Congressional Documents
EXCERPTS - Acquisition Programs
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 105-132
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
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R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 1119
together with
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
June 16, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
One Hundred Fifth Congress
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona RONALD V. DELLUMS, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah Carolina
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey LANE EVANS, Illinois
STEVE BUYER, Indiana GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JAMES TALENT, Missouri ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama JANE HARMAN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania
HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
RON LEWIS, Kentucky ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JIM TURNER, Texas
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee F. ALLEN BOYD, Jr., Florida
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
Carolina JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
SONNY BONO, California CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
JIM RYUN, Kansas
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey
BOB RILEY, Alabama
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION.................. 19
TITLE I--PROCUREMENT............................................. 19
OVERVIEW....................................................... 19
Aircraft Procurement, Navy................................... 57
Items of Special Interest.................................. 61
Weapons Procurement, Navy.................................... 66
Items of Special Interest.................................. 70
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy............................ 74
Items of Special Interest.................................. 77
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force.............................. 101
Items of Special Interest.................................. 106
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS......................................... 139
Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 139
Section 121--Limitation on Obligation of Funds for the
Seawolf Submarine Program................................ 139
TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION............ 140
OVERVIEW....................................................... 140
Navy RDT&E................................................... 164
Items Of Special Interest.................................. 174
Air Force RDT&E.............................................. 202
Items Of Special Interest.................................. 211
Defense Agencies RDT&E....................................... 216
Items Of Special Interest.................................. 225
TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS...................................... 399
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS......................................... 405
Subtitle B--Naval Vessels and Shipyards...................... 406
Section 1022--Authority to Enter into a Long-Term Charter
for a Vessel in Support of the Surveillance Towed Array
Sensor (SURTASS) Program................................. 407
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
TITLE I--PROCUREMENT
OVERVIEW
The last few years have seen a vigorous debate concerning
the adequacy of the Clinton Administration budgets for defense
modernization. Administration officials argue that a
``holiday'' in weapons procurement was justified due to the
many new weapons purchased in the 1980s and to not having to
replace older weapons retired as a result of the drawdown in
the size of the force. The 104th Congress reasoned otherwise:
namely, that the disproportionate cuts in the equipment
modernization accounts jeopardized the technological edge that
was so brilliantly demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War.
Consequently, Congress added $11 billion to these accounts in
the fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 1997 National Defense
Authorization Acts (Public Laws 104-106 and 104-201)--a 15
percent increase over the budget request for each of those two
years--despite the Administration's opposition to doing so. In
taking these actions, the 104th Congress sought the expert
advice of the military service chiefs on how best to apply the
additional funds to the most urgent unfunded modernization
priorities. Regrettably, no sooner had these acts had been
signed into law than the Administration proposed to use the
added modernization funds to pay for the operations and
readiness shortages contained in their budgets.
This same pattern continues with the fiscal year 1998
budget request. Attainment of even modest modernization
increases has again been deferred until ``next year.'' Despite
obvious and compelling evidence of procurement shortfalls and
despite the fact that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
concluded that, beginning with fiscal year 1998, the Department
required $60 billion annually to keep the force modernized, the
fiscal year 1998 budget request of $42.6 billion represents a
cut of $1.5 billion from the budget enacted for fiscal year
1997 and is $2.9 billion below the spending levels forecast in
the President's budget for fiscal year 1998 just last year.
Furthermore, the budget request marks the fourth consecutive
year that the Administration has reduced the fiscal year 1998
procurement figure--by a cumulative total of $14.5 billion--
relative to its earlier projections.
The committee notes that the recently-released Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) acknowledges that the planned ``rebound''
in procurement ``has been repeatedly postponed in recent
budgets as increases previously projected for the procurement
accounts have been eroded by unexpected demands for additional
funding in operational activities.'' The committee is dismayed
by the fact that the
Department believes this shift in resources from modernization
to operations will continue and that procurement funding,
instead of growing to $60 billion per year, could be expected
to stall in the range of $45-$50 billion. The committee further
notes that this belief is reinforced by the independent
National Defense Panel's critique of the QDR, which found the
QDR modernization plan risky due to tenuous assumptions of
further base closures and savings from acquisition and other
infrastructure reforms.
Notwithstanding the Administration's lack of resolve to
deal proactively with the continuing modernization problem, the
committee--for the third year in a row--has added funds
significantly in excess of the procurement budget request.
Moreover, in formulating its proposed addition of $3.8 billion,
the committee has also once again been responsive to meeting
the unfunded priorities submitted by the various military
service chiefs of staff. However, because the committee
believes that the QDR has not made the correct decisions
regarding tactical aircraft and the B-2, it has taken different
positions on these two issues. Furthermore, the committee
disagrees with the Department's assessment of the Arsenal Ship
demonstrator's utility and its proposed teaming arrangement for
construction of the New Attack Submarine. These topics are
discussed at length in the report.
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Aircraft Procurement, Navy
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Items of Special Interest
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F/A-18
The budget request contained $2,101.1 million for
procurement of 20 F/A-18E/F aircraft, four fewer than the
number for which advance procurement funds were requested in
fiscal year 1997, and $90.5 million for advanced procurement of
30 aircraft in fiscal year 1999.
Based on the recently-released recommendations of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Navy's current
procurement objective for the F/A-18E/F is 548 to 785 aircraft,
at a maximum production rate of 48 aircraft per year, which has
been decreased from the fiscal year 1998 budget request
procurement plan of 1,000 aircraft at a maximum production rate
of 60 aircraft per year. The committee understands that the
Navy plans to determine its actual procurement objective based
on the initial operational capability date of the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF).
The committee is sensitive to the Navy's requirement to
modernize its tactical aircraft fleet. Unfortunately, the Navy
failed in its attempts to replace the A-6 and F-14 fleets first
with the A-12 and then with the A/F-X, both of which were
terminated. Consequently, the F/A-18E/F program emerged--more
by default than by design--as the Navy's choice to replace the
A-6 in the all-weather attack mission, replace the F-14 in
thefleet air defense and tactical reconnaissance missions, and to
supplement existing F/A-18C/Ds. The F/A-18E/F improves range and
payload capabilities compared to the F/A-18C/D, but it will not be
nearly as survivable as either the A-12 or the A/F-X would have been.
Accordingly, the committee strongly supports the Navy's participation
in the JSF program to meet its longer-term force structure and
modernization requirements and believes that the JSF will be more cost
and operationally effective than any previous Naval aircraft when it
enters service with the fleet. Therefore, the committee recommends an
increase of $20.0 million in PE63800N to accelerate development of the
Naval variant of the JSF, as explained elsewhere in this report.
The committee notes that the budget request proposal to
reduce the quantity of F/A-18E/Fs procured in fiscal years 1998
and 1999 by 10 from the 60 proposed in the fiscal year 1997
acquisition plan, together with the QDR recommendation to
reduce both the total procurement objective and the maximum
production rate of this aircraft, suggests that future
aircraft, shipbuilding, and other weapons procurement demands
on the Navy's budget are necessitating consideration of
alternative F/A-18E/F production rates. Accordingly, the
committee recommends $1,348.9 million for continued F/A-18E/F
production, a reduction of $752.2 million. The committee
believes that until the review of the QDR by the independent
National Defense Panel is completed in December 1997 and
assessed by the Congress, the F/A-18E/F program should proceed
at a slower pace.
.............
V-22
The budget request contained $472.0 million to procure five
V-22 aircraft and $69.7 million for advance procurement of
seven aircraft in fiscal year 1999.
The committee has been a strong supporter of accelerated V-
22 procurement and endorses the recently-released Quadrennial
Defense Review's (QDR) recommendation to achieve a long-term
production rate of 30 aircraft per year by 2004. However, the
committee notes that despite the fact that in fiscal year 1997
Congress appropriated advance procurement funding for 12
aircraft in fiscal year 1998, the Department has requested only
five. Therefore, consistent with its prior actions, the
recommendations of the QDR, and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps' unfunded priorities for fiscal year 1998, the committee
recommends an increase of $189.3 million to procure two
additional aircraft.
Weapons Procurement, Navy
Overview
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Items of Special Interest
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Joint stand off weapon (JSOW)
The budget request contained $58.7 million for 113 JSOW
missiles for the Navy. No funds were requested to procure JSOW
missiles for the Air Force until fiscal year 1999.
The committee continues to support accelerated procurement
of precision guided munitions and integration of these weapons
into aircraft and mission planning subsystems. Also, the
committee notes that the Chief of Naval Operations included
additional JSOW procurement in the top one-third of his fiscal
year 1998 unfunded priorities.
The committee added funding in fiscal year 1997 to
accelerate the integration of precision guided weapons on the
B-2 bomber and understands that some of this funding will be
used to complete JSOW integration in late 1998. The committee
urges the Air Force to accelerate updating the B-2's mission
support system in order to employ JSOW at the earliest possible
date.
The committee recommends an increase of $10.0 million for
the Navy to procure 37 additional missiles and an increase of
$29.0 million for the Air Force to initiate procurement of 100
missiles. The committee understands that these increases will
reduce the fiscal year 1998 JSOW unit cost by 24 percent. The
committee expects the Air Force to accelerate JSOW capability
on the B-2 with these weapons.
Standard Missile (SM)-2 Block IIIB medium range (MR) modification kits
The budget request contained $35.6 million for 80 SM-2
Block IIIB MR modification kits.
The SM is the Navy's primary surface-to-air weapon against
hostile aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles. The latest MR
version to enter production, SM-2 Block IIIB, retains the full
performance of earlier models and adds improvements against
electronic countermeasures. However, the current SM inventory
is dominated by older versions that are less capable against
modern anti-ship weapons and ineffective against some newer
threat missiles.
Even though the Navy plans to supplement its new missile
production by upgrading older missiles to the Block IIIB
configuration, its projected Block IIIB inventories at the turn
of the century will still fall significantly short of the
quantity required to meet deployment inventories. Accordingly,
the committee recommends an increase of $33.0 million to
procure an additional 80 SM-2 Block IIIB MR modification kits.
This action will allow the Navy to field more of the latest-
version missiles and reduce the need to ``cross deck'' the
missiles between deploying and returning ships.
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Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
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Items of Special Interest
.............
New attack submarine (NAS)
The budget request contained $2,314.9 million for
procurement of the first NAS and $284.9 million for advance
procurement of the second and third NASs in fiscal years 1999
and 2001 respectively.
In presenting its budget request for fiscal year 1996 two
years ago, the Navy was poised to proceed with its plan to
begin producing a 30-ship class of NASs at a single shipyard,
the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics. Congress
rejected the Navy's plan, directing that the NAS would not be a
serially-produced new class of nuclear attack submarines and
further directing that Newport News Shipbuilding would
participate in the future construction of such submarines.
Congress was concerned over having the NAS design serially
produced at a single shipyard since it could have led to
production of a scaled-down, less capable, version of the NAS
predecessor, the Seawolf, while precluding the consideration of
technological innovation available through the other nuclear-
capable shipyard. Moreover, because Congress was concerned with
the prospects of an unaffordable nuclear attack submarine, it
reasoned that competition between Electric Boat and Newport
News was viewed as important to controlling costs.
The results of Congress' efforts were enacted into law in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
(Public Law 104-106). Section 131 of that Act replaced the
Navy's plan with one that set forth a series of four
submarines, beginning construction in each of fiscal years 1998
through 2001, which use the NAS as a baseline design and
successively incorporate new technologies. The first and third
of these submarines were to be built at Electric Boat; the
second and fourth were to be built at Newport News. The
Congressional plan stated that the best designs from each
shipyard would form the basis for serial production of the
first of a new class of next-generation submarines beginning in
2003 (amended to 2002 by the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201)). Although the Navy's
original plan also projected commencing construction of four
NASs between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2003, the Navy,
nevertheless, maintained that the Congressional plan was
unaffordable.
Notwithstanding the previously signed Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with Electric Boat and Newport News to
facilitate the competition requirements of Section 131, the
Navy's budget request for fiscal year 1998 is premised upon
having the two shipyards team to produce not only the first
four NASs, beginning construction in fiscal years 1998, 1999,
2001 and 2002 respectively, but all NASs thereafter. This
teaming arrangement, in conjunction with authorization to
initiate a proposed multiyear procurement contract for the
first four submarines, would, according to the Navy, save
$600.0 million ``over the current plan.''
The committee notes several inconsistencies between
provisions contained in the formal Team Agreement and
representations made to the committee in other documents: (1)
The Team Agreement states that, ``The Government, acting
through the Department of the Navy (``Government'') planned to
construct four NAS submarines, the first and third of which
were to be built by Electric Boat, and the second and fourth of
which were to be built by Newport News, in accordance with the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.'' The
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition), in a formal witness statement submitted to the
committee earlier this year stated, ``The plan the Secretary of
Defense submitted to the Congress in March of last year, for
fiscal year 1997, included funding for two of the four
submarines and concluded that it would be very difficult to
accelerate funding for the program in the context of other
modernization priorities.'' (2) The Team Agreement states that,
``Both Electric Boat and Newport News have been encouraged by
the Government to enter into a team arrangement for NAS
submarines, and the parties anticipate alterations to existing
law to accommodate the team arrangement contemplated by this
Agreement.'' In the same formal statement noted above, the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy stated that, ``In December
1996, Electric Boat and Newport News proposed to construct New
Attack Submarines as a team, rather than as competitors.'' The
committee is puzzled by such apparent contradictions and
believes they call into question the forthrightness with which
the Navy is dealing with the Congress.
Additionally, the committee notes that the Navy has
proposed legislation that would waive section 2306b (a) of
Title 10, United States Code, which enumerates those
determinations that an agency head must make as being in the
best interests of the government in order to enter into a
multiyear procurement contract, and would repeal the provisions
of the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years
1996 and 1997, which codified the Congressional plan for next-
generation nuclear attack submarines. Based on the Navy's
request for a waiver of section 2306b (a), the committee can
only infer that authorizing a multiyear procurement in the case
of the NAS may not be in the best interests of the government.
Accordingly, the committee does not recommend approval of this
waiver. Moreover, the committee believes that the current NAS
design is the best the Navy is willing to do rather than the
best the Navy is capable of doing and, therefore, declines to
repeal the Congressional plan for production of the next-
generation submarine, as enacted into law.
The committee is pleased that the Navy has followed the
committee's direction to increase funding for advanced
submarine technologies and notes that the fiscal year 1998
request adds approximately $60.0 million to the amount
requested in fiscal year 1997 for this purpose. However, the
committee is not convinced that the Navy is committed to
maturing these advanced technologies and inserting them into
the NAS, especially into any of the first four submarines.
Although the Navy asserts there are many technology insertion
``opportunities'' on these four submarines, the committee does
not yet see evidence of a funding commitment to incorporate
more than a very few of them as they mature. Because of this
apparent shortcoming, the committee recommends a provision
(sec. 121) that would prohibit the obligation of more than 50
percent of the funds authorized and appropriated for fiscal
year 1998 for the Seawolf (SSN-23) until the Secretary of
Defense certifies that he will fully fund in the future years
defense program accompanying the fiscal year 1999 budget
request 50 percent of the procurement resources estimated to be
required for incorporation into each of the first four NASs
thetechnology ``opportunities'' available for those vessels, as briefed
to the committee by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition).
The committee is aware that the initial sea trials of the
Seawolf produced some very unexpected and positive results.
Those results testify to the potential of contemporary
hydrodynamic design to both improve the performance and enhance
the affordability of the NAS. Unfortunately, the Seawolf's
hydrodynamic design is not reflected in the NAS, and the
committee believes that the results of these sea trials
demonstrate that the Congressional plan not to freeze the NAS
design has merit.
Based on the Seawolf initial sea trials, the committee
believes that the current NAS power plant might be capable of
providing performance levels beyond those demonstrated by the
Seawolf, if alternative hydrodynamic technologies are
exploited. If such is the case, then: (1) an even smaller power
plant might be used on an NAS-displacement platform to produce
planned-for NAS performance levels while simultaneously
yielding more space for additional weapons storage; or (2) a
smaller power plant might be used to provide Seawolf
performance levels on a less-than-NAS-displacement platform. In
recognition of the fact that hydrodynamic shaping and advanced
control surfaces cannot be ``inserted'' once a submarine is
built, the committee further believes the Navy should pursue a
parallel, large-scale demonstrator that is not limited by form
(hull and appendages) or by a single hull design to evaluate
the potential to achieve higher levels of performance with
either the NAS or smaller power plants. The committee is aware
of the encouraging hydrodynamic and acoustic potential
identified by a recent Electric Boat evaluation of
incorporating a double hull around a contemporary submarine and
believes this potential reinforces the benefits of constructing
such a demonstrator.
For this purpose, the committee recommends an additional
$103.0 million in research and development funds and directs
the Secretary of the Navy to issue a competitive solicitation
for the demonstrator to the shipyards not currently involved in
the design or future construction of the NAS. Furthermore, the
committee directs the Secretary to transfer funds in the future
years defense program accompanying the fiscal year 1998 budget
for the Arsenal Ship demonstrator, which the committee
recommends terminating in Title II of this report, to the
submarine large-scale demonstrator.
Nuclear aircraft carrier refueling overhauls
The budget request contained $1,615.0 million for the
refueling overhaul of the Nimitz nuclear aircraft carrier and
$92.9 million in advance procurement for overhaul of a second
carrier in fiscal year 2001.
The committee understands that the Navy will not install
the close-in weapons system on the Nimitz, as previously
planned and budgeted. Therefore, the committee recommends
$1,608.4 million, a corresponding reduction of $6.6 million.
.............
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations
.............
Section 121--Limitation on Obligation of Funds for the Seawolf
Submarine Program
This section would prohibit the obligation of more than 50
percent of the funds authorized and appropriated for the
Seawolf Submarine until the Secretary of the Navy certifies
that he would fully fund in the future years defense program
accompanying the fiscal year 1999 budget request 50 percent of
the resources estimated to be required for incorporation into
each of the first four New Attack Submarines of the technology
``opportunities'' available for those vessels, such
``opportunities'' being those presented to the committee in
testimony by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition).
.............
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Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
.............
Items of Special Interest
B-1 modifications
The budget request contained $114.2 million for B-1
modifications, but did not include funding to procure a digital
data link for this aircraft.
The committee notes that the Air Force Chief of Staff's
fiscal year 1998 unfunded priority list included as the fifth
highest priority a request for funding to provide a limited
capability and to develop tactics and concepts for employment
of a digital data link on the B-1 fleet. Such a data link
allows the fighter and bomber fleets--the ``shooters''--to
receive real-time, secure, and jam-resistant targeting
information from aircraft such as the Airborne Warning and
Control System or the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
Radar System--the ``sensors.'' This linked information improves
an aircrew's situational awareness, operational coordination
among shooter aircraft, and in-flight re-targeting of emerging
higher priority targets. It also contributes to the positive
identification of both airborne and ground forces, thereby
contributing to the elimination of friendly fire. The committee
endorses the requirement to include the B-1 on the Department's
primary data link and recommends $24.0 million to install a
stand-alone Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
terminal and display on up to six B-1 aircraft for this
purpose.
B-2
The budget request contained $174.1 million for the B-2
bomber. These funds are requested for costs associated with
additional software investment, technical orders, interim
contractor support, aircrew training devices, peculiar support
equipment, program management administration, and non-recurring
costs for curtailment of the B-2 production line.
Having held two hearings on the B-2 since the committee
concluded its fiscal year 1997 authorization deliberations, the
committee is convinced of the need to continue production of
this bomber. No less than seven former secretaries of defense
have recommended doing so, as have numerous other former senior
leaders of the Air Force and the Congress. Likewise, current
Air Force leaders privately acknowledge that they would welcome
more B-2s in the bomber inventory, except that they are
``unaffordable.'' The committee rejects this ``unaffordable''
assertion and strongly believes the United States can afford
additional B-2s.
Twenty-one B-2s does not constitute an adequate force level
to deal with the many likely contingencies and crises over the
next 30-40 years, and no other military systems in existence or
on the drawing boards can adequately substitute for the
capabilities the B-2 offers. As noted in testimony presented to
the committee by the former air component commander in the
Persian Gulf war, the B-2 is the only weapon system in the U.S.
inventory free of range, survivability, and lethality
limitations, and, as such, could well be the nation's only
practical option for quickly projecting truly decisive power in
future regional crises.
On April 1, 1997, the B-2 reached its initial operational
capability milestone. According to a statement issued by the
commander of the Air Force's Air Combat Command, ``This is a
significant milestone in ensuring the future of national
defense. The combination of low observability, large payload
capacity, bombing accuracy, and long range gives America a
unique, unprecedented military capability. This combination
allows the B-2 to penetrate sophisticated defenses and threaten
an enemy's war-making capability. It gives the United States
the capability to project power to any part of the globe within
a matter of hours and deliver combat power with precision in
support of warfighting commands.'' The committee agrees that
the B-2's combination of range, payload, precision weapons
delivery, and stealth make it uniquely capable of independently
responding quickly and decisively from secure U.S. bases to
future contingencies anywhere in the world--and thus justify
its continued production. Accordingly, the committee recommends
an additional $331.2 million for the B-2. This amount
represents an increase of $353.0 million to initiate the
eventual procurement of an additional nine B-2s coupled with a
decrease of $21.8 million, which was requested for production
curtailment costs. Of the $353.0 million added, $281.0 million
is for reestablishment of those elements of the production line
that have been previously laid away and $52.0 million is for
advance procurement.
Missile Procurement, Air Force
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
AGM-130
The budget request contained $1.5 million for AGM-130
management administration and contractor support, but did not
include funding to procure additional AGM-130 missiles.
The AGM-130 is a precision-guided air-to-surface missile
employed on the F-15E aircraft to strike targets from outside
point defense ranges and is the F-15E's only 2,000-pound class
weapon with this capability. The committee is aware that both
the Department's Heavy Bomber Force Study and a separate study
conducted by the Defense Science Board recommended that the Air
Force retain 1,000 AGM-130 missiles in its inventory. In view
of this fact, and to address the unfunded requirement
identified by the Air Force Chief of Staff, the committee
recommended an increase of $95.0 million in fiscal year 1997
for an additional 250 missiles. Recognizing that the
requirement for the AGM-130 still exceeds the number of
missiles funded in prior years by over 200, the committee
recommends an increase of $41.0 million for an additional 100
missiles.
TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
.............
Navy RDT&E
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
Advanced deployable system
The budget request contained $33.0 million in PE 64784N for
continued development of the Advanced Deployable System (ADS),
an element of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System
program. The request includes funds for the concept evaluation,
program definition, and risk reduction phase of an ADS
prototype and engineering and manufacturing development for
production of the ADS.
To meet the requirement for providing reliable detection of
quieter threat submarines operating in the noisy and shallow
waters of the world's littoral regions, a significantly
improved information processing and data fusion capability is
needed for support of ADS operations. The committee finds the
budget request to be insufficient for development of these
capabilities and inadequate to support the conduct of at-sea
testing to validate performance in challenging littoral
environments. Accordingly, the committee recommends an increase
of $10.4 million for continued development and integration of
automated detection and data fusion algorithms, rapid
prototyping of information processing capabilities, and at-sea
testing to validate the expected improvements in ADS
performance.
.............
CVN-77 research and development
The budget request contained $17.9 million in PE 64567N for
aircraft carrier contract design for the CVN-77.
The Navy has stated that CVN-77 will provide a transition
from the Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carrier to the next-
generation CV(X). As such, CVN-77 is a candidate for
development, evaluation, and incorporation of a range of
advanced technologies and acquisition reform initiatives which,
not only could result in lower life cycle costs, but could also
set the standard by which further improvements in the
application of advanced technologies and acquisition
initiatives to the design and construction of the CV(X) will be
measured. Accordingly, the committee recommends an increase of
$17.0 million to accelerate the evaluation of maturing advanced
technologies for potential incorporation in the design of CVN-
77.
CV(X) carrier systems development
The budget request contained $90.2 million in PE63512N for
future aircraft carrier research and development.
The committee notes that this request represents an
increase of $84.5 million above the amount appropriated for
fiscal year 1997 and $88.4 million above that projected for
fiscal year 1998 in the fiscal year 1997 Future Years Defense
Plan. The increase is planned for advanced development of a
range of advanced technologies for potential incorporation in
the design and construction of the next-generation CV(X)
aircraft carrier.
The committee notes that the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council approved a mission needs statement (MNS) for a New
Tactical Aviation Sea-Based Platform for the 21st Century, the
CV(X), in March 1996. The committee understands that among the
potential alternatives that may compete with CV(X) in meeting
the operational requirements of the MNS are the Mobile Offshore
Base (MOB) and the Arsenal Ship, as well as land-based
aircraft. The committee further understands that MOB studies in
support of the CV(X) cost and operational effectiveness
analysis have just been initiated. The committee also notes
that the budget request includes funding for an Arsenal Ship
demonstration that could lead to procurement of up to five
Arsenal Ships. The committee is concerned that the issues
raised in the committee report on H.R. 3230 (H. Rept. 104-563)
and the statement of managers accompanying the conference
report on H.R. 3230 (H. Rept. 104-724) relative to the need for
validation of the Arsenal Ship operational requirement and
performance analysis have not yet been addressed by the Navy.
In view of the above, the committee believes that it is
neither fiscally nor technically prudent to increase advanced
carrier systems research and development for the CV(X) to the
degree sought by the Navy. The committee believes that
increased emphasis should be placed on the research and
development program for the CNV-77, and elsewhere in this
report, has recommended an increase to the research and
development program for the CVN-77 aircraft carrier to provide
a transition to the CV(X). The committee recommends that
funding for carrier systems research and development for the
CV(X) be held to the level originally projected for fiscal year
1998 and recommends a decrease of $88.4 million
.............
F/A-18E/F super hornet
The budget request contained $317.0 million in PE 24136N
for the F/A-18 fleet. The committee understands that $267.5
million of this amount is for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and
that funding for this program has increased $114.2 million over
the amount forecast in the 1997 Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP).
The committee has expressed great concern, described in
detail elsewhere in this report, over the unaffordable pace of
tactical aviation (TACAIR) modernization being pursued by the
Department. Of the three most costly TACAIR programs in the
Department's request--the Air Force F-22 Raptor, the Navy F/A-
18E/F Super Hornet, and the Joint Strike Fighter--the Super
Hornet was recently approved by the Department to enter
production, even prior to final recommendations by the
Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Panel.
The committee is unaware of any justification to support
such a large increase in this year's research and development
request for the Super Hornet over the recently forecast funding
level identified in the 1997 FYDP. Therefore, the committee
recommends $202.8 million for the F/A-18 fleet, a decrease of
$114.2 million for the F/A-18E/F.
.............
Joint air to surface standoff missile/standoff land attack missile
expanded response
The budget request contained $9.6 million in PE 64312N and
$203.3 million in PE 27325F for the Air Force/Navy Joint Air to
Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) program and $28.9 million in
PE 64603N for the Navy's Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded
Response (SLAM ER) program.
The JASSM program was established in the fiscal year 1996
budget, following cancellation of the Tri-Service Stand-off
Attack Missile (TSSAM), to develop a replacement for that
system at the earliest possible date. In the statement of
managers which accompanied the conference report on S. 1124 (H.
Rept. 104-450), the conferees stressed the urgent need for the
operational capability that would have been provided by the
TSSAM and the expectation that theSecretary of Defense would
establish a joint program in the Air Force and the Navy for development
of a TSSAM replacement that would meet the requirements of both
services.
The committee notes recent proposals by the Navy to replace
the joint program for JASSM with the Navy's SLAM-ER, prior to
completion of the current program definition and risk reduction
phase for JASSM. The committee considers such a proposal to be
premature and not in the best interests of the joint program.
The proposal is, however, one of the program alternatives that
could be considered at the Milestone II review for entry of the
JASSM program into engineering and manufacturing development in
July 1998, if properly based on the technical progress in the
program and risk reduction phase, cost and operational
effectiveness analysis, and other factors that must be taken
into account in that review.
The committee has reviewed the Navy's SLAM-ER program and
considers the development and procurement schedule excessively
concurrent. The committee understands that on the basis of a
single controlled flight test, the Navy has made a low rate
initial production decision that will result in the procurement
of approximately 19 percent of the total planned buy of SLAM-ER
before the completion of development and operational testing.
The committee further notes that flight test of a SLAM-ER with
operational seeker will not be conducted until Development Test
II. The committee believes that this decision is neither
technically nor fiscally prudent. The committee directs the
Secretary of the Navy to review the development and acquisition
program for SLAM-ER and provide to the Congressional defense
committees by December 31, 1997, and provide an assessment
which addresses the concerns expressed by the committee.
Joint standoff weapon system
The budget request contained $71.5 million in PE 64727N for
the joint standoff weapon system (JSOW). JSOW is a modular
design that is being developed in three variants: a submunition
dispenser, an anti-armor submunition dispenser, and a unitary
warhead variant which will incorporate an imaging infrared
seeker, data link and 500 pound blast fragmentation warhead.
The committee understands that the submunition variant has
completed development and initial operational testing with a
success rate of over 96 percent and has been approved for low
rate initial production with initial deliveries to the Navy for
use in the F/A-18 in 1998. Initial procurement of the anti-
armor submunition variant is scheduled for fiscal year 1999,
however, current program funding levels would delay fielding of
the unitary warhead variant until 2002. The committee
recommends an increase of $9.0 million to accelerate the
development and fielding of the unitary warhead variant.
Joint strike fighter
The budget request contained $448.9 million in PE 63800N
for Navy portion of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.
The committee is concerned that, although this request
represents an increase of almost 100 percent in funding for
Navy JSF participation over fiscal year 1997 levels, it is
based on schedule, cost, and quantity objectives that no longer
reflect the Department's plans for Navy tactical aircraft as
outlined in the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). The committee understands that the QDR proposes a major
increase in Navy JSF aircraft quantities from the level
anticipated in the 1997 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) and
supports efforts to accelerate the Navy portion of JSF. The
committee recommends an increase of $20.0 million and directs
the Secretary of Defense to use the increase in funding to
ensure that JSF meets all Navy requirements and to enable this
program to support a significantly increased quantity of Navy
JSF aircraft.
The committee is also concerned that the 1997 FYDP does not
reflect adequate funding within the JSF program to continue
development of the alternative fighter engine (AFE) beyond the
current demonstration/validation phase. The committee continues
to believe that a fully developed and flight tested AFE is
essential to reduce risk to the JSF program and to provide
credible competition necessary for controlling program cost.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to
provide a report to the Congressional defense committees no
later than February 15, 1998, detailing the level of funding
within the JSF program that is identified to fund full
development and flight test of the AFE.
.............
Submarine combat system multi-purpose processor (MPP)
The budget request contained $42.3 million in PE 64503N for
SSN-688 and TRIDENT modernization, including $33.5 million for
submarine sonar improvement. However, the budget request did
not contain funding for the MPP.
To facilitate rapid improvements in submarine acoustic
data processing, the Navy selected the MPP as the cornerstone
of sonar upgrades for the existing SSN-688, 688I and TRIDENT
submarines. At one-half the cost of legacy systems, the MPP
provides the Navy with vastly improved processing power and the
ability to integrate advanced software to existing hardware
using an open operating system architecture. For fiscal year
1997, the committee recommended an additional $11.0 million and
Congress appropriated $7.0 million for advanced development and
rapid introduction of the MPP into the U.S. submarine fleet. To
continue this cost-effective initiative, the committee
recommends an increase of $15.0 million.
.............
Surveillance towed array sensor system/low frequency active program
The budget request contained $9.9 million in PE 24311N for
the integrated surveillance system, including research and
development support of the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor
System (SURTASS) and for the integrated undersea surveillance
system (IUSS).
The committee understands that the SURTASS is a proven
mobile, long-range underwater passive acoustic sensor systems
and that the addition of the low frequency active (LFA)
capability provides a significant increase in the capability of
the system to detect quiet submarines operating in both deep
ocean and shallow coastal littoral waters. In the statement of
managers accompanying the conference report on H.R. 3230 (H.
Rept. 104-724), the conferees agreed to increased funding for
the SURTASS program which would:
(1) continue development and integration of SURTASS
twin line arrays, reduce the size of transmit arrays,
continue fiber optic array development, expand
frequency processing capabilities, and conduct at-sea
testing of resulting developments;
(2) sustain the low frequency active program and
development of more reliable low frequency active
transmitters; and
(3) adapt SURTASS software algorithms for submarine
sonar systems.
The committee recommends an increase of $4.0 million in PE
24311N to continue the development of fiber optic sensors for
the SURTASS/LFA program.
.............
Air Force RDT&E
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
Bomber testing
The budget request contained $389.3 million in PE 65807F
for test and evaluation support of Air Force test ranges and
facilities.
The committee is aware of ongoing efforts to improve B-2
bomber testing capability at the Bark Flight Test Facility and
supports the expansion of this facility's capability to conduct
testing of other Air Force bomber aircraft. The committee
recommends an increase of $8.0 million to add test capability
to this existing facility for B-1B, B-52, and other bomber or
strike aircraft.
Conventional ballistic missile
The budget request contained $32.8 million in PE 63851F for
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) demonstration and
validation activities.
The committee notes that a number of ``rogue'' nations have
constructed hardened, deeply buried facilities. Some of these
facilities represent command and control structures and sites
at which weapons of mass destruction are developed and stored
and are therefore of great military significance. The
destruction of these sites requires a weapon that can penetrate
hardened structures or rock, while maintaining sufficient
structural integrity to detonate. The committee further notes
that the ability of the U.S. military to strike at these
targets effectively without recourse to nuclear weapons is
extremely limited.
The committee believes that a conventionally armed ICBM has
the potential to hold these targets at risk, in the near term,
and at modest cost. This proposed capability is based on a
combination of very high ICBM warhead terminal velocities,
technologies that allow precision delivery, long range,
relative invulnerability to enemy defenses, and the maturity of
current ICBM technology.
Therefore, the committee recommends $49.3 million for ICBM
demonstration and validation activities, an increase of $16.5
million. The additional funding is for the purpose of
establishing a conventional ballistic missile advanced concept
technology demonstration program. The funding is to be used to
modify an existing reentry vehicle, complete flight test plans,
and procure long lead items to support a flight test.
.............
Minuteman safety enhanced reentry vehicle
The budget request contained $137.9 million in PE 64851F
for efforts to upgrade the Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) guidance and propulsion systems.
The Minuteman guidance replacement program (GRP) is
replacing 1960's vintage electronics with modern supportable
technology. The program is proceeding through engineering and
manufacturing development and the first of the upgraded
guidance systems is expected to be delivered in 1999. The GRP
also preserves the option to incorporate the Mk-21 safety
enhanced reentry vehicle on the Minuteman III ICBM if
Peackeeper ICBMs, which are now equipped with the Mk-21, are
retired.
The committee notes that the Mk-21 is the most modern,
safest, and logistically supportable reentry vehicle in the Air
Force inventory. It further notes that the Air Force is
planning to replace the older Mk-12A reentry vehicle with the
Mk-21 on 150 Minuteman III ICBMs. However, the actual design
and development efforts for the hardware and software needed
for the incorporation of the Mk-21 remain to be accomplished.
Initial engineering tests will be accomplished with additional
funding authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 1997. The
committee believes that a continuation of this effort will
reduce the risk of a potentially costly redesign and refit of
the new guidance systems. To promote the timely completion of
Mk-21 integration efforts, the committee recommends $152.9
million for PE 64851F, an increase of $15.0 million.
.............
Joint strike fighter
The budget request contained $458.1 million in PE 63800F
for the Air Force portion of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). As
mentioned elsewhere in this report, the committee is extremely
concerned that the current pace of the Department's tactical
aviation programs is both unaffordable and not coordinated with
the emerging Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The committee
notes that this request represents an increase of $27.0 million
over the projected funding for JSF identified in the 1997
Future Years Defense Plan and recommends $431.1 million, a
decrease of $27.0 million.
.............
Defense Agencies RDT&E
.............
Advanced submarine technology program
The budget request contained $69.1 million in PE 63763E for
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency marine technology
program. No funds were included for joint U.S./Russian
submarine research and development.
The committee recommends an increase of $3.0 million to
enable the Director of DARPA to establish a U.S.-Russian
cooperative program for research and development relevant to
nuclear submarines. This initiative will capitalize on the
trust and confidence created under DARPA-sponsored initiatives
with the Russian submarine design bureaus and institutes of the
Russian Academies of Science. The cooperative program should
apply to technology in the areas of nuclear submarine
architecture, ship automation and damage control, submarine
hydrodynamics and hydroacoustics. The technical direction and
scope of these initiatives will be coordinated with the
Department of the Navy.
.............
Joint strike fighter
The budget request contained $23.9 million in PE 63800E for
continued development of the Joint Strike Fighter. The
committee understands that defense-wide funding for this
program has been transferred to the Navy and Air Force research
and development accounts, and, therefore, recommends no funds
be authorized in defense-wide research and development accounts
for this program.
.............
.............
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
----------
DISSENTING VIEWS OF RONALD V. DELLUMS
I voted against reporting H.R. 1119 from the committee for
several reasons. First, the price tag for this bill continues
to be significantly out of line with the military requirements
of this country, out of line with a properly balanced
allocation of expenditures across all national security
accounts, and out of line with the strategic and geopolitical
realities of our world.
The national security agenda of this country contains three
equally important elements, and requires a balance of funding
among the accounts of each element. We must have a vibrant and
energetic economy and an informed, healthy, trained and
educated citizenry in order to maintain our domestic
tranquillity. Second, we must have an engaged foreign policy
and foreign aid program that can promote sustainable
development, a respect for human rights, and the growth of
democracy, all of which are vital for regional stability and
the prevention of war and conflict. Third, we must field a
right-sized, properly equipped and appropriately trained
military force in order to deter violence and aggression,
participate in internationally sanctioned peace keeping and
meet our obligations to support humanitarian operations.
Our national security is as dependent on the amount of the
discretionary budget allocated to the first two of these
accounts as it is to the account that is recommended to be
authorized in this bill and report. To the extent that we over-
fund the defense account, as I believe we have done with this
recommendation, those other elements of our national security
agenda will continue to atrophy.
Second, the committee recommendation would procure too much
of yesterday's technology by adding, for example, funding for
long-lead procurement of nine additional B-2 bomber aircraft as
well as for the purchase of additional tactical aircraft for
which there is no urgent requirement.
Third, the committee recommendation would press forward too
rapidly with national missile defense, notwithstanding that the
committee recommendation implicitly adopts the administration's
so-called three-plus-three strategy for development and
preparation of a national missile defense system. I applaud the
committee's retreat from any effort to implicitly or to
explicitly recommend a program that would exceed the limits of
the ABM Treaty.
Fourth, the committee recommendation fails to offer the
operations and maintenance, personnel and other savings that
could be attained if our force structure were further
realigned. In an era where we will face no peer competitor for
at least a decade, we should undertake such action in order to
meet the near-term and mid-term requirements that will confront
us.
Fifth, I am troubled that the committee recommendation
siphons off important resources from the environmental clean-up
and construction accounts of the Department of Energy's defense
programs in order to finance procurement of the unnecessary
additional items in the procurement account.
Sixth, I am also troubled at the decision to reduce funds
for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, a program that is
essential to our interests in reducing or eliminating threats
that are currently posed by nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and materials.
Ronald V. Dellums.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF JOHN SPRATT
I support most aspects of this legislation and will vote
for it, but I disagree with the diversion of $2.6 billion in
budget authority from the Department of Energy (budget
subfunction 053) to the Department of Defense (budget
subfunction 051). I agree with OMB Director Frank Raines, who
wrote the following to the Chairman of the House National
Security Committee prior to committee mark-up:
The Administration does not support reducing funds
from DOE (subfunction 053) accounts below the
President's 1998 budget request or allocating these
funds to DOD programs. This would be inconsistent with
our understanding of the Budget Agreement reached with
the Congressional leadership.
Of the $2.6 billion diverted, $1.5 billion was designated
to start a ``full funding'' policy of major Department of
Energy (DOE) capital investments. ``Full funding'' simply means
that Congress provides sufficient budget authority to cover the
entire estimated procurement cost of major capital investments
in one year, rather than paying for the project over a period
of years (``incremental funding''). In essence, the DOE was
``banking'' funds needed for large projects, most of which were
for the Stockpile Stewardship program (which ensures the safety
and reliability of our nuclear weapon stockpile) and for
environmental clean-up of sites contaminated by radioactive
waste.
The committee also slashed $936 million from the DOE's
$1.006 billion request to ``privatize'' portions of its
environmental clean-up program. The DOE wants private companies
to build facilities to treat hazardous radioactive waste. In
exchange, the DOE will guarantee that it will pay for the
treatment of the waste at a set price per unit of treated
waste. By law, an agency cannot enter into a contract without
having the budget authority to fully cover the costs of the
contract, so the DOE needs to have the budget authority now in
order to commit to paying for treatment of waste years from
now.
I am not sold yet on DOE's privatization policy, and the
committee may be wise in postponing this policy. But I am sold
on the need to clean up DOE's nuclear weapons facilities, and
whether the clean-up is financed through direct appropriations
or by privatizing some projects, there is a need for
environmental funding. The simple fact is that the committee
diverted these funds to the Department of Defense (DOD) and
created a $936 million hole in the DOE's five-year
environmental clean-up plan. It would have been more prudent to
fence the money, to prohibit DOE from spending it until we are
convinced of the merits of privatization. If the committee
remained unconvinced, Congress could then direct that the funds
be used to clean-up our nuclear weapon sites in more
traditional ways. Diverting the funding to DOD has effectively
cut nearly $1 billion from a sorely needed program.
The committee's actions have created a $2.6 billion
shortfall in the DOE's planned activities over the next five
years. In prior years, this shortfall could have been overcome
by re-adjusting future budget requests. But under the
bipartisan budget agreement, function levels for discretionary
spending have been established for the next five years. The DOE
will be hard-pressed to replace this loss of funding since it
will either mean retrieving the money from future DOD budgets,
or adding funding from other budget functions to the 050
function and violating the budget agreement. This problem is
exacerbated since the $2.6 billion diversion fromDOE to DOD
went into procurement items that will generate future DOD costs, making
it even harder to retrieve the funding from future DOD budgets.
I do not believe that we fully thought through the
implications for environmental clean-up or nuclear weapons,
particularly stockpile stewardship, when we decided to divert
this funding. While I support the overall bill, I hope these
issues will be revisited during the House-Senate conference.
Other important programs at DOE received cuts that seem
unwarranted. The Office Worker and Community Transition was
established by Congress in the early 1990s to ease the impact
of worker layoffs at DOE sites.
On a more positive note, I was pleased by several actions
taken by the committee to address needs at Shaw Air Force Base
and the South Carolina National Guard.
The committee fully funded the Air Force's request for
$6.072 million for the construction of an ``information warfare
sq ops facility.'' The facility will house a new information
warfare unit at Shaw Air Force Base in Sumter, South Carolina.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff state in Joint Vision 2010 that
information superiority will be a key asset in the battles of
the 21st century. The Research & Development and Procurement
Subcommittees held a hearing this week which underscored this
point. Lt. Gen. Douglas Buchholz, Director for Command Control,
Communications and Computer Systems who represented the JCS at
the hearing explained, ``Our successes in the battlespace of
the future, whether combating large, heavily armed forces or
providing peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, depend upon
the precise application of force across the full spectrum of
missions. The cornerstone of this effort is the ability to get
the right information to the right place at the right time--or
information superiority.'' The Air Force's information warfare
unit at Shaw is tasked with making informational warfare
``operational at the component level.'' In other words, its
work is where the rubber meets the road, developing methods to
make certain that information technology can be used to
tactical advantage.
The committee included language directing the Air Force to
study the acquisition of land near Shaw without appropriated
funds. This language will allow the Air Force to exercise its
authority, granted in the FY96 Defense Authorization Act to
acquire land adjacent to Shaw. This land will provide a
significant enhancement to the base, improving operational
flexibility for the Air Force.
.............
John Spratt.
.............
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF JAMES M. TALENT
I am pleased that the full committee, after vigorous
debate, soundly rejected efforts to procure a mix of the older-
model F/A-18C/D and the new F/A-18E/F ``Super Hornet,'' and
instead procure only the newer E/F. However, I must express my
profound disagreement with the net result of the House National
Security Committee's action, which was to reduce overall
procurement funding for Super Hornets from the Navy's request
of $2.1 billion for 20 low-rate initial-production aircraft to
$1.348 billion, and to reduce the Navy's research and
development request from $267.5 to $153.3 million. These
reductions are entirely unjustified and will detract from the
Navy's ability to execute its missions in the increasingly
demanding threat environment of the next two decades.
The Secretary of Defense, in his June 10, 1997 letter,
emphasized his ``strong support of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
program,'' stating that ``our warfighters require the most
advanced technology available.'' He further added that ``the
Quadrennial Defense Review clearly validated the need for the
F/A-18E/F. . . . Without the E/F we would be sending our pilots
into combat at the turn of the century with the 1970s
technology of the F/A-18C/D.''
The Chief of Naval Operations, in his own letter to the
chairman and ranking member, expressed his ``strongest possible
support for the F/A-18E/F program . . . It is the cornerstone
of the future of carrier aviation and the Navy's number one
aviation priority.'' Further, he recently stated to Congress
that ``the multi-mission F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is a leap
forward in both TacAir design and survivability. The Super
Hornet may look like its predecessor, however it is far larger,
significantly more capable, and most importantly it is a first
strike, every day strike, survivable weapon system for the
foreseeable future.'' The Navy states that the Super Hornet
will dominate all possible threats for at least the next two
decades.
The CNO's letter further states that ``the E/F has
flawlessly progressed through every required milestone to
include operational requirements, mission needs, cost and
threat analysis, and engine development. Admiral Johnson
describes the entire aircraft program as ``a model of
acquisition reform and unprecedented cost performance. The F/A-
18E/F has completed significant portions of the flight rest
program (over 1,100 flight hours) . . . Testing results have
clearly exceeded all specific performance parameters. The
program is on schedule, within budget and under specification
weight.''
In terms of cost, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Dr.
Kaminski, in his recent Selective Acquisition Report, found
that the Super Hornet would cost only 13 percent more than its
C/D predecessor based on production figures of 1,000 aircraft
per program. His report pegged C/D per-unit cost at $36.5
million and E/F per-unit cost at $41.6 million.
In terms of survivability, the Center for Naval Analysis in
its recent report to Congress, reported that the Super Hornet
would suffer roughly one fifth the losses of an F/A-18C/D
airwing given the same threat environment and warfighter
scenario. The independent Institute for Defense Analysis, in
its report requested by the Joint Staff, determined that the
Super Hornet's survivability characteristics, to include a
radar signature only one-tenth that of the older C/D, reduces
the number of targets considered as ``high risk'' to the pilot
and aircraft by 75 percent over the C/D Hornet it will replace.
Finally, it is essential to point out that the E/F program
is not in competition with the emerging joint strike fighter
concept. The Super Hornet will replace aging F-14s, whose
operational costs the Navy desperately seeks to avoid, and
older Hornets, all of which have reached the limits of their
technological upgradability. The most optimistic forecast for a
Navy version of the JSF is 2010, and even then the service
would not be able to place a meaningful number of aircraft on
its carrier decks until approximately 2015. The Super Hornet is
indeed a ``bridge'' from the F-14 and C/D-model Hornets to the
joint strike fighter, and that bridge by any reasonable
estimate appears to be about two decades in length.
I am pleased that the House National Security Committee,
after careful consideration of these important issues, declared
its overwhelming and bipartisan support for the F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet program.
James M. Talent.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF PATRICK J. KENNEDY
.......
This year the committee again worked to ensure a strong
focus remained on anti-submarine warfare (ASW). As a maritime
nation, we must be able to achieve and maintain sea control,
therefore we must invest in ASW to remain effective against
increasingly advanced submarines. In recognition of the
continuing importance of ASW to our national security, as was
done in previous years the committee made a significant
increase to the Administration's request for ASW.
While the committee maintained undersea warfare as a
priority, it failed to accept the proposal put forward by the
Navy and the shipyards with respect to the teaming agreement.
In this instance, I believe we lost an opportunity to take the
most cost effective approach tomodernizing our submarines while
maintaining a hedge against a future threat. By pursuing a plan that
calls for competition of submarine construction at extremely low rates
of production, we will embark upon a prohibitively expensive course
that will force us into the dangerous position of possessing only one
shipyard actively constructing submarines. The Navy's proposal
represented an opportunity to endorse the concept of putting the best
minds in the business together to develop a more effective yet
affordable next generation attack submarine. I am disappointed the
committee did not pursue the teaming route though I am confident that
we will again revisit this issue during the conference process.
...........
Patrick J. Kennedy.