RONALD H. GRIFFITH
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
The Total Army -- United States Army, United States Army Reserve (USAR), and Army National Guard of the United States (ARNG);
military and civilian -- recognizes that the end of the Cold War, marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, represented a fundamental shift in
the geostrategic environment. Changes in the Army since then reflect that strategic shift and are apparent in each of our components. While
much has changed, the historic link between the citizens of our Nation and the soldiers of our Army has remained strong and certain.
GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN 1980
In 1980, the focus of the Nation's Armed Forces was on the defense of Central Europe. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact posed a
monolithic threat to the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). National survival was at stake. As part of our national
security strategy of containment, the Army maintained four active heavy divisions forward deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Additionally, several sets of equipment were prepositioned throughout Western Europe for more than five divisions of early reinforcing forces
from the continental United States. These forces, together with the forward deployed forces of the other Services and our allies in NATO,
including those of the host nation, served as the principal deterrent to Soviet aggression in Central Europe.
THE COLD WAR ARMY -- 1980
The Army of 1980 consisted of 1.35 million soldiers. The active component (AC) was organized principally in 16 divisions and 8 separate
brigades and regiments. The USAR was organized to support mobilization and deployment of all Army forces, provide tactical support to
operationally deployed forces, and conduct special theater missions. The ARNG was organized principally in 8 divisions, 25 separate brigades
and regiments, and 13 separate tank and mechanized infantry battalions. Upon receipt of indications and warning of an attack, the defense
strategy required the immediate deployment of most active forces to reinforce forward-deployed forces in Europe and to serve as the initial
defense of the NATO alliance. Reserve combat forces served as compensating leverage against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.
Requirements for smaller scale contingencies and support to state and territorial missions were considered achievable with warfighting forces.
By the end of the Cold War in 1989, Army personnel end strength had increased to 1.55 million soldiers: 777,000 in the AC; 319,000 in the
USAR; and 457,000 in the ARNG.
GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN 1997
Today's geostrategic environment is dramatically different than that of the Cold War. Threats to our national security are typically well below the global nuclear threshold, but are also more numerous and complex. National survival is no longer the principal concern, but American interests are more diversified and global. We can no longer focus our attention so heavily on just one region of the world, but rather must be vigilant and proactive in regions of strategic significance to the United States. Perhaps most importantly, we no longer face an enemy force of over 200 combat divisions. Instead, we face an environment characterized by uncertainty and "come as you are" contingencies of a regional nature. Responding to threats in coordination with our friends and allies remains our goal, but established alliance frameworks do not exist for many potential contingencies. This fact, in combination with the relatively immature nature of some potential theaters of operations, requires today's deploying forces to be strategically adaptive and multi-mission capable.
In direct response to the strategic shift in the international security environment, our national security strategy of engagement includes the use of
military forces to shape the geostrategic environment consistent with our values and interests, as well as the maintenance of military capabilities
and readiness levels required to respond rapidly across the full spectrum of military operations when U.S. interests are threatened. This places
a premium on combat readiness in peacetime and versatility -- the ability of units and individuals to accomplish multiple, disparate functions.
Finally, our national strategy emphasizes the fundamental requirement for our Armed Forces to prepare for the new challenges and
opportunities that lie ahead in the 21st century.
ARMY OF 1997
The active Army today consists of ten divisions and two armored cavalry regiments, with a personnel end strength of 495,000 soldiers. This reflects a 35.7 percent reduction in personnel end strength since 1989. The current National Security Strategy actively employs military forces to shape the geostrategic environment, and demands very high states of readiness from all types of military forces, especially those required in the early weeks and months of a contingency. The active Army provides the combat forces capable of executing operations in two near simultaneous major theater wars, but is not capable of providing all essential support forces.
The USAR provides the bulk of the Army's combat service support (CSS) forces for echelons above division. Many of these units are among the first units -- AC or RC -- to be mobilized and deployed in the event of an emergency. Elements of the USAR are also critical to the mobilization and deployment of both AC and RC forces and provide cost effective augmentation to the Army's training base in peacetime. By the end of fiscal year (FY) 1998, the USAR will achieve an end state of 208,000 soldiers, a result of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR). This equates to a 34.8 percent personnel reduction since 1989.
Army forces in the ARNG today are predominantly organized into 15 enhanced separate brigades (established by the BUR), 8 divisions with 3
brigades each, and 3 separate brigade-size units -- a total combat force of 42 combat brigades. The 15 enhanced separate brigades were
established to reinforce, augment, and/or backfill AC units as required by the theater commander. The Army's goal is to have these brigades (7
heavy, 7 light, and 1 armored cavalry regiment) ready to begin deployment in 90 days after mobilization. The remaining maneuver forces were
retained by the BUR as a hedge against uncertainties elsewhere in the world. Forces in the ARNG comprise a significant portion of the Army's
total capabilities. They include 55 percent of the Army's combat forces, 66 percent of combat support (CS) forces, 63 percent of field artillery,
and 46 percent of air defense forces. Personnel end strength in the ARNG has been reduced 19.7 percent since 1989 to today's force of
ARMY OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS
Although downsized significantly since the end of the Cold War, the Army has been called with much greater frequency to protect and advance the Nation's interests, both at home and abroad. As the Nation's decisive land force, the Army provides our political leaders and the theater commanders-in-chief -- the CINCs -- with a full spectrum of military capabilities. Since 1989, the Department of Defense (DOD) has conducted 27 contingency operations. Forces from the Army have participated directly in 25 of them, providing more than 60 percent of all DOD forces committed. These operations include:
In FY 1996, over 35,000 soldiers were operationally deployed every day of the year. This is a nearly 50 percent increase from the previous year. Additionally, there are 100,000 soldiers forward stationed in Northeast Asia and Europe as the linchpin of our security strategy in these strategically important regions.
Most operational deployments, especially those of extended duration, are a blend of soldiers, units, and capabilities from all three of the Army's components. A snap shot of Army operations in Bosnia demonstrates this point. On June 5, 1997, the Army had 9,253 soldiers on the ground in Bosnia. While the bulk of the force consisted of active soldiers (77.5 percent), soldiers from the USAR comprised 12.7 percent, and soldiers from the ARNG comprised 9.8 percent of the Army force.
Army RC forces contribute significantly to both operational deployments and other federal peacetime missions that do not involve an operational deployment. For example, in FY 1996 alone, the USAR and ARNG provided 5,846,427 and 417,506 soldier-days, respectively, in federal service.
On the home front, the ARNG conducts the bulk of the missions in support of states and territories. From 1991 to 1996, soldiers in ARNG
units averaged nearly 300,000 soldier-days annually in support of state and territorial missions. Requirements are not uniformly distributed
across all 54 states and territories, nor are usage rates consistent from year to year within the individual states and territories. These realities
highlight the importance of the role of the National Guard Bureau in working with Department of the Army and the 54 states and territories to
distribute resources allocated to the ARNG across the Nation so as to best meet state and territorial requirements when those forces are not in
a federal status.
TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL
The blend of AC and RC units, soldiers, and capabilities is a direct result of the Total Force Policy implemented in 1973. Today, 46 percent of
the Army's soldiers are in the AC and 54 percent are in the RC. This is the highest RC percentage in the Army since before World War II.
Funding of AC forces has decreased by 42 percent since 1989.
RC funding has decreased 19 percent. This reflects the increased percentage of the Army that is organized in the USAR and ARNG, and the increased investment in the readiness and capabilities of RC forces. From FY 1989 to FY 1998, although Army funding has declined, USAR funding (minus the procurement effect) has increased as a percentage of the Army's total obligation authority (TOA) from 5.2 percent to 6.6 percent. During the same period, the ARNG's share of Army TOA has increased from 8.8 percent to 11.0 percent. In fact, today's funding level for the Army RC, as a percentage of total Army funding, is the second highest in more than 30 years.
Constrained resources dictate the Army allocate resources based on a First to Fight principle. The First to Fight principle makes no distinction
between AC and RC forces. Army RC forces required to deploy in the early days of a contingency are resourced at higher levels than later
deploying AC forces.
Thanks to Congress, despite significant reductions to Army procurement programs, modernization of RC forces has been accomplished at an
unparalleled rate. From FY 1992 through FY 1998, RC modernization -- in accordance with the First to Fight principle -- exceeds $21.5
billion. USAR modernization exceeds $2.8 billion for FY 1992 to FY 1998. Over the same period, ARNG modernization exceeds $18.7
billion. Modernization of RC forces has been a combination of new procurement and the cascading of modern equipment from AC forces
(which were eliminated by the 1991 Base Force Study or the 1993 BUR). Examples of Army modernization of RC forces before AC forces
include: fielding of the Paladin 155 millimeter self-propelled howitzer in FY 1999 to 1-127 Field Artillery (Kansas ARNG), 1-214 Field
Artillery (Georgia ARNG), and 1-114 Field Artillery (Mississippi ARNG), before the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions; fielding of the
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System in FY 1997 to the 2d Battlefield Coordination Element (Alabama ARNG) and I Corps Artillery
Headquarters, before fielding to the 82d Airborne, 101st Airborne, and 3d Infantry Divisions; and the fielding of over 500 Family of Medium
Tactical Vehicles to elements of RC special operations forces, 9th Army Reserve Command, and the Tennessee ARNG, before fielding to the
3d Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions. The ability to maintain this momentum in modernization is dependent on reversing the decline in Army
ARMY RC INITIATIVES
The Army is undertaking several initiatives to enhance readiness through improved AC and RC integration. The Army National Guard Division
Redesign Study reflects the commitment to transform 12 brigades of combat capabilities in the ARNG to CS and CSS capabilities. Other
initiatives include development of the concept for composite or multi-component units; assignment of AC officers to ARNG units; RC support
of rotational operational missions; increased RC shares of Army field artillery and air defense artillery forces; support of Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
using the USAR's Regional Support Commands to facilitate regional support, planning, training, and response teams tied to federal
requirements for crisis and consequence management against weapons of mass destruction; and a concept of associated RC units with active
Army organizations. Additionally, the Army is working to better identify and synchronize pre- and post-mobilization objectives for RC units in
order to optimize peacetime training opportunities and minimize post-mobilization training requirements.
QDR -- A TEAM EFFORT
The Army approached the QDR as a team effort. Representatives from all components were included in the process that worked with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff study panels and that advised the Department of the Army leadership. Throughout
the QDR, these representatives were instrumental in formulating and preparing analyses that affected all components of the Army. The intent of
this integration of AC and RC representatives was to ensure that the Department of the Army leadership received an objective assessment of
QDR findings and recommendations, and that each component had a full view of, and direct impact throughout, the entire QDR process.
THE ARMY'S QDR CROSSROADS
The QDR defense strategy supported CINC warfighting requirements for land forces. It was clear that, in a resource constrained environment, the Army's requirements exceeded the level of resources likely to be received in the foreseeable future. The Army was at a crossroads with two distinct options. The first option was to maintain pre-QDR personnel end strengths and rely on OSD and Congress to provide additional funding to address the modernization shortfalls. This approach was inconsistent with the trend to balance the federal budget and not in keeping with the OSD guidance for QDR efforts guided by a zero fiscal growth assumption. The second option was to increase funds now for Army modernization through reasonable personnel reductions, while preserving the Army's ability to implement key aspects of the defense strategy. Such personnel reductions would be achieved by streamlining headquarters, reducing non-warfighting functions, and increasing the efficiency of Army infrastructure. The Army chose the second course of action.
Identifying where personnel reductions could be achieved was based on several completed and ongoing analyses, including: Total Army Analyses; several recent studies by RAND, the General Accounting Office, and the Congressional Budget Office; the Ground Force Assessment prepared jointly by OSD and the Joint Staff; the historical usage of Army forces in support of federal and state missions; and the Joint Staff's Dynamic Commitment wargame seminars.
The Dynamic Commitment seminars (which included key leaders from the CINCs' staff and representatives of Service staffs and components) highlighted the increased requirement for light infantry forces and CSS capabilities throughout the spectrum of operations. These requirements often stressed current Army force structure, especially the active force and the CSS capabilities in the USAR. It was apparent that if the Army were to meet its requirements in all aspects of the defense strategy, increased participation of relevant ARNG forces would be essential.
To facilitate the assessment of the impact of personnel reductions and how those reductions might be achieved, OSD and the Joint Staff considered several options. These options were thoroughly developed and assessed based on their support of the national military strategy. Ultimately, the option that best met the strategy was chosen.
Based on the many supporting analyses and in consultation with OSD and the Joint Staff, the Army determined that some personnel reductions could be achieved, while preserving the Army's "go to war" capabilities and fully meeting the requirements of the strategy. The Army developed and assessed several options, ultimately deciding to reduce Army personnel by 15,000 AC and 45,000 RC soldiers (7,000 USAR and 38,000 ARNG), and between 17,400 and 33,700 Department of the Army civilians, with the precise number to be determined through a most-efficient organization study process. The net fiscal effect of these personnel reductions, when fully implemented, is an estimated $2 billion annual savings in personnel-related funding that would be reinvested to significantly enhance Army modernization and accelerate the reshaping of the Army RC.
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and I co-chaired an off-site meeting at Fort McNair, June 2-4, 1997, with representatives from all Army components, including civilian personnel, to gain consensus and develop an implementation plan to achieve the personnel reductions.
In preparation for the off-site, the Army analyzed personnel requirements from all components. Forces were categorized as committed or uncommitted based on formally established mission requirements. Being identified as uncommitted was not a characterization of a unit's utility, but rather a determination that it was excess to the CINCs' warfighting requirements.
The Army's analysis determined that the Army is maintaining 6,298 soldiers in the USAR that are uncommitted or excess to today's warfighting
requirements, and 62,432 soldiers in the ARNG in the same category. This determination was the basis for the recommended apportionment
of the 45,000 RC personnel reduction.
1997 OFF-SITE RESULTS
The off-site resulted in several agreements which were subsequently briefed to the Secretary of Defense by representatives of all components of the Army on June 5, 1997:
1. The QDR-directed reduction of the active force will be executed according to the plan presented by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans -- 5,000 soldiers per year in FY 1997 through FY 1999.
2. The QDR-directed reduction of 45,000 soldiers from the RC will be accomplished by the end of FY 2002, in two phases:
3. Civilian personnel reductions will be accomplished through a programmed reduction of 17,400 civilians by FY 2006. This ramp will achieve QDR savings of $1.062 billion by FY 2006. Savings will be generated through restructuring, force structure reductions, and competitive A-76 studies to address specific civilian reductions. The balance of 16,300 spaces and associated funds of $995 million remain in the Army to pay either for contract costs or Full-Time Equivalents (i.e., salaries) for our employees if in-house capabilities are determined to be most cost effective.
4. The Army intends to reinvest savings from personnel reductions in the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study initiative (affecting both USAR and ARNG forces) to accelerate ARNG conversions, implement decisions from TAA 03, and eliminate much of the Army's current CS and CSS shortfalls. Additionally, the QDR RC personnel reductions will provide increased funding for readiness and modernization of RC forces, thereby enhancing their utility in both state and federal roles.
5. Modernization of RC force structure will proceed along a time-line equitable with the modernization of the AC.
6. Funds will also be applied to increase Major Construction National Guard to $50 million annually FY 1998 through FY 2003.
The QDR provided a focused opportunity for the Army team to assess our roles, responsibilities, requirements, capabilities, excesses, and shortfalls in relation to today's challenges, the National Military Strategy and fiscal realities. The QDR also highlighted the need for Army forces having full spectrum capabilities and the strategic value of "boots on the ground." The Joint Staff's Dynamic Commitment wargame seminars and other analyses were instrumental in identifying force requirements and assessing Service capabilities.
Army soldiers and forces will continue to be called with greater frequency than in the past to shape the geostrategic environment consistent with our national values and interests. When directed, Army forces will respond rapidly with decisive and sustained force when our Nation's interests are threatened.
The Army made some difficult decisions during the QDR. We chose to pursue reasonable personnel reductions in all components to free the resources needed to improve Army modernization and accelerate the reshaping of the Army RC. Both of these actions are critically important as the Army prepares for an increasingly complex and uncertain future.