviation from the base closure criteria.

According to Navy documents, during a process called Phase I, all installations were to be evaluated against the first four OSD closure criteria (military value) developed by the Secretary of Defense. This was done. At the end of Phase I, the Base Structure Committee (BSC), the group charged with determining which Navy facilities should close, then excluded from further review those bases `that received an overall rating of `green' after applying all four military value criteria.' In the case of the naval shipyards, the only base that merited exclusions from further review on this basis was NSY Puget Sound.

One would therefore assume that if the Navy were strictly following the base closure criteria, as mandated by law, seven remaining shipyards should have been evaluated during Phase II. However, only one shipyard--Philadelphia--was evaluated during Phase II against the final four criteria. The five remaining nuclear shipyards and the one other conventional shipyard (none of which received an overall rating of `green') were summarily excluded from consideration for closure. This decision was based not on the eight criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense, but on criteria the Navy unilaterally and arbitrarily decided was more important.

According to Navy documents, the BSC excluded the six nuclear capable shipyards from further consideration because of the nuclear workload scheduled for the navy shipyards in the remainder of the century. The documents state that `this scheduling is based upon the best information available and takes into consideration the known force structure reductions.'

If this information carried such weight that it allowed the Navy to supersede evaluation against the Secretary of Defense's final criteria, then it is imperative that this `workload' data be made available to Members of Congress, the Base Closure Commission, and the GAO. Accordingly, I hereby request that all documentation concerning both the nuclear and conventional workload for the naval shipyards for the remainder of the century immediately be made part of the public record.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

My best.

Sincerely,

Arlene Specter.

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Exhibit 2

Chapter 4--The Navy's Base Closure and Realignment Process and Associated Recommendations

We were unable to conduct an extensive review of the process the Navy used to recommend bases for closure or realignment, because the Navy did not adequately document its decision-making process or the results of its deliberations. In addition, the Navy did not establish an internal control plan to ensure the validity and accuracy of information used in its assessment as required by OSD.

Due to the limited documentation of its process, we also could not assess the reasonableness of the Navy's recommendations for closures. However, we reviewed and recalculated the Navy's ship berthing, capacity analysis and found that excess capacity would remain, even with the closure of recommended bases.

THE NAVY'S PROCESS AS DESCRIBED BY NAVY OFFICIALS

The Navy's Base Structure Committee, which was charged with making base closure and realignment recommendations, began its review of the Navy's basing structure in late January 1991. However, the Committee did not fully explain its process to us until May 7, 1991, when it informed us that after review of data prepared by its working group, the Base Structure Committee decided that much of the data were biased in favor of keeping bases open and were inadequate for an objective assessment of the Navy's basing needs. Its review, therefore, emphasized a series of briefings and meetings attended by Committee members, Navy and Marine Corps headquarters officials, and representatives of field activities. According to Committee members, decisions made during the process were sometimes made in the presence of everyone in the meetings and were clear to everyone in attendance. In other cases, the decisions were made by the Committee in closed executive sessions. Based on this review, the Committee proposed closure and realignment actions to the Secretary of the Navy on March 21, 1991.

We reviewed the charts that were used in the presentations to the Committee. These charts were generally in outline form. Our review of this information showed that presentations were organized by 23 Navy and 6 Marine Corps categories representing the various Navy functions and missions. For example, the category `naval stations' included bases that have deep water harbors and piers and serve as home bases for Navy surface ships and aircraft carriers. The category `naval air stations' included bases that have runways and hangars and serve as home bases for aircraft. Other categories included submarine bases, shipyards, aviation depots, supply centers/depots, Marine Corps bases, Marine Corps air stations, reserve centers, and RDT&E activities.

The Base Structure Committee told us that a capacity analysis was then discussed for each functional category, which compared the 1997 force structure facility requirements against the existing inventory. Critical factors were identified for each category and served as units of measure for capacity. For example, pier space was used as the primary unit of measure for naval stations, and airfield apron and hangar space were used for naval air stations.

Of the eight categories of bases the Committee retained for further closure and realignment analysis, four were retained because the Base Structure Committee identified potential excess capacity: (1) naval stations, (2) naval air stations, (3) shipyards, and (4) Marine Corps air stations. Two other categories--the training and construction battalion centers categories--were retained for further analysis, because they showed potential excess capacity in segments of the overall categories. The medical category was also retained because of the link between medical facilities and major installations that were being evalauted for closure or realignment. Finally, the RDT&E category was retained for analysis based on a mandated requirement to reduce personnel by 20 percent.

A military value rating was then assigned by the Base Structure Committee to each base in all the categories being analyzed except for the medical category. 1

Committee members told us that they rated each installation using the first four DOD selection criteria, which addressed military value, and then they independently assigned each installation an overall color-coded rating.

1 Three hospitals were reviewed because three installations with hospitals were being considered for closure: Orlando Naval Training Center, Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, and Long Beach Naval Station.

Bases receiving an overall green rating were excluded from further study, according to Committee members. For example, in the naval stations category the bases receiving an overall green were Coronado, Guam, Ingleside, Little Creek, Mayport, Mobile, New York (Staten Island), Norfolk, Pascagoula, Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound/Everett, and San Diego. The Committee continued to evaluate bases that were given an overall rating of yellow or red. Additional bases were excluded from further review because of their unique assets, geographic location, strategic importance, or operational value, leaving 19 bases and the RDT&E category to be evalauted for closure.

Committee members told us they then performed a `quick estimate' cost-benefit analysis of each of the remaining bases to determine the feasibility of closing them. After makings its final decisions, a full COBRA analysis for those closure candidates was conducted.
Local economic and environmental impact analyses were also done for the closure candidates.

The Committee proposed closing 11 bases and 10 RDT&E facilities. It also recommended that 1 base and 16 RDT&E facilities be realigned. In addition, three hospitals were proposed to be closed as a result of the Committee's decisions.

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GAO'S VIEWS ON THE NAVY'S PROCESS

In addition to the limitations placed on our review by the lack of adequate documentation, we identified three problems with the Navy's process. First, due to the lack of supporting documentation, we could not determine the basis for the Committee's military value ratings for Navy installations. In late March, we received selected data given to the Committee by its Working Group. This information was provided to us, but we were not advised until May 7, 1991, that the Committee had decided that much of this data were biased in favor of keeping bases open. In mid-April, the Base Structure Committee provided us with four additional volumes of material that consisted primarily of briefing charts that were basically outlines of matters and data to be discussed, without any explanation or supporting data. Also, Committee members said they did not prepare minutes of their deliberations.

Second, we identified apparent inconsistencies within the Committee's internal rating process. For example, the Committee had given identical ratings to two naval stations on each of the first four DOD selection criteria but had assigned an overall rating of green to one and yellow to the other. Similarly, the Committee had assigned identical ratings to six naval air stations for the first four DOD selection criteria. Four bases were assigned an overall rating of yellow and two an overall rating of green. These inconsistencies are significant because any base given an overall rating of green, based on the first four DOD selection criteria, was excluded from further closure or realignment consideration. In explanation, Committee members stated that `not all yellows are equal' and `not all greens are equal.' Since the Committee did not document these differences, we could not determine the rationale for its final decisions.

Lastly, although required by OSD policy guidance to develop and implement an internal control plan for its base structure reviews, the Navy did not assign responsibility for developing and implementing such a plan.

GAO'S VIEWS ON THE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Because the Committee did not document the rationale for its decisions, we could not comment on the Committee's closure and realignment recommendations based on the process. As an alternative, we looked at ship berthing capacity of naval stations in comparison to the Force Structure Plan because naval stations are a major category of the Navy's facilities. Also, we have conducted prior work and have ongoing work related to homeporting needs. Data obtained from the Navy's Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare) showed that the most appropriate indicator for naval station requirements is ship berthing capacity. An analysis of the capacity data showed the Navy will have excess capacity remaining if only the four recommended naval stations are closed.

The Navy's capacity analysis indicates an inventory of 257.6 thousand feet of berthing (KFB) at naval stations and a requirement of 174.2 KFB, leaving an excess of 83.4 KFB. This excess represents the capacity at naval stations worldwide and also includes some inadequate berthing space. In addition, 14.5 KFB of berthing space is available at facilities other than naval stations.

When we subtracted the 75.2 KFB identified with space associated with (1) overseas facilities, (2) recommended closures, and (3) inadequate berthing facilities, 22.7 KFB of excess berthing capacity remains (see table 4.1).

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Exhibit 3

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, May 17, 1991.

Hon. Dick Cheney,
Secretary, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On April 19, 1991, the enclosed letter was FAXed to Secretary Garrett requesting that `all documentation concerning both the nuclear and conventional workload for the naval shipyards for the remainder of the century immediately be made part of the public record.' This information has not been provided either to my office, the General Accounting Office or the Base Closure Commission.

I requested that this information be made part of the public record because the Navy has not provided adequate analysis or supporting documentation to justify its decision to exclude from further review for possible closure all of its shipyards except for the Philadelphia Navy Shipyard. The Navy's decision process is described on page 8 of Tab C in the Navy's `Detailed Analysis' which states that these yards were excluded from review because of `unique' factors relating to the nuclear workload and the availability of drydocks on the West Coast.

At a presentation by the Navy to my staff on Monday, May 13, Navy staff from OP-431 asserted that the Philadelphia Shipyard should be closed based upon projected workload trends. How can any reasonable person analyze a closure recommendation made on this basis without detailed information about availabilities on all of the Navy's ships and the naval shipyard workloads?

Subsequent to the May 13 meeting my office received a computer printout which purports to be the depot level maintenance schedule from FY 1991. Unfortunately this document contains no information on future AEGIS work scheduled for public/private competition and also lacks the results of the April Scheduling Conference, the most recent representation of the Navy's workload.

After my staff informed Navy counsel on May 15, 1991, that we required more current and complete Navy data, they suggested that we provide them with a list of specific requests for documentation. The list follows:

(1) All information describing availabilities on all Navy vessels, including work scheduled for public/private competition, until the year 2010. This should allow for a more accurate view of the Navy's fleet composition after near-term submarine decommissionings. Since the Navy briefers at the May 13 meeting suggested that Philadelphia should be closed based on projected workload trends, we feel it is important to understand workload trends in the context of the fleets composition beyond the year 2000.

(2) List of changes made to the Navy's workload schedule as a result of the Scheduling conference.

(3) Explanation of why amphibious and auxiliary ships were scheduled to yards other than Philadelphia, and upon what criteria these decisions were based.

(4) Explanation of how the depot maintenance schedule reflects the Navy's projected operational requirements.

(5) Detailed explanation of the Amphibious and Aegis ships for which the Navy's workload is `increasing' as it is stated on page two of Tab C in the Navy's `Detailed Analysis.'

As I'm sure you are aware, Section 2903(c)(4) of 10USC 2687, requires the Secretary of Defense to `make available to the Commission and the Comptroller General of the United States all information used by the Department in making its recommendations to the Commission for closures and realignments.' The information I requested on April 19, 1991, is absolutely essential not only to understand the Navy's `exclusion' decisions, but to comprehend the Navy's evaluation of installations against the four military value criteria.

Accordingly, unless you can demonstrate to me otherwise, I intend to argue before the Base Closure Commission and inform the President that the Navy has deliberately sought to avoid compliance with the 1990 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act. Furthermore, I intend to request that based on the Navy's non-compliance its recommendations for closure should be dismissed.

I would appreciate a prompt reply.

Sincerely,
Arlen Specter.

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Exhibit 4

Memorandum


To: Senator Specter.
From: Mr. Morrie Ruffin.
Date: May 15, 1991.
Re Status of 4/19/91 Request to Secretary Garrett for Additional Information on Navy's `Analysis.'

Per your request, I have described the sequence of events pertaining to the Navy's `response' to your letter of 4/19/91. Attached is a copy of the 4/19 letter.

4/19/91--Your office FAXed a copy of the attached letter to Secretary Garrett. The letter requests that all documentation concerning both the conventional and nuclear workload at the naval shipyards for the remainder of the century immediately be made part of the public record. This request was made because the Navy's `detailed analysis' provides no justification for its decision to exclude all Navy shipyards from review for closure.

5/7/91--Having received no response to your letter and having confirmed that neither the Base Closure Commission nor the General Accounting Office had received any information subsequent to your letter, I called the Senate Navy Liaison office and inquired as to the status of the reply.

5/8/91--I received a call from a Mr. Fred Sterns in Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations Jackie Schafer's office. I informed Mr. Sterns that we wanted every piece of information available on the Navy's ship maintenance schedule (data on the maintenance schedule for every ship in the Navy). I also suggested that we wanted all other information that would allow the Navy to represent that to do the Navy's nuclear workload the six nuclear Yards should be excluded from review for possible closure. He informed me that this information would be `on your doorstep at 8:00 AM, Monday, May 13, 1991.

5/13/91--At 9:30 AM I received a call from Mr. Sterns where upon he stated that he believed he had everything we had asked for and asked when he could send it over. At 11:30 AM I met with a Mr. David Rolfe Herron from Schafer's office, and Capt. Thomas Williams and Ms. Mary MacKinnon from OP-431. At the meeting they presented me with the attached memo marked B. I asked them if they felt they had complied with the request made in your letter. They said yes. I then asked them if the memo represented `all documentation concerning both the nuclear. . .' (see highlighted portion of letter) They said no and promised to provide us with more information. I said we wanted it but that it was probably too late.

Following the meeting, I had a conversation with Mr. Herron.

I mentioned to Mr. Herron that he should inform Ms. Schafer that Senator Specter's office was not satisfied with their response to our request. He then mentioned to me that he was in a difficult position because the response to the April 19 did not appear to be a Navy priority. He then mentioned to me that he had a copy of a routine slip attached to the letter which gave a due date for the response of 5/24/91. (5/24 is the date of the regional hearings on PNSY and the last official opportunity for us to make our case before the Base Closure Commission.) I asked Mr. Herron if I could see a copy of the routine slip. He proceeded to remove from his folder a copy of your letter which appeared to have a routine slip attached to it with a due date of 5/24/91. I then asked Mr. Herron if I could borrow the routine slip for a minute whereupon a Mr. Lieban (also from Schafer's office) who had entered the reception area grabbed the letter back from Mr. Herron and quickly forced it into Mr. Herron's brief case. Mr. Liebman said something along these lines: `God knows, you can't have that.'

5/14/91--In the morning I spoke with Wendy Pensinger, a staffer on the Base Closure Commission, and mentioned the incident with Mr. Herron. She took his name and the names of the two other individuals who accompanied him to our office. In the afternoon, Mr. Liebman delivered to our office a computer print out of the `ship availabilities at all of the Naval's shipyards.' This document is also barely adequate in that it was outdated and did not include any of the AEGIS work which will be up for Public/Private competition.

5/15/91--Spoke with Captain Rice, the Executive Assistance to Ms. Schafer, and Jim Dykstra, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, and reiterated our request for information.

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[Page: S7894]

Exhibit 5

automated navy route slip

Primary Controlling Office SECNAVAD.

Classification of attachment: Unclassified.

From: Sen. Specter.

Date: 19 APR 91.

Date received: 23 APR 91.

To: SH.

Abstract: Documentation regarding closing of nuclear & conventional shipyards be made part of the public record.

CR1: Closure.

CR2: Shipyard.

CR3: Public

CR4: Documentation.

CR5: Phase I.

CR6: ABC.

Remarks Distribution: 1U006286.

DOC OUT TO: Sen.

Date: 24 MAY 91.

Due to: SECHAVAD.

Date: 10 MAY 91.

Control Center Primary Routing:

To: SECNAV.

PC: G.

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Exhibit 6

Department of the Navy,
Washington, DC, May 21, 1991.

Hon. Arlen Specter,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Senator Specter: Thank you for your letter of April 19, 1991 regarding the Navy's recommendations for base closures.

During Phase I of the Navy's two-phase analytical procedure, Step Five called for the exclusion of facilities distinguished by such factors as unique assets, geography, strategic importance, or operational value. Because the nuclear workload toward the end of the decade includes such a large number of nuclear refuelings on submarines and cruisers, it was determined that the six nuclear-capable shipyards would be excluded from further review.

The Navy's Base Structure Committee evaluated each shipyard and assigned a color code, Green (favors keeping the installation open), Red (favors closure), or Yellow (potential candidate for closure if not sufficient `Red' installations to eliminate excess capacity). The Phase I rankings resulted in four shipyards having an overall rating of `yellow' Charleston, Long Beach, Philadelphia, and Portsmouth. Of these, the two nuclear-capable yards were eliminated as stated above and Long Beach, the other conventional shipyard, was excluded due primarily to the criticality of the large drydock at that facility. This drydock is designated as a backup dock for NIMITZ-class aircraft carriers and nuclear cruisers on the West Coast. Philadelphia Naval Shipyard then remained the only shipyard under consideration for closure.

My staff has been in contact with your Legislative Assistant, Mr. Edmund M. Ruffin, and has delivered to him additional documentation concerning both the nuclear and conventional workload for the naval shipyards for the remainder of the century.

As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely

H. Lawrence Garrett III,
Secretary of the Navy.

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Exhibit 7

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, May 22, 1991

[DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION, MAY 22, 1991]

Commission Demands Explanation of Navy Base Closure Process

Chairman Courter today released the following statement: `Last week the General Accounting Office released a report on base closure and realignment. This document made it clear that the methodology designed by the Navy was sound. However, the GAO raised serious questions about the application of this methodology.

`On Monday of this week members of the Commission staff met for four and a half hours with the Navy's base closure group in an effort to determine how their conclusions were reached.

`During this meeting we learned that the Navy group employed a great deal of subjective judgment in drawing up their list of recommendations for closure and relignment. Nobody on the Commission can say yet whether the Navy's judgments were fairly and consistently applied, but we intend to find out.

`We have repeatedly sought clarification from senior Navy representatives. I have publicly asked for minutes, notes and any documentation that would give us an idea of how the service came up with its recommendations. What we have received is inadequate.

`The GAO and the Commission staff have pointed to an alarming lack of information about the Navy's decision-making process. Therefore, we are demanding from the Navy a detailed explanation of the process used to justify its recommendations for closure and realignment.

`On Monday we asked Navy representatives to prepare for the Commission a narrative account of their selection process. We have provided the base closure group with a detailed plan aimed at ensuring a thorough account of the Navy process. We hope the Navy will agree to this plan and comply with our rigorous schedule.

`The Commission is determined to follow the GAO's recommendations. If necessary, I will call a special hearing to learn more how the Navy's recommendations were reached.

`It's clear that the Navy maintains significant excess capacity. If Navy representatives cannot prove that their selection criteria were applied evenly, then the Commission is fully prepared to draw up a list of recommendations using methodology designed by the Navy and GAO application guidelines.'

PROPOSED DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION COURSE OF ACTION ON DEPARTMENT OF NAVY BASE CLOSURE PROCESS

1. Due to gaps of information in the Navy process identified by both Commission staff and the General Accounting Office (GAO), staff of the Base Closure Commission (BCC) met with the Navy base closure group (the Base Structure Committee, or BSC) on Monday, May 20, 1991 to request detailed information on its process. During that meeting, staff learned that the Navy's BSC applied a great deal of undocumented, subjective judgment to a major Navy facilities study (the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, or VCNO study), as well as numerous briefings from field commanders. Despite general explanations of the process, the Commission is still unable to determine if the subjective judgment of the Navy's group was applied fairly and consistently to all bases in all categories in accordance with the Force Structure Plan and Department of Defense criteria mandated by law.

2. During its decision-making meetings, the BSC kept no minutes and in its written submittal to the Commission, only briefly explained why bases were on the list.

3. Therefore, the Commission proposes the following course of action. The Navy has pledged its cooperation, and we look forward to its acceptance of this course of action and conformity with the Commission's rigorous schedule.

The BSC must provide written explanations of its decisions, using the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) working group study as a baseline. The VCNO working group studied options for base closures beginning in January 1990 and has rated each Navy installation against five weighted criteria called `major factors.' The major factors are mission suitability, availability of facilities, quality of facilities, quality of life, and community support. Each rating is supported by verifiable quantitative and qualitative measures. This approach is similar to that used by the other Services. The VCNO study was a significant input to the BSC's decision-making process, which also included briefings from the Navy's major operational commands.

The BSC must provide an explanation of the relationship between the five VCNO major factors and the DoD criteria used by the BSC to rate each installation. Although the BSC used the VCNO study, the BSC translated its ratings to correspond with the military value criteria required by the DoD Federal Register notice. The Commission needs that translation between those two sets of rating criteria to determine the fairness and consistency of the BSC's rating process.

The BSC must provide explanations for the changes it made to the VCNO ratings. The BSC rated some installations differently than the VCNO study based on the briefings it received and its own military judgement. The Commission needs detailed, written explanations for each instance in which the BSC disagreed with the VCNO study's major factor ratings. The explanations must be explicit, verifiable, and, whenever possible, quantifiable.

The BSC must justify its overall installation ratings. The BSC used the military value DoD criteria to assign an overall rating for each Navy installation. The Commission staff needs detailed, written explanations for each of those ratings. Explanations must address how installations were compared with others in the same categories. Explanations must also address those installations excluded from further review based on geography, strategic importance, operational value, and other unique assets.

The BSC must provide the back-up data for the VCNO study. The data on which the VCNO study's ratings are based is needed to verify those ratings and to review the consistency of their application within installation categories. The Commission will provide the BSC with a list of the missing data.

The Commission will review the BSC responses. The information provided by the BSC in response to the above steps will allow the Commission staff to determine whether the BSC's decision methodology substantially deviated from the requirements of Title XXIX.

The Commission's staff will present options to the Commissioners for any changes to the Navy's list of base closures and realignments.

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[Page: S7895]

Exhibit 8

Strategic and Operational Consequences

Given the assumption that the Navy's carrier force will be predominantly or entirely nuclear powered in the next century, the work force and most facilities at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard must be considered excess to requirements. There are two east coast facilities capable of conducting all repairs (including nuclear repairs) to aircraft carriers: Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. These shipyards are located in the same local area, but the decrease in the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union has reduced the necessity for strategic geographical dispersion where sufficient capacity exists. The sunk costs of existing facilities at Philadelphia are significant, and the rare, if not unique, nature of the dry docks, make keeping the dry docks operable (if not operational) a necessity.

Closure of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, without retention of the large carrier capable dry docks creates a shortfall in dry dock capability for emergent dockings of aircraft carriers. The only carrier capable dry dock available on the east coast, under Navy control is at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and will be fully utilized. Without the dry docks available at Philadelphia, the only other dock capable of taking an emergent carrier docking is at Newport News Shipbuilding (NNSB). Exhibit C-7 illustrates this situation graphically. This dock is privately owned and its docking schedule is not controlled by the Navy. The cost to have NNSB provide a dedicated dock under contract is considered prohibitive. The only alternatives are to use the NNSB dock if available or to physically remove a ship already in dock at Norfolk Naval Shipyard if possible.

The closure departs from a long standing Navy strategic and operational requirement which provided for two Naval shipyards on each coast capable of docking and repairing aircraft carriers. The resultant demand for use of the remaining dock at Norfolk Naval Shipyard would have long term impact on the Navy's flexibility in workload assignments and will reduce the effectiveness of the shore establishment in supporting fleet operational and maintenance requirements. Retention of the Philadelphia drydocks provides backup capability for emergency situations.

The Propeller Facility consists of specialized equipment and 100 highly skilled management, engineering, programming, machine shop and foundry personnel. There is no comparable facility in terms of capacity or capability in the United States, in either the Public or Private sector.

The unique and necessary capabilities represented by NAVSSES as well as the increasing need for berthing for inactive ships mandate that NAVSSES and the NISMF detachment remain.

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Exhibit 9

Department of the Navy,
Washington, DC, June 5, 1991.

Senator Arlen Specter,
U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.

Dear Senator Specter: As requested during the 4 June 1991 meeting held in the Pentagon enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted.

The COBRA Analysis that was presented to the Navy's Base Structure Committee on 29 March 1991 was based on enclosure (1), COBRA input data supplied on 26 March 1991 by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

Enclosure (2) was received subsequent to the final COBRA analysis and the presentations to the Navy's Base Structure Committee.

Enclosure (3) reflects a summary of the differences between enclosures (1) and (2) submission.

In forwarding the revised COBRA data on 29 March, NAVSEA highlighted 2 of the options that had previously been discussed with the Base Structure Committee: Option One: Close and preserve Philadelphia Naval Shipyard; Option Two: Downsize Philadelphia to 1200 men.

The NAVSEA recommendation supported a low-risk approach to ship maintenance. OPNAV's assessment of the military requirement was that Option One provided sufficient capacity along with the rest of the public and private sector on the East Coast to satisfy any concern.

Very respectfully,

J.R. Lang,

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director, Ship's Maintenance and Modernization Division.

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Exhibit 10

Dry dock utilization for FY-90 at all naval shipyards was in excess of 100% as shown in the table below. This is due to some special cases where there is more than one ship in the dry dock such as the special case of submarine inactivations where these ships can be worked in series without significant impact on operational requirements: or where a ship is in the same dry dock for greater than 10 months at a time, in the case of nuclear ship refuelings. In those latter cases, dry dock maintenance must be deferred until a subsequent period when the dry dock is vacant.

CAPACITY ANALYSIS

The projected utilization rates for the next three years are shown in Exhibits C-2 through C-5 and the table below. While the FY 90 and 91 rates reflect all work assigned in the shipyards, FY 92 through FY 99 projected usage do not.

NAVAL SHIPYARD DRYDOCKS PERCENTAGE UTILIZATION BY SHIPYARD MISSION CATEGORY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Fiscal year--                                                    
                               1990  1991  1992 1993  1994 1995 1996  1997  1998  1999 
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SSN/CGN refueling             125.3 137.0  86.7 94.9  72.4 89.5 94.7 109.9 101.3 119.8 
Large/CV/CVN capable          112.3 102.8  90.1 95.3 106.9 84.2 85.5 103.6  80.2  82.2 
Other nuclear capable         139.7 130.0 103.7 83.7  85.4 65.3 75.0  79.7  86.9  94.2 
Other                          78.0  23.0  36.0 18.6   5.5 48.8 26.9   5.3  12.5  14.6 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dry dock #4, at the former Hunters Point Naval Shipyard in San Francisco, a large, CV/CVN capable dry dock, has been used for several years to dock emergent fleet work on the west coast. It will be decommissioned in FY 1991 when a large section of the former naval shipyard is leased to commercial interests in accordance with public law. Dry dock #2, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, a nuclear refueling dry dock, will be unavailable during part of FY 1991 and all of FY 1992 while it undergoes modification.

Dry docks in naval shipyards fall into four categories based upon their contribution to the mission requirements which they satisfy: dry docks in which nuclear submarines or nuclear cruisers may be refueled; nuclear capable dry docks other than refueling dry docks or large dry docks capable of handling aircraft carriers; large, aircraft carrier capable dry docks; and other dry docks.

A primary critical mission of the naval shipyards is the refueling of nuclear submarines and nuclear cruisers. Critical to accomplishing this mission is the availability of nuclear refueling dry dock complexes. The projected utilization of the available complexes is shown on Exhibit C-2. Dry dock use can exceed available capacity due to the unique nature of nuclear submarine inactivations, when more than two submarines are in a dry dock at a time.

The usage of the navy dry docks capable of nuclear refueling operations is projected to remain high for the remainder of the century as nuclear submarines undergo refueling operations. While there may be some unused capacity from time to time, this extra capacity may in fact be unusable.

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[Page: S7896]

Exhibit 11


DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

Naval Sea Systems Command,
Washington, DC, March 29, 1991.
From: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command.
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-43).
Subj: Base closure final documentation.
Encl: (1) Philadelphia Naval Shipyard--Option 1; (2) Philadelphia Naval Shipyard--Option 2; (3) TAB A Report Documentation--Naval Shipyards.

1. Enclosures (1) and (2) provide the COBRA options for the naval shipyards as requested on 28 March 1991. They are as follows:

a. Philadelphia Naval Shipyard--Option 1: Close and preserve Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in FY 93 after completing the USS Constellation (CV 64) SLEP and the USS Forrestal (CV 59) dry docking availability. Retain the propeller facility, the Navy Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (NISMF) and the Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station (NAVSSES) in Philadelphia. Move the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) overhaul to Norfolk Naval Shipyard.

b. Philadelphia Naval Shipyard--Option 2. Commence realignment of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in FY 93 and complete downsizing to approximately 1200 people in FY 95. Retain the propeller facility, the Navy Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (NISMF) and the Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station (NAVSSES) in Philadelphia.

3. Enclosuure (3) provides the revised documentation for the above options.

4. We recommend that option 2 be approved for Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, i.e., that Philadelphia Naval Shipyard be drawn down to a small size activity in the mid 90's as workload declines in order to provide a government controlled CV dry dock site and ship repair capability for the north east.

J.S. Claman,
Rear Admiral, USN.

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Exhibit 12

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, June 6, 1991.

Hon. Dick Cheney,
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, the Pentagon, Washington, DC.

Dear Secretary of Defense Cheney: I urge your immediate, personal action on serious wrongful conduct by Department of the Navy personnel in withholding critical information favorable to the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

We have now caught Navy personnel `red-handed' in concealing data which supports keeping the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard open.

On June 4, 1991, Congressman Weldon and I met with Navy Department personnel and asked about a report, which we had heard about, favorable to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard which Naval personnel denied existed. When I received a copy, or at least a part of that report yesterday, I asked for a followup meeting which was held yesterday at 6:00 p.m. at the Pentagon at which time I confronted Navy personnel with the document. At that point, I was handed what appears to be the same document with additional documents with a transmittal letter to me dated June 5.

This is only part of an incredible sequence of events involving false denials and withholding of documents. I know you do not have the time to get into the many, many facets of the Navy Department's wrongful conduct so I will limit this request to the two pages of the document which I enclose.

As you will note, the cover page states:

`We recommend that option 2 be approved for Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, 1

i.e., that Philadelphia Naval Shipyard be drawn down to a small size activity in the mid 90's as workload declines in order to provide a government controlled CV dry dock site and ship repair capability for the north east.'

1 Downsize, but keep open.

As you will further note, the second page specifies the underlying factual basis which is so favorable to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard:

`Closure of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, without retention of the large carrier capable dry docks creates a shortfall in dry dock capability for emergent dockings of aircraft carriers. The only carrier capable dry dock available on the east coast, under Navy control is at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and will be fully utilized. Without the dry docks available at Philadelphia, the only other
dock capable of taking an emergent carrier docking is at Newport News Shipbuilding (NNSB). Exhibit C-7 illustrates this situation graphically. This dock is privately owned and its docking schedule is not controlled by the Navy. The cost to have NNSB provide a dedicated dock under contract is considered prohibitive. The only alternatives are to use the NNSB dock if available or to physically remove a ship already in dock at Norfolk Naval Shipyard if possible.

`The closure departs from a long standing Navy strategic and operational requirement which provided for two Naval shipyards on each coast capable of docking and repairing aircraft carriers.'

When I confronted Navy Department personnel with this material yesterday, Rear Admiral John S. Claman, Deputy Commander for Industrial and Facility Management, replied that this information was in documentation previously provided to my office. After further discussion, Ms. Mary O. MacKinnon, Deputy, Shipyard/Maintenance Policy (OP-431), conceded that the information was in fact not previously provided.

I ask for your personal explanation of this important matter.

After I had a letter hand-delivered to you at the May 22 Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing, you replied by letter dated May 24 that Secretary Garrett had responded to the outstanding questions. That was not done by Secretary Garrett's letter dated May 22, and, in fact, the pending questions have not been answered even though Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations & Environment Jackie Schafer handed me additional materials at the conclusion of yesterday's meeting.

Mr. Secretary, the Navy Department's integrity is at issue which goes far beyond the subject matter of base closing.

On this state of the record, in light of the Navy Department's failure to provide relevant information to allow for compliance with the terms of the Base Closure Act, it seems to me that the only appropriate course of action is for the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to be removed from the base closure list, which I ask you to do forthwith.

Sincerely,
Arlen Specter.

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Exhibit 13

United States Senate,
Washington, DC, June 6, 1991.

The Defense Base Closure Commission,

Hon. James A. Courter, Chairman.

Hon. William L. Ball III,

Hon. Howard D. Callaway,

Hon. Duane H. Cassidy,

Hon. Arthur Levitt, Jr.,

Hon. James C. Smith II,
Washington, DC.

Gentlemen: With this letter, I am enclosing for you a copy of my letter to Secretary Cheney of today. This is the tip of the iceberg and my staff and I shall be forwarding to you other information.

At this juncture, I do want to raise one other matter which arose at the June 4 meeting attended by staff from the Base Closing Commission, Navy Department personnel, Congressman Weldon and myself.

In the course of that meeting, we discussed the absence of hard data up to the present time for the Navy's decision to close the Philadelphia facilities notwithstanding your Commission's news releases of May 22. At that time, your staff members, Mr. Matt Behrmann, Mr. Paul Hirsch and Mr. Alex Yellon, advised that the Commission was still acquiring information; and, in addition, was seeking to determine whether the Navy consistently applied its subjective standards on other bases which might be a justification for the use of subjective interpretations on the Navy's decision to close the Philadelphia facilities.

At that time, I raised the question as to whether it was possible realistically, to evaluate the consistency of subjective judgments. I respectfully submit that cannot be done.

If Secretary Cheney does not delete the Philadelphia facilities as called for in my letter to him today, I ask your Commission to delete the Philadelphia facilities from the base closure list since there cannot be an adequate factual basis, as a matter of law under the statute, when it is admitted by all parties that it was a subjective determination.

Sincerely,
Arlen Specter.

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Exhibit 14

House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, June 13, 1991.

The Defense Base Closure Commission,

Hon. James A. Courter, Chairman.

Hon. William L. Ball III,

Hon. Howard D. Callaway,

Hon. Duane H. Cassidy,

Hon. Arthur Levitt, Jr.,

Hon. James C, Smith II,
Washington, DC.

Gentlemen: Last week, I met with Admiral James Lang, Admiral John Claman and Members of your staff to request internal Navy documentation prepared during the base closure review process. In addition to other data, I requested all base closure correspondence from the recently retired Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command, Admiral Peter Hekman. I would like to call to your immediate attention the enclosed memos which I received this afternoon.

As you can see, Admiral Hekman was aware that the Secretary of the Navy was considering a proposal to mothball the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard as early as December 19, 1990. In his memo to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Hekman said it would be more prudent to downsize the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard than close it. He concluded that `a Navy industrial capability is required in the Philadelphia area to provide a safety valve when a private sector shipyard is unable to complete awarded ship work.' This is precisely the argument I have made against the Navy's recommendaton to rely on Newport News shipbuilding for emergent work.

One month before the Navy announced its recommendation to close PNSY, Admiral Hekman stated that retention of a downsized Yard is the most cost-effective solution. He specifically noted that retention would provide the fleet with a low-cost, reliable repair capability and help spread the cost of continued operations at the base. At a time when Admiral Hekman was fully aware of the five-year budget plan and proposed reductions he cautioned against and realignment of Philadelphia before FY95. He emphatically stated that realignment of PNSY in FY93 would cause `significant: perturbations to carrier overhauling yard assignments and could result in the East Coast CV overhauling on the West Coast.'

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[Page: S7897]

I think these statements speak for themselves, and greatly overshadow the confusing, color-coded rating systems and data that the Navy has presented to date. I am troubled that the Navy would ignore this strong advice and question why it was not made available to the congressional delegation and the Commission before.

After reviewing Admiral Hekman's correspondence and the additional materials I have provided to you, I am confident that you will have all the documentation you need to remove Philadelphia Naval Shipyard from the base closure list.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Curt Weldon,
Member of Congress.

Exhibit 15

Department of the Navy,
Washington, DC, December 19, 1990.
From: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command.
To: Chief of Naval Operations (CF-04).
Subj: Realignment data for Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.
Ref: (a) COMNAVSEA 1tr 5000 OPR: 07T3/T0373 Ser: 00/6224 of 20 Nov 10; (b) CINCLANTFLT 1tr 4700 Ser N436/007378 of 14 Sep 90.

1. In reference (a), I provided information relative to the proposed realignment of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, while maintaining the propeller shop and foundry, the Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station (NAVSSES) and the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (NISMF). While I realize that the Secretary has been briefed and has concurred with the proposal to mothball Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, I strongly recommend that this decision be reconsidered. It is more prudent to downsize Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to approximately the size of a Ship Repair Facility (SRF) in order to support Navy ships in the New York and Earle homeport areas. In reference (b), CINCLANTFLT outlined the history of Atlantic Fleet depot maintenance problems with marginal ship repair contractors. A Navy industrial capability is required in the Philadelphia area to provide a safety valve when a private sector shipyard is unable to complete awarded ship work.

2. Further, recommend that the drawdown of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to an SRF-size shipyard not be done until FY 95, as the shipyard is required to support scheduled workload until that time.
P.M. Hexman, Jr.

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Exhibit 16

Department of the Navy,
Washington, DC, March 15, 1991.
From: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command.
To: Chief of Naval Operations (CF-04).
Subj: Realignment of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.
Ref: (a) CNO 1tr Ser: 431F/1U596599 of 11 Jan 91; (b) NAVSEA 1tr Ser 00/6312 of 19 Dec 90.

1. In reference (a), you indicated that my recommendation that Philadelphia Naval Shipyard be downsized rather than closed was not accepted by the Base Closure/Realignment Advisory Committee. The fleet needs the capability of a naval shipyard to provide a credible repair capability able to service the Newport, Philadelphia, New York and Earle area, as well as to provide a source of repair when a private sector shipyard is unable to complete the assigned work in the areas, as stated in reference (b).

2. Under the closure option and in interest of clarification, the 30 people mentioned in reference (a) were an estimate of the number of people required to man the drydock in a mothball status. In addition to this, 255 people would be required to man the remaining facilities, 155 to provide residual facilities support and 100 to run the propeller shop and foundry. This compares with approximately 1,200 personnel under the `small repair capability' option: 135 residual facility support, 100 to run the propeller shop and approximately 945 to perform repair work for the fleet. Any required additional support for this facility would be from another larger naval shipyard such as Norfolk Naval shipyard.

3. I continue to take the position that retention of a credible repair capability at Philadelphia for naval ships homeported in the Northeast area is the most cost effective solution:

(1) It provides the fleet with low cost, reliable repair capability,

(2) It helps spread the effects of the costs to Navy Programs of the other repair facilities (foundry, utilities, etc.).

Further, the workload distribution for naval shipyards in the 90's supports full operations at Philadelphia through mid FY 95. As previously briefed, executing a realignment of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in FY 93 will cause significant perturbations to carrier overhauling yard assignments and could result in an East Coast CV overhauling on the West Coast.
P.M. Hexman, Jr.

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Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

END