STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE JOHN W. DOUGLASS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION)
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND FORCES
OF THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS
MARCH 25, 1998
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the Department of the Navy’s fiscal year 1999 tactical aviation
modernization programs.
Since the end of the Cold War, it has been primarily the
naval forces that have been called upon to respond to crisis
around the world. The Navy and Marine Corps team has helped
control events, from Europe to Africa to Asia. Since 1990 there
have been 93 contingencies in 96 months. Almost half occurred
with less than two weeks warning. Today, naval forces are not
just the favored option, they are often the only option.
The Quadrennial Defense Review validated our force today
and our mission for tomorrow. If events of past years are
representative, the 21st Century will be a time when our leaders
call early and often on the Navy and Marine Corps to protect our
national interests. In today’s world of promise and challenge,
stability is essential and naval forces are a fundamental asset
in support of our nation’s strategic and economic interests
around the globe. The U.S. built 172 bases overseas since the
end of World War II. We are, at last count, down to 24 bases
with our options for replacement both diminishing and
unaffordable. Accordingly, the Navy and Marine Corps contribute
an essential shaping force and will almost always be the first
to be called to respond. With such responsibility, the burden
on the Navy and Marine Corps, and especially Naval aviation, is
clearly to prepare now.
The Navy operates ten active carrier air wings and three
active Marine Corps airwings. The fiscal year 1999 Aircraft
Procurement, Navy budget requests $7.5 billion for 71 aircraft
and other aviation modernization and upgrade programs. The 71
aircraft procured include 30 F/A-18E/Fs, 7 V-22s, 3 E-2Cs, 15 T-
45s, 4 CH-60s and 12 AV-8B remanufactured aircraft.
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
In the year 2002, a U.S. aircraft carrier will deploy with
a strike/fighter aircraft that is five times more survivable
than the aircraft currently deployed. I am referring to the
deployment of the single seat F/A-18E and dual seat F/A-18F
aircraft, a deployment, which with your continued support, is
and will remain on the same schedule it has had since 1992.
Several very detailed studies have shown that an air wing
composed of today's aircraft operating in a high threat area
will take nine days to deliver 3,000 weapons while the air wing
of F/A-18E/F aircraft will deliver the same support in less than
four days. The savings in lost aircraft, lost air crew, and
expeditiously supported ground forces dwarf the 10 percent
premium in aircraft production cost.
The fiscal year 1999 budget requests $2.9 billion for the
procurement of 30 F/A-18E/F Low Rate Initial Production aircraft
and $216 million for continued research, development, test, and
evaluation. The evaluation to be conducted by the Navy's
independent operational test and evaluation force will begin in
1999. The development test phase is a little over 66 percent
complete, and has become the most successful aircraft
developmental testing period in the history of naval aviation.
It is a more thorough evaluation than ever conducted on previous
aircraft. At its conclusion the Super Hornet will have been
cleared for employment of 27 different weapons configuration.
In comparison, the original Hornet had been cleared for only two
weapons at the completion of full scale developmental testing.
During initial carrier qualifications conducted last year
on board the USS JOHN STENNIS (CVN 74), the Super Hornet proved
to be a flawless performer. However, the flight test program
has detected an anomaly at certain locations in the flight
envelope, where one wing briefly experiences more or less lift
than the other, and the pilot must counter what you might
consider a slight swerve if it occurred to you while driving
your car. Aeronautical engineers refer to this anomaly as wing
drop. It was discovered as early as the 1950s in the F-86
aircraft, and is quite common in high performance swept-wing
aircraft.
The Navy and McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Boeing Company, have worked hard to solve this
problem and identify solutions to wing drop. We have approached
this problem in a very deliberate and scientific manner, and
several minor wing modifications that solves wing drop while
eliminating or minimizing any other performance impacts.
As a result of these investigations, installation of
porous wing fold fairings has been determined to be the most
promising solution. These fairings cover the wing fold
mechanism and open when the wing is folded. The porous fairing
has many small holes that influence the airflow over the wing,
eliminating wing drop throughout the maneuvering envelope. This
modification has been tested in both the fighter escort and
interdiction load configurations and has been found to correct
wing drop with little anticipated impact on other performance
measures. In a configuration commonly used in deployment
training, the aircraft experienced significant buffet during
maneuvering flight. This buffet is not a safety of flight
issue. Refinements in the design of the porous fairing are
giving improved results for wing drop and maneuvering buffet,
and these are being flown with a representative set of load
configurations to confirm our favorable expectations. The
porous fairing modification could easily be adapted to aircraft
already in the production process.
Solving wing drop and buffet relies heavily on flying the
test aircraft to validate and verify the identified solutions.
In recent months, flight test activities have been delayed due
to weather. The highly instrumented test aircraft can not fly
in any form of precipitation, and the Patuxent River test area
has received a significant amount of rain over the past several
months. However, the process to characterize and dispose of the
buffet issue is well under way. Limited test flights have
yielded data that shows closure on the causal factor for the
buffet. The remaining path to the low rate initial production
decision II approval will be event driven. Weather and the
results of flight test will determine when the decision can be
made.
A Blue Ribbon panel of independent subject matter experts
from NASA, the Air Force, and academia has followed the
Navy/Boeing effort closely and approves the current approach.
Wing drop is not the only item discovered in the test program;
but neither it, nor any of the others, present a serious risk to
the success of the program. An Operational Test IIA period was
conducted on the F/A-18E/F aircraft in November 1997. Based on
the Operational Test IIA Report, dated March 17, 1998, the F/A-
18E/F aircraft received the highest possible rating of
“potentially operationally effective, potentially operationally
suitable”. The F/A-18E/F engineering and manufacturing
development phase is 94 percent complete, on schedule, on cost,
and meeting or exceeding specified performance.
Joint Strike Fighter
The Department of the Navy is fully committed to the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. Joint development of the JSF is
imperative for modernization of Navy and Marine Corps forces
with an affordable weapon system that meets the needs of the
warfighters.
The centerpiece of the JSF Program is affordability --
this demands a new way of doing business, and JSF is
accomplishing that. The program has used from its inception
principles such as Cost As an Independent Variable to balance
weapon system capability against its life cycle cost. The JSF
is effectively achieving such a balance through the use of Cost
and Operational Performance Trades; investing in key
technologies; emphasizing design, manufacturing and support
initiatives; and leveraging the benefits of commonality to
reduce the total ownership cost to the warfighters.
To an unprecedented degree, through early interaction of
warfighters and technologists, the JSF Program is using Cost and
Operational Performance Trades as an integral part of the weapon
system development process. Each iteration of the requirements
is provided to industry who evolve their designs and provide
cost data back to the warfighters as they proceed to evaluate
trades and make decisions on the next iteration of requirements.
The Services have included cost goals in their requirements.
The Cost and Operational Performance Trades process is ongoing
and supports completion of the final Joint Operational
Requirements Document in fiscal year 2000.
JSF cost goals will not be achieved by trading performance
alone. The JSF message to contractors is that they must use
innovative manufacturing methods, take full advantage of
commonality among aircraft variants and establish revolutionary
business practices to reduce cost. The JSF family of variants
will be highly common and built on the same production line
using flexible manufacturing technology.
In the current phase, the program is also maturing key
technologies to lower weapon system cost and reduce development
risk in Engineering and Manufacturing Development. Demonstrator
aircraft will fly in 2000 and show us the basic aircraft
performance, further reducing risk as we proceed to the next
phase of development. Milestone II and Engineering and
Manufacturing Development start are planned in fiscal year 2001.
Initial procurement of JSFs for the Air Force is planned in
fiscal year 2005, followed by the Marine Corps in fiscal year
2006 and the Navy in fiscal year 2008.
The program is proceeding on cost and on schedule at this
time. Funding stability is essential for the remainder of the
program. In fiscal year 1998, three technology efforts were
canceled to pay for general reductions taken across RDT&E
programs. If there are further funding reductions in fiscal
year 1999 and fiscal year 2000, it is likely to result in a
program slip since contracts are being executed, aircraft are
being built and technology efforts are more than 50 percent
complete with little reserve to accommodate program reductions.
The Navy has assessed the possibility of accelerating the
naval carrier variant of the JSF program and concluded that the
single benefit of early fielding of the carrier variant is the
acceleration of “competition” between the carrier variant and
the F/A-18E/F. However, there are several drawbacks that make
the acceleration of the carrier variant unfavorable. Drawbacks
include, the requirement for $4.9 billion more than the planned
(Quadrennial Defense Review approved) production profile in
fiscal years 2005-2009, in a fiscally constrained environment.
This $4.9 billion does not include other appropriations such as
military construction and operational costs required to support
earlier introduction of the JSF carrier into the fleet. In
addition, the F/A-18E/F has the capability to meet the Navy’s
requirement until the Quadrennial Defense Review approved
acquisition of the carrier variant in fiscal year 2008. The
current production of the carrier aircraft deliberately trails
the Air Force and Marine Corps variant to reduce the risk of a
single engine Naval variant. To enable the smooth transition of
the Navy to a single-engine JSF, the current risk-reduction plan
allows for additional flight test and operational hours on the
engine.
MV-22 Osprey
The MV-22 Osprey is the highest priority for Marine Corps
aviation and critical to the implementation of our Operational
Maneuver from the Sea concept. The V-22 Osprey is designed to
replace the Marine Corps CH-46E and CH-53D, as well as the Air
Force Special Operations Command TH-53A, MH-53J, MH-47D, MH-60G,
MC-130E, HC-130 and HC-130E. The fiscal year 1999 budget
request includes $665 million for procurement of 7 MV-22
aircraft and $355 million for continued Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation.
The acquisition of this medium lift tiltrotor,
vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft represents a
revolutionary leap in our ability to project forces from over
the horizon towards inland objectives. The MV-22 will fly
significantly farther and faster with a greater payload than our
aging fleet of medium lift CH-46 helicopters. Its ability to
carry 24 combat-loaded Marines at a cruising speed of 240 knots
is key to the execution of maneuver warfare. This combat
multiplier nearly triples the present day battlespace and will
give commanders the tactical flexibility to respond, to adapt
to, and defeat a wide range of threats. The MV-22 will give us
the ability to maintain battlefield dominance well into the 21st
century. Initial operating capability for the MV-22 is the year
2001.
F-14 Tomcat
It is important to mention the initiative we have
undertaken on the F-14 Tomcat program. The F-14 aircraft will
bridge the Navy’s 50 strike fighter gap while awaiting the F/A-
18E/F. The F-14 Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) is
scheduled to be installed in fleet aircraft in June of this
year. The DFCS provides the warfighters with departure
resistance, auto anti-spin controls, carrier line up
improvements and increased reliability. We have received
excellent results from the flight test, currently underway. The
F-14 program has successfully created an Integrated Modification
Plan which minimizes cost and aircraft time away from the fleet.
Close
In summary, Mr. Chairman, the Navy and Marine Corps team
is working hard everyday to make acquisition success a routine
occurrence. Our guiding principles are to communicate fully and
openly with the Congress, industry, our warfighters, and our
acquisition professionals, to do everything it takes to make
sure our Sailors and Marines are provided with the best
equipment for the lowest investment possible. The Department of
the Navy’s tactical aviation programs combine operational
requirements and acquisition successes to ensure we receive the
best aircraft at the most affordable cost. We appreciate the
support provided by the Congress and look forward to working
together with this Committee toward a secure future for our
nation.
1998 Congressional Hearings